Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado by Powell, Lewis F., Jr.
Washington and Lee University School of Law
Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons
Supreme Court Case Files Powell Papers
10-1972
Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado
Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Constitutional Law Commons
This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Powell Papers at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, CO. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 5. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives,




Court .... ~.~ _ 10 Voted on 
Argued ... · · · · · · · · 
• 0 0 • . . . . . 
Submitted · · · · · · · · · ·, 19 . .. 
. .... . . . . . . . . . . . , 19 ... 
Assigned ..... · · · · · · · · · · · · ·' 19 . .. 
Announce~· ......... ······., 19 · · · No 7 
.. .............. ,19 ... (~) 
WILFRED KEYES 'ETAL 
vs. 
. ' Petitioners 
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO • 1, DENVER ' COLORADO, ET AL. 
10/8/71 c ert. filed. 
1~ tcr/ .~t- '~_,__J- -7/1 tf 
fJ-w-4~ '~ w~ ·bf~ 
----- 7 _.£ {..<- -t. ~ "' ~ ' "\ ~)_ ),__. ,_( -L~  .-h'---
0, -D1<-- I '-':f J" v tr'V~ "' v -<! \- ~ 
OVL- · 0 d 
FOR CERT. JURISDICTIONAL I 
;~;:::~~~~~~~~~~~=r~1ST§A~T~EfM~EfN~T~~~M~EiR~~~~~~~~~~:::== . . . . .. . . . I G D N POST DIS ITS MOTION AB- I NOT I -." • · • AFF RE Rehnquist, J .... ·. ·. · · · · · · · · · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v """ a ri;- SENT ~;:.; Powell J · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ' . . . . . . . . . . .I .......... . 
Blackmun J . · · · · · · · · · · 
' 0 •••• 
0 ••••• 
Marshall, J. · · · · · · · 
•••• 0 
White J . · · · · · · · · · · · · 
Stew~t . ~ ....... · · · · · · · ·I· · · · · 
' .......... . 
Brennan J · · · · · · · · · 
' ....... . . . . . . 
Douglas, J. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... . 
Burger, Ch. J. . . · · · · · ·I · · · · · · · · 
-~~~~~·~··~·~·~~~~· ...... • • • • 0 
- HOLD l I 
•••••• 0 0 •• 0 • ~ ••• 
..... 
....... I .1. I ............. . . . . . .... ...... ••••• I •.•. 
. • 'I' .. ·I· ...... ·I· . • • • • • • -1 ........ .:...:...:. 
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CASE J,.l sT. 
This petition and the accompanying petition in No. 71-572 
are concerned with the federal court's rulings with reference to 
school desegregation in Denver, Colorado. In order to appreciate 
--...... " c::::-
A .. the c~ms ra~sed I will trace briefly the history of this case. 
~~· (~;: ~ Petrs are the parents of Negro and Mexican-American school 




Bd of Educ, and the School District. Petrs filed this suit in the 
USDC D Colo seeki~eclaratory ~d injunctive ~lief) Their case 
was comprised of 2 distinct causes of action and they have been treated 
separately throughout. The first cause of action dealt with condi-
~ tions in the Negro-Spanish schools in northeast Denver, known as the 
"Park Hill" region. In this area the DC found, after an extended 
trial, a pattern of de 1ure segregation arising from two general 
• 
• 
causes. First, while segregation in Denver has never been a matter 
of state or locally enforced written law, the DC found that the 
~merous activities of the school authorities had perpetuated and -----exascerbated the degree of racial separation in northeast Denver. 
Among the acts constituting de jure segregation were the following• 
(1) minority race teachers were assigned to minority race schools 
instead of being distributed throughout the school system; (2) new 
school construction was planned, both in terms of location of the 
+J.c,... 
school and its enrollment size, to perpetuateAracial character of 
the school (designed to serve only an identifiable Negro neighbor-
(3) 
hood rather than designed to straddle racial lines);/attendance lines 
were changed from time to time in a manner that cut along racial 
lines rather than drawing in students from adjacent non-Negro 
areasr (4) use of portable classrooms to accommodate an expanding 
Negro population within already heavily Negro schools rather than 
Nc.,H~t..S 
sending •••• to white schools (22 of 23 available portable class-
rooms were utilized in schools with enrollment over 70% Negro or 
Mexican-American)~~e second c~use of de jure segregation in the 
Park Hill area was the school board's rescission of Resolutions 
promulgated by the previous Board calling for positive action to 
integrate the schools. It appears that a major issue in the school 
-el«.f• .. ., ••c..£, 
boara1campaign was whether ~candidate would approve or reject 
the already-approved resolutions. The board members-elect did 
• .,.J .. 
vote to wipe out the integration plans ~ place in their stead 
alternative plans which the DC and the CA found would be ineffective 
in dismantling the segregated schools. 
The CA found all of the DC's first set of factual findings to 
• be supported by the evidence and agreed that, taken together, they 
amounted to de jure segregation. The CA found it unnecessary to 
state whether it agreed with the second conclusion but indicated that 
• 
the rescinded resolutions were more realistically designed to 
dismantle segregated schools than the substitute plan. In sum, 
the CA aff'd the DC's conclusion that de jure segregation had 
1~und in the.Park Hill region. ~~e second cause of action presented by Petrs focuses on 
·~ the schools in the remainder of Denver, excluding Park Hill. The 
~ DC examined all Petr's claims concerning the nature of segregation 
~ ~d concluded that any separation which existed was not de jure--
~/.0. , it was not the product of state impoSition as had been the' 
/ ~~ase in the first cause of action. (Petr had claimed that the 
l'~ City's freedom of choice plan constituted de jure state action; 
~----------
that transfer policies favored white migration to white schools; 
attendance zones were gerrymandered to effect further separation; 
building and repairing patterns tended to exascerbate disaprities.) 
• Despite its finding that segregation was not the product of state 
action, the DC found that the students in 15 schools were receiving 
• 
1 
I 1 d :--1 • .. ~(.. Th f • d • f 1 d • an unequa e ucat~ona opportun~ty. at ~n ~ng o unequa e ucat~on 
......_.__. ..._.. ~ .. - .. ... ... .."" ... ...._ .. 
was peemised on the following• (1) consistently lower performance ~ 
on standard achievement tests; (2) teachers were less experienced 
in nonwhite schools; (3) the system of teacher transfers based on 
~uJ.t.,.S 
seniority allowed experiencedato flee the undesirable atmosphere 
of the nonwhite schools; (4) higher rate of dropout in nonwhite 
schools; (5) nonwhite schools were generally smaller and older; 
(6) the DC also was presented with, and may have relied on, 
testimony indicating the intangible indicia of unequal education--
feelings of inferiority; low academic expectancy among teachers 
Sfll~t .... + 
leading to lowJachievement; low student morale • 
Having found (1) that the school system was providing to some 
of its students an inferior educational opportunity, and (2) that 




that the inequality was not tolerable under the 14th Amendment • 
On this score the CA reversed the DC. The CA agreed with the 
factual findings that some students were receiving an inferior 
education but concluded that the federal cts are powerless to act ..--
in the absence of a finding of constitutional deprivation. 
The Petition challenges only the CA's resolution 
of this second cause of action. Petrs claim (1) that the DC and CA 
erred in concluding that the segregation found to exist in the 
City were not the product of de iure efforts to racially separate the 
children, and (2) even if segregation was not the product of state 
action, the CA erred in ruling that a federal ct is powerless 
to correct the effects of unequal educational opportunities. 
I find that the only possibly certworthy issue is this latter 
one. I do not think there is much to be gained at this time by 
granting a case of this type merely to define what the word "de jure" 
means. The lower courts have uniformly agreed that practices, 
such as altering attendance ,zones, building new schools,repaiting 
~ I 
old schools~appointing teachers, may constitute de iure segregation 
under circumstances that indicate the school officials performed 
such acts with the design and effect of perpetuating segregation. 
The question in most federal coutts has dissolved into one of fact. --------------....___ -...____ _____________ ____ 
~ 
The other question--whether a federal court has the power to 
I I '\ \ 
compel affirmative action to eradicate unequal schools--is a more 
difficult one. The state of the law in this Court as I understand it 
runs something like this. If racial segregation in a school is the 
product of state action, i.e., is dejure, the school boards and the 
courts must take affirmative action to dismantle that dual system • 
If racial segregation in a- city's schools is the product of normal 
residential community lines or other factors not related to some 
affirmative state action, ~ it is de facto, the state has no duty 
• 
• 
to take positive steps to integrate those schools • But, the state I~ -
may not maintain segregated schools, no matter how they bepame k~ 
segregated, unless the education offered is equal. To this 
extent I believe Plessy v. Ferguson is still good law. If the 
school children are to remain separate, they must at the least be 
treated equally. I do not believe that a city can offer a higher 
quality education to members of one race than another merely because 
the city is not responsible for their separation in the first place. 
Despite my disagreement with the CA on this point, I am not 
prepared to recommend that cert be granted. It is my understanding 
that several cases are presently being prepared for filing in this 
Court involving the question of equalization of per-pupil expenditures 
on a statewide basis (the California case was the first and there 
have been a number since then). Indeed, as of 12/24/71 there 
• appears to be a direct conflict in the lower federal courts with 
a federal court in Texas holding that local property taxes may not 
• 
be the source of school financing because of the per-pupil inequities 
while another federal court in Iowa (I believe) has held to the 
contrary. Those cases when they arrive here most certainly should .... be gr .. ted and at that time the Court will have to consider this 
question of whether a federal court may take any affirmative 
action to wipe out the inequalities in the educational system in the 
absence of state imposed prior segregation. Therefore, unless three 
of the other Justices are strongly disposed to grant on the "equality 
fo education" issue, I recommend that you deny "on discretion" and 
• await cert petitions in the property tax cases. 
DENY (?) LAH 
Denver School Cases No. 71-507 
This case arises froma a very complex facutal and legal 
background in the courts below. I thought it would be helpful 
to refresh you in a brief way .- as to the findings• and 
~x~~ee«xgR proceedings in the lower federal courts. 
There are two sets of schools that are being discussed 
here. The first are those in Northeast Denver and the second are 
the so"called Core City Schools. There x was a different set of 
findings xixkxxegxx«xx~xex and legal conclusions with regard to 
each. 
I-- The s Northeast Denver Schools 
The x USDC found that these schools wer~egregated by 
affirmative state action. 
The CAlO xsxxxtx sustained the trial court with regard to -- ~ 
the Northea~t Denver schools. It found that the trial court was 
s-,,:r~ae• in ~is finding of a history of state imposed segregation 
with regard to the Northeast Denver or Park Hill area schools. 
~~ II-"The Core City Schools J.l:'r/ (~)The ltxil trial court found that th~tions compl~ed of 
~ ~ in the core city schools ~e not racially inspired and accor-
~9~~dingly the allegations x of de jure segregation xa were not 
'"'~ I_.J • 
~ accepted. 
~ -The CAlO sustained the trial court's xx& finding that the 
segregation existing in the core city schools was not racially 
xx inspired or racially motivated • 
...._ ... 
(b) The trial court found also that although the core city 
schools aiaxR~Xxkax~xxa~iaiix ~RX~xxe& were not segregated by 
racially motivated state action, nonetheless fifteen designated 
~ xk schools, those with an 8 excess of 75% minority population, 
should be gra9Ped relief because it was demonstrated that they He 
"' were offering their pupils an1 ~nequal education in violation of 
the equal protectio~ause. 
The CAlO resersed the xk trial court on this issue. It held ______ ...... _ 
that where no xxxxexxm~sxesxxegxegxxxsxxxxxxxsaRH history of 
state imposed segregation was found and where HB there existed 
no history of segregatory intent, then there was no constitutional 
deprivation involved and no basis for a court to gx gxxxx grant 
xxesxxxx any remedy. The courts were powerless under the constitu-
tion to grant any remedy, the CAlO said, even though inequality xx 
and inferior educational opportunities might exist in fact. 
Finally, xke both courts said that Denver's neighborhood 
l school policy was not unconstitutional under the 14th Amendment be-cause it permits sex segregation in fact. 
• 
---3---
As we discussed this case in some detail on Thursday, I will give 
you a s~ somewhat more abbreviated memo, summarizing what I feel 
to be the most salient points of the case. I think that ~~~t 
&8383 though the case presents -~~ what superficially appear to 
~
be many diverting and peripheral issues, ~~ that the main one, 
and the one which this case inevitably will call upon you to aai 
~ ~ decide,is ahthaz whether to extend the •• affirmative duty to 
~ --~ eliminate 3~ school segregatmon to those areas where there is no 
~ history of overt BKhaatxmasa~za~atia~x state imposed school -.seg-
~ ~ ~r~n. I think the Denver case is ia likely to present the ques-
~~ tion is in its most typical form. Here in Denver there is the 
II'-' ----
'~~ ~~ w~~1t.cearl northern city pattern of residential segregation, with a 
~: - ~ of conflicting evidence which absolves the school authorities 




those 3~ same authorities of maintaining the segregated status quo • 
I am convinced that there is a legally respectable way to 
take ax~ virtually any position you want as to the constitution-
ality of de facto L se?regation. There is unfortunately no legally 
, t)l I:~~ • :s;,c.."Yc /') 
respectable way, J; ·~ Dill. 0 take your most ~aatx heartfelt r 
views on the remedial validity of cross-town busing. • 
I will try ta first to outline the ia~aixa~ai~sis path of 
legal analysis that I think this case caiiis calls for on the 
question of the ca~•t~ ca~stit~t~iaaaiit~ constitutionality of de 
fat facto segregation. 
I--IF YOU WISH II TO UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DE FACTO IIKMIK 
S~tt:.&£rr 
SEGREGATION _____ p • THIS ANALYSIS. 
(M~X~~~x~~~~i~~~XM 
(a) All previous decisions of this Ea Court have dealt~ only 
history 
w.~ JfAfLS with the ~zaaia~ of state imposed segregation. The Court in Brown ... .,.... 
I noted that the *•tz petrs had all been denied "admission a to 
sE~JDais 
---4---
schools attended by white children under laws ••z~itti~~ requ1r1ng 
~ or permitting segregation according to race.~n Greene the Court 
spoke of an affirmative duty which existed until "it is clear that 
state-imposed segregation has been completely removed."(p.439). In 
Swann, the Court • explicitly noted that the case dealt only with "States 
~ having a long history of maintaining two sets of schools in a single BE~ 
BE~x school satti~~ BM system deliberately operated to carry out a goverm-
mental policy to separate pupils in schools solely on the ~ basis of race." 
(p.6). And in the i~ Emporia case last a term the question was once again 
framed in terms of school districts that had not yet completed the "process 
of dismantling a system of •~iBZB~ enforced racial segregation."~~¥ 
Thus the Court has ~BB gone out of its way to stress that its ~BEis 
decisions have applied to only those states with a history of state imposed 
• segregation and taxi~~i¥ thus to imply that only a ~· history of state-
~ 
~ 
imposed segregation amounted to "state action denying equal protection 
of the laws."Ram~iaxi~ Many of the ~~ northern circuit courts which have 
considered the question of northern urban de facto segregation have taken 
the Court at its word that the duty to dismantle segregated schools applied 
only where a history of state~ imposed segregation was i~B involved. ~ 
See e.g. ii~ Deal v. Cincinnatti Board of i~~Education, 369 F.2d 55(CA6) 
and Taylor v. Bd. of Education of New Rochelle, 294 F.2d39(CA2). This is 
obviously the theory under which the CA10 acted in this case when with 
regard to the core city Denver schools, it remarked1"We ~-~~never considered 
Brown to prohibit racially i~Bix imbalanced schools provided they are • 
established and maintained on ZBEii racially neutral cr~teria •••• " 
Once this is established you could go on to contrast the situation 
of Denver with those of the States where the Court has imposed ax~ an aiiiz~ 
affirmative duty to dismantle dual schools. You Could first start by proving 
that the real culprit of racial segregation in Denver was not the actions of 
(~~~ ... ~--... 





formed in Denver primarily in the years following World War II and fa 
formed independently of any state policies or actions. The ~~~ zaasa 
reasons for housing segregation were primarily economic and the zaw 
------~-.. "'--~----- ·····-·· -·---····~--"'· ""~·"''""~• .. «•"" __ .......... ,. . .• " - '"" ...... ,.. .••.•..• -"" 
result of private prejudices w~i~ which axisti existed BHtisaax outside 
__ _,_ __ ___..---,'d; ..... ..._.,.~"\-' 
the official arm of the state. i~xfaEt~x9&~¥BZ Not only were these 
residential patterns not a matter of state enforcement, but 9B~»azxm~aza 
even while they were • for{!jng, Denver operated under the provision 
in the Colo. constitution ~zm~i8i, AztiEii Article IX sectioni 8, 
which ~zm~i¥i prohibited racial discrimination in the public schools. 
In 1959 the Colo. legislature even passed a fair housing law. Not only 
was Denver operating under a ~mii state legal policy of ~•~MBiBEZi~i~ati 
non-discrimination, in contrast to southern states, but there is some 
ta~~i8ai tangible evidence that the school board in Denver BEta actually 
took a number of poaitive steps to alleviate racial imbalance such as 
transfering Negro attendance zones to predominantly Anglo Geo. Wash-
ington High school, adopting majority to minority transfer program such 
as VOE, and pouring additional funds and new experimental compensatory 
problems into minority schools. 
Thus the Denver schools situation can be sia said to differ from 
districts with a history of state imposes saf segregation in that 
zas'' residential ~atta~ patterns \~ere the prime EB~tfli¥M contributors 
mf to racial imbal4nce, that the school board ope~ated under a non--
discriminatory policy in the Colo. statutes and constitution, and that e 
the school board actually took some steps of a positive ~aHt nature to 
('" 
redress racial imbalance. 
Then you can go on to say, if you wish to H~B~ uphold this kind 
of de facto segregation, ~; •z~M II)ilt4 tht that you reaffirm both the 
• CA10 and the USDC's findings tMt that no public segregatory purpose or 
actions are the prime contributors to the segregated situation in Denver, 
\
and that as ~HE~xasx~BH detrimental as segregated~ schools may be, the 
constit~tion_does not afforD a bssis for ~remedy where no state h ~ction 
equal ~xma protection has been found by either of the courts aat 
in their consideration of the B¥iaa~ lengthy evidentiary record. 
Finally you may wish to add a short ata statement to the effect t~ 
the state does have at least a zt rational interest and perhaps a 
-------..-----------------~~"""-·,~~,_ ______ _ 
compelling £_ne in pursuing the values inherent in a neighborhood school 
----~ ~--~ -- ~ ,.--- --....... ~"''l'li""·""'-~'•N,~)"l\"",..,._,...,:-,...,•~'ll"~r...,,.,.oo;:rl""'i'~"''~Vo'("'<~'-"''-•~'l"'"'-""<•'~''•"·•...,M~.,.,""""'""'_W"'.._...., .. ~-~-... .....,.,.....,--. 
policy which is neutrally ~•i~t~i maintained. ~mHXB~¥XBiamx&B¥Xt~atxit I 
~· personally believe that a neighborhood school ~miiE~ policy Bi does 
qualify as a legitimate state interest under the ••H equal protection 
EiB~ clause as long as it is non-prjudicially maintained. 
You may also, if you write an opinion refusing to extend Qzaa~ 
Green,Swann and company to northern school districts wish to say that 
where no state policy is involved in the maintenance of sai segregated 
schools,t~aza that it cannot be stated with certainty that those schools 
~ are providing an unequal education. One major indiciai of inequality 
might t be the stigma asamEai associated with a polic~ of state imposed 
~ 
segregation, but where this is absent, the evidence as to inequality is 
E»~ii i conflicting. Even Dr. Coleman has published a study ~· qualifying 
fhis earlier remarks and it may not be fair to say that achievement scores 
~are a proper index of a school's• educational quality since the sshai ssh 
school ~y have mt to overcome enormous deficiencies in a student's home 
BBEk~m background even to get t~i him to the 10th percetile on his Sta~im 
Stanford achievement test score. 
These are, I aaiai believe the major analytical outlines you might 
wish to pursue should you decide not to extend Swann, with its remedy of 
cross-town busing,to northern,residentially segregated school districts. 
There are two little hookers in writing an opinion along these lines. One 
is •~z whether you would wish to affirm the fi~~i ~ findings of the USDC 
and ~ t~axaffi~ their affirmance by the CA10 that there was segregatory 
intent on the part of theDenver School ~oard with respect to the Park Hit 
---7---
area schools. In reviewing~ this evidence, you are bound of course 
~ by Fed. R. of Pro. 52 which binds appellate~ courts to the evidentiary 
findings of the USDC unless those fi~~i findings are Eiaz Eia clearly 
erroneous. I do not personally believe the supposed segregative acts 
of the ~ Denver school board with respect to the Park Hill area schools 
were ~ious or in fact so different from those with respect to the 
core city schools where the trial court found no history of segregative 
intent. The teacher policy was ~»zsias pursued with za~ respect to 
the neutral Eziti criteriai of seniority, and as to the construction 
of Barrett School, is it not ie~i»logical for the school board to 
constrcut a ~. small school to~ relieve overcrowded conditions in 
the middle of the Negro communitya it was EB~»i•~ conveniently ~·~•t 
meant to serve?. In fact, there were important reasons of traffic safety 
which persuaded the School Board to construct Barrett School the size 
~ that it did. However, i I ~~ must also admit that there can conceivabl' 
be segregative motives imputed to the actions of the School Board 
in its transfer of assignment xe~• zones and its construct~on of SE"Bmi 
schools, and its ZBE zasEisi rescission of the Resolutions. Thus, t"~ 
with this whole case being filled with ¥ a very contradictory and 
illlusive brand of evidence, there EB is azgua>Jy enough evidence 
to support the USDC's determination and survive appellate reversal 
under Rule 52. 
Believing as I do that you cannot reverse both the CA10 and 
the USDC in their evidentiary findings with re~ct t" to segre~tory 
enver 
schools, you must then confront ~atz; petr•s arguments t"z that 
~ 
such ~eti»BSXEaiixfez segregatory action Eais calls for s~stem wide 
relief throughout Denver and ~i not merely the limited relief i~~BB&m 
granted by the CA10 withxxas~&EtxtmxthaxRaxkxWiii covering only the 
Park Hill area schools. On pages 71-79 of their brief, petrs make the 
----8----
case for ~ system-wide relief. ihBXEBS They contend in ass~ essence 
~ that the segregatory actions of the school board affected not a mere 




the Negro population of the district, They complain that all at~ 
blacks within the SEhmt school s district were hurt and affected by 
the discriminatory actions of the SEhmt school board. They contend 
t~at further that no school axis~x as exists in a school district 
in isolation, but that a policy of keeping some shE schools black 
has the reiproca! effect of keeping other white. ~at~zatt The entire 
Denver school board was possessed of segregat,ry "hidden ••tk motive" 
~-~:.~~~~~!!:?~1~;;-~~ 
petrs assert, and the only reason segregatory motives were most ¥isia 
visible in the Park Hill area were because Park Hill schools za~zas•~ 
represented a pressure point where Negro migration was •aki~~ threaten-
ing formerly all white areas. 
This could prove to be the stickiest point in the case. Bill Kelly 
feels that B¥i~~·~EB evidence of segregatory intent on the part of the 
school district with regard to the Park Hill schools necessarily 
Em~¥iEt~ convicts the board of segregatory intent m~xtha in its ~·~~iii 
h~ing of the affairs of the a~tia •~i entire school district. I sus-
pect some members of the Court could feel likewise. I think the most 
i•~mza important question in this regard is whether an effective z•~ 
remedy can be ~zat granted with regard to the Park Hill schools only. 
Presumably the Negro children in the Park Hill sEhmt schools could be 
part of an integratory busing program while the core city Negroes 
z~ remained in a segregatory setting. This looks a little ridiculous, 
however, to have the anomalous situation of the core city blacks, the 
~mmzaaz poorer blacks, still confined in their ~~· "ghetto" schools 
while the less impoverished Park Hill blacks are integrated si•~k simply 
, because the ~m~ztx USDC managed to find segregatory intent with regard 







idence relating to both areas is remarkably similar • 
SUMMATION1 The preceeding has been a discussion of the ~:rmBi~ 
analytical paths and problems in an opinion upholding the traditional &is 
distinction between de facto and de jure segregation. For the reasons 
stated aBBE above, a legally respectable face Ea~ can be put on an opinion 
affirming~he basic position of the CA10. But tRa:ra ~¥, to take your 
phrase, my "Confederate emotions" rebel at this m course, and there is 
an extraordinary anfount of hypocrisy involved, when today, Southern and 
Northern cities present bascially the same situation. You know as well as 
I do that the history of southern segregation before 1954 has as little to 
do with the present :ra racial imbalance in the schools of southern cities. 
Southern cities and northen cities are today both suffering racial 
imbalance in thi r schools from what is basically the ss~x same root cause. 
That root EBBH cause is economic disparities aJOB iJOxtR& between the tm~ 
two races and ~:ri»ata the private desires of whites to keep segregated 
neighborhoods. This is what has resulted in racial imbalance in the Eitias - .. 
1 
mfxB~BmtR city school systems of both north and south, and not any bogus 
t legal mumbo jumbo about histmzH histories of state-imposed segregat~n.­
As a matter of policy you must ask ¥BH:rsi yourself how long must an area BH 
bear t tBB the onus of its history, when as a pratical matter, all aistiJOEt 
distinctions between the South and the rest of tre country have s ceased 
to exist. 
***************************************************** 
II---IF YOU WISH TO I ELIMINATE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DE JURE AND DE K 
FACTO SEGREGATION AND TRANSPOSE THE SWANN REMEDIES TO ~~~X ~~~ NORTHERN 
SCHOOLS. 
There are several ~as ways to accomplish this analytically and 
legally, all of BRiER which are intellectually respectable. There are 
three analytic paths, as I see it, to this result. Two of the paths 






ultimately and inevitably point in the direction of eliminating y the 
de facto-de jure distinction. 
~')The f~way to insure the a ultimate elimination of the 
distinction would be to grant petr's plea for s~stem wide relief. 
This would afford an acceptance of petr's contentions that evidence 
of segregatory intent with regard to a s~mstat~i substantial ~Mll'"¥ 
portion of Denver's Negro population i~E~i~atasxt~axa~tiza taints ----- -.... -
the ma~ement ;f the entire school district. The analysis isxt~a 
A .............._ ,._. .-. ~ 
.._... -
would be that where segregatory purpose is proved with respect to 
one portion of the school district(i,e, the Park Hill schools), then 
actions elsewhere with s a sa~za~a•z•y segregatory effect must BB 
,tyti-' 
~zas~•aaxtaxma likewise must be presumed t ~ntaken with a segregatory 
purpose, The analysis would also rest on the assumption that within a 
school district, no action of the School Board can be viewed in isaiatia 
isolation, 
The reason this ~za~t analysis would lead to the elimination 
of the de facto-de jure distinction is that ~• very few school districts 
anywhere in the country will be found tom be entirely without segrega-
tory motives in all their actions. And if one sa~za~atazy finding 
of segregatory ••tia motive is allowed to taint the actions of the BE~BB 
school board across the entire district, t~a• then it is clear that 
will 
every district wiii ultimately be found culpable, 
~The s!:ond ~ay to arrive at the elimination of the de facto, 
de jure distinction is to upset the USDC's finding on the lac~ of 
discriminatory intent on the part of Denverls school board in it~ 
........ "'----...., ,...,t:sauuA .+#- -- ... 
actions with regard to the core city schools, The chief piece of B¥iaa~E 
.___..,...-- ...... ~ 
evidence •~i~E which could be used in this finding is the a construction 
of Manual High School and the boundary lines drawn therefor, The EB~stz~ 
construction of Manual differs very little from the construction of iazz 
----11---
Barrett where the USDC did find segregatory i~t~ ~ intent on the part 
~ of the school board. Both schools were constructed a squarely in t~a 
middle of all black or black dominated areas, ana boundary lines 
were drawn for each which effectively •••~• assured segregatay atta~aa~E 
attendance. Furthermore, ~-~ many ~aiiEi policies •~ix which I believe 
the USDC pointed toward in finding discriminatory intent on the part 
of the school board with respect to Park Hill existed district wide, 
such as the ~iaEB~~ placement of taaE~BZB i~•• inexperienced teachers 
int the mat black schools. This crourt could,if it wantedlsay it was 
inconsistent to find segregator~ intent ai on the part of the school 
board with regard to the Park Hill area schools • and not with regard 
to the core city schools when the lines of evidence were so pa~el. 
This reasoning would go far to eliminating the distinction 
between de jure and f de facto, iha I have a strong faa feeling that the 
~ actions of the Denver school board are fairly typical of the decisons 
~ 
of schools boards acrosss the country. In fact, I should t~atx think the 
Denver mza~axaf school board is comparatively innocent in segregatory 
motives. Denver has a rather small Ha~aza Negro ~·~t population as 
compared to most northern cities, and if the Court fi~as actually 
reverses the USDC and CA10 and finds segregarory intent on the school 
board with regard to the core city schools, then no school ma board 
action anywhere will withstand BEZ constitutional BEZH~ scrutiny. 
~~ The_!inal wa! of eliminating the de jure,de fats facto aisti~Et 
distinction is the most direct, and the way petrs would most like the 
Court to go. This ••~i way does a not hinge so closely as the previous 
two m~txE~tsxaxazaaaxs•atha on the particular facts of the Denver 
sitHata situation, but rather fashions a broad legal rule •i which will 
c~t a veritable tornado throug~ut northern school distric\s• This 
path is suggested by the a E~~ combination of petr's questions 3 and 





camouflaged, virtually asks ti this Court to say that seperate schools 
are unequal per se, and question 3 is worded thusly: "The court below 
erred in holding that the sole critierion ae of constitutionally 
actiona~le racial segregation was segregationist intent judged by the 
narrow test whether decisions of the school board EB»ie resulting in 
racial separation could conjecturally be explained by any conceivable 
non-racial explanation," 
As one reads eet~'s brief, it soon becomes clear exactly what ~atz 
petrs are asking, They ask the Ea»x Court to jettison a "purpose" test 
~
altogether and to hold that state actions and classifications which have 
a segregatory effect with regard to public schools require a compelling 
state interfet to justify them, This would almost be tantamount to ruling 
neighborhood schools »~s »~Ea~stit»tiaa~ unconstitutional per se, 
because the effect of every BE~aii school board &Eta action can somehow 
be interpreted as maintaining the segregated status quo, 
To eaxt~is reach this result would involve the carry-over of ta 
.. 
two fundamental concepts the Warren Court used with regard to southern BE 
schools, The first is the Ei celebrated statement in Brown I that 
"separate schools are inherently unequal," Once this is accepted, them 
~ it becomes siao clear that any state action having the effect of separa-
''y tion, i ,e. of inequality, becomes a denial of equal protection, The 
~effect test is thus easily ~ustii justified because it has so long been 
iff ... t· the test used with regard to southern schools. Last termi, in the 
~· Emporia case, the majority za~ae rejected the CA4's reliance on a purpose 
.. 
test as too elusive, and sxi said the aii test of unconstitutional 
action had always been, not its purpose, but its effect in aiding af 
• or hindering the eis~a~i dismantlement of dual school systems everywhere, 
And the Court in Swann stated that "As we said in Greene, a schools 
authorities remedial plan or a districts court's remedial decree is to 





It would tMi thus be very easy to carry faa forward the southern 
school district analys~s into the north by saying simply tht that 
sep~£ate, segregated facilities are unequal, north or BBHXM south, 
and that any state action which has the effect of EB~ti~H~i continuing 
such inequality is a denial of equal protection, H~is unless justified 
by a EBM~i compeiling state i~taza interest. 
I do not need to stress to you how great an impact such an 
analysis could have. But that essentially is what petrs would have us 
adopt. 
***************************************************** 
My intent in this memo is to provide you ~ziMat primarily with a 
legal anlysis which could enable you to most effectively If support •hata 
whatever policy result you might wish to choose. As I said before, this 
is one of those peculiar cases, where the evolution of constitutional 
law in the Court's past decisions makes •~¥ any of a ~HMV number of 
courses you wish to take legally respectable. From a policy standpoint, 
this is a very unattractive case because we are facedwith thee ~mssimiiit 
possibility of extending an odious za~ remedy BEZBB across the EBH~zt 
country and victimizing thousands of innocent families and schoolchildren 
or leaving our own section of the country to suffer in isolation under an 
inequitable and hypocrtical EB~stitHtima~ constitutional doctrine. 
P.s. I reread Swann the other evening, a~ the language is even stza~ 
stiffer than I had remembered. iaz Burger got very little for his vote. 
There is language like thisa "Desegregation plans cannot bei limited to 
the walk-in school."(p.30) ••••• "The importance of bus transportation as 
a normal and accepted tool of educational ~i policy is readily discernable 
in this and the companion case ••• "(p.29). And a great deal of language ama 
r ~/1/--
,aamt about the far-ranging powers of equity. There is ms• some language 
•hiEhXKBJQ 
~ which may one day justify a rule of reason,but I doubt that this& 
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Mr. J. Harvie Wilkinson, III 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
DATE: July 31, 1972 
Keyes v. Denver School District 
The school cases from Brown through Charlotte/Mecklenburg 
and Emporia hwve all articulated or assumed a distinction between 
de facto and de jure segregation. 
By this technique, the federal courts have undertaken 
a rather massive program of - not merely desegregating but 
affirmatively of integrating schools throughout the South. At 
the same time, with isolated exceptions, the courts have done 
little or nothing·about segr.gated schools in the rest of the 
country. In many of the great cities, outside of the South, 
segregated schools have been a way of life as surely as they 
were in the South. 
I have never been convinced that the de factrde jure 
distinction was sound as a matter of constitutional law. I 
have been completely convinced that it is unsound as a matter 
of social policy. MOreover, and putting constitutional principles 
aside for the moment, it seems immoral to hold this generation 
2. 
in the South responsible for the "sins" of their fathers with 
respect to segregated schools because there was "state action", 
and to impose no comparable responsibility on the same generation 
in other sections of the country even though the schools are 
just as segregated. Or, putting it differently, if segregated S"c.4u/$ 
are so bad that the courts can impose an affirmative duty to 
integrate them in one section of the country on the flimsy ground 
of correcting a lawless past state action, what justification 
is there for saying that this evil need not be corrected in 
other sections of the country? 
The evil is segregation. If segregation if a denial 
of equal protection, black children in the nothern schools have 
been denied it to the same extent as those in the southern 
schools. I realize, of course, that there must be "state action" 
before the Constitution can be invoked. Yet, in an interesting 
opinion by Judge Walter Hoffman of the Eastern District of 
Virginia, he documents the fact that all but a small handfull 
of our states have - at one time in the past - had racially 
restrictive laws that could have contributed to segregation. 
Almost certainly this is true of zoning and housing laws and 
regulations, often relied upon by federal courts in the South. 
* * * * * 
,, '' .... 
3. 
The views expressed above, obviously, are not 
definitive in any sense. They are, rather, the making of a 
sketchy argument as the background for asking you to focus on 
the question: Can we make a principled argument to support 
the view that there is in most circumstances no valid 
constitutional distinction between de facto and de jure 
segregation, as these terms have been used? 
* * * * * 
I am not at all sure that this issue will be before 
the Court in the Denver School Case. But it may be. In any 
event, it will certainly be before the Court in the Detroit 
case, now on its way - I believe - to the Court. 
In·your intensive study of the Denver school case,, 
and the doing of a full bench memo on it, I would appreciate 
your keeping this question in mind. 
Although I have little hope that I could persuade 
a majority of the Court to go with me, I will certainly write 
separately in support of repudiating the de jure/de facto 
distinction if a sound and principled argument can be made 
for my tentative view. 
I have done no research in this specific area. I do 
call your attention to Judge Skelly Wright's article 6ntitled 
"Prof. Bicket, The Scholarly Tradition and the Supreme Court", 
84 Harv. L. Rev. 769, at pp. 798 !! ~· Judge Wright does 
4. 
not address this question, but he describes some of Prof. Bickel's 
views which are tangentially relevant. I recommend that you 
read Prof. Bickel's book, and particularly the portions thereof 
referred to by Judge Wright. 
Also, please obtain from Hunton, Williams a copy of 
my brief in the Charlotte/Mecklenburg case. You may find a 
part of this slightly helpful. 
* * * * * 
I reaffirm that I have no fixed views and will keep 





Mr. J. Harvie Willdnsoo, m DATE: Sept. 28, 1972 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 71-507 - Denver School Case 
I recommend that you do selective reading from Prof. Bickel's 
book "The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress". 
I do not have the book before me, but Bickel's discussion of 
the segregation cases of this Court takes place in his final essay -
the name of which is something like "Remembering the Future". He 
argues, usually in his uniquely oblique way, that there is no distinction 
between de jure and de facto segregation; that since the publlc schools 
are operated by the state, the continuation of segregation - which this 
Court has f01Dld to be unjust - constitutes state action which infringes 
rights. 
But Bickel points out that if the Court pursues the logic of its 
own decisions (and holds that the affirmative duty to eliminate segregation 
ls a national constitutional duty), the result wlll be to force public 
educatloo to be centralized at least in the states and possibly in the 
national government. The rationale for this ultimate view ts that ( 1) 
the 14th Amendment requires equal educational opportunity; (it) this 
cannot be afforded through segregated schools; (Ui) in view of white 
2. 
filgbt, and the historic movement of more amuent people to suburban 
areas, local school districts cannot assure integration ( •·I· Richmcmd 
consolidation case); (tv) therefore, only the state itself can enforce 
desegregation on a statewide basts. But what about situations like New 
York City where at least three states are Involved? 
And if the cOJUJtltuticmal requirement is "equal educational oppor-
tunity", what about the contrast between Mississippi and Connecticut 
(for example) in terms of expenditures per pupil on public education? 
Thus, this line of argument brings us to the San Antonio- Rodriguez 
ease. The philosophy underlying the three-judge court decision - if 
carried to its ultimate logical extreme - would require nationalizing of 
all public schools. 
Thus, while my lawyer's judgment (not to mention my Confederate 
emotion) ten .. me that the distinction between de jure and de facto 
segregation is a constitutional phony, we need to do a lot of clear thinking 
as to whether elimination of this distinction would not result (as Prof. 
Bickel suggests) tn a revolutimary change tn our federal system. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
lfp/ss 
ee: Mr. Larry A. Hammond 
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Mr. J. Harvie WUkinSon, m 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 71-507 Denver School Case 
DATE: October 7, 1972 
The press this morning (Bt*JJ by McKenzie) states that the 
Solicitor General has filed a brief amicus 1n this case. 
I am sure you will want to give it your attention promptly, as 
the press account indicates that it takes a "middle position". 
L. F.P., Jr. 




Mr. J. Harvie Wilkinson, m 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
DATE: October 7, 1972 
No. 71-507 Denver School Case 
You and I have discussed the artificiality of the view that 
segregated schools are the product of discriminatortal governmental 
action. They may be - and certainly have been in the past in certain 
areas. But my own c ooviction is that, certainly for the 17 years since 
Brown v. Board of Education and perhaps for the last quarter of a 
century - the segregation of schools in the larger cities has resulted 
primarily from social and economic causes, and has been influenced 
very little by any intention on the part of govemment at any level to 
impose and continue segregation. 
Washington, D. C. may be an example of this point. I suggest 
that you ask the Library of Congress {through our own library upstairs) 
to provide the following data oo the D. C. schools for the 20-year period 
1950-70 (the school year ending June 30, 1971): 
1. The racial mix, in terms of percentage of whtte and black 
students, at five year intervals - 1950-1955-1960-1965 and 1970. 
2. The average test scores for the District of Columbia schools 
at each of these five year intervals (you. can obtain from the Denver 
•·· .. ~· .. 
2. 
school briefs the preclae D&me of the standard IICholaatle achtevemeDt 
tests and be sure you have comparable grades). 1t may be that these 
test scores have not been publlshed for the past 20 years, aDd you w1ll 
have to take whatever years are avaUable. 
My guess ls that these figures wUl shOW that segregation 1n the 
D. C. schools has substantially increased smce Brown v. Board of 
Education_, over a 17 -year period when there certainly was no de jure 
action here in the Dtstrict. I suspect, also, that the test scores will 
have deteriorated. 
1f the statistics agree with my ''hunch", nothing very dramatic 
wUl have been proved. I will not attach any great weight to the results, 
but we may have a concrete illustration to support the thesis -if we ~ 
pursue it -that so-called de faCto segregation is far more virulent_... ":1-~~'1 -, 
than an~-1 de jure segregation. 
L. F. P., Jr. 






I did not wish to leave without leaving you my final thoughts 
on the Denver schools case. As you know I have written you a skazt 
ia~a longer previous memo on the legal analysis of the situation, 
mHtxa¥&iai spelling out the options but avoiding the expression of 
my own viewpoint. Since you asked me to give you my ••xas personal 
view, I will. It is not a pleasant case, and no solution a satisfies 
me. But here briefly are my convictions. 
**************************** 
I think the distinction between de jure and de facto should be 
ax¥BRiEiaxtaxaii~i~ataxit¥ tRisxisxmasaaxa~ The racial problem and 
the problem of segregated BR schools has a now become a national one. 
It seems fundamentally h'pocritical to deal~ with the national problem 
of racial segregation under two entirely ais.xitaxa~axiiiaza~t disparite -------sets of legal concepts. The law does not gain iz in respect¥ by Hi - .. 
doing so. Whatever the law does~xitx~~a~x in the area of race relations 
must henceforth& be done fronally, candidly and without hypocrisy. 
The presence of the de jure de iaEa facto distinction has only inhi-
.. 
bited recognition of the racial problem as a national one and prevented 
us from dealing in a nationally unified way with it. The de jure de 
facto distinction has encouraged legislative efforts such as the~oting 
Rights Act and others which have a fundamentally discriminatory effect 
against a~xa one section of the country. It has encouraged those who 
can see the South only tR~~h racial glasses while seeing~ their own 
equally segreg~ed sitHaax situation as a pure a~B¥ and justifiable one. 
The legal distinction of de jure and de facto no longer confor~s to 
--~---------~ 
the reality of our times. Northern and southern cities have R~~22iR~&alx 
~--..,1 
stataMiM•asaaxsa~xa~atia~ similar experiences. Segregation has resulted 





is what has contributed to the racial sa~azt separations across (J~) 
our land. Even the rural South is now integrated. Lastsummer I 
wrote an aaitzaiaixs~awi~~xthat editorial pointing out reliable 
statistics from the Southern Educational Council which showed the } IJ~J- i 
shcools of Mississippi were more integrated than ta those of Penn ~' 
. t'~~ ... ~ 
Examples of more extensive southern integration abound. --~ 
Against this backdrop, the Court's taia taia talk of a history 
of state-imposed segregation has very little current relevance. 
The South is in many cases more integrated than the Northa and West 
and t~axix what segregation remains results from the same causes. 
One section of the country E~~x EB~B cannot suffer interminably the 
onus of history when that hisz history aaasx~a does not accord with 
current reality. Where ix segregation finds the same root causes 
and exists to roughly the same extent in mat~ across our country, 
the a simlar legal doctrine ~~B~ ~~ must govern its elimination • 
/ ,r~ under Green, Swann,and Wti Wzi Emporia, and transpose it to northern 
*************************** 
1\ \\ 
I would take the effect test applied to tha southenn schools 
~ ~,· and western districts. I would say that the state i6 intimately inter-
-~-;r. twined with the administration of public sh ~hools. Whereever the 
•'~V st:::-:nder;;.ke;:~ons w:;:;,-;:::~v; t~e effe;; of p:;;etuati~g the 
~ ~ shtlOll~at:~tat,;:P~~~~~ t~~~at amounts to axMiad state uti• 
.,/ 
action in viol~ion o~ equal protection of the laws. A This is so 
~............... :::w;::-=wza ~ ~. J ,.,. _,../ r ''. "~· regargless of whether those actions had a segregatory i"ta"tx•ahi i"t• 
l'-V"" / 
-
intent behin6 them. Under this test, the Denver school ma ~ board 
-- ~ -has been ~~i guilty of a violation of equal protection. Its actions, 
----------~--~~~_.~~~~~~~-----~----~----------~---~--~--------though they may a well have been benignly motivated, nonetheless 





I find the purpose test 
~~ .. ~~,~~ 
~,~~ ..._.-l,w~ 
u ed~\' the CA10 unsatisfactory. It is 
absolutely i~~•sx impossible to tell fz•~ from all the conflicting 
pie~s of evidence in this case whether motive or purpose is benign 
or malignant. If the courts continue to use a purpose test, they 
will be BRBBBW pursuing shadow BK&Bi evidence the way the lower courts 
did here. The evidence was almost identical with respect to the core 
city schools as with the northeast schools, yet the courts found 
de jure segregation with regard to one and t de facto segregation 
with regard to another. This will happena all over the country and 
/~----------------------------------
involve the courts in elusive determinations which will produce 
~ a great lack of uniformity witRi~x not only among differnet 
school districts but within the same BR school district itself as 
happened in Denver and Tulsa. Thus in those cities we ~i~ find the 
Negor children in one part of the city entitled to BB relief 
because the court found de jure while the Negro children BK several 
blocks away entitled to no relief because the courts found ~ de 
facto, The courts cannot be involved in that sort of charade. 
~
Thus I think the E CA10 must be reversed and a~xaff&Et the test 
.......___ ~ -&>.,-~J.t. -a::z 
applied to the actions~of the Denver school board was whether 
,_, . -their actions had the effect of perpetuating sa~& segregation. In 
this case and i~ in most other school districts they will have had tRa 
h tR& that effect. , · tr/- ~) 
***************** ** ****~ q dft., 
Once the Denver school board h found in violation, it 
has a ~uty to eliminate inequality in the SERBBis public schooling. 
~illtxtilllatxa~tJXis 
(This is getting ijfos~ to the property tax case). Tha duty encompasses 
the p~vision of compensatory programs to Negro schoolchildren, 
and reasonable integarti ve steps such as ~ I'EIDlfhhJO,J;f;> construction 
of-new s~ho~l! in-integra:ed sett~ngs,~~djustment of scho~l 
.. , 3 w 





portation to those who voluntarily wish to avail themselves of it 
to transfer from a majority s to a minor~ty black school. Busing is 
a remedy of last resort and, as~aEai especially in urban areas no 
child may have a one-way bus ride against his will without his 
parent's consent of more than t~azt~ thirty minutes. Long bus rides 
for the sake of integ~tion are not ~BE~ittBB¥ required. Finally, 
under the equal protection clause, you may wish to say that a state 
has at least a~ational and atxm probably a compelling state interest 
in the maintenance of neighborhood schools. This interest i~ » under 
the equal protection clause is constitutional}~tifiable where 
~Be the state has undertaken to provide fair housing laws, integrated 
neighborhooe attendance zones and other steps designed to achive 
~•i~ •~ maximum integration wit~e»txie~~xmMsxxia&s¥ within the 
neighborhood setting • 
Thus I 
*********************** 
~ /l:ne.l ,.~/.o J would reverse the CA 1 Q[]t tJac:fi~ firmly on Swann. 
I think you should express these views at EB~iBB conference. I 
am convinced that your views are so unique as to require you to 
write separately. iMtxt~BEB But it is a sound position and one which 
makes good sense and is t~ez humane and realistic. It neither abandons 
the blacks nor uproots &Mt our KB» community and neighborhood values. 
It aiieww legitimizes the interests of community and neighborhood 
under the equal protection si• Ki» clause. And it ~ abandons the hypoc-
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December 1, 1972 
Re: No. 71-507 Keyes v. School District No. 1 
Dear BUl: 
As I was tncltned toward a different view from that of the majority, 
I will defer decision for some further study and also to see whether 
ODe of the other Justices writes. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
lfp/ss 
cc: Tbe Cooference 
.invrrmt ~llurt of tqt ).lnitrb §tatrs 
11Jasltittgton. p. ~· 211,5'~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL December 1 1 1972 
j 
Re: No. 71-507 - Keyes v. School District No. 1 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: Conference 
.iuprtmt <l;Mtrt cf t~t 'JUnittb .itatts 
,rasltinghrn. p. Ql. 21lgt'!-~ 
CHAMBE:RS Of" 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 
December 5, 1972 
Dear Bill: 
In 71-507, Keyes v. School District, 
I join your opinion as I told you less formally 
last week. 




Will~ o. Douglas 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
,Snprtmt QJotttf of tltt Jnittb jtalttt 
jlhts~lott. ~. <!}. 2ll~~~ 
December 7, 1972 
Re: No. 71-507 - Keyes v. School District 
Dear Bill: 
At Conference I voted contrary to the op~n~on which 
you have written for the court, and will probably adhere 
to that position; I will write something myself only as 
a last resort. 
Sincerely, 
~(l}j\J 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
~tqtrttttt <!lourt of tqt 'Jtlnittb .itatttt 
,rattlthtgton. !D. <11· 2ll,?~~ 
December 7, 1972 
No. 71-507 - Keyes v. School District No. 1 
Dear Bill, 
I am in basic agreement with your 
opinion in this case, although I do have some 
suggestions about which I shall be getting in 
touch with you. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
the Law Clerks 
j 
juprtutt Qillltft 4lf tlrt 'Jhitt~ jtattg 
Jragfrhtghtn.!D. <q. 21lbi~~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE 
December 18, 1972 
Re: No. 71-507 -Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colo. 
Dear Bill: 
I want to give you a 11 progress report 11 on my 
consideration of your proposed opinion. 
With the likelihood of the Detroit cases being 
linked on some points, I suspect there is some common ground 
between issues in Detroit and Denver. I have no definite 
feeling that Denver must wait on Detroit but for the moment I 
will hold up untif the situation is clarified. 
p 
~53' 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
• 
Memo to: Jay Wilkinson 
From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
December 20, 1972 
G;J 
You will recall our discussion as to Mr. Justice Brennan's 
emphasis- in his Keyes opinion- on intent. 
Please take a look at the cert note in No. 72-604 New Jersey 
v. Smith, where there is a reference to the opinion of CA 3 tO the 
effect that the absence of segregatory intent is immaterial. 
The case involved a claim that the grand jury selection process 
discriminated against blacks. 
'Ibis might give you a lead to some Supreme Court decisions 
in which we have said that segregatory intent was immaterial in various 
types of situations. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
LFP, Jr. :pls 
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December 28, 1972 
Keyes -No. 71-507 
In discussing the distinction between the effect of the de facto and 
de jure rule, I might consider the following: 
Under the de jure rule (as in Swann), the Court says that the 
Constitution requires the elimination of all vestiges of a dual system -
requiring busing to and from residential areas which would have been 
predominantly white or black entirely without regard to an "de jure" 
status. 
As contrasted with this situation, neighborhood schools are still 
allowed in cities where segregation is regarded as de facto. 
I see nothing in the constitution that requires an "over-reaction" 
even if the distinction between de facto and de jure is a valid one. Putting 
it differently, why should a greater degree of forced integration (by 
busing) be required in Richmond because of de jure segregation than 
would have .s:x::idH: existed in Richmond had there never been any such 
de jure action. 
Putting it differently, the result of the present constitutional rule 
is to force a substantially degree of integration in southern cities than would 
have existed if there had never been any laws compelling segregation. 
Thus, present and future generations of children are being penalized -
in terms of being bused away from their neighborhoods - in a highly 
punitive manner for tiJK "sins" of their forebearers, even though there 
is no casual relationship (no proximate cause) between such "sins" and 
the condition of segregation which exists. 
2. 
December 28, 1972 
Keyes -No. 71-507 
In discussing the distinction between the effect of the de facto and 
de jure role, I might c msider the following: 
Under the de jure rule (as in Bwann), the Court says that the 
Constitution requires the elimination of all vestiges of a dual system -
requiring busing to and from residential areas which would have been 
predominantly white or black entirely without regard to an "de jure" 
status. 
As contrasted with this situation, neighborhood schools are still 
allowed in cities where segregatim is regarded as de facto. 
I see nothing in the constitution that requires an "over-reaction" 
even lf the distinction between de facto and de jure is a valid me. Putting 
it differently, why should a greater degree of forced integration (by 
busing) be required in Richmond because of de jure segregation than 
would have a:x:JDK existed in Richmond had there never been any such 
de jure action. 
Putting it differently, the result of the present constitutional rule 
is to force a substantially degree of integration in southern cities than would 
have existed if there had never been any laws compelling segregattoo. 
Thus, present and future generations of children are being penalized -
in terms of being bused away from their neighborhoods - 1n a highly 
punitive manner for 1iE "stns" of their forebearers, even thougb there 
is no casual relationship (no proximate cause) between such "sins" and 
the condition of segregation which exists. 
2. 

Memo to the file 
From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
January 2, 1973 
Re: Keyes - LFP' s Draft Memorandum (No. 71-507) 
I should include -possibly in the text - the following quotation 
from Bickle's artie le of September 23, 197 2, in the New Republic (p. 23 ): 
"Under the impact of Swann, moreover, it is doubtful 
that the de jure - de facto distinction can long survive 
... even technically, the distinction is showing some 
cracks, as in the Emporia and Scotland Neck cases of 
last June and it is fatally vulnerable in a larger sense. 
The enforcement of a requirement of racial dispersal 
of school population in one region of the country but not 
in other regions is morally and politically, and therefore 
ultimately legally, an untenable position on any perma-
nent basis. " 
L.F.P.,Jr. 
LFP, Jr.:pls 
cc: Mr. Jay Wilkinson 
Rough Draft LFP, Jr./pls 1/5/73 
KEYES 
A Continuing Duty 
Near the end of its opinion in Swann , the Court appeared 
to say that there would come a time when school authorities could 
forget segregation: 
"At some point, these school authorities and others 
like them should have achieved full compliance with 
this Court's decision in Brown I . The systems 
would then be 'unitary' in the sense required by our 
decisions in Green and Alexander. 
"It does not follow that the communities served by 
such systems will remain demographically stable, 
for in a growing, mobile society, few will do so. 
Neither school authorities nor district courts are 
constitutionally required to make yea~by-year 
adjustments of the racial composition of student 
bodies once the affirmative duty to desegregate 
has been accomplished and racial discrimination 
through official action is eliminated from the system." 
402 U.s. at 31, 32. 
It is certainly true that communities do not remain"demo-
graphically stable;" and that the state of integration in a school system -
and particularly in individual schools -will rarely remain even approxi-
mately constant except perhaps for elementary schools located deep 
within massive residential patterns of one race or another. It also 




possibility explicit in the Swann language quoted above that at 
"some point" in time the responsibility of school authorities 
would end. I agree that there should be no end of a continuing 
~responsibility on the school authorities, as 
instrumentalities of the state, to take all reasonable and appro-
0--~~~ 
priate measures to maintain -an integrated. system. The assuring 
that this responsibility is discharged, and that the proper authorities 
have a continued awareness of it, will hardly be facilitated by the 
courts' adherence to the de jure/ de facto distinction with its 
KIIZl< corollary distinction between ~rpose and~ For this 












Mr. J. Harvie WllkiDscm, m 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. '11-50'7 Kef!& 
DATE: Ja.auary 8, 1973 
SlJlce the Christmas ''bolldaJS" I ban deyotecl sueh time u I 
eoald mate aft1Jable to dietatmg a memoraacbnn Oil Keyes. Here It is, 
Ia an of Ita roa&h aac.t meaadermr form. 
Althoagb I haft not yet declded what I wt1l do, I am certain that 
l caaot join the oplD.lon cireulated by Mr. Justice Brennau. 1t ts 
aacoeptable to me for two major rea&(Xla: (1) lt adheres to - mdeed 
empblatzea and perhaps embroiders - the de Jure/de facto dlstlnetlcm; 
IUld. (U) tt remands the case to the dlatrlct cout (UDder groau.clrulea which 
tcftlly foreshadow a Swaim type deaegrep.tloa. depoee) without addreatag 
and attempting to clartfy the amblpltles of Swaim lritb respect to raclal 
-~·-· and busing. 
I can caa.celYe of no prtD.c1pled buSs for appl.JIDr the cle jure/de 
faeto dJsttnetlm, for the 1"ttUOil8 stated Sa my memorudum. J:neideDtally, 
the 5th C1rcult optalca ill '12-849 (Corpu Cbrtatl)- which Lai'I'J broapt 
to my attention- reaches a e<mClualonldenttcal with my Olrll newa. 
lf I had seen the 5th Cire1dt oplldoa before dletatmg my memo, obrioaaly 
I woald haft alluded to tt aad meluded some porttcu of It ln my draft. 
. } ... 
2. 
A.. to Swaim, the opbllon obrioaaly was an elaborate compromise 
Nflectmg - and attempting uuucceafully to harmonise - diftrgtmt news 
~ Jatlces. Yet, I do thlak tbe domJaant threac:l of Ita reaaoalllg Nhl"'• 
the eueDce cl. a "rule of reu011 '', caWnc u:pcm the flezlbWty of equitable 
remedies. SWann baa been mtalllterpreted primarily for two reucma: 
•appro'Nd a drutie butDg program m Charlotte, aad dlatrlcta eoarta 
han looked at tt rather tbaD tile amblguoaa lupa(ll of the opla!OD. In 
aclclltiOD, there ta oae aeatenee Ill the oplnloll whtch, If taken oat ol. 
coatat, requtrea ''the dlstrlet judp or acllool autborlttea (to) make 
enry effort to achteYe the greatest poealble degree of actaa1 cleaesreptlca 
• • • • " (p. 26). 'Ibis has beeD cc:utraed to reqalre maaatve bulllg of 
elemeatary chllclrea, m aome iDataDcH ap to 20 mllea and for a couple 
of hc.ra a day. In my Ylew there Sa not the allgbtest justiftcatlon in the 
Coaatltutlon or any rattcmal buts for such a t!'al'estJ. I recall SeDator 
BUDlpb.rey'a commeat to me after retumtng from the Florida e&mPI'P· 
Be aald - by no meaaa eatlrely Ill Jest - tbat the Supreme Court hu cot 
the eoantry Into "one hell of a mesa", and tbat the Coart should ftnd 
aome way to lead u oat of 1t. Be aut that he would aot haft tolerated 
the butng of hta cbildreJl from tbelr former home m MOiltgomei'J C011Dty, 
MarfJand to Southeast WublqtOD. Obriouly I woald not qaote the 
s.ator - a statement made ID the prlftcy of oar apartment - and I do 
3. 
DOt want anyoae In my chambers to quote blm. I m8JitlOD thla here beeauH 
ao tme can daabt Hubert H11Dlphrey's decUcatlOD to ractal equalltJ and to 
e• , z stamping oat sqrepted echoola. 
Retumlllg to S!aJm, the aenteD.ee caUlDg for tile ,_eatest pouible 
degree of deeegreptlcm has prompted district ecmts to attempt jat 
t1aat, prtmarlly by butag. They -m to onrlook, however, other 
Jaapage tD the qtta1ca wtlleh Ia preetsely to the c.trary - u I N&Cllt. 
But whatner SWaml may ban aald, there Is DO eCJDCelvable 
ccutltatioaal but. for compellJD.g the type of baatag wblch we ba'N 
wttaeued ln some of the eases. I have felt, UDtll now, compelled to 
aeqateeee where the cUatrtct court has fOUDCI that the busing wu n« 
ordered to achteve "racJal balance". But here ta Keyes, I ban tor the 
tint time aa opporbmlty to ezpreas my news as to the meanmg of Snml -
U I ccmclude that this will serve any uaefalppurpose. 
I am ctmeemed, however, by the fact that may w1ll view an 
a:pnatCD from me u retlect1ng a "southern" blu, 1f not Indeed 
soatbem "ractsm". There bas beeD, of eoarae, eoagb ra.et.sm to 
go arOIIIDd for most 8\'el'J aae. There hu beea aa much among blacb 
ta neent yean u amcmgwb.ttea. As you lmolr, I personally suppozted 
Brown when th1a was extremely uapoptlar tn VlrgJaJa; I oppoact masslft 
resistance and tnterpoattlcm, and was regarded by many in Virginia aa 
• \ J ........ 
a llberal mtegratlODtstf. I have not retreated Ia the slightest from my 
e Cll'ftetic:m that we mut tntegrate the schools oo a DatiODI.l buls aad by 
the ue ol. all reucaable meaDIJ. But the comblDatiGD. of Greea aad 8nD -
as these have beea ecmatraed, has proclu.ced edacattoaal chaos and -
_., that the Denver deetalca. wUl man the deeegregattOil Utlptlon. Jato 
the North - the rattcmale of these declstcas (as tnterpreted) simply canact 
be applletl in many of the great northem cttles. It mates ao aeue to 
hue a J'\tle of ccmatttuttcmal Jaw whleb Is physlcaJJ.ylmpoulble to 
implement. The reaalt may be - u propoeecl tn the IUchmcmd aDd Detroit 
~ Wt.iL 
cun- that local govermnental boandarles"be ipored, and that the butllg~ 
be extended into vast metropolitan areas. But how far wU1 these extend? 
Ulllea the populatloals ordered not to take "ftlght", a comblDatlCil of 
the moblllty and resentment of the peq)le will frustrate even metropolltaD 
areabumg. 
Despite my eoacel"'UU, I am reluctant to write u opbdon which 
wlll be widely constJ'\ted- howeyer 1t ts written- u being a retreat 
from the proeesMs of IDtepstlug soaadly the raeu of oar eoantl")', 
wbteh after all wtll han to cc.ttnae to 1tn topther for the cmnmma 
I therefore want yoar judgment, and that of Larry ud Blll, 
u to what fao.ld say and whether I should say tt. I m'GSt, of coarse, 
5. 
reaern the final deelalon for myaelf, but I respect the rien of each ol 
yoa. 
I woald like for yoarto proceed Cll the uaumpttoa. that I wU1 
write aadq»bdoa. Indeed, I am certam to write somethtae. It wl1l 
either be a fft puqraplaa neordlac the two reu..a (atated abon why 
I eau~ Jola 1D the BNDMJI opbdoa.) or lt will be a lalrlylClllg expoetttcm 
of my Yl-. The attached memoranchun 18 the begbming of euch an 
aptaloa.. 
I would J1ke for 10111 to take my memor&Ddam and deYelop lt Into 
a eeholarly, restrained and carefally wrtttea draft oplnlca. 
I spent most of my time on the ftrst point (the UD80UildDess of 
de jure/de fat:to), &Dd thla part of the memorandum- In my riew- 1s 
aat too far removed from a printable ftr8t draft. I am sure, nevertheleu, 
that It caa be c<malderably Improved and streragtheed. 
The seccmd part of my memOl'IDdum (dealhtgwlth the amblgaJtlee 
of ~ and partJcularly wttb busing) was dtctated more hurrtedly ad 
wtll reqalre canstderable ttgbtentng, revtahtg and rewriting. Also, yoa 
wUl han to do some research and sapply certaht documentation. 
I call your attention particularly to the subsectloa. entitled 
''Ultimate Goal - Equal Educattcmal Opportunity" (p. 44), and to p. 48 
thereof. I Intended here to deal briefly, bat w1tb appropriate documeatatlca 
m the footnotes, with the emerging view of scholars that there 1a no 
• 8. 
el•rly d!seernlble •w•• correlatl<ll between Integration aDd improred 
edaeat1onal achievement. In cXher words, the ezperieDce with lntegratlOD 
to date baa beea d18appoiBtmg ill terms of producing better eclaeatlca tn 
mtepoated schools. The truth Ja, as scholars are beglnnlDg to admJt, that 
Gae aoelo-eeODomte status of chUdND (white or black) 18 the single most 
releftllt factor ta determiDJDg the aaccesa ln school. Tbts entire area 
18 a delicate me, with high emoticaal feellaga ofte being lnYolYed. I 
do aot want to overemphasize tt, and might ..,_ relegate the entire •bjeet 
to a footnote - aa lt 18 not ceatral to my bulc poettlcm. 
A ftDa1 word of eautiaa: I am troubled by this entire problem, and 
may not decide for some time what 1 shall do. A good deal may depend 
on how well you can rework my memorandum Into a scholarly, prmclplecl 
optalcm. MeanwhUe, please do not ''talk 1n the corrld~'' here at the 
Court, as I want to preserre tall flexibUlty as to my ultimate actlaa 
wtfhcat maldDg any lmpHed commitments to other chambers aa to what 
I mlgbt do. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
.ilttFtntt Ql11nri 11f tlft Jtrlttb Jtw• 
jiaslthtg~ ~. <!J. 20~'1-~ 
January 9, 1973 
Re: No. 71-507 - Keyes v. Denver School District 
near Bill: 
I think I will try my hand at writing a dissent from 
your op~n~on in this case. I will try to have it in 
circulation late this week or early next week. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
~tutt ~ourtltf tqt ~nittb ,jhdttY 
,.._.ltbt¢ou. ~. (!}. 21llJ'l.' 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
January 9, 1973 
Re: No. 71-507 - Keyes v. School District No. 1 
Dear Bill: 
1 am in large part in accord with your circulation of 
November 30. I am not at all certain that the de jure--de facto 
distinction in school segregation will hold up in the long run. 
Segregation may well be segregation, whatever the form. 
Nevertheless, I withhold my vote pending other cir-
culations and pending further consideration of the Detroit and 
Richmond situations. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
• 
.January 9, 19'13 
Re: No. '11-50'1 Keyes v. School DistriCt No. 1 
Dear BUl: 
This is a supplement to my note of December 1. 
Although I have not come to rest as to my final posltlcm, I am 
now worldng on a draft of an opinion that may coneur in the remand but 
for different reascms. 
ln view of the complexity of the problem and our other workload, 
1t will be some time before I am able to ctreula.te it. 
stneerely, 
Mr. Justtee Brennan 
cc: The cooterence 
Memo to: Jay Wilkinson 
From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
January 11, 1973 
~(J-'1 
/}} / Keyes 
In view of the time lag in obtaining requested doCuments, 
I suggest that you ask the Library to obtain for you the latest 
available Digest of Educational statistics, published by the Office 
of Education at HEW. 
1bis source was cited in swann 402 u.s. at 14. My guess 
is that this digest will contain some helpful statistics. 
I think it also worthwhile to look at major law reviews for 
comments and articles on swann. While most will be laudatory, 
perhaps there will be some that recogniZe the infirmities of the 
opinion. 
I think I have mentioned that Larry probably bas the Jenks 
bOOk, which at least merits a footnote. 
L. F. P., Jr. 





Mr. J. Harvie Wilkinsoo., m 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 71-507 Keyes 
DATE: January 18, 1973 
In my rough memorandum, you will find a subseetloo. dealing with 
the tnterest of parents. 
1 cited Pierce, and suggested that there are other Supreme Court 
cases emphasizing the duty and rights of parents. There is a quote 
in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949), Frankfurter J. concurring, 
that may possibly help. It refers to the "deference" owed the "private 
tnterest ••• of a man in the children he has sired". 
1 do n<t coo.sider this to be an especially strong authority, but it 
may lead you tnt o others. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. J. Harvie Wilkinson, m 
DATE: January 19, 1973 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Keyes 
This may give you some background information although I 
would not spend too much time on it. 
Please return the report to my dfice after it has served your 
purposes. 




Mr. J. Harvie Wilkinson, ID DATE: February 18, 1973 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 71-507 Keyes - Draft of 2/1/73 and 2/14/73 
The above drafts, delivered to me in what you describe as 
rough, preliminary form, have now been reviewed by me. 
Although I have made a few changes as I went along, I followed 
your admonition and have not tried to edit them as I would and will your 
final draft. Rather, I have reviewal-them to see whether they are in 
line substantively with my thinking. 
The short answer is "yes". 
As to the first issue (pages 1-21), this is substantially as I wrote 
it - although I think your editing has strengthened it. It is ready to go, 
when you have completed the footnotes. 
As to the second issue (the meaning of Swann), your draft is a 
vast improvement over my initial effort. Some of it - especially your 
analysis of the busing issue and the interests adversely affected by 
compulsory busing - is brilliant. 
I make the following general comments: 
/' 1. I have discussed with you (Saturday afternoon) the need to 
rearrange the subsections. Part IV should be moved ahead of m -C. 
I am not quite sure where m-B should go. I suggest you outline your 
present draft and consider the best way to restructure it. 
2. Subsection m-B seems a little ''bobtailed". Peih aps you 
can work it into one of the other subsections. 
3. The paragraph beginning on page 36 comes, I think, from 
my draft and therefore has an idea which I would like to retain. But it 
has an analytical defect, as presently written. It assumes that the 
affirmative 
"aMia•Bi*J duty doctrine" only requires restoration to the state which 
would have existed, absent unlawful action. Of course, the doctrine 
has not been applied that way - and this is what I think is so wrong. 
Yet, the first part of our opinion assumes that the affirmative duty 
doctrine should be applied nationwide. Perhaps the answer is that it 
can be applied properly only pursuant to a rule of reason, under the 
facts and circumstances. 
2. 
4. In discussing the interests adversely affected by transportation, 
should we make it clear that we are talking primarily about the 
elementary grades? 
5. Should'W.e use the phrase "achieve desegregation" or "further 
integration"? 
* * * * 
In general, I think you have made real progress. I agree that 
another work of careful scholarship, writing and rewriting- and 
documentation - is necessary. 




Mr. J. Harvie WWdns<m, m DATE: February 18, 19'73 
LewiS F. Powell, Jr. 
No. '71-50'7 Keyes - Draft of 2/1/'73 and 2/14/'73 
'11\e aboVe drafts, delivered to me in what you describe as 
rough, prellmtnar)' form, have now been reviewed by me. 
Although 1 have made a few changes as 1 went aloog, 1 followed 
your admonition and have net tried to edit them as 1 would and wUl your 
final draft. Rather, 1 have revtewdthem to see whether they are in 
line substantively with my thtnldng. 
The short answer is ''yes". 
As to the first tssue (pages 1-21), this is substant1ally as 1 wrc:te 
it - althongh 1 think your editing has strengthened tt. 1t 18 ready to go, 
when you have completed the foctnctes. 
As to the seecmd issue (the meaning of swann), your draft is a 
vast improvement over my initial effort. Some of it - especially your 
analysis of the buSing issue and the interests adversely affected by 
compulsory rosing - ts brilliant. 
I make the follaw~g general comments: 
1. I have discussed with you (Saturday aftemoon) the need to 
rearrange the subseetioos. Palt IV should be moved ahead of m -C. 
I am not quite sure where m-B should go. I suggest you outline your 
present draft and ccmatder tbe best way to restructure tt. 
2. Subsecttcm m-B seems a little ''bobtaUed". Pelb aps you 
can work 1t into one of the other subsections. 
3. The paragraph beginning on page 38 comes, I think, from 
my draft and therefore has an idea whlcb I would like to retain. But 1t 
. 
has an analytical defect, as presently written. It assumes that the 
,~vauty doctrine" only requires restoration to the state which 
would have ex .. ed, absent unlawful action. Of course, the doctrine 
bas not been applied that way - and this ls what I think is so wrong. 
Yet, the first part of our opinion assumes that the affirmative duty 
doctrine should be applied nationwide. Perhaps the answer is that 1t 
can be applied properly only pursuant to a rule of reasoo, under the 
facts and circumstances. 
2. 
4. In discussing the interests adversely affected by transportation, 
should bre make it clear that we are talking primarily about the 
elementary grades? 
5. ShouldU use the phrase "achieve desegregation" or "further 
Integration"? 
•••• 
In general, I think you have made real progress. I agree that 
another work of careful scholarship, writing and rewriting - and 
documentation - ts necessary. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
.......... ------------------
Memo to: Jay Wilkinson 
From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
FebruarY 28, 1973 
Re: Keyes 
At a recent Conference, in connection with a case the 
name of which I have forgotten, Justice Stewart made a remark 
which is so true, I would like to incorporate the substa.J.¥:e of it 
in our opinion - perhaps in a footnote. He said: 
"A school may be all white or all blaCk and still 
not be a segregated school if the system is 
genuinely desegregated." 
'Ibis is a very important principle that very few people 
understand. 
LFP,Jr.:psf 
Memo to: Larry Hammond 
From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 71-507 Keyes 
March 1, 1973 
In your cert memo in 72-722, you speak of my desire to 
"overrule Swann and its companion case from Mobile." 
'Ibis is a misapprehension. I do think that the affirmance 
in swann of the busing plan in Charlotte/Mecklenburg was unfor-
tunate, and in the end will be a disservice to education and parti-
cularly the younger children who are bused so extensively. 
If one accepts Green as being applicable to an urbanized 
area, I could have joined the opinion in Swann so far as its language 
goes. As you will see from what I have been working on with Jay, 
I would like to bring the Court back to the language of Swann (basically, 
a rule of reason) so that the district courts will look to the decision 
rather than to the Charlotte decree itself. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
LFP,Jr.:psf 
. 
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Memo to: Messrs. Hammond and Kelly 
From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 'H-50'1- Keyes 
March 13' 19'73 
I deliftr to each of yoa herewith a "Cbambers Copy" of the 
first printed draft of my oplDlon, concurriDg ill part and diasenttng 
iD part. 
There is a vague rumor fioatiDg about that neither of you is 
totally enchanted with my position on school desegregation. I am 
also DOt unaware of the precllctable negative response that will come 
from the eastern media aad, perhaps, from a majority of those who 
write in the law Journals. The response may be DO less influenced 
by the fact that I am a "southeraer" and I persoally am undoubtedly 
lnfluenced by the environment in which I was raised. Yet, DOt by way 
of justification bat as baekgrounc:l which may be relevant to an uader-
standhv of my position, I recite the persoal aperieiiCe I bave had 
with tbls problem. 
I was chaltman of the Richmond School Board when Brown was 
decided, and served on that Board UDt1l I was appolntecl to the state 
Board of Edacation in Juua17· of '81, on W'hieh I served for eight years. 
Without go~JV into IllY of the details, I was regarded by the white 
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commUDlty lD Richmond u a far-out llberal on the race l88Ue aad the 
echoola there were gradually desegregated, prlmarUy wader the free-
dom of choice plln that was coD8ldered valld by most courts (1DcludtJ11 
the Foarth Circuit) UDtll Green wU decided lD early 1861. I opealy 
opposed the "muaive re8latuee" program lD VlrllDla and the South, 
and quietly helped to defeat it lD the VirglDJ.a Legislature. 
But the moderate coarae rarely pl-• ...,cme. To the dlamay 
of JDIUl)' southern conservatlfts (iDcludlDg old friends) I haft hoDeatly 
belle'Ved lD the actn.Dtages, lD our plurlatlc soelety, of the chlldrea of 
all races aDd creeds beblg brought together in pabllc education. I thoagbt 
the Brcnm decision was loag overdue • Bat I wu 118Y8r wlllblg to move 
u fast as some of my blaek frleada urged (which reiAllted ill senral 
Vlrgbda commUDltles lD the schools beblg abut dowll and in worseablc 
race relatlou), and I atlll do DOt belle'f'e in the "all or DOthlag" u:treme 
lallpage of Greea. Tbe Green case itself was correctly decided on ita 
facta, bat to sagest that the Coustitutlon requires that there be DO all 
black echool ill my 'f'lew is a rewrltlDg of the CoDstltutlon and a perfectly 
ab~n~rb social and ectacattoaal poUcy. 
The constltutloDil error of Green was perpetuated in Swum UDder 
totally dlffereat factual clrcUD18taDcea. Ap.ln, the de facto/ de jure 
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dlat1Dction - as unpriDcipled aa any I bave yet seen attrtbated to the 
CODStltutlon - wu al8o reaffirmed. But despite my view aaJe the 
wroDgDess of Swum, I would DOt vote to overrule lt ReD if joiDed by 
four other Justices. It bas become a 8)'mbol of great sipiflcuce for 
our black citizens, and u I read the ratloaale of 8walm as written, it 
does not support the way it has been iDterpreted by the district courts 
in the South. 
Ill any event, the inJection of the federal courts into the pubUc 
school systems to the point where school authorities are more pre-
occupied with mtxtng children than they are with educat!Dg them, has 
been little short of a disaster to the cause of public education and ita 
necessary sapport in many communities. 
1be purpose of my wrltiDg in Keyes is to try, reeogniziJW tbat 
it can only be a beglnniJW, to lead the Court back to a position that eaa 
fairly be called a moderate one, acceptable as sensible by a majority 
of our citizens of both races. I would also like to persuade the Court 
to depart from what it has chosen to call a coastitutioDal position wb.lch, 
in my view, had no support whatever 1D the CoDstltuUon (the eaforced 
basing of l.DDocent YOUDI children for many miles to achieve a degree of 
mhrtug whkh resalted DO more from state acUon 1D Atlanta thaD it has 
from state action in Harlem.) 
-4-
But enough of thls. I did DOt illtead to make a "speech"- least 
of all to Larry Rammoad aad Bill Kelly. Bat u I do iad:aed respect 
your views ud Jucfcmeata, I thought possibly tbia preface to the request 
wldch followa may be helpful. 
I would like for each of you to read the draft, aeceptiDg my 
position as refiectlDg my carefully conaidered judcment, but neverthe-
less feeliDg free to make any aad all suggestiona which you think WODld 
strengthen or improve it. Obviously, I am amdous to have a acholarly 
and ratioll8l product. I do not expect much agreement with my view, 
but I would like for falr-mhtded lawyers to tbJnk that it is a satisfactory 
piece of legal craftsmanahlp. 
I will be grateful to both of you. 





Mr. J. Harvie Wilkinson, m 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 71-507 Keyes 
DATE: March 13, 1973 
In connectim with our point 1n Keyes as to the "flexiblllty" -
and wide range of discretion on the part of a court of equity to balance 
mterest and rights (including constttutlcmal rights) - see the Chief's 
opinion in 71-1470 Lemon v. Kurtzman at pp. 7 (last paragraph at 
bottom of page), 8 and 9. 
I think you may very well be able to pick up a phrase or sentence 
from this and add it to our Keyes draft either in the text or in the note. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
Comments on the Chambers Opinion in Keyes 
l\CK 
March 15, 1973 
My own Preface will be very short. In the spirit 
of your request, I accept for the purposes of this 
memo thw two propositions which underlte the draft 
opiniona 1) that the de jure/de facto distinction 
should be supplanted by a more objective and national 
approachJ and 2) that the Court should "signal" the 
lower courts not to use extensive busing. 
As you point out, .. the close readers of this 
opinion are likely to be its opponents rather than 
) 
its friends. In my view, this makes it particularly ~·,~ 
(j) - LVf 
im~ant notAte use argumentative language and 
no ~ o tak~iberties with the case law. On the former -
point, I have marked a few places in the draft where 
I think that certain adjectives might well be 
deleted or replaced, because they draw attention 
away from the argument and imply that others are 
not ~roceeding in good faith. In particular, I 
think that the negative form of "principled", 
that is "unprincipled", has become an epithet among 
scholars and judges rather than a mere adjective. 
Your argument is really not more "principled" or 
"logical" than the majority's "unprincipled" or 
"illogical" positiona rather, it simply is more 
practical and better reflects contemporary social 
reality. As to the use of the case law, I 
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readily admit that I have no more than a passing 
acquaintance with the school desegrirgation cases 
and have asked Larry to focus particularly on this. 
Nonetheless, I venture ~ observations@ I would 
not have read Wright v. Emporia as it is explicated on 
page 14 of the d~t, in my view, • that case 
concerned not what it takes to determine whether 
a school board has a constitutional duty to desegregate, 
but rather whether once a violation and duty has been 
found a school board may take a step which further 
exacerbates the segregation;@ as an heir to the 
legal realist tradition, I do not think that the 
present deraf~ adequately acknowledges your 
of disagreement with Swann's view of the proper 
remedy, a~long the same lines, I do not think ~ 
it fair to characterize what the district a courts ) 
have done as "purporting" to follow Swann(p.34). 
zA ~ 
I. 
My major suggestion concerns the structure of 
the argument. After establishing what it takes 
to make a prima facie case of segreagation, the 
draft goes on to talk about remedy. It seems to 
me that this leaves out a step--what it takes for 
a school board to rebut the prima facie case. 
Indeed, notion of a prima facie case would seem 





In saying this, I recognize that the draft already 
deals with this problem in a number of places, for 
example footnote 10 and various paragraphs in the 
section on relief. But I think that rebuttal and 
remedy are analytically distinct and that rebuttal 
ought to be featurm in the tex•t. In other 
words, it is my view that the argument ought to proceed 
as followsa 1) this is what it takes to make out a 
prima facie case; 2) this is what a school board 
must demonstrate to overcome a prima facie case 
of a constitutional violation; and 3) this is 
what .... a court ought to order by way of 
remedy if a school board fails to rebut a prima 
facie case. 
While,of course, as I understand it, your view 
is that 2 and 3 ought in parctice to be aaout 
the same, I think that they are nonetheless analytically 
different and that the equitable flexibility which 
reposes in the district courts must be given a bit 
more room to roam--that is, a district court ought to 
be able to order at le~t a bit more in the way of 
remedy than a school board undertake on its • own 
to rebut a prima facie case. 
I do not think that the rebuttal and remedy sections 
should be long and wholly repetitive of one another. 
But I do think that they are analytically distinct. 
II. 
Even if you do not accept my reading of Wright v. 
City of Emporia, I think that the opinion ought to 
make use of Hernandez v. Texas , 347 u.s. 475(1954), 
which contains good language undermining the de 
facto/de jure distinctiona 
"Circumstances or chance may w ell di~tate 
that no persons in a certain class will serve on 
a particular jury or during som particular period. 
But it taxes our • credulity to say that mere chance 
resulted in there being no members of this class 
among the over six thousand jurors called in the 
past 25 yeaics. The result bespeaks discrimination, 
whether or not it was a conscious decision on the 
part of individual iur commissioner." /Emphasis 
added • U.s., at 
I alos think that strength can be drawn from this 
Court's • statutory decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 
401 u.s. 424, a case involving employment discrimination. 
There, the Court held that an employer subject to 
the Act may not employ a testing device which 
has the effect of discriminating unless it is • 
shown to have a"manifest relation to employment". 401 
u.s., at 432. Motivation was found to be irrelevant. 
In short, the fact that a testing device has a 
discriminatory effect establishes a prima facie case, 
which the employer can rebut by showing a manfest 
rela~ion to employment. By analogy, segregated 
schools establish a prima facie case of discriiination, 
which is rebuttable by a showing of manifest ~altion 
to educational policy. The First, Second, Fifth, and 
• 
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Eigth Circuits have ma~ggs approach a constituttonal 
one for public employment(policemen, firemen etc.). 
The various opinions in those circuits are long 
and careful and would provide support for your 
position here. 
III. 
I cannot quite put my finger on it, but I have a 
sense in reading the draft that it shifts frequently 
from state action to school borad action. On 
page 18, for example, the first paragraph of "C" 
states that segre~taion is not 1111111)•• solely 
a product of state action, goe•s on to state that 
socio-economic influences have contributed to the 
segreagation, and then concludes that public 
school authorities have a continuing responsitility. 
Per~aps at some point the opinion ought to 
confront explicitly the fact that other state or federal 
bodies(zoning bo~ds, housing authorities, FHA 
loan policies etc.) have contributed to the segregation. 
IV. 
I would be expec•ially wary of citing the Chief's 
chambers opinion in Winston/Salen, at least i~ text. 
As I understand it, the Chief wrote that opinion 
shortly after Swann, interpret.-ed Swann there, 
and then distributed the opinion in envelopes marked 
"Personal" to each federal judge in the country. The 
whole incident created a ansiderable amount of 
-6-
animosity both among treother judges of this Court, 
who thought that they had reached a compromise and 
do not circulate their chambers opinions in this fashion, 
and among the lower court judges, Who felt that they 
were being lobbied. Nor do I think that the 
citation adds anything of substance to your draft. 
v. 
Finally, as I read the d~ft, I made numerous 
notes or suggestions in the margins, some of 
them grammatical. I have a near compulsion to do 
this, and you will want to reject many of the suggestions 
out of hand. 
',_ .:.. ... ,· ~-- -""'·'!!M ' . ~ ' 
Comments on the Chambers Opinion in Keyes 
\£K 
March 15, 1973 
My own Preface will be very short, In the spirit 
of your request, I accept for the purposes of this 
memo thw two propositions which underl~e the draft 
opiniona 1) that the de jure/de facto distinction 
should be supplanted by a more objective and national 
approach; and 2) that the Court should "signal" the 
lower courts not to use extensive busing, 
As you point out, .. the close readers of this 
opinion are likely to be its opponents rather than 
its friends, In my view, this makes it particularly 
important not to use argumentative language and 
not to take liberties with the case law. On the former 
point, I have marked a few places in the draft where 
I think that certain adjectives might well be 
deleted or replaced, because they draw attention 
away from the argument and imply that others are 
not ~roceeding in good faith, In particular, I 
think that the negative form of "principled", 
that is "unprincipled", has become an epithet among 
scholars and judges rather than a mere adjective, 
Your argument is really not more "principled" or 
"logical" than the majority's "unprincipled" or 
"illogical" positiona rather, it simply is more 
practical and better reflects contemporary social 





readily admit that I have no more than a passing 
acquaintance with the school desegr~ation cases 
and have asked Larry to focus particularly on this. 
Nonetheless, I venture two observationsa 1) I would 
not have read Wright v. Emporia as it is explicated on 
page 14 of the d~tt in my view, • that case 
concerned not what it takes to determine whether 
a school board has a constitutional duty to desegregate, 
but rather whether once a violation and duty has been 
found a school board may take a step which further 
exacerbates the segregation; 2) as an heir to the 
legal realist tradition, I do not think that the 
present d•raf.C adequately acknowledges your degree 
of disagreement with Swann's view of the proper 
remedya and along the same lines, I do not think 
it fair to characterize what the district • courts 
have done as "purporting" to follow Swann(p.34). 
I. 
My major suggestion concerns the structure of 
the argument. After establishing what it takes 
to make a prima facie case of segreagation, the 
draft goes on to talk about remedy. It seems to 
me that this leaves out a step--what it takes for 
a school board to rebut the prima facie case. 
Indeed, notion of a prima facie case would seem 
to carry with it the possibility of rebuttal. 
.. ,.._.,. .•. 
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In saying this, I recognize that the draft already 
deals with this problem in a number of places, for 
example footnote 10 and various paragraphs in the 
section on relief. But I think that rebuttal and 
remedy are analytically distinct and that rebuttal 
ought to be featurm in the tex•t. In other 
words, it is my view that the argument ought to proceed 
as followsa 1) this is what it takes to make out a 
prima facie case; 2) this is what a school board 
must demonstrate to overcome a prima facie case 
of a constitutional violation; and 3) this is 
what .... a court ought to order by way of 
remedy if a school board fails to rebut a prima 
facie case. 
While,of course, as I understand it, your view 
is that 2 and 3 ought in parctice to be about 
the same, I think that they are nonetheless analytically 
different and that the equitable flexibility which 
reposes in the district courts must be given a bit 
more room to roam--that is, a district court ought to 
be able to order at le~t a bit more in the way of 
remedy than a school board undertake on its • own 
to rebut a prima facie case. 
I do not think that the rebuttal and remedy sections 
should be long and wholly repetitive of one another. 
But I do think that they are analytically distinct. 
-4-
II. 
Even if you do not accept my reading of Wright v. 
City of Emporia, I think that the opinion ought to 
make use of Hernandez v. Texas , 347 u.s. 475(1954), 
which contains good language undermining the de 
facto/de jure distinctions 
"Circumstances or chance may w ell di~tate 
that no persons in a certain class will serve on 
a particular jury or during som particular period. 
But it taxes our • credulity to say that mere chance 
resulted in there being no members of this class 
among tne over six thousand jurors called in the 
past 25 yeruirs. The result bespeaks discrimination, 
whether or not it was a conscious decision on the 
art of individual 'ur commissioner." /Emphasis 
added • u.s., at 48, 
I alos think that strength can be drawn from this 
Court's • statutory decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 
401 u.s. 424, a case involving employment discrimination. 
There, the Court held that an employer subject to 
the Act may not employ a testing device which 
has the effect of discriminating unless it is • 
shown to have a"manifest relation to employment", 401 
u.s., at 432. Motivation was found to be irrelevant. 
In short, the fact that a testing device has a 
discriminatory effect establishes a prima facie case, 
which the employer can rebut by showing a manfest 
rel~ion to employment. By analogy, segregated 
schools establish a prima facie case of discriiination, 
which is rebuttable by a showing of manifest ~altion 
to educational policy. The First, Second, Fifth, and 
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Eigth Circuits have ma~Bgs approach a constitutional 
one for public employment(policemen, firemen etc.). 
The various opinions in those circuits are long 
and careful and would provide support for your 
position here. 
III. 
I cannot quite put my finger on it, but I have a 
sense in reading the draft that it shifts frequently 
from state action to school borad action. On 
page 18, for example, the first paragraph of "C" 
states that.segreagtaion is not solely 
a product of state action, goews on to state that 
socio-economic influences have contributed to the 
segreagation, and then concludes that public 
school authorities have a continuing responsitility. 
Per~aps at some point the opinion ought to 
confront explicitly the fact that other state or federal 
bodies(zoning bo~ds, housing authorities, FHA 
loan policies etc.) have contributed to the segregation. 
IV. 
I would be expec»ially wary of citing the Chief's 
chambers opinion in Winston/Salen, at least i~ text. 
As I understand it, the Chief wrote that opinion 
shortly after Swann, interpret.,ed Swann there, 
and then distributed the opinion in envelopes marked 
"Personal" to each federal judge in the country. The 





animosity both among treother judges of this Court, 
Who thought that they had reached a compromise and 
do not circulate their chambers opinions in this fashion, 
I 
and among the lower court judges, Who felt that they· 
were being lobbied, Nor do I think that the 
citation adds anything of substance to your draft. 
v. 
Finally, as I read the d~ft, I made numerous 
notes or suggestions in the margins, some of 
them grammatical. I have a near compulsion to do 
this, and you will want to reject many of the suggestions 
out of hand. 
.• ·.; . '~ :-:., ' ~. drl· ·, 
(y 
LAH 3/21/73 
Rea LFP's Chambers Draft of Keyes v. School Dist No. 1 
My comments will proceed in, as far as possible, the 
order of the opinion. 
(1} On page 5 you discuss Green and emphasize that 
the "affirmative duty" imposed there was "proper" in light 
of the fact that freedom of choice was a "subterfuge." You 
point out twive in the paragraph that New Kent is a rural -
school district with no residential segreg~tion and none 
of the problems of urban schools. Either in text or notes 
you might consider discussing Green's two companion cases, 
Raney & MOnroe. Raney seems compatible with your views 
re Green but Monroe does present a problem. Jackson, 
Tennessee, the city from which Monroe came, has 7600 
students in the system and has considerable residential 
segregation. As a factual matter it seems that Monroe 
falls somewhere in between Green and Swann. It's not rural ~-~v-" I 
And, you might conclude that, as ~ but its not metropolitan. 
~~ ~~ in Green, the integration plan in Monroe, which called for 
~~~a free-transfer plan, was a subterfuge. I think, therefore, 
~ ~ ~ I that you can handle Monroe but I wonder whether you should 
~ ~~. cons~er ~~nin~ the notion that there was an abrupt 
~-_ ,/ --
~ o-. ~ '-~1 change between Green and Swann. 
~~~,.r 
~1"'1 
(2) Your historical analysis (pp 5-7) of this Ct's 
decisions jumps from Green to Swann. You have not discussed 
the place that Alexander v. Holmes Cty plays in this 
evolutionary process. Alexander may not be directly perti-
nent to your thesis because it deals with the problem of 
delay more than anything else. But, the Alexander order 
affected some 30 school districts in Mississippi and "many 
--2- ... 
thouiJsands of children." The Supreme Ct opinion is cryptic 
and devoid of factual detail and I do not recall without 
more research whether any of these Mississippi districts 
were urban (Jackson, for instance). The CAS opinions 
would disclose this fact. But, the important point seems 
to be that if the e ere urban_~£~~~~lved 
t~"--~~~C:.~-!:-~~E~t:e!~l2-.!_Jjlat__t_~ was 
a fundamentally new and different factual sita tion when --.....--._ ... .......__ __ ._ 
Swann came here. On the other hand, if the districts were 
all rural it might buttress your point. 
(3) In your discussion of why the de jure/ de facto 
distinction is unprincipled, I see two threads but I am not 
sure which one is responsible for rendering the distinction 
unprincipled, or whether both reasons pertain. I would 
call the first thread the rural-urban shift, i.e., in rural 
school districts not characterized by racial residential 
separation segregation in the schools was clearly a result, 
in the South, of the operatjion of state law, but in the 
metropolitan areas in the South the existence of state 
laws was largely irrelevant (p. 6) since segregation 
resulted from residential separation. ~ause state law 
noC~~£-c,.._~ (~.AA..-~~~ 
is i~i the operative~factor in the S~uth{ there is no J 
factual basis for distinguishing between northern and 
southern metropolitan districts. The second thread is 
the change in constitutional rationale, i.e., while Brown 
espouced a limited negative right to be free from compelled 
separation, later cases, such as Swann, have established 
an affirmative right to an integrated education. When the 
--3--
rationale was negative, it made sense to apply it only to 
wipe away state-imposed separation and substituting some-
thing like freedom of choice, But, if the rationale 
is a right to an integrated education it should make little 
difference to the disadvantaged class whether segregation 
is caused by old state laws or by residential patterns. 
From your subsequent commentary I judge that you are relyin~ 
primarily on the latter reason for saying that de jure/ de 
facto is unprincipled, but it is not quite clear. If you 
are relying on both I think you might more clearly state 
your dual reliance. I don't think that there should be 
any doubt in the reader's mind as to why you reject the 
distinction. 
(4) On pp 9, 11 and fn 10 you emphasize that the 
constitutional right now should be defined as a right to 
li.I.I.HdiFtiA an education in an "integrated school system." 
WOY have you focused on the system rather than the individual 
school? Are blacks any less disadvantaged if they attend 
an all-black school in an integrated system than if they 
attend an all-black school in an unintegrated system? If 
you continue to focus on "rights" I think you need to ex-
plain this inconsistency (especially since you seem to 
regard the cause of segregation as essentially irrelevant). 
(5) As Bill's memo indicated, I think there is a 
s~ious __ 9uestion about your reliance:_~on~mporia. The 
...... , .. ~ ...__..,............._......,~_..,....,-.-,.--,~-... -___..,__,__ 
Ct's opinion is careful to explain that it rests on cases 
like Green and Monroe which involve only the remedial 
question. There was no effort in Emporia to decide whether 
there was a constitutional violationr it was conceded that 
--4--
Emporia had imposed segregation as a matter of law and that 
it, threfore, had an affirmative duty to dismantle that 
system. The only question in the case, then, was whether 
the City's withdrawal from the system furtheredior 
~ 
impeded the performance of that duty. For this purpose 
" 
the intent or motive for the City's action was irrelevant; 
the only question was one of effect, i.e., a simple factual 
question whether the plan operated to assist or impede iii 
integration. The manner in which you read the case sounds 
much like the way the CA4 handled the case. That is,the 
CA4 treated the question as whether the act of setting up 
the new system had a segregatory purpose or discriminatory 
purpose. Under traditional analysis though that question 
was as immaterial as whether freedom of choicej,free transfer, 
or neighborhood schools have a segregatory purpose. (You 
l
~ might shif#t your argument to another place ~~ opinion, 
state that you now agree with the reasoning, and urge that 
~·~--............. -~---- ..._---
it be applied throughout the country. But, as is, I do ---.__...-..-----
not think that "fair-minded lawyers" will find this a 
satisfactory handling of a recent case.) 
(6) On page 26 you might consider substituting your 
own cite to the Augusta school case from last summer for 
the cite to the CJ's in chambers opinion. You also might 
cite the companion case to Swann, styled North Carolina 
State Bd v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 in which the Ct struck down 
a state law which prohibited busing to achieve racial 
balance. The language is close to that you use. 
(7) At pp 20-21 you state that Swann approved 





.;2 ;;~. .. 0;'"-~u.-11-~ 
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state that the "far-reaching contours" of Swann may have 
caused other lower cts to enter "similar decrees." You 
drop a footnote (17) citing several cases i~volving extensive 
busing (Thompson 40 minutes to 1 hr each waYJ Northcross 
34 minutes with more to come; Potts 2 hrs and 20 minutes 
each way). These examples might lead one to believe that 
Swann sanctioned lengthy an onerous bus rides, yet the 
opinion states that the average ride was only 7 miles and 
that the longest rides would not be over 35 minutes. All 
this occurred in a school district which bused students 
prior to this Ct's decision an average of 15 miles and 
an average of over 1 hour. It was also a system in which, 
prior to integration, the most busing was done by elementary 
children and in which "four and five-year-olds traveled I~ 
the longest routes in the system." On these facts it is ~tt.--­
hard to understand how Swann's decreee, as distinguished ~ ......,.._..,._,....__ 
from its broader language, can be said to be responsible ~· 
for other more extensive orders. If you are going to emphasize 
the factual contour4s of Swann and compare it with other decrees 
I think you have to face this factual problem. 
(8) Somewhere in your discussion of neighborhood 
schools, possible in the paragraph on page 24, you might con-
sider whether you should cite approvingly the Ct's decision 
in Davis v. Bd of School Commissioners, 402 U.S. 33. This 
is the Mobile case in which the DC and the school bd relied 
on "neighborhood school zoning for elementary children and 
tthe conseqmence was substantial segregation. The Ct there 
said, much as you do on page 21, that "neighborhood school 
zoning" is not per se adequate to meet the remedial respon-
sibilities of local boards." I think you would improve 
--6-- ~~ 
the position you have consistently~ i.e.,that you would not 
overrule Swann, by citing the facts in Mobile and Swann 
and stating that, at least under the facts of those cases, 
student transportation was justified. I think you are close 
to saying that now (pp 25-26 and fn 25). 
(9) At some point, either in the first or second 
parts if the opinion, I think you need to discuss what 
the values of integration are. When you reject de jure/ ----......____..--·--
de facto it is because, at least in part, there is a 
right shared by all alike to an integrated education. 
You accept that interest yet you ascribe to it no si&ni-
ficant importance in the text of your opinion. If you are --------....--.--------------.... --,,..,..,----··~~.----..-.... -,._.~ ... -..... --
balancing interests you might consider giving some space to 
the reasons underlying integrated education so that it 
appears honestly to stand on the same scales with the 
children and parental interests in neighborhood schools and 
in an settled educational environment. In so doing, I would 
also delete the qumtation to William Rasberry (p 32). Whether 
some blacks find it offensive to be forced to go to school 
with whites seems beyond the question. It seems to me that 
your sentence following the quote fully undercuts it but 
its presence at all demeans the interest involved. Also 
you might consider cutting out the paragraph (pp31-32) 
suggesting that busing is punishment meted out to innocent 
children. It is similar to the language in fn 24 in which 
you state that some commentators have regarded integrative 
ga 
bus rides as atonement for prior segretory trips. Such 
language tends to belittle the benefits of integration. 
I do not think that federal judges have imposed busing orders 
--7--
to punish or extract atonement from innocent children. 
Rather they have done so in order to provide an integrated 
educational environment. The tone of your opinion at 
present is good but I think it would be improved if 
~~ -~·''<'>-·~ ~---............. __ ..... __ ,...,..,,. ... ~~-"'·.----·-~ ....... ...._ .. - -
you (1) 
and (2) 
attach a discussion of the value of integration 
___...~\~~-.....,_,.__..,... . ....,__...__.. 
delete any suggestion that student transportation 
---~---.... ~--···~~--~-,-·----'"""'·-... -......_,_,,_.. __ ,._..,_......-r_.,.....,~-'--·~ 
has any punitive overtones. 
~--·""""-... ~ .. ,.··"''......._.,,.,~ .... ·<>·'"' .................. ~,..._ 
(10) There is another argument that I would like to 
see the opinion at least aknowledge. You have assumed that 
busing is most detrimental to little children and you are 
given to cue to do so by Swann itself. But I wonder whether 
other considerations might temper that conclusion. I 
think some studlies have found that integration--if one of 
~:;;-,..,~·.e~·~ .. -,, ___ ,.....,., ___ ,.._::,.~.~- .... -."'"""'"'""•'"' "'""""'·---·-~--~·~--....... ..,.,.,___...,_.-.._ .... ___ ~ 
its purposes is to provide an environment in which blacks 
and whites can learn to live together and to understand 
each other--is most effective at the grade school level. 
~---------" .. ~-------.------·-
Little children are lacking in the defense mechanisms 
which older children and adults have nurtured over the 
years. I am reminded of a book Jay suggested to me, Willie 
Mortis's Yazoo, in which he discusses the first days of 
integration after Alexander in Mississippi. The grade schoml 
kids would pal around together and imingle readily; the racial 
attitudes the the parents proved more inconsequential to 
the young than to those in high school. A similar Westing-
house documentary on TV several weeks ago also reflected the 
written 
same general conclusion. Possibly/empirical studlies have 
~ . either approved or rejected this notion. Related to this 
~~- ~phenomenon is the fact that, some would argue, busing harms - ~ ~~-~  high school kids more than it does grade schoolers because 
t-t..A-..., ~ ~~ w~. ~ ~ ~ _oo., .. • <e ~A ,k.o--/.:.1 J..t...d" 
f ~ ~ ~. 4)..-.., ~<..:::1 ~ 
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the high school environment is centered significantly around 
extracurricular activities {yearbook, athletics, band, etc) 
many of which require participation during nonschool hours. 
Students relegated to school bus transportation may be de-
prived of this opportunity. As a result their high school 
experience might be made a more bitter one and less rewarding. 
And, they might view ineegration as the cause of this 
deprivation, thereby exascerbating the difficulty of 
effective efforts at useful integration. 
I think that this problem deserves some consideration 
primarily because I believe that you would want readers of 
your opinion to believe that you are sensitive to the 
benefits of racial harmony in the educational process. 
Your opinion might suggest that school boards might well I~~ 
view elementary schools as the most appropriate place to ~ 
~-
launch efforts at integration. ti"f  
~· 
I have made one or two language suggestions that I 
will show Jay, but this is all of my general reactions and 
suggestions. In the main I think that your opinion is 
~suasive and makes considerable sense. Your appraach 
suggests a rational manner in which to deal with the 
problems of expanding Brown into the North. It is also the 
hardest thing to write that I have seen this Term or last. 
It requires the sort of careful use of language that you 
have employed. I will be glad to contribute in any other 




a. a LI'P' a Cbabera Draft of lftt• y. lcbttl Plat 191. 1 
My c-nta ¥111 proceed 1n, u far aa peeelble, the 
order of the opln.lon. 
(1) Oft p- S J0U dliCUII GDIQ an.cl tnapbaalse that 
tbe •atfirllative duty• irlpolhtd tber:e vaa •proper• ln llabt 
of the fact that freedoll of choice vaa a •eubterfuae. • You 
peint out twin in the parap'11Pb that New :rant 11 a rural 
eohool cU.atrlct with no neidentlal HSH~ .. tlon and noM 
of the probl_. of urbu. achoola. lither in text or notea 
JOU •l&ht oenaider dlecuaein& GrMD' • two OOIIPanlon cuea, 
pegey & Mpgnt. "M' .. _. COIIJ)atlble vlth your vl.eva 
re Qrnp but Mrlprot doea preHnt a probl•. J.cklon, 
Teameaaee, the city fftMI vhl.oh tllftl'll c_, baa 7600 
ltudenta in the eyat .. and baa conaiderable r:ealdentlal 
aesnsatlon. AI a factual utter lt •- that -
falla a--.r:e 1n betwen Qrnp and SVMQ• lt'a not rural 
but lta not •tropelltan. And, JOU •l&ht conclude tbat, u 
in Qnfp, the intearatlon plan in tMprgt, wbl.ob called for 
a fne•tranafer plan, vaa a aubterfuse. I think, tlwnfon, 
that you can handle Meprgt but I wncter ,._thor you ehould 
cenaicler aoftent.ns tbe notion that then vat an alm.tpt 
chan&e between Qnta and SVMP• 
(2) Your hletorloal analraia (pp 5-7) of thle Ct'a 
declalona J._,• fi'OII Gnta to lytgn. You bave net dlaouaaecl 
the place that Al......,. y. 1111- Qtx pl&)'a in thia 
wolutionary pnceaa. Alg•gster aay not be dlnotl)' pertl• 
nent to your tbeala becauM it cteala with tbe problea of 
clel&J •re than anythln& elH. But, t1w A1ttvm'tr order 
affected - 30 aobool dlatrlota in Mlaal.aalpp1 and ~ 
• --2--tbeullaanda of cht.lctren. • !be Supre. Ct oplrd.on 11 o17Jtlc 
and clwold of factual detail an.ct I do net recall without 
•" nMaroh wbether any of t:Mae Mlaat.aat.ppl dlatrlcta 
wre urban (JaokHn, for lnatance). the CAS oplnlona 
wuld dlaoloM thla f~~et. But, tbe l.llportut pot.nt .... 
to be that lf there wre urball 8Cboel ayat_. lnvelwcl 
there lt •laht undercut :rour aut-nt that there vu 
a f'und.-ntally new and dltferent factual al~tlon vben 
'WDD ~ twre. On. tbe ether band, t.f the dlaulota •n 
all Nral lt •labt buttreaa your polnt. 
(3) In your dlaouaat.on of why the dtt tyn/ df {Mtt 
ellatlnctt.on t.a unprlnolpled, I - two tbreada llut I a not 
aure 'tlbt.cb one la naponalble for nndert.na the dlatlnctt.on 
unprlnolpled, or 111betber both reuoq pertain. I •ulcl 
call the flnt thnad tbrt rural•urban abltt, J.a.t..., 1n rural 
aoboet dlatr't.cta not cb&racterlaed by neW reat.cla\tt.al 
aeparatlon Han&atlon ln the aohooll wu clearly a reault, 
1n tbe &eutb, of the operattlon of atate law, but ln the 
•tnpelltan anaa ·t.n the leutb tbl exlat:ence ef atate 
1.,. waa laqely lftelevant (p, 6) 1t.nce aesreaatt.on 
naulted fi'OII na1dent:lal ..,_.att.on. lecauM atate law 
not 
l.a ... the operatlw f.ator 1n the ltouth, there t.a no 
factual bull for dl.ltt.nsulablna bltwen .nortberll and 
aoutbem •U'OP011taa dlatrt.cta. · n. aee.-rut tbl'ead la 
the chanaft la oonatltutt.onal ratt.Oilale, .a..a... vb.lle Jnw 
eapouoed a lllllted neaatlve rlsbt to be free fro~~ OOIIIMtlled 
aeparatl.on, later caae1, al.lch a SJIIM• have eatabllabecl 
an atfll'llatlve rlsht to an lnteanted eclueatt.en. lllen the 
__ , __ 
ratlonale wu neaats.ve, t.t Ude MnM to applJ t.t only to 
wt.pe ..., atate•i.Jipoaed aepuatlon and aubatltutlna eoae• 
tbl.na lU. fneda of cbctlce. But, if tbe ntlonale 
u a d.abt to 8ft lnte&l"ated ectueatt.on lt abeuld .ue little 
difference to the dleadvant-sed clua ,._tber Hlft&&tt.on 
la oauaed by old atate lava er bJ naldentlal patteZOM. 
rna JOUr tubeec~Uent •-•tai'J I judse tbat JOU are relylna 
prlui'S.ly on the latter nuen tor a&Ji.na that sit 1sani dl 
C•ta 1e unprt.nolpled, but lt tA •t caulte clear. It you 
are ret:rt.na on both I think )'OU •labt ..-e clearly state 
your dual nllance. I don't think tbat there eheuld be 
ar doubt 1n tbe aacter•a •J.ftd u to wbJ ,.u reject the 
dlatlraotloa• 
(4) Oa pp '• 11 and tn 10 JOU eiiPbaalH tbat the 
oonatltutlonal ri.aht now abould M defined u a rlsbt to 
MtiMIM an eduoatlon ln an •t.ntearated aohool a)'atft& ~ 
WD1 have you toouaed Oft t1w ••• rather than the lndlvldual 
aoboel t AN bleekl an)' teaa dlaadYantased lf tbiJ attend 
an alt•bl•k aobool 1n an ll'ltesrated a)'ata than t.t they 
attend an all•blMk achool lrt an unlntesrated ayateat It 
,.u eontt..nue te focut on •rt.ahta• I thlnk you -.d to ex• 
plain thla laconelatenay (eapeclalty alace you - to 
reprd the oauae of Msn&atloft aa eaMntlallJ irrelevant). 
(5) Aa Blll'a - lndloated, I thlak tbere 1a a 
..now. caueatlon allout JOUI' nllance oft_.,.. The 
Ct'a opl.alon 18 oueful to ~laln that 1~ nata on e&Ma 
lllce CIIMD and - tlbt.eh t.nvotve only· the reMC!lal 
.-.ts.on. 'lben wu no effort 1a -da: to deelcle waetber 
then waa a eonatltutlonal vlolatt.ona · lt • wu conceded tbat 
• ..,Ia bad t,...ed ._,.aact.on aa a •tter of law and tbat lt• tbl'eton, hacl an atftnative dut.J to dl ... tle that 
.,._.. The onl1 ••tt.en 1n t:M cue, theft, _. whether 
the Ciey'a vlthdraat fro• the.,.~ fUI't:bencltor 
t.alpeded tbe ped'oaanoe ot that clut)'. Fer thl.a purpoH 
the t.n.tent or •tlve for the Clt.J'• action wu ln'el•ant.t 
tbe oal)' caueatt.on vu oae of eftt~et• 1·••• a alllple fetual 
fiUeati.H. -.tbft tbe plaa operated to aaalat or I.Jipede Ml 
lnteant.ion. 1.'he • .,..,... ln whloh JOU nad tbe o- aouada 
auch lt.ke tbe _, the CM baad1ecl the c-. that. t.a • tbtt 
CA4 tnated the ...-t.t.on u metber tbe •t of Httl.ns up 
the new .,.~ had a -sator, purpo• or cJlaerillinatery 
JMII'I'*ae. Uadw trad1t1ona1 analyala tbDuah that queatl.on 
vu aa s.-&te.rlal aa whether fnedoa of olwle ... fne truafer, 
or aeisbbodwod IObOela haw a HP'8Ptol7 purpoH. (You 
•t.aht ahitft ,.ur -. ... nt te anott.r pl•• .t.ft the opt.nt.on., 
ata'te that JOU.., ~PM with the reuoat.na, and uqe that 
it 118 appllecl tbnulbeut the oountr)'. Jut, aa la, I de 
not think that "fatr-•lllclecl lav:Jen• will tlnd thla a 
aatlafMtoJ? baadllna of a·. recut c-.). 
(6) On •- 26 JOU •labt oonalder aubatltutlna ,.ur 
._ olte to the Aupata aobool oaae fro. last· •~r ·tor 
the ot.te to tbe CJ' • 1n. ehaa.._. oplnt.en. You alae ·~ 
olte the oeapant.oa 0- to -... at)'led fMnb r ... ,.,, .. \'\ 
''i 
' •· •. \ l '.' \ 
S!ttf M x. beAD• 402 u.s. 43 1.a whlbh tb8 ce auuek ~ 
a atate law vbioh piOhlblted bual.na to Mblwe rao1a1·· , f 
i'\.. 
balaaee. lbe 1....-ae la ot ... to that yeu uae. ' .\ \, 
ll' \ 
(7) At pp 20·21 )'OU •tate that _, appnved I ;; !, ·, .,.~ 
I• l I , 
"ateMlve tranetortatl.oa of el-tal7 puplla. • Yea ''U."' ': 
' 4 0. . ',r . ~ 
.. , .... 
r ltate that the •tar•reachtna conta~ra• of laM 11&1 baM 
'I 
) 
\caused other tower eta to enter •aw11ar cteonea.• You. 
'drop a fMtnote (t 7) cltt.Ds aeftn1 ouea ln¥olv1Da ateu1ve 
buatn& ('DM!MP 40 alnutea to 1 br eaab _,, BtntiPDM 
34 alnutea vlth ..n to 0-· ruu 2 hn and 20 alnut• 
••h va)'). tbHe .......,1ea allbt: lead.,. to Jaell.eve tbat: 
laM auctt.onecl leaatbJ an ... nua bua l'lctea. ,.t t:be 
oplnt.on atatee tbat t1w ave~ rlcle vu oal)' 7 al.lea and 
that tbe ltJv&tlti rJAII wuld •t be ever 35 al.mltQ. All 
tbla ocou:n:'ed ln a eobaol dlstrlot tdllob bused atudeata 
priol' to tbla et•a cteelat.on art..-- of 15 alt .. aacl 
an averaae of eMil' 1 botJI'. It _. alao a a)'lt• l.n wbloh, 
prl.or to lnte8fttlen, the ••t llwllns vaa ctene bJ tls ?Dt•n 
ohllctren and 1n ..tllch •to\d' aDCl flw-,.ar•olda ts-aYel.ect 
the lons•t routee ln the •J•ta· • On theM f•t• lt t.a 
hard to Wlderatanct bow Man'• deoreee. u dlatt.aaulaW 
from lta broader tanauaae. ean be aald to. M napoull»le 
for ether •ze exteaalve orders. If )'OU U'8 &Olna tO eiiPbUlse 
the f•tual eontotda of k-P ucl OOIIPaft t.t vltb otber dtloi'Ma 
I thlnk J'OU have te f•e tbll fMtual probl•• 
(8) .. ..._.. ln JOUI' dltouaalen of aelshiMtltiOOd 
aoboola, poulble ln the puaarapb. on,... 24,, reu •llht oon-
elcleJ:' 1fhethft JOU abould ot.te approvln&lY tbe Ct'a ~llt.en 
1n DAYS.. v. 14" ••t Qtwh•iiMa• 402 u~s. ·33 •. tbt.a 
la tbe ...._,ltlle c- 1.n wbt.ob t1w DC aa.d ta. acboOl lid nlW 
en ••l&hbodllod aebeol IIOilla& for el~UQ oblldrea aad 
tt. ~ vu etabetantlal ~clon. "Dle Ct the~ 
aald, ..m .. ,.u do - Pas- 21. that .. lab .. dleed .0~1 
801\ln&• la aot per ae ....,..te to -t the ~dlal napon• 
albllltt.• •f local llouu. • I tbt.ralc. you wuld blpswe ·. 
I ' , I 
·-6-· 
, tbe poat.tlon ,_ have ooft81atentl)', l.•lt.•th&t ,.u would not 
·· ..... rule IYMR• 16' oltl.ng tbe f•t• t.n Mobile and Swann 
a4 •tatlna tbat, at lMat under the feeta ef those e ... ,, 
atu.lent uanaportatl.on wu juat1fled. I think JOU an cloee 
to ..,i.Da tbat nov (pp 25•26 and fn 15). 
(9) At 8088 point, et.ther 1n the fl.rat or second 
P8fta if the opt.n.t.on.. I thlnk you need to dt.souaa 'tlb.at 
the valuee of lntepatlon .... lbln 10U reject a• tug/ 
dt , .. lt 1a heoauae. at ~t: 1n part, there l.a a 
rlabt lbarec1 b1 all alike to • lntepated edueatt.en. 
Yeu ... ,t tbat i.llt_...t ,.t JOU asert.be to lt no at.&nl· 
fleut l.llportanoe ln the text of ,our oplnl.on. If 10U are 
lllllanolna lntel*lta you at.aht conat.cter at.vt.ng - •PIIC8 to 
ta. re-u uaderl)'ln& integrated education so that t.t 
appears bonHtl)' to au.nct on the •- eoalea vltb the 
oltlldnn and panatal t.ntereau 1n nelahltorbood achoola and 
t.D an Httled eduoatloaal envt.J:o~t. la eo doing, I would 
also delete tblt quitatt.on to W1111aa Basbeft7 (p 32). llletber 
- 11»1Mka flncl lt otfeulve to be forced to so to acbool 
vltll -'tl.tM •••• be,ond the •••tlon. It -• to • that 
,..- HDtenoe follovt.ns the quote tullJ undei'Outs lt llut 
,.u •tabt oout.cter outtlns out the paraai'&Ph (pp31·3Z) 
auaae•t'• tbat bualns u puaut.en.t aetect out to lnnocent 
eht.lclnft. It I.e el.llt.lu to the lanaU~~Se 1n tn 24 1n eta 
JOU atace that ... oo-.ntaton baVe re&arded lntegratlve 
sa 
bua rl.clea .. atoneMnt fo~ prior aeantOJ:)' trips. SUch 
1 ...... tenda to bell.ttle tbl beneflta of l.ntesntt.on. 
I do not tbt.Rk tbat federal judaea bave lapoeed tuat.ns ordera 
-·7·· 
to puni.lh or extract ato~ent froa lnnooent children. 
Rather they have done ao 1n order to provide an lntesrated 
eduoational envlronaent. 'lhe tone of your opinion at 
pr:.Mn.t 1a aood ~Jut 1 think lt wuld be t.mproved 1f 
you (1) attach a dlacuae1on of the value of ln.tegratlon 
and (2) delete an:v auueation tbat student transportation 
baa any pun1t1ve overtones. 
(10) then 1a another ~t that I wuld llke to 
eee the opl.nloa at teut almowleqe. You have ueu.d that 
W.t.ag 1a ••t dout..o.ul to llttle ohlld:r:en and you are 
siven to oue co do -.. by 'ann 1teelt. But I vonct.r vhetber 
other conaldera.tt.ona •labt taper tbat oonelwd.on. I 
think •• atudtt.ee have foWlfl that i.ftteant1on••lf one ef 
lta ~-· ie to PI'OVlde an envll'onment ln vblch bl•u 
and Wh1t:Aie -.n. leun to lt.ve toaetber and to undentand 
each otber••l.a ••t effective at the arade achoel level. 
Little ehildnn ue laold.ns in the defeue .chanlau 
wtd.eh older ebllctren and adults have nurtund over tbe 
,.... I • realndtld of a book J&J auueat-' to •• W111le 
'M)riis'e •w• 1n wbloh be dt.aeuaaes the flrat dqa of 
t.nbaration after ttnte"'t t.n .Mlaalaalppt.. 1he srade eobotl 
k1da wuld pal &l"GWld tosettaer Del lml.nsle readt.lyt the rMlal 
attltud• the tbe parents pl'OWCI .re t.noonMC~Uentlal to 
the )'OUNI than to tboae t.n hlgh aoboel.. A ala11ar weatt.ns• 
' 
houee deeUIIentary on TV MVeral vaekl.· ago··· also reneoted the 
Wltte.n 
- senaral conclualon. Poaa1bly/e~aplrleal atudt11ea have 
either appJ:OVed or rejeCted th1a notton~ Related to· tld.a 
pbenoaenen t.e the t•t <that, .. would csue, bwti.J18 ha1:'U 
'I : ~ I 
hiab Hbool ld.48 110ft than lt doea &rade .aoboolere becatH 
.. 
• the hlab school environment ls eantered ei&nt.f1cantly uouad extraourr1cular aot1v1t1es (78arbook, athletlca. band. eta) 
ntanJ of Vhloh recaulft putic1patton durin& noD80hool houn. 
Students Nlqated to eehoot bus transportation 11a7 lte cltt• 
pd.ved et thl.e oppoftuniey. Aa a nault thelr hisb aobool 
experlenee 111sht be made a aon bitter one and leaa 1'8WU'dl.na· 
And• they •laht vl.ew ineep-atlon aa the eauee o! thla 
deprlvaclen, thereby exucertatln& the difficulty of 
effective efforte at uaeful 1ntesrat1on. 
I think that thls pre'blell clea.:.rYea eoae conaideratl.oa 
prlturr11)' beeauae I 1Mt11ew that ,ou would want readere of 
your opt.nlon to believe tbat JOU are aenaltl.ve to the 
beneflta of racial bal:'IIOn)' f.n the eduoatlttnal pl'OCeaa. 
Your opinion •icht auueat that echoot bouds sa18ht well 
vtew eleaentar)' sohoola u the 110at: approprl.&te place to 
laanoh eftorte at integration. 
I haVe ac:te one or tw ·lan&uege augeationa that 1 
will ebov Jttt-. but t!d.a la all ot ray seneral reactiona aAd 
sugest1ona. In the 11&111 I think that your op1n1on 1.8 
.-.uaat.ve and makes eona1derable a.nae. Yeur apprueh 
St188eata a rational 11.1r1J118r 1n wtd.eh to deal with the 
protJ1- of exPanding IL'PD l.nto the Nerth. It 1s alao tbe 
llaNest thing to wrlte that I have aeen th:la Ten. or lut. 
It requifta the eort of careful ue of tanauaae that J'OU 
have eaplo)'ed. I w111 be slad to contribute 1n any other 
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This memorandum, n<X intended by any means to be exhaustiv~ 
or to refiect more than questions for us to dlscuss, is dictated prepatory 
for our conference this afternoon: 
1. We must decide as between duty affirmatively to operate 
"an integrated school system" or to operate a desegregated school system. " 
At least one member of the Court, as you lmow, informed me recently 
that all prior opinions have been careful to express the obligation in terms 
of "desegregation". I have n<X check to verify this statement, I wonder, 
however, whether there is In reality a disttnctim. In this cc:mnectim, 
take a look at a rought draft of a memo I wr<Xe on January 5, addressing 
the language in Swann to the effect - in substance that once a system has 
been desegregated the problem is solved and the courts turn responsibillty 
back to the school board. Even if one accepts this view as being realistic 
when Swann was written, do you think it has any continuing vitality in light 
of Bill Brennan's opinion in Keyes? In theory, perhaps 1t could be argued 
that once the Denver school board has desegregated the Denver schools 
in accordance with the SWann formula, 1t could then forget the matter and 
2. 
and allow soclo/ecaa.omlc forces to resegregate the schools, as they surely 
would. Do you find anythta 1n Brennan's opinion whlcb. would allow 
thts? I am inclined to think that hts opinicm places a caa.tinuing and 
affirmative duty to do what ts necessary to preserve desegregated schools 
(or integrated schools). 
This is a delicate question and cme rather fundamental to our 
poetticm. My opinion would certainly cc:mtemplate a continuing duty on 
the school board, as the instrumentality of the state, to take reascmable 
steps- with due regard to the various interests- to maintain and operate 
a desegregated (integrated) system. WhUe I believe realistically that thts 
is where the Court is certain to end up, where do you consider we are 
at this point? 
2. Larry suggests that the tcme of my opinion ts good, but might 
be improved if (1) we discussed the value of integration, and (ii) deleted 
~Y suggestion that student transportation and any punitive overtcmes. 
point 
As to Larry's first'_. here, I think we might add a sentence 
in the text at an appropriate place stating that the Court has steadfastly 
aclmowledged since Brown Illlllla the merits of a desegregated educaticm, 
and then perhaps quote some of the appropriate language in a footnote. 
I would be careful to make tt clear that the advantage and to which all 
would agree relates to the pluraltstic nature· of our society making tt 
3. 
essential that citizens of all races learn til: at an early age to live, wor~ 
play and cooperate with each other. A seeood advantage which I certainly 
recognize is that undoubtedly there is psychological damage to any minority 
resulting from discrimination or even the feeling that others regard them 
as inferior. Yet, if we do a footnote along these lines, I think we should 
also add that the advantages in terms of accelerating the learning process 
are stUl being debated inconclusively by the scholars. Kere you could 
cite Coleman, Monihan, Jenks and perhaps others. I would, however, 
emphasize the affirmative aspects of desegregation, namely, our 
pluralistic society and the operation of a school system which cannot ""*' 
fairly be said to cause minority chUdren to feel demeaned or discriminated 
against. I personally doubt very much that mixing the races in the schools 
wUl have any significant effect oo elevating the learning abUity or the 
ultimate quality of the education. Soeio-ecooomic background are far, 
far more relevant than race or racial mixing. 
Larry's second point presumably refers to the statement of page 31 
as to "some retributive theory". I do not want to abandon the paragraph, 
but suggest a revision of the last sentence to read as follows: 
"It would indeed be a novel applicatioo of equitable power -
not to mention a dubious extensioo of cODStitutional doctrine -
to apply some retributive theory which would employ 
extensive transportation of students in disregard of other 
interests for the purpose of achieving a greater degree of 
forced desegregatioo than would have resulted from purely 
natural and neutral non-state causes." 
3. In connection with Larry's first point, discussed in the foregoing 
paragraphs, 1f we add a foctncte discussing the merits of integration along 
the lines I menttmed, and with the caveat as to whether integrated schools 
improve the quality of education and leaming ability, we can omit entirely 
the sentence at the bottom of page 32 and the accompanying footnote in 
which you quote Rasberry. 
4. Larry makes a point that some authorities think lntegrattc:m 
at the elementary level is the most important time. If there were no factors 
to the contrary, his point would have coosideral:Mie weight. I do believe 
that the younger children are, less likely to develop racial coosciousness. 
But the principal thrust of our opinion is the necessity of balancing in a 
rational manner the complex matrix of interests which are involved, doing 
this in a way that achieves certain objective Bilk without destroying 
other values. 
At page 33, the opinion summarizes the advantages of neighborhood 
schools and the disruptioo. caused particularly by transportation of 
elementary age children. This is my convietic:m and I do not want to change 
the emphasis. We might, however, add a fodnote on this page generally 
alone the lines Larry suggests, .!· !: , recogntzing that there are some 
advantages in commencing as early as practicable the integrative experience, 
but these advantages are outweighed by the disadvantages setf forth in the 
• 
$. 
text. Perhaps also 1n this note - or 1n anc:ther ncte as some appropriate 
place, we might make the point which 1s embodied somewhere - as I 
recall- in my draft of January 2, 1973 -that the psychologlcallmpact 
of a segregated system (emphasized by Chief Justice Warllll in Brown) 
is certainly ameliorated if the system itself is a desegregated ODe, so 
that the chUd lmows - and may be assured by its parents from the outset -
that in due time there will be an opportunity even for the child most 
deeply situated in a ghetto area to have a biracial school experience. 
In such a system there would be neighborhood schools many of which 
would be integrated, through the d:her techniques we have mentioned. 
The level of integration would increase at the junior high level, as the 
"neighbool" or "community" expands, and finally- at the high school 
level - an integrated experience would be inevitable in cities with 
substantial racial m1x. Thus, there would always be both the promise 
and the assurance of opportunities which should remove the psychological 
hurt so emphasized in Brown L 
~r. 
5. Returning now to Larry's memorandum, in the order of its 
numbered paragraphs, I see no great problem with respect to his No. 1 
and No. 2. You might drop a footnote after citing Green that refers 
to Raney and Monroe. Green was the decisiODal case; Raney, according 
6. 
to Larry, was also a strictly a rural county, and Monroe also was essentially 
rural - involving 7600 students and in no way comparable to a large 
metropolitan city or area. 
As Swann relied em Green (and placed no emphasis em Aleaander) 
I think we can ignore Alexander unless you want to add it to a foctnote 
somewhere. 
As to Larry's No. 3, he sees ''two threads" in our de jure/de facto 
dtscusston. He is as right as to what we rely an primarUy, namely, that 
it can make no difference to the disadvantaged class whether its 
d.lsadvantage is caused by lmg since invalidated state laws or by the 
failure of a school board to take all appropriate remedial steps to maintain 
a desegregated system. 
Larry's "first thread", as he reads our opinim, is that in the 
metropolitan areas in the South the existence of segregatory laws is largely 
irrelevant. I do think this is true, and yet I believe Larry has failed to 
identify the single most important "thread" for my view that the 
dtstinctlm no longer has a principled basts, namely, the extension by 
the Brennan opinion in Keyes of the affirmative duty doctrine to Denver, 
where the only "state action" has been that of the school board. This 
means that a prima facie case of unlawful segregatioo can probably be 
made in every city in the United states where there is a substantial 
........... ____________________ _ 
'1. 
minority population. 
6. In bls paragraph 4, Larry Inquires wby we focus oo "system" 
aaldng U blacks are any less disadvantaged U they alblll attend a single 
all blaek a•••K school In an integrated system? I think our opinion 
auwers this. If n~ we should make it perfectly clear. The answer 
fundamentally is that- as Potter Stewart has said a number of times in 
conference - a school system may be integrated (or fully desegregated) 
with all white and all black school remaining. If the residential patterns 
are so deep that all reascmable remedial remedies are unavailable, 
especially at the elementary ages when due C<Xl&ideration is given to the 
values of neighborhood schools, there will certatnly be all white and all 
black schools. The "right" 1s not personalized in the sense that any 
particular child may demand the right to attend a xa mixed schooL 
Nor may any particular cbild demand the right not to attend such school 
or even not to be transported. The right is ooe shared with all children 
within the school district to have the school system operated in a ccmstitutional 
meaning that the system itself must be desegregated and so maintained 
by all appropriate means and with due regard to all relevant rights and 
interests. Perhaps, in view of Larry's question, we might add a sentence 
or two in the footnote which defines the characteristics of an integrated 
school system. 
8. 
In his No. 5, Larry questicms our reliance em Emporia. We have 
discussed this before. It may be that - for the reascm Larry suggests -
we have given it too prominent a place In our argument. I wwld certainly 
not omit it entirely, nor omit the quoted language. Perhaps it wCilld be 
prudent to de-emphasize our reliance em it, either by shifting most of It 
to the notes or by a more extended analysis of what the Court decided. 
(Or by a combination of both). I am not persuaded, without rereading 
Emporia, that Larry interprets the decisicm in the way that I did. 
6. I don't understand Larry's No. 6. 
7. Larry,'s No. 7 as to the transportatioo statistics does require 
careful consideraticm. I think he is right about the prior extensive 
busing of elementary chUdren in Charlotte/Mecklenburg. 'lb.a-e the 
school district embraced :tax the entire county as well as the city. 
Possibly the thing II to do is omit all examples or perhaps only leave in 
Potts, characterizing it as the most extreme case which has come to my 
attention. 
It is true, as Larry suggests, that there is some broad language 
in SWann which Bickel mentioned, namely, the statement at p. 26 to the 
effect that a court must require ''the greatest possible degree of actual 
desegregation. " See my discussion of this oo p. 50 of my rough draft 
of Jan. 2. If construed literally, this extreme language would require 
an intolerable disruption of education in every major city in the United 
9. 
states. Transportattcm is a logiltical problem and if enough money is 
provided, all of the chUdren tn Harlem could be bused to the remote areas 
of the ether borroughs of New York City and vice versa. But obviously 
8waJm did not intend any such irrational result. In the very same 
paragraph the Court went on to say that no ''per se rule" rm nor "any 
rigid guidelines were tntended. 
I dcm 't feel strongly at all about this, but y011 could add a footnote 
potnttng out that the extreme language - sometimes cited as to greatest 
possible degree of actual desegregaticm, must be read tn its context; 
ctherwtse, its literal appllcatim would mortally wound public educaticm. 
8. I don't get the potnt of La~'s No. 8. 
9. I have already addressed, at the outset of this memorandum, 
Larry's paragraph No. 9. 
10. Likewise I have already commented on hts suggestion in his 
paragraph 10. 
* * * *. 
Larry's analysis of my draft opinion is, as we wmld have expected, 
per ceptive and lawyerlike. I am grateful to him, especially in view of hts 
more enthusiastic attitude toward busing, for such a detached and 
ccmstructive commentary. After you and I have discussed all of these 
points more carefully, we can consider such revtsims as may then seem 
appropriate. 
10. 
We have already discussed BW Kelly's memorandum, and you 
are working on the cooceptual analysts point which seemed meritorious 
to both of us. We wUl talk about some of his other points this afternoon. 
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No. 71-507 Keyes 
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1 am working my way through the revisions in Jfeyes, generally 
with a feeling of satisfaction. 
One nagging problem which cmtinues to exist, however, relates 
to the language we use to describe when (!. !.·, under what circumstances) 
a prima facie case exists of unconstitutionality. We have used different 
terminology and my tinkering with some of the language has not helped 
straighten this out. Please focus oo what we have said especially on 
pages 10 and111, rider A, p. 14-15 and p. 18. There may well be other 
examples. 
Although 1 am not wedded to any precise language, there is 
merit in a fairly high degree of cmsistency on language as critical as 
this. 1 rather like your language on p. 18 which states the necessary 
finding as being that "a public school system remains significantly 
segregated." We should avoid a formulation which would, in effect, 
create a per se rule requiring proof only of the existence of a number 
of all black or all white schools. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WM . .J. BRENNAN . .JR. 
•Jqtt"tm:t <!fond of Urt ~tb .jtatte 
,-aeltittghtn. ~. <!f. 2llc?'l-~ 
April 3, 1973 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE: No. 71-507 Keyes v. School District 
At our original conference discussion of this case, Lewis 
first expressed his view that the de jure/de facto distinction 
should be discarded. I told him then that I too was deeply troubled 
by the distinction. Nevertheless, it appeared that a majority of 
the Court was committed to the view that the distinction should be 
maintained, and I therefore drafted Keyes within the framework 
established in our earlier cases. While I am still convinced that 
my proposed opinion for the Court is, assuming the continued 
vitality of the de jure/de facto distinction, a proper resolution of 
the case, I would be happy indeed to recast the opinion and jettison 
the distinction if a majority of the Court is prepared to do so. 
Although Lewis and I seem to share the view that de facto 
segregation and de jure segregation (as we have previously used 
those terms) should receive like constitutional treatment, we are 
in substantial disagreement, I think, on what that treatment should 
be. Unlike Lewis, I would retain the definition of the "affirmative 
duty to desegregate" that we have set forth in our prior cases, in 
particular Brown II, Green, and Swann. Lewis's approach has the 
virtue of discarding an illogical and unworkable distinction, but 
only at the price of a substantial retreat from our commitment of 
the past twenty years to eliminate all vestiges of state-imposed 
segregation in the public schools. In my view, we can eliminate 
the distinction without cutting back on our commitment, and I would 
gladly do so. I welcome your comments. 
W. J. B. Jr. 
.· 
/~ 
.hp-ttm:t <!fonri ttf tlft ~t~ .jtattg --,~·-"··---
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
.. asftingt~ ~.<If. 2llbi)l.~ {"_9 }~c-~t--r-~ 
/t - --, 
!.~_-, /'}~'-·· 
lLt...:"> ·., 
April 4, 1973 
No. 71-507 - Keyes v. School District 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
This is a comment on Bill Brennan's memorandum of April 
3, in which he expressed the view that my suggested formulation of 
the correct reading of Swann would "constitute a substantial retreat." 
I recognize, of course, that we are dealing here with an 
area in which we all make judgments with relatively few objective 
standards to guide us, and I certainly have great respect for Bill's 
judgment. But I ee1' · 45' do not consider my interpretation of Swann 
to be a "substantial retreat" from the basic constitutional rationale 
of Brown-Swann line of cases. As I have said in Conference, it seems 
to me that some district courts (apparently not considering the total 
context of Swann), have interpreted that opinion too strictly in favor 
of extensive transportation to the detriment of other legitimate interests. 
Bill and I do read Swann differently. As I understand it, he 
would construe Swann as applying the Green formulation to every county, 
city or metropolitan area, regardless of its size and demographic 
characteristics, and as requiring therein the elimination by transporta-
tion and other necessary means of "all vestiges of state-imposed segre-
gation in the public schools." Believing,as I do, that some school 
board (e.g. state) responsibility probably can be shown to exist for the 
extensi'Ve"segregation that exists in every racially mixed metropolitan 
area, the Green formula (prescribed for a rural county with only two 
schools) simply cannot be applied as a constitutional rule of general 
applicability. As Alex Bickel has said: 
"In most of the larger urban areas, demo-
graphic conditions are such that no policy 
that a court can order and a school board, 
a city or even a state has the capability to 
put into effect, will in fact result in the fore-
seeable future in racially balanced public 
-2-
schools. Only a reordering of the environ-
ment involving economic and social policy on 
the broadest conceivable front might have an 
appreciable impact." (see my note 21.) 
Quite apart from the question whether the Constitution authorizes the 
Court (rather than the legislative branch of government) so to reorder 
the economic and social policy of the United States in this way, it seems 
to me that we may place the Court itself in the untenable position of 
enunciating a formula which simply cannot be complied with in many 
school districts without the most serious disruption. 
For these reasons, I have tried to articulate a formula of 
general application which preserves the basic principles of past de-
cisions, which will impose on school authorities continuing obligations 
to achieve integration, and yet one which will not be unworkable for 
the community involved. It is necessary to keep in mind, as one reads 
the entire draft, my identification of the constitutional right which is 
implicated. See pp. 9-12. The right is to attend schools in an integrated 
school system. The correlative duty is on the school board to operate 
such a system. In a sense, this goes beyond any duty heretofore ex-
pressed by the Court. Yet I consider a requirement that school board 
decisions be taken with overall integrative effect (as well as with due 
regard to other relevant interests) as being the most effective way to 
achieve the constitutional mandate that segregatory considerations, 
subtle or otherwise, do not enter into the decisions of public school 
authorities. 
I particularly invite attention to my outline of the contours of 
what constitutes an "integrated school system" (pp. 10, ll). I see in 
these no "retreat" whatever, unless one believes that the only effective 
and constitutional means of achieving ultimate "desegregation" is to 
employ court-compelled transportation in disregard of demographic 
conditions and at the expense of other educational interests. As to the 
employment of transportation, an essential technique in many situations, 
I simply attempt to clarify and rationalize a rule of reason which will 
recognize other legitimate educational and communal values which locali-
ties across the country are entitled to assert. 
I would add only this: having spent 19 years of my adult life 
working in public education, I am convinced that the ultimate goal must 
be the best possible education for all children; that this includes, in view 
. . • 
-3-
of the pluralistic nature of our population in addition to the constitu-
tional mandate, the operation of integrated school systems; it also 
must mean less drastic overseeing by federal courts of the operation 
of the schools by the duly constituted local authorities; and, unless 
we wish to risk ultimately the grave impairment of public school 
education, it means a rule of reason with which school boards and 
widely varying communities can live. 
I do not ask the Court to "retreat" on this vital issue. I do 
indeed urge (1) the adoption of a constitutional rule of national applica-
tion to the effect that all school boards have a duty to operate inte-
grated systems, and (2) a clarification of the meaning of Swann so 
that it is read as expressly authorizing the balancing of all relevant 
interests rather than encouraging transportation to the full extent 
necessary to achieve racial integration, to the detriment of other 
interests and consequences. 
L.F.P.,Jr. 
LFP, Jr. :psf 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
No. 71-507 Keyes v. School District 
This is a comment on Bill Brennan's memorandum of 
April 3, in which he expressed the view that my suggested formulation 
of the correct reading of Swann would "constitute a substantial retreat". 
I recognize, of course, that we are dealing here with an area 
in which we all make judgments with relatively few objective standards 
to guide us. But I certainly do not consider my interpretation of 
Swann to be a "substantial retreat" from the basic constitutional 
rationale of Brown-Swann line of cases. As I have said in Conference, 
it seems to me that district courts (taking a phrase or two out of the 
total context and looking at what was actually approved in Charlotte/ 
~: ....... 
Mecklenburg as being within the broad discretion of~~ li biict 
. h 
courts) .I have misinterpreted the extent to which compelled bus 
transportatloo is required by ~~.:.;-I do read Swann 
~~~~ ciiB differently. ~~<111 consrue a's-~the 
Green formulation to every county, city or metropolitan area, 
4 ~4.._~ ~Jt_ 2. 
~~~~~ 
regardless of its size and emographic characteristics, and as 
~ 
requiring the elimination of "all vestiges of state-imposed 
'\ "" 
segregation in the public schools." Believing, as I do, that some 
p-h'~k~~ 
school board (~. g. state) responsibili~can be demeastPateeVor 
# ft , ' 
the extensive segregation that exists in every racially mixed 
metropolitan area, the Green formula (prescribed for a rural county 
a •. # Ali e :i ;Q r 
with only two schools) simply cannot be apPlled as a constitutional 
~ 
\ 
rule of general applicability. As Alex Bickel has said:_j 
" 
"In most of the larger urban areas, demographic 
conditions are such that no policy that a court can 
order and a school board, a city or even a state has 
the capability to put into effect, will in fact result 
in the foreseeable future in racially balanced public 
schools. Only a reordering of the environment 
involving ecnomic and social policy on the broadest 
conceivable front might have an appreciable impact. " 
(see my note 21). 
Quite apart from the question whether the Constitution authorizes 
~ 
the Court (rather than the legislative branch of government)Jto 
~....dUI- ~E~1.-;z:es*mu~tu.pe the economic and social polic of the United states 
,.( 
'.A ~ I.e·~~ . --..&:"/ ~ fr(.;..:.._ 
in this way,Awe ~hi!Se+k%%UJA4tfliii.Court the untenable position 
of enunciating a formula which~~~~ ~li~t~ 
wiZ4 u..... ~ ~----~~ ~ lllt..""-
may 9~ dise Pedi:hm the CI:M! t a:ftd the entire j ttdic iai ;; 
3. 
For these reasons, I have tried to articulate a formula 
of general application which preserves the basic principles of past 
decisions, which will impose on school authorities continuing 
pressure to achieve integration, and yet one which will not be 
unworkable. It is necessary to keep in mind, as one reads the 
entire draft, my definition of the constitutional right which is 
implicated. See pp. 9-12. The right is to attend schools in an 
"integrated school system". The correlative duty is to operate such 
a system. In a sense, this goes beyond any duty heretofore 
expressed by the Court (prior decisions have referred to a duty to 
/I-~ 
"desegregate"), and even Swann expressly .mftieafes that once 
desegregation has been accomplished no further duty remains - a 
.9~~1... 
view which perieBillly J!eg:ud. as.l\unrealistic and in the end 
* 
self defeating. 
*No school system remains static. I have seen the black/white 
ratio in Richmond shift as much as 5% per year, and population 
shifts within a city or any given metropolitan area shift and change 
constantly. The process of maintaining an integrated system, 
under reasonable standards:k is a continuing one. 
4. 
I particularly invite attention to my outline of the contours 
of what constitutes asx an "integrated school system" (pp. 10, 11). 
I see no "retreat" whatever, unless one believes that the only 
effective and constitutional means of achieving ultimate "desegregation" 
is to employ court-compelled transportation to the maximum degree 
possible, regardless of conditions and all other educational interests. 
As to the employment of transportation, essential in many situations, 
I simply attempt to clarify and rationalize the rule of reason 
articulated in Swann but apparently not fully understood by the 
district courts. 
I would add only this: having spent 19 years of my adult 
life working in public education (including the trying years of leading 
my city gradually into an integrated system despite bitter opposition), 
I am convinced that the ultimate goal must be the best possible 
education for all children; that this includes, in view of the pluralistic 
nature of our population in addition to the constitutional mandate, 
the operate of integrated school systems; it also must mean less, 
rather tha~ more, ~Y admittedly unqualified federal 
5. 
a-[/ s 
courts wHh the operation of the:adilalx school by the duly constituted 
A 
authorities; and, unless we wish to risk ultimately the grave 
n impariment of public school education, it means that a rule of 
reason -with which school boards and widely varying communities 
can live - should be the basic position of this Court. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
lfp/ ss 4/4/73 Rider A 
I do not ask the Court to "retreat" on this vital issue. I 
\ 
( 1) tJ.,e t;._)o,.;i;,., of 6-. _C<•)·J.· ·,.,·, ,." .. 
do indeed urge it (I) h adept; e ecrnt't ••isnal rule of national 
!!it SF In . . ~ ,I! _.. I!. -
app. hcahon to the effect that all school boards have a uty t:o operate 
. t. .... 
~~-._,,.,re., = 1 f. I r .. 
"
4 ,/'.JPJ sC:..,..,.o- o...GG..Vt ~cG..T•6-lo!O- '1•1(._) 
- into d systems, and (~) te ela•*'Y i&Q meaning of Swann so that 
. ..+ 
e'!( pre.s:. !'} 
as authorizing the s .. i*alde balancing of all relevant interests 
:'J? COf-lrO "I r\~ 
rather than s sr~in!(.._ transportation to the full extent necessary 
! -/ ' 
C-.(>,.'; ,· ~ :;e._ r (\_ ("' } ;\. .. / 7z I (2 Q f C... 1 ,'r~-, I 
to 118UmiJuMie :tilt esti:8&& ef &We il'nf'wca Jz:ilq;jm ae~iegwt~z._ 
16 -fj,e_ ~'e..#r, ~/ --""" 7". vc ·' 1 tEerl .: __ .,,_~,J ;J.t1~~" est~ 
P?(iiJRrdJsu of other iMe•esf!s e:r tt.e ••nl}ll&m?'i.io 
•, ··. 
~ "'l6 ..... -~-~)-' / 
L. F. P., Jr. 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
No. 71-507 Keyes v. School District 
This is a comment on Bill Brennan's memorandum of April 
3, in which he expressed the view that my suggested formulation of 
the correct reading of Swann would "constitute a substantial retreat." 
I recognize, of course, that we are dealing here with an area 
in which we all x.nake ju~ments with relatively few objective standards 
~~ . ...4... 
c~ '1.; ~~ p-+ &.o;. 'r; ~~~ ~ 
to guide us1\ But I~ do not consider my interpretation of Swann 
to be a "substantial retreat" from the basic constitutional rationale of 
Brown-Swann line of cases. As I have said in Conference, it seems 
fL~-----'4 
to me that some district courts~.ut considering the total context of 
Swann), have interpreted that opinion too strictly in favor of exten~ive 
-~~ ... -h. 
~ ~:JPHy-~~ 4·~ ~-1.. ~-H-¢.-~-c:;;/s. 
transportation.{ --,--.ria· _,,. - . ~ 
. .f.c; 4 ....... " ....... lo 1..- ( -'hl > ~ 
. . . . . ; ........, 
£
~differently. ~~that -1 
/~ ---- .... -
/ ' . ' -
.::::.... medial re~uirement of extensive tjransportation . s nOt oniy educ~_-
//- I , \ ~ """-
. . I \ . -- .J 
U Jti~,.Uly unsound ,;.1 extends lo!!. beyond the remedying of segregated 
-2-
------------------------- ------·-- -- - ·- -· ---- . - ______ , 
school conditions for which school authorities are -e"'IMl. responsible, !_ 
/-4J·v~-1.~ ~~k..~ ~ -~ \. 
_;me~ formul~ o1eliminating segregation "J;'bot and branch" cannot~-;P 
i / l_ \ 
I I ·• 
-~··he applie~.; l!o le to·inajor metropolitan areas without serious a~erj \ ·, 
t c onse~~s. _ As_ Ale; !lkl<el host"" . . . 1\ i · .J 
"In most of the larger urban areas, demographic 
conditions are such that no policy that a court can 
order and a school board, a city or even a state has 
the capability to put into effect, will in fact result 
in the foreseeable future in racially balanced public 
schools. Only a reordering of the environment 
involving economic and social policy on the broadest 
conceivable front might have an appreciable impact." 
(see my note 21). 
~-.mpeobiftl't;Z,:~;.;:zl:-., ~~~stitution does1 n~t authori. 
~~ / ~ 




, the economic and social policy of the Unite~ States in th_i~way~ a~~ 
'k,v-~- ~ C~::ew; ;&'~~~..1_ ~A. 
non-discri\.._natory, democratic atpirations of localities~ achieve a 
,f-i;ense of community in their educational programs are entitled to judicial 
I 




For these reasons, I have tried to articulate a formula of 
general application which preserves the basic principles of past de-
cisions, which will impose on school authorities continuing obligations 
-3-
to achieve integration, and yet one which will not be unworkable for 
the community involved. It is necessary to keep in mind, as one reads 
the entire draft, my~~~ constitutional right which is im-
<\ 
plicated. See pp. 9-12. The right is to attend schools in an integrated 
~~.~~ 
school system. The correlative duL~i~to operate such a system. In 
the constitutional mandate that segregatory considerations, subtle or 
otherwise, do no~::';~~·wy into the decisions of public school 
authorities. 
I particularly invite attention to my outline of the contours of . 
......__~ 
what constitutes. an "integrated school system" (pp. 10, 11). I see~ no 
"retreat" whatever, unless one believes that the only effective and con-
stitutional means of achieving ultimate "desegregation" is to employ 
court-compelled transportation in disregard of demographic conditions 
and at the expense of other educational interests. As to the employment 
-4-
~-
of transportation, an essential~~ sib.::i~ 
I simply attempt to clarify and rationalize a rule of reason which 
~ 
will recognize -t!hctt 0t~gkly legitimate educational and communal values 
'\ 
..- Jk 
which localities across H!is country are COBiU~tieMUy entitled to 
1'\ 
assert. 
I would add only this: having spent 19 years of my adult life 
working in public education, I am convinced that the ultimate goal 
must be the best possible education for all children; that this includes, 
in view of the pluralistic nature of our population in addition to the 
constitutional mandate, the operation of integrated school systems; 
$ 
operation of the school by the duly constituted local authorities; and, 
1\ 
unless we wish to risk ultimately the grave impairment of public school 
education, it means a rule of reason ll1lii:lK with which school boards 
and widely varying communities can live. 
I do not ask the Court to "retreat" on this vital issue. I do 
indeed urge (l) the adoption of a constitutional rule of national application 
-5-
to the effect that all school boards have a duty to operate integrated 
systems, and (2) a clarification of the meaning of Swann so that it is 
read as expressly authorizing the balancing of all relevant interests 
rather than encouraging transportation to the full extent necessary to 
achieve racial integration, to the detriment of other interests and 
consequences. 
L.F.P.,Jr. 
--!:" t -- -· - - --
This is a comt.Ctent on rill 3rennan's memorandum of 
April 3, in which he expressed the view that my suggested formulatioo 
of the correct reading of Sw~p._ would "constitute a substantial retreat". 
I recognize, of course, that we are dealin~~ here ¥.rith an area 
in which we all make judgments with relatively few objective standards 
to guide us. But I certainly do not consider my interpretatilon of 
Swann to be a "substantial retreat" from the basic constitutional 
rationale of Prown-Swann line of cases. As I have said m '::;onge:rence, 
SOI'iiC) -f- tJu,.,. ( ')at (b-.....-;;,-.,...-{"'At 1 ~ 
it seems to me tfia~CITstrict courts H .... - .> r·· n 1 .• ~...- • ~.n ,;_....._~ 
h... t;, -r...t u, .. ~r- "'f -~ ~), 
total &ani: ex!: and look4ng llt..w.bit+ wa:s oa!MwLllij!: a~,Q¥~~~-
2. 
r~J:ess·of its stze·and demographic characteristics, and ·as 
the Court (rather than the legislative branch of gov,ernment) to 
:r.-estructure the economic and social policy of the United states 
Cll•d -tl,,:;t -&'~•r>f; ... )?i))j. J,.'),CY• ~,,,.,,J,,r~\ 
in this way, W4il p1ac:e tbe Sawceme CO!ld' J.D.J.ha -uDte13alille J9esiUGil 
t'~·nu>cn.L c. c.sp•" .... i.c-r< $ 0 ~ b~~.i,t,:;;!J,Ib. 7~: o'j'"· '' ij@ ~:ei" 
~c"····· ..,.Hti-tbat it 
i t·f-+.,. J#. 
.. ~ ' L f . ..e.;, .. f I 4 • .,., 
t'fEP-~ 
cL d., :t've . .-., • 
,· r;:A e ; ;h , e r r;Ju e.. 
· • rsr 
3. 
For these reasons, I have tried to articu11.te a formula 
of general application which preserves the basic principles of past 
decisions, which will impose on school authoritie1; continuing 
J-'ltt¢. k 
.pPeBBQPe to achieve integration, and yet one which will not be 
'~:~ ... !~ .e:_02:~'2!-~~J_;i.f~ .. J.~:~t._''.J)!~.~--' 
unwor'"kabl~[ It is necessary to keep in mind, as <me reads the 
entire draft, my definition of the constitutional right which is 
implicated. See pp. 9-12. The right is to attend schools in an 
/ / 
Jl'tt-;teg!.:~!~d sc~_oo!_syst~~~ The correlative duty is to operate such ""'-
f, 'tr"" 
a system. In a sense, this goes beyond any duty heretofore 
Ye.i I f~r"$¢" .. !11 
expressed hy the CourtJpl'iQ;r c;laeisieue have 1 efet ad is!! ~tat_y to 
4. 
I particularly invite attention to my outline of the contours 
of what constitutes ux an "integrated school syst.em" (pp. 10, 11). 
I see no "retreat" whatever, unless one believes that the only 
effective and constitutional means of achieving ultimate "desegregation" 
a... 
I simply attempt to clarify and rationalize-. rule of reason r.UA, c..lv 
w;l/ ye_c_o~"''J;Je 1/-;tJr"'"j"-/"1 ie_J.f; n,,Jc.. C:'dhc.c.i,:,.,o,__f .._,..) 
a:rtkudat&lil ~ 6:11-•nlsat &J!!Ipi!Pe~@de• stacd#:tb:e:..... 
vIes l,· c loc.d·t'l5 H C<v!.<~',t"'1 Ov( !!. ~ . w .c. f e 11 oc ;i« ~ c.c.ross · "" -' 
.d;ietriet e ~~f.&... •• 
en f;-lle J ~ c...s.se.r-1"". 
I would add only this: having spent 19 years of my adult 
life working in public education ~ltiQJng tbe t11y:i11g yea Ei Q£~ .. ·-n 
..) 
I am convinced that the ultimate goal must be the best possible 
education for all children; that this includes, in vie,w of the pluralistic 
nature of our population in addition to the constitutional mandate, 
Oft l'a:1;cl't\.. 
the a,uue of integrated school systems; it also must mean les~ 
c/r-< st. e-
n*lle• *AilR Rll•8w interference by alit !11edJ.y np1 tlltui federal 
5. 
courts with the operation of theEdlx:tx school by t:he duly constituted 
authorities; and, unless we wish to risk ultimately the grave 
u: impartment o! public school education, it means -$tiM: a rule of 
reasonN:with which school boards and widely varying communities 
can live, ehaal:!llsu iohe t•!!t'ft}5t~eeittan ef tltie Oettri::oe::.... 
L F. P., J:r. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF' ..JUSTICE 
.ittptttttt ClJttttrtltf f4t ~b' ~taftg 
'Jillaslfi:ngtan.lO. ClJ. 2U~.l!1 
May 30, 1973 
Re: No. 71-507 .. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1 
Dear Bill: 
I have been waiting for the 6th Circuit case 
and I now conclude that I will defer action. 
Indeed I think this case shou 1dgo over to 
the next Term, but the 6th Circuit opinion may alter 
my View. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 




.JUSTICE WM . .J. BRENNAN, .JR. 
.iupt'tmt <!fcurt cf tlrt 'Jltnittb .itatte-
::ur~ut1png~ ~. <q. 2Ll~Jl.:l 
May 30, 1973 
RE: No. 71-507 Keyes v. School District No.1 
Dear Chief: 
I most strenuously oppose your suggestion that Keyes 
go over for reargument. If you have canvassed the Detroit 
issues, as I have, you might agree that none of them is 
even remotely connected with any decided in Keyes. More-
over, Byron is out of Keyes,and any idea that it must go 
over because it overlaps issues in Detroit is only to suggest 
that he must also stay out of Detroit. I thought we all agreed 
that Richmond should come down when it did to be sure that 
we\i have a nine-judge Court for Detroit. Your suggestion 
would defeat that objective. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS 01'" 
THE CHIEF" .JUSTICE 
Re: 
Jttpttmt Qlllltrl of tlft ~b Jhdts 
Jlaslfhtghtn, J. <q. 2llc?,.~ 
May 30, 1973 
No. 71-507 -Keyes v. School District No. 1 
Dear Bill: 
Your note of today indicates you did not observe that 
my comment about putting this case over is tied to what is 
revealed by the Court of Appeals opinion in the Detroit case. 
I freely confess I have not canvas sed the Detroit issues. I 
have an abundance of work on the cases already here and for 
my part my final conclusion on Keyes would await a reading 
of the 6th Circuit opinion in Keyes. Their analysis of the issues 
may not correspond with yours and, of course, it will be their 
opinion we will be asked to review. 
I do not understand your point on Byron's participation. 
We pointedly laid aside an 8th Circuit case on the death penalty 
to decide the same issue in another case presenting precisely 
the same issue in order to be sure Harry could participate. 
There is no basis to think Byron would need to stay out of the 
Detroit cas.e in any circumstance. 
May I suggest that your concern is premature. After 
I read the CA6 opinion I may well agree with you. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference. 
~ttp'ftnu <.qtmrl of tqt ~ttiftb .ihttts 
._.aslfhtgton:. ~. <.q. 21l.;i~$ 
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
May 30, 1973 
Re: No. 71-507 - Keyes v. School District No. 1 
Dear Bill: 
I had again reviewed the circulations in this Denver case 
and was ready to write when the Chief's note to you of today 
came around. 
Wholly apart from the suggestion of the Chief Justice, and 
without passing upon the merits of that suggestion pending further 
discussions, I would be ready to join your last circulation. This 
generally is in line with my note to you of January 9. 
I retain some unease about the situation, for I am persuaded, 
as Lewis and Bill Douglas appear to be, that the de jure-de facto 
distinction eventually must give way. Lewis 1 opinion -- both parts 
of it -- is, for me, forceful and persuasive. I take it, from your 
letter of April 3, that you also are inclined to the view Lewis enter-
tains except for the question of remedy. I feel, however, as appar-
ently you do, that we need not meet the de jure-de facto distinction 
for purposes of the Denver case. Because I feel this way, I join 
you. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: J. Harvie Wilkinson, m Date: June 15, 1973 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 71-507 Keyes v. School District 
Please review the attached memoranda from Justice 
Brennan with recommendations as to the ''holds" for Keyes. 
I would like pour view as to each of these seven cases 
in a little memorandum that can be attached to the Brennan 




THE CHIEF" .JUSTICE 
Ju;rrmu <!fouri of tlrt ~~ ~tatt• 
.. a.Irhtght~ :!f1. <If. 21T~"'~ 
June 19, 1973 
Re: No. 71-507 - Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1 
Dear Bill: 
Will you be good enough to show me as 
concurring in the result. 




Copies to the Conference 
- --~~-·-~-----------.. --.. -' ,. 
11- s-, 7 
~~~~ 
(~ ~ ..._,.,...,...e.c~~~ '/ II'") 
MEMORANDUM  
TO: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Date: June 21, 1973 
FROM: J. Harvie Wilkinson, Ill 
On Thursday, June 21, 1973, I checked with the Library 
to make certain there were no more recent school desegregation 
statistics than those contained in Footnotes 3 and 4 of your Keyes 
opinion. The Library confirmed that the most recent HEW statistics 
for the 1972 school year will not be available for another two weeks 




ro. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
FROM: J. Harvie Wilkinson, m 
?I- ~r~' 
Date: June 21, 1973 
On Thursday, June 21, 1973, I checked with the Library 
to make certain there were no more recent school desegregation 
statistics than those contained in Footnotes 3 and 4 of your Ketlus 
opinion. '!be Library confirmed that the most recent HEW s sties 
for the 1972 school year will not be available for another two weeks 



















































































































































































































































































' AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER SUNDAY, JULY 23, 1972 PAGE B6 
Busing: .The Push-Pull Effect 
Wednesday, as if to underscore the unhappy and 
unprofitable relationship that has developed be-
tween the courts and Congress on the question of 
school desegregation, U.S. District Judge Stephen J. 
Roth made final his comprehensive busing order in 
Detroit, and a subcommittee of the House turned 
loose a version of Mr. Nixon's "anti-busing" legisla-
tion-which evidently stands a fairly good chance 
of passage. No coincidence could better illustrate-
at least symbolically-the push-pull effect that has 
come into play between the two branches of gov-
ernment on this subject, an action-reaction phe-
nomenon of sorts that has impelled each, in 
different ways, to strain at the outer limits of 
constitutional commands and restraints. For Judge 
Roth's decision represents the evolution of certain 
low court-endorsed doctrines and assumptions about 
segregation to a point well beyond anything en-
dorsed thus far by the Supreme Court and-in 
some respects-beyond anything that logic can 
easily sustain. For their part, the politicians and 
legislators continue to promote counter measures 
relevant only' to their own immediate political 
needs, measures destined to make worse, not better, 
the murderous conditions of ghetto entrapment and 
ghetto school life that Judge Roth-however flawed 
his decision-was at least trying seriously to 
address. 
The Detroit ruling, which will now be appealed, 
is tremendous in its sweep: altogether it covers 
schools enrolling about 780,000 students; it involves 
a great number of suburban school districts against 
which no specific finding of discrimination was 
made, but which Judge Roth believes must be 
made a party to the state's rectification of condi-
tions that prevail in Detroit; by September, 1973, 
the order would apparently require the reassign-
ment of some 300,000 children-half of these black 
children sent from Detroit to suburban schools, the 
other half white children reassigned from the sub-
urbs to the city. Despite all this, however, it is not 
the magnitude of the order alone which makes it 
distinctive. Perhaps more important is the doctrine 
on which Judge Roth has based his decision and the 
way in which he has described his remedy. He has 
made very clearcut indeed certain assumptions and 
opinions that turn up more ambiguously in other 
lower court rulings. 
One is that school systems have an affirmative 
duty to assign students in a manner that over-
comes neighborhood racial 
under desegreation pressures, present patterns 
of racial concentrations iri the schools are the 
result of hundreds of decisions, legal and illegal, 
public and private, inside the school systems and 
outside them. In the record of nearly any large 
school system, it is therefore possible to find some 
administrative actions which have tended to pro-
mote the segregation of children by race. Taken 
together, the Detroit finding and the Detroit rem-
edy could lead to endless relitigation and endless 
readjustment of racial proportioning in a fashion 
that lost sight of both the educational and consti-
tutional questions involved. 
Along with the Denver and Richmond cases, to 
which it bears certain important similarities, the 
Detroit case will doubtless be resolved when the 
Supreme Court addresses itself to this phase of 
desegregation law in the fall. That fact plus the 
strong likelihood that the high court, if it follows 
its own reasoning in Swann, will establish limits to 
what the lower courts may order, should have been 
enough to keep Congress and the administration 
from trying to play high court themselves. But it, 
of course, was not. The variation on the administra-
tion "anti-busing" bill now out of subcommittee 
would strip the federal courts of the right to rem-
edy certain violations of a child's constitutional 
rights under any circumstances, and it is another 
measure of the spirit motivating the legislators that 
they have in fact stripped from this measure what 
funds are allocated for the improvement of ghetto 
education. 
We shall return to the provisions of this perni-
cious legislation which is soon due for further 
House action. For now it seems enough to offer 
it as an example of what the push-pull effect is all 
about. For 18 years now, the federal judiciary has 
been obliged to assume the lonely and often inap-
propriate role of school desegregator for the nation, 
with lower courts often being obliged to function 
as proxy school boards. All this is owing to the 
massive default of the other branches of govern-
ment at all levels and of communities across the 
nation who were content to let the courts take the 
heat. So it is hardly any wonder that some federal 
courts may have overreached themselves or made 
policy that is less than fair and/or less than wise. 
And they can hardly be faulted for showing them-
selves to be the only branch of government with a 
sustained concern for righting inequities which 
others have assiduously ignored. For the principal 
"help" these courts have received from men like 
those now pushing "anti-busing" legislation is the 
where sn c h ron centra ti ts.-.areWlrte...re:sult.1l1Wtlrul&.._..,h.."""'~t;""~·-~l""*-"'"""''"""J>-'~c...A,_.""""~ ...... '-A.....,rt-.._....,._ 
is tremendous in its sweep: altogether it covers 
schools enrolling about 780,000 students; it involves 
a great number of suburban school districts against 
which no specific finding of discrimination was 
made, but which Judge Roth believes must be 
made a party to the state's rectification of condi-
tions that prevail in Detroit; by September, 1973, 
the order would apparently require the reassign-
ment of some 300,000 children-half of these black 
children sent from Detroit to suburban schools, the 
other half white children reassigned from the sub-
urbs to the city. Despite all this, however, it is not 
the magnitude of the order alone which makes it 
distinctive. Perhaps more important is the doctrine 
on which Judge Roth has based his decision and the 
way in which he has described his remedy. He has 
made very clearcut indeed certain assumptions and 
opinions that turn up more ambiguously in other 
lower court rulings. 
C'+-' 
One is that school systems have an affirmative 
duty to assign students in a manner that over-
comes neighborhood racial concentrations-even 
where such concentrations are the result of hous-
ing patterns to which the school system was not a 
party. Another is that failure to do so-acquiescence 
in letting school zones reflect these housing pat-
terns-may be accounted evidence that the school 
system as a whole has promoted de jure segregation. 
Judge Roth found that school officials in Detroit 
had done some things to further racial integration 
and some things to inhibit its progress-the latter 
including, for example, the creation of optional 
attendance zones, a refusal to bus white students 
' into predominantly black schools, and the location 
of certain other schools in ways that reinforce 
racial patterns. He espoused, however, what has 
been called the theory of "total taint," which holds 
that whether or not a school system's actions pave 
been consistently and/or predominant.ly taken with 
an intent t9 segregate children by race, and whether 
or not such actions as it has taken bear prime 
responsibility for the segregation that occurs, evi-
dence that some of its actions have contributed to 
the separation of the races is sufficient to bring 
down upon it a finding of de jure segregation. 
Judge Roth's remedy-which would assure that 
"upon implementation, no school, grade or class-
room be substantially disproportionate to the over-
all racial composition" of the city-suburb area-is 
also distinctive. It is, in uncommonly pure form, a 
racial balance solution. Heretofore, the Supreme 
Court has authorized the creation of fixed racial 
proportions only as a relative and transitional means 
of measuring whether a formerly dual school sys-
tem has in fact taken steps to dismantle its out-
lawed arrangements: Judge Roth appears to be 
authorizing racial proportioning in the classroom 
as an absolute and permanent feature of desegre-
gated schools. 
This last departure is one which we have long 
opposed on grounds that it represents a substantive 
and dangerous reassertion of race as the defining 
feature of the individual citizen and one on which 
government can base all manner of actions affect-
ing him. Between a transitional and necessarily 
race-conscious remedy for past discriminatory acts 
and the establishment of government's right to deal 
with people in perpetuity strictly on the basis of 
their race, there is, it seems to us, a profound dif-
measure of the legislators that 
they have in fact stripped from this measure what 
funds are allocated for the improvement of ghetto 
education. 
We shall return to the provisions of this perni-
cious legislation which is soon due for further 
House action. For now it seems enough to offer 
it as an example of what the push-pull effect is all 
about. For 18 years now, the federal judiciary has 
been obliged to assume the lonely and often inap-
propriate role of school desegregator for the nation, 
with lower courts often being obliged to function 
as proxy school boards. All this is owing to the 
massive default of the other branches of govern-
ment at all levels and of communities across the 
nation who were content to let the courts take the 
heat. So it is hardly any wonder that some federal 
courts may have overreached themselves or made 
policy that is less than fair and/or less than wise. 
And they can hardly be faulted for showing them-
selves to be the only branch of government with a 
sustained concern for righting inequities which 
others have assiduously ignored. For the principal 
"help" these courts have received from men like 
those now pushing "anti-busing" legislation is the 
observation that you can't do anything about the 
schools until you do something about housing and 
that you can't do anything about housing until you 
do something about jobs and that you can't do any-
thing about jobs until you have done something 
about schools. 
C'+-t 
Judge Roth's decision seems to us a highly !lUes-
tionable one-not least on the grounds that it 
probably won't work. It seems evident to us that 
judicial remedies of the kind that flowed from 
Brown have pretty much exhausted their usefulness 
as a way of addressing the deprivations that flow 
from the great racial concentrations in our inner 
cities. And it seems evident, too, that what is sorely 
wanted is federal policy based on well-conceived 
legislation that would draw children toward inte-
grated schools with an emphasis on educational 
benefits, one that would take advantage of the fact 
that falling birth rates are already creating unex-
pected vacancies in many good school systems, one 
that would enlist federal and community funds and 
effort in the socially desirable goal of racial inte-
gration and the constitutionally required goal of 
racial equity. 
Even though most white Americans recognize the 
unfairness of shutting the ghetto's children into 
inferior housing and inferior schools, few of the 
politicians who represent that majority seem will-
ing to help it work out reasonable solutions to the 
problem. They would rather dump the problem 
on. the courts-and run against the predictable 
result. That is the meaning of what the President 
and the Congress are up to this summer-and that 
is the reason we find Judge Roth and some of his 
lower court colleagues who have been wrestling 
with these cases sympathetic and honorable figures 
who, if they have been wrong, have been wrong for 
decent and right reasons. 'that is more than you 
can say for the politicians who are after them in 
full cry. 
A Correction 
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The Busing Bust 
During the long months in dubious effectiveness as a rider 
which Congress has been nibbl- to the omnibus education bill 
ing around the edges of an ap- recently signed by the President. 
proach to the forced-busing prob- T h e subcommittee-approved 
lem, the original educational-so- bill puts busing at the bottom of 
cia! rationale for busing has a list of priority desegregation 
evapora-ted. remedies available to judges. 
First, social scientist James S. Such alternatives as neighbor-
Coleman of Johns Hopkins Uni- hood assignments, free transfer 
versity said that federal judges from a school where a student is 
have been misusing his mam- in a racial majority to one where 
moth 1966 government-financed he is in a minority, revision of 
study of student achievement, attendance zones or grade struc-
entitled "Equality of Educational t u res , construction of new 
Opportunity," as a justification schools or · closing of inferior 
for massive busing. "I don't ones, and use of magnet schools 
think a judge can say there is or educational parks, would have 
prima facie evidence of in- higher priorities as remedies 
equality in educational opportun- than busing. Even as a "last re-
ity on achievemeot grounds if sort," busing could not be re-
there is school segregation," the qui red in the sixth grade and 
Coleman Report's author said. below, and busing orders would 
N e x t , Harvard Professor automatically terminate after 
David J. Armor, himself a propo- five years. Additionally, the bill 
nent of integration, reported that seeks to preserve the integrity of 
his before-and-after study in five school district boundaries from 
Northern school systems showed judicial manipulation of the kind 
that busing produced no im- proposed by District Judges in 
provement in pupil achievement, Richmond and Detroit. 
but did produce increased racial The bill may not be the whole 
intolerance, declining edu- answer. We would like to see an 
cational aspirations, and lowered authentic educational freedom of 
self-esteem on the part of black choice returned to both black and 
pupils who were bused. w h it e families with strict 
Nevertheless, it apparently safeguards against any in-
takes Congress a long time to ·dividual being denied the ex-
catch up with reality, if it ever ercise of his choice. But the bill 
does. A subcommittee of the is a good start toward recogni-
House Education and Labor tion that enforced busing is the 
C o m m i t t e e has just gotten least desirable way to correct 
around to approving one of the past injustices against black chil-
two bills President Nixon pro- dren and to seek sound edu-
posed on March 17 to deal with cations for all the nation's young. 
the busing problem. The second In short, it is time for Congress 
bill, calling for a freeze on all to recognize that busing has been 
new busing orders until July 1, a bust and that expeditious ac-
1973, is still mired in a House tion is needed to set the nation on 
·Judiciary panel, but Congress w i s e r paths toward non-dis-
did enact a busing moratorium of criminatory, quality education. 
William _Raspberry 
~inging the Same 
(School Contract) Bell 
IF THE D. C. SCHOOL board's squab-
ble over what to do with Supt. Hugh J. 
Scott when his contract' expires next· 
Qctober Ita$ a familiar ring, it is be-
cause the song Ita$ been played so often. 
The names, faces and tiUes ~;hange, but 
the refrain is constant: The schools are 
bad, and the only ones who can improve 
them are the people downtown-the 
school board and the superintendent. 
They're playing it again, ·both with 
Scott's contract and with a proposal that 
he and t}l.e ,poard work out a statement 
of what ·changes we may expect in the 
school s11_stem next year. 
• ' As" long ·as we're singing old songs, 
· let ' ~e repeat one I wrote over a year 
ago, 3ust aftet the school board elections, 
.. not only . to demonstrate how little 
thing~ change but also because I still 
: believe that we're looking to the wrong 
people for solutions. Here it is: 
\1 < r 
PEO:t>L~ ... ARE expecting the elec-
tion of Marion Barry and the candidates 
he supported to transform our schools 
into institutions of academic 'excel-
lence. It is no reflection on the victori-
ous candidates to say: It won't happen. 
For w..bile the bickering among school 
board m,embers, and between certain 
board :members and the superintend-
ent, 'has garnered a lot of press cover-
age, the nub of the prdblem is not at 
the Presideptial Building. The problem 
~s in local classrooms, where dlstress-
mgly large numbers of . our children 
are not learning. Marion Barry for all 
' of ~s brains, leadership abilit~, imagi-
·nabon am! rapport, is not going to 
teach a single child to read. Don't do 
him the disservice of expecting him to. 
-r:he Board of Education, Washing-
tomans :keep forgetting, is neither a 
centrally located tutorial service nor a 
hydra-headed superintendent. The 
board's job is to set the policies by 
which our schools shall be run. The 
long-run implications of wise policy 
are obvious. But those who expect ma-
jor short-term improvements are 
bound to be disappointed. 
' , This is not to castigate those who 
have ):>een elected to the board but to 
r emind the people who elected them 
that casting a ballot is only a first step. 
'It is, of course, important to elect 
'board members who are ·bright enough 
. to set sound policy and strong enough 
to see that it is carried out. And in 
that regard, it will be useful for the 
community to give the board some 
idea of what that general policy should. 
be . . . But policy is no more than ·a 
statement of what we want to happen'; '• 
it doesn't mak~ it happen. 
The key figui-e in what makes it hap: 
pen is the local principal, and ordinafr 
parents can exert rp.ore influence at-
that level than anyone else. One super .• 
intendent and 11: school board mero: 
bers simply cannot keep day-to-day 
t abs on 18(}-odd principals. - ' 
PARENTS CAN. And if they want. 
genuine il!lprovement in their 'ch1l-
dren'sl 'd cation, they'd better. Casting a_ 
ballot 's no substitute for visiting 
Schoo S, seeing at first P,and what iS 
happening (or not happening), offering. 
suggestions and volunteering assi~h 
ance. 
. ~ "" . ' 
It is no accident that edu ation s" 
worse at t schoo a · 
'i vo ement is east. know t at ''in 
many o e ow-inc.ome neighbor..: 
hoods, where the least learning is tak..: 
ing place, parents often are too busy .. 
too timid or too poorly educated them-
selves to get very much involved ih 
what's happening at their children' !; · 
schools. • · 
But they'll have ·to make the time t'b 
get involved if they · expect .their 
schools to get ).Jetter. As a matter J>f.. .. 
fact, simply knowing that his or her-
parents · are concerned can do a gr~~t 
deal to motivate a child to learn. 
The superintendent and the schooi' 
board can increase the effectiveness Of· 
parental involvement by giving princi.-· 
. pals sufficient autonomy to do wb}t":, 
parents want done and by holding. 
· them accountable for results. Princi: 
pals may choose to pass this autonomy 
along, in effect telling individual' 
teachers: I don't care how you do it;:_ 
but this is what. must be qone. 
The board of education can offe!"' \ 
guidance, resources and assistanc~.: 
But it cannot improve classroom learn: _ 
ing any more than the board of Geh· 
eral Motors can make a better automo-
bile. ·• 
It will be nice for a change to have a 
strong, effective and unified board.. 
But the real work of improving educa:· 
tion is in the hands of principals., -. 
teachers and parents. ' ' 
/ 
Joseph Alsop 
Johnny Still Can't Read 
It is not the sort of stuff headlines 
are made o~, but the deepening crisis 
in American education is still the most 
ominous single feature of our political 
landscape. Consider the following 
facts: . 
ITEM: The Supreme Court has just 
refused to strike down the discrimina-
tory system by which our schools are 
largely financed by property taxes. 
The court was probably wise not to or 
der a judicially-contrived educational 
earthquake. But that still leaves rich 
school districts paying lower taxes and 
getting better schools, and poor school 
districts getting poorer schools while 
paying higher taxes. 
ITEM: Only a few decades ago, New 
York City's school system was still a 
model for other big cities. The other 
day, however, the annual citywide 
reading tests showed that the New 
York system had once again dropped 
further behind in teaching the city's 
children the most basic and essential 
skill, which is how to read. The read-
ing level has been declining conUnu-
ously in the New York schools since 
1965, when testing began. 
ITEM: There is a class difference 
here. Queens and Staten Island child-
ren, still predominantly white and mid-
dle class, are still reading at the level 
of the ·national averages, and some-
times above. But in the overwhelm-
ingly black Williamsburg district in 
Brooklyn, for instance, the boys and 
girls in the ninth grade are reading at 
the level of normal sixth graders. That 
means most of them will leave school 
effectively illiterate. 
ITEM: Really recent exact figures are 
not available. But in all big cities in 
America, the black and Puerto Rican 
components in the school populations. 
-the ones who are not learning to 
read, in fact-have been steadily in-
creasing, year by year. In most Ameri-
can big cities beginning on a North-
South line from Chicago to New Orle-
an~ line and going eastwards, the 
whites are now in the minority in the 
school populations, both in North and 
South. 
The social meaning of this for the 
future hardly bears thinking· about. In 
the last half centuries, great numbers 
of Americans-all the so-called ethnic 
groups, for instance, and the Chinese-
and Japanese-Americans-have es-
caped from partial or total exclusion 
into full success in the larger Ameri-
can society. But these groups escaped 
by having the tools to escape; and 
reading was the first tool. 
--~------~---
Thus the meaning of the school cri-
sis is that our last large E-xcluded 
groups, the great majorities of the 
blacks and Puerto Ricans are not be-
ing given the tool they ~eed most of 
all, in order to escape into equality. 
T.here is no use talking about equal op-
portunity, for people who cannot take 
advantage of opportunities, even when 
offered. And there are precious few 
opportunities in modern America for 
persons who leave school without the 
ability to read and write ·and figure . 
So consider the future of so many of 
our big cities, which are getting nearer 
and nearer to being straight-out ghet-
tos half hidden behind financial and 
!business districts! All this in sum beto-
kens a horrifying failure of American 
-~. 
.o. .tty today, and an eveh more hair-
1 -~ng problem for American society 
in the future . 
Yet the soggy silence that now pre-
va~ls on ~hese subjects also has its own 
grim, qmte current political meaning. 
~fter all, you do not look to hold-the-
line conservatives like President Nixon 
for creative answers to vast social 
problems. For such answers you look-
pr used to look-to the liberals who 
want change and do not fear it. 
~ut in the crucial area of education, 
as m so many other areas important 
for domestic policy, the American lib-
erals have fallen strangely silent. TJJ.ey 
cannot even find the energy to chal-
, l~nge the nonsense of pseudo-thinkers 
like Harvard's Christopher Jencks 
who has grandly announced that it i~ 
hopeless to expect the schools to edu· 
cate the people who need education 
most. , 
The reasons for the liberal silence 
on education are pretty obvious too 
The slogan-thi.t?-k remedy of the' past. 
was school desegregation, forcible if 
need be, and by busing if need be. But 
• 
three things have happened to make 
the slogan-thinkers taciturn. 
Busing has proved to be a horribly 
hot political potato, especially with the 
white blue collar workers who are so 
vital to the Democratic Party. Most 
black people have turned out not to 
want their children bused, any more 
than blue collar whites want it. And 
even where the device has been given 
the fairest kind of chance, in places 
like Berkeley, Calif., mere forcible de-
segregation has turned out to do little 
or nothing to raise black children's 
reading levels. 
.This is a thing that can be done, and 
has been done, although it costs a good 
deal of money. It was done for in-
stance, very briefly,- by the mdre effec-
tive schools program in new York City 
-which was killed by liberal hostility 
and liberal neglect, because it did not 
suit the slogan-thinkers. But is it really 
liberalism (or is it bankruptcy?) To 
have no p~oblem except dismantling 
the country's foreign policy and na-
tional defense? All the same, that is 
American liberalism today. 
• @ 1973, Los Aneelee T!mea 
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REVIE\V & OUTLOOK 
The court in general is moving m 
that direction, as a number of cases 
in the last week suggest. It held thnt 
tests for police applicants are not 
discriminatory simply because a 
disproportionate number of blacks 
The using Tan~~e tail; di scriminatory intent must be 
President Ford's proposal for E The best an I sis that \ve have proved. lt held that it is illegal for 
~ egislation limiti ng t~e use of busing see~ o w ~re the courts' desegre- private schools to refuse admission 
111 school desegregatiOn cases prob- gat10n deciSions went astray ap- to blacks, but that a white cannot be 
ably would not succeed in solving pears in a court opinion, Justice subjected to employment discrimi-
the busing turmoil even if, im proba- Powell's cons<!nti_ng. opimon 1n nation to favor u black . Yesterday it 
bly, it were enacted by Congress. Reyc:; v. School D1stnct t:Jo. 1, the held that school districts need not 
But that is by no means to 11uy the Denver bu!:>lng case. Just1ce Powell chan.ge desegregation plans to keep 
proposal is not directed at 11 real notes the moral force of Brown, and abreast of population patterns. 
problem. approves of Green v. Co1mty School These are healthy decisions, and 
The courts have worked them- Board, in which a suiJterfuge to us they seem to point to an ulti-
selves into a huge tangle on the bus- "freedom oi choice'' plan was mate resolution of the busing tangle 
ing issue. They have done so for his- stru~~ down nnd an "affirmative along the li nes suggested by Justice 
torical reasons with which one must duty to desegregate promulgated_. Powell. Busing orders were an up-
sympathize, but that does not re- This was an appropriate remedy for propriate remedy in breaking dcwn 
duce the present problem. The bus- the facts of Green, a rural county subterfuges ert>ctetl by recaicitrant 
ing orders recently in the news clearly maintaining a dual school segregationists, but they are dis-
command almost no public support. system. proportionate to the more subtie of-
When the public sees children bear- The cou rt went wr_onl.'!, Jus~ice fcnses the court s now typically en-
ing the brunt of pu hl ic policy, it nat- Powell clearly feels, 111 Swa"!ln v. counte r. And there is a danger in 
urally asks preci sely what" public C~arlotte-Mecklenburg, when 1t ap- the courts trying to undo the effect 
purpose is being se1·ved . In public plted t~e Green remedy to the far of residential patterns, for they can 
debate the typical response is to different facts of an urban setting. never know how much the patterns 
throw the accusation of racism at He notes that the busing order re- r esult from discrimination and how 
anyone who dares raise the ques- quired Charlotte "to alleviate condi- much from truly free choice. 
tions, and even the courts don't do tions which in large part did notre- If President Ford's actions in 
?. much better job in supplying a suit from historic, state-imposed de supporting legi.~tltion and Justice 
persuasive answer. jure segregation." Rather, it re- Department h l''iefs speed the 
The original Brown decision quircd r edress of the effects on court's progress toward this solu-
striki ng down segregated schools school r acia l composition of "seg- tion, it will be all to the good. The 
stood 011 a finn moral foundation: regated re!Jidential an9. migratory courts will be on sound moral foot-
The state shall be neutral with re- pHtterns" Charlotte shares with any ing, and accordingly will ngnin 
spect to r ace. It is unconstitutional metropolitian area, Southern or command public suppor t, when they 
for a ·state to pass laws assigning Northern. find their way back to the original 
school children on the basis of race. Now, Charlotte had maintained a logic of Brown: with re spect to race 
But as the law evolved, as the legally mandated dual school sys- -the state shoil be neutral; this Con-
courts struck down subterfuges in- tern--de jure segregation by any stitu tion is colorblind. 
tended to violate 1his command, as definition. But Justice Powell re- __ _ 
they dealt with recalcitrant racism, marked that in nearly any school 
it arrived at a different point. district the authorities have contrib-
Schools must take affirmative ac- uted in one way or anothe r to what-
tion to desegregate, even if this ever segrt>gation exists .. and since 
means assigning school children on Swann the courts have in fact been 
tht:> basis of ruce . stretching the de fure doctrine ac-
This latter conclusion the .public cordingly . In this. Justice Po~ell 
will not support, nnd the public is -sugges~s. they a re met·ely followmg 
right. But it is difficult to write lnws tht:; log1c of Swann: If the law re-
te lling the courts how to int erpre t Qlllres Cha ~lotte. to remedy the ef-
lhe Constitution. President Ford • s fects of . rcS1lient1al_ patterns,. to fol -
proposols for example would limit low racial r att.os 111 correc:tmg d~ 
h d 
.' f .b· . ' d .. facto sq~regatwn, 1t rP.qutres all 
t e u~atton o us.mg or ers to hve cities to do likewise. · 
yt:>nrs ~: .. the court s. or.~ers are fo1- Ju stice Powell concurred in the 
lo~,·ed 111 good fmth ; but. 1-i0~ ~3 decisiun upholding the Denver 
fmth IS oftt•n already the preuse ~~- busing order, in part because 
sue. Tht• cuurts can of course be d1- S - · ttl d 1 B t · · 1 d u:o rm 1s now se e aw. u rected by const1tut1ona umen - I I l k" th th J 
d 
. c ear v 1e was as 111g e o er u!l-
nwnt, an ·we can conct·l.ve . an tices 'to jui"n .him in dealing. with 
amendment_ bnsed on the p11nc tple Su•ann's '·'ambiguities" in a way 
of n color~ltnd lnw. But It would ~e that would gt> t away from rac ial ra-
far bt•tter 1f tht• cu11rts '~o rlwd thetr tios and bnck to a colm·blind rule. 
own way out uf the tan~te, nnd per-
haps th~t i!l not too much to hope. 
))()J . f976 0 .1 3J 
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William Raspberry 
Busing: A Question of Power 
The "busing" controversy, in many 
of its manifestations, is less a dear-cut 
issue of morality and simple justice 
than a question of power. To the de-
gree that it involves a power struggle, 
some perspective may be useful. 
It is no disparagement of those acti-
vists whose life-risking commitment 
created The MovP.ment to say that the 
civil rights struggle of the 1960s 
turned largely on the embarrassment 
of white people. It took far more cour-
age and ·strength than most of us pos-
sess to create that embarrassment; and 
often the white people who were em-
barrassed were far removed from 
those against whom The Movement's 
fury was directed. 
But it did work, and the result is 
that some landmark civil rights legisla-
tion is on the books; some of it is even 
being enforced. 
It worked exceedingly well to use 
police dogs and firehoses in Alabama 
to embarrass white people in the rest 
of the country, and there was even 
some ·scattered success in embarrass-
ing white people right where they 
lived, with demonstrations over job 
and housing discrimination, for in-
stance. 
And if it is true that this success im-
plies that The Movement-that black 
people-possessed power, it is also 
true that what was involved was power 
of a very contingent sort, relying for 
its existence on its appeal to con-
(cience and basic morality: on the em-
barrassment of white people. 
Some of those in the forefront of the 
busing thing are forgetting how contin-
gent that power was. They think that 
the power is real and that nine-tenths 
of the people can be forced by a mi-
nority of the remaining tenth to do 
something they don't want to do. 
The odds against that happening 
would be great even if the morality 
and justice of the question were 
clearly on the side of the minority. But 
"busing" is an issue on which moral 
and just men may differ. 
There are important distinctions to 
be made, for instance, between school 
desegregation, which says that Qificials 
may not practice racial discrimination ~ 
in pupil assignment, and inte(ITI~tion,. -~ 
which says that the law requires not. 
only an end to racial seg1egation but~ 
also that each black pupil have his fair · 
share of white schoolmates. ' · ' 
For a time, the only people willi:rig ' 
to speak out against "busing" as .' a • 
means for redistributing . children ·On , 
the basis of their race were. the same f 
people who only a short time earlie~ 
were using buses fot the express pur- ' 
pose of maintaining racial segregatfulf. ·; 
Anyone who identified with the .bigo~s. • 
antibusing stand ran the risk of be.in~"f 
identified with his bigotry as w:el!. ~ 
That's embarrassing. •. ·J 
' ,.. ~ 
But the embarrassment is dy1pg; . . 
More and more white people are ' 
saying: It might be unfair to make you · 
bus your children away so that mine "' 
can keep their all-white schools; but..i\ • 
also is unfair for you to make me bus 
my children away for the purpose of 
integrating your children's classroorriS::-" 
Decent white people have begun • .to., 
speak of the value of neighborhood,¥ 
schools without any more fear <>f em-, 
barrassment than black parents who '. 
say the same thing. ' 
The pofnt is this: If opposition to 111 
"busing" is a position held not only by> 
white bigots but by whites generall.,v; ' 
then it is likely that the prpbusing peo-• 
ple are riding a loser. For when white~ 
embarrassment goes, what is l~ft is a 
power struggle pure · and simple. ·J. · 
don't like the odds. '·' 
What would seem a reasonable thin~1 
for black Americans to do at this point! 
is to back off for a moment and dec~ 
on some priorities. If that happened~ I. 
suspect the result· would be close to' 
what NAACP Executive Director Rof 
Wilkins said several days ago: Integra-• 
tion is a desirable end, .but qual'ity edlb·· 
cation is a higher. prior-ity, . • ~-~ 
The Wilkins formulation (which( ·in-t 
cidentally, already is being "clarifi~q:\ 
nearly out of existence) may come 
close to the consensus view of bhick 
America: Keep integration where yo· · 
have it, increase it where you can, bnt'; 
the name of the game is quality edu:ca. 
tion. Let busing revert ,to being just- a 
means of transportation. · ' 
As the breadth of white opposition 
to busing is taken into account, blacks 
can begin -to tr\lde busing for other 
things they consider more important: a 
fair share of the money and resources, 
for example, or maybe even .some spe-














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































skills or competence. 
Even if schools were made 
fully equal, the study argued, 
there is no guarantee that they 
would produce adults with 
equal incomes. 
When the study first was 
made public, it was widely as-
sumed that it would provide 
support for arguments against 
equalizing spending between 
schools, and even against 
spending more money for 
schools. Jencks himself said 
he feared the conclusions 
would be "taken out of context 
and used to support all kinds 
of political causes" which be, 
as a liberal, would consider 
"detestable." 
The study, it is now clear, 
figured prominently in the rea-
soning used by a Supreme 
Court majority last week. By a 
5-4 vote, the court upheld the 
financing of public education 
by local propertY taxes even 
while conceding that this leads 
to unequal spending between 
school districts. 
Not aRight 
Education is not a funda-
mental right under the Consti-
tution, and thus there is no 
guarantee that school districtJ 
must finance education equal-
ly, the court concluded. 
Justice Lewis F. Powell 
Jr.'s majority opinon appears 
to rely significantly on Jencks' 
study and on some similar 
conclusions drawn in 1966 in 
the famous "Equality of Edu-
cational opportunity" report 
by James S. Coleman of Johns 
Hopkins Unversity. 
The Coleman study -which 
Jencks relied upon in part in 
his new study - concluded 
that added spending for educa-
tional "inputs" (improved fa-
cilities, equipment and teach-
ing), does not produce the 
desired "outputs" (improved 
· stuoent achievement). More 
important, it concluded, are 
social and economic differ-
ences in a child's personal and 
familY background. 
Justice Powell's opinion ba-
sically sides with Jencks and 
Coleman, accepting the doubts 
they have raised about in-
creased school spending. 
Educational experts, the jus-
tice said, are divided on this 
point and it is one of the "hot-
test sources of controversy" in 
KEYES 
III. 
The Court's remand in this case requires that the district court 
determine whether "the Denver school system is a dual school system. " 
If so, ''respondent School Board has the affirmative duty to desegregate 
the entire system 'root and branch.' Green v. County School Board, supra, 
391 U. S. at 438, " supra, 22. As the opinion of the ;_ourt virtually compels 
a ' 'dual school system" finding,* the D€:nver school authorities are face to 
fac~:: with the type of desegregation order now familiar in southern cities. 
Although ~is cited, it is not factually relevant for the reason 
* 
stated above.* The controlling case is~. and the question which will 
confront - and confound - the Denver School Board is what indeed does Swann 
require. It is this question which I will now address. Swann purported to 
enunciate no new principles, relying heavily on Brown 1 and 2 and on~· 
* 
After suggesting that the "deliberate racial segregation policy with respect 
to the Park Hill schools" may constitute the entire Denver ystem a dual one, 
the majority opinion ''observes" that "Denver is not a school district which 
might be divided into separate, identifiable and unrelated units." The opinion 
goes on to ''suggest" that "the official segregation in ida: Park Hil~ affected the 
racial composition of schools throughout the district." Supra, 13, 14. 
** In Green, a sparsely settled rural county was involved -with only two 
school and 1300 pupils. The city of Denver has 100 square miles, there are 
120 schools serving some 100,000 pupils. 
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It did, without discussion, extend the full sweep of the affirmative duty 
rule of Green to a large metropolitan school district, and it affirmed a 
district court order which had relied heavily on "racial ratios" and had 
ordered extensive bussing of elementary as well as secondary pupils. 
Perhaps because of the relatively drastic contours of the Charlotte/ 
Meckltnburg desegregation decree approved by this Court, lower federal 
courts have 1001 since read Swann as requiring similar decrees. In the 
context of a large urban area, with heavy racial concentrations of white 
and black citizens in different - and sometimes remote - sections of the 
school district, substantial bussing of pupils is inevitable if Swann is read 
as expansively as the facts in that case might justify. I take a somewhat 
different view of WR Swann. It can fairly be read - not as mandating the 
massive restructuring of every segregated school system -but as laying 
down a broad rule of reason which recognizes that desegregation remedies 
must remain flexible, and that other values and interests are implicated. 
It is illuminating to review the unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice 
Burger. It commenced with the reaffirmation of Brown 2' s emphasis on 
the "practical flexibility" of remedies: 
-3-
"In fashioning and effecting the decrees, the courts will 
be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, equity 
has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping 
its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling 
public and private needs.·· Brown 2, 349 U.S. at 229, as 
quoted in Swann, 402 U.s. at~ 
The Chief .Justice referred to the "massive problem" of converti8g from 
a dual to a unitary system, and empl:asized the duty on school authorities 
nevertheless to fulfill this obligation. But in the same paragraph there 
the 
was a reference to the "breadth and flexibility" inherent in/equitable powers 
of the district coults, and then went on expressly to state that: 
The 
" .•. a school desegregation case does not differ fundamentally 
from other cases involving the framing of equitable remedies 
to repair the denial of a constitutional right. The task is to 
correct, by a balancing of the individual and collective interest, 
the condition that offends the Constitution." 402 U.s. at 15, 16. 
X'm Swann opinion then identified the areas of school board decisms which 
influence racial composition, and as to which appropriate action may be taken: 
new school construction, closing of old schools, faculty assignment, the 
formulation of attendance zones, the pairing or clustering of schools, and 
the formulation of policies on various matters. The ~ourt reserved for 
special attention on the two central issues in the case, the extent to which 
racial balance and the employment of pupil transportation (bussing) is re-
quired. In retrospect, perhaps the members of the Court who joined Swann 
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will agree that as to these issues there can be reasonably wide differences 
of opinion as to what was actually held. The district court in Charlotte 
had premised its desegregation plan on a "norm" - a desired goal - of 
achieving racial balance of 71%- 29% in the school system, although 
recognizing that some variations would be "unavoidable." This Court 
approved the plan, rut expressly stated: 
"If we were to read the holding of the district court to 
require, as a matter of substantive constitutional right, 
any particular degree of racial balance or mixing, that 
approach would be disapproved and we would be obliged 
to reverse." 402 U.S. at 24. 
In addressing the related problem of whether any "one-i"ace"schools 
would be tolerated, the decision was again not clear. The Court's 
opinion does identify the goal as achieving ''the greatest possible degree 
of actual desegregation;' but recognizes that "no per se rule can adequately 
embrace all the difficulties of reconciling the competing interes~involved." 
402 U.S. at l. 
Swann is best known for its holding with respect to the bus 
transportation of pupils, although again- upon critical examination- the 
language of the opinion is ambiguous. It recognized bussing as "one tool 
of school desegregation, " and approved the district court's plan for ex-
-5-
tensive bussing. At the same time, the Court expressly said: 
"No rigid guidelines as to student transportation can be 
given for application to the infinite variety of problems 
presented in thousands of situations." 402 U.S. at 29. 
And reference was made expressly to the necessity of considering the 
"health of the children " and whether the bussing proposed would "sig-
nificantly impinge on the educational process." 402 U. S. at 30, 31. 
B. 
If a rule of reason is to be applied, x:of.tJrmk as I think is 
required, where a district court is called upon to decree desegrEg~.tion 
it should accord due consideration to the following: 
Racial Balance 
The misunderstanding - and misapplication- of Swann on this 
issue has been profound. As a correct formuiation of what is required is 
central to the bussing and other subordinate issues, it is necessary that 
KlnliiK school authorities and courts understand the parameters of the 
issue. A requirement of racial balance, as used in these cases , would 
-6-
mean that the student population of each school would reflect 
substantially the same ratio, in terms of minority and majority 
races, as the total population of the school district. 
We start with the seminal decisions in Brown which con-
tain nothing - either in holding or dicta - that supports even the 
use of racial balance as a starting point. Green did say that there 
should be no identifiable "black school" or "white school ; • but as 
shown above there were only two schools before the court in that 
case, affording an unlikely as well as unnecessary vehicle for 
enunciating a principle applicable to the wholly dissimilar situation 
found in major urbanized districts with massive residential segre-
gation. It was not until Swann that the issue of racial balance was 
considered by the Court. In that and its companion cases the plaintiffs 
did contend for a rule requiring the substance of the racial balance 
* doctrine. The Court specifically rejected the demand for a racial 
* See,~·· Becketv. School Board, 308 F. Supp. 1274,1276 (E .D. 
Va . ) 1969. See also WA~te_r and bl!da SQqelqff, JJ., concurring in 
part and dissenting in' part. (Jay: as I afctate this I don't have the pre-
BXB: cise name of the Fourth Circuit case and I think it was in 431 F . 2nd, 
138 . Anyway, this is a case that was appealled to this court in Swann.) 
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balance test, holding that "any particular degree of racial balance 
or mixing •.• would be disapproved ... , " but said that consideration 
could be given to "mathmatical ratios" as "no more than a starting 
* point in the process of shaping a remedy .•. " 402 U.S. at 24,25. 
The difficulty has resulted from a widespread misunderstanding 
and misinterpretation of what was actually said in \\Xx Swann . It 
has become customary for district courts to say, in effect, that they 
are not decreeing racial balance but - pursuant to other language in 
** Swann - they feel compelled to approach it as far as "practicable. ' ' 
See Chambers opinion of Chief Justice Burger in Winston-Salem/ 
~Forsyth 8:1. of ltl. v. Scott, 404 U.s. 1221, 1228 (197!). 
** An example of this is found in the district court's order in Winston-
Salem/ Forsyth Bd. of Ed., supra, in which an extensive bussing progiram 
was ordered to "achieve the greatest possible degree of desegregation. " 
- f -
It should be made explicitly clear that the Constitution -
and this after all is the touchstone of the rights at issue - u does 
not require racial balance or indeed a school system in which every 
school has some mixing of the races. Quite apart from the controlling 
fact that no language in the Constitution nor in any decision applying 
the equal protection clause to other situations involving racial 
discrimination*, the Constitution could hardly be construed to require 
an absurd if not impossible result. Few would suggest, for example, 
that it would be feasible to apply even approximately the population 
racial balance in a city like Washington or Newark to every public 
school therein. 
The argument for racial balance also overlooks the fact 
that the remedy far exceeds that whici1 is necessary to correct 
*:Jay: -Try-to think of some parallel cases. One type of situation 
which comes to mind, and which may be mentioned as an example, 
is that it is far more important to apply racial balance to housing 
than the schools. Indeed if the Constitution requires this type of 
homogenization of the population, the way to achieve it would be 
to ~~I?P~ housing integration on a racial basis throughout a city. 
.- 0 -
the constitutional evil. Let us use Denver as an example. It is 
doubted that anyone would contend that, absent state action of any 
kind whatever, the schools in Denver would have a substantially 
different racial composition from that which actually exists. 
I have agreed in Parts I and II of this concurrence that the Denver 
School Board, by its action and nonaction, may be legally 
responsible in some degree for the extent of segregation that 
exists. It can certainly be said that if an affirmative duty existed 
to ameliorate segregation the board could and should have taken 
steps toward this end. But if one assumed a maximum discharge 
of constitutional duty by the Denver Board over the past decades, 
the fundamental problem of residential segregation would continue 
to exist and this woo.ld be Dk reflected in the schools. 
ROUGH DRAFT LFP, Jr.:PLS 1/4/ 73 
KEYES 
IV. 
The Court's opinion in this case has been awaited ex-
pectantly primarily in the hope that it will shed light and provide 
~ . ~~;):.....,...._,) 
guidance on two issues, namely: (i) whether state action will be 
<. ~ ~~6.~  h-:f "'k..a 
found in a city like Denver where therelha'S 13eea il{) compelled ~~;._1-,,.. _ _J o-1 
~;,£~ r 
or authorized segregation; and (ii) if so, whether the ambiguities 
of Swann , construed to date almost uniformly in favor of extensive 
busing, will be redefined to restore a more viable balance between 
the various interests which are involved. With all deference, it 
seems to me that the Court has addressed neither of these issues 
in a way that will lead - so far as the judiciary may lead - to a 
coherent national policy with respect to integration in the schools. 
The Court has adhered to the de facto/ de jure distinction 
under circumstances, and upon a rationale, which can only lead to 
increased and inconclusive litigation, and - especially regrettable -
deferment 
to~ of a nationally consistent judicial position on this critical 
subject. There is, of course, state action in every school district 
in the land. The public schools have always been funded and operated 
54. 
by states and their local subdivisions. It is true that segregated 
schools, eve1: in the cities of the South, care the product primarily 
of social and economic factors - and the resulting residential 
patterns. But nevertheless there is probably not a school district 
in the United States, with any significant minority school population, 
in which the school authorities - in one way or the other - have not 
contributed in some measure to the degree of segregation which 
still prevails. So long as school authorities are told (as they 
are by the Court today) that they are responsible only for such 
of their de jure action or non-action as emanated from a segregatory 
intent, they are unlikely to feel the slightest urgency in moving 
toward desegregation. It is only human nature for each of us to 
assume that his motives are pure, especially if the Sur reme Court 
says that this is the controlling rest as to one's duty. 
The second issue - relating to the 2m biguities of Swann -
was not addressed at all in the Court's opinion. This means that 
the District Court, upon making the findings which are foreshadowed 
by today's opinion, will be obligated to apply Swann to the city of 
No. 71-507 KEYES v. SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Memorandum of MR. JUSTICE POWELL. 
I concur in the remand of this case for further proceedings 
in the District Court, but on grounds that differ from those relied 
upon by the Court. 
This is the first school desegregation case to reach this 
Court which involves a major tity outside the South. It comes from 
Denver, Colorado, a city and a state which have not operated public 
schools under constitutional or statutory provisions which mandated 
1 
or permitted racial segregation. Nor is it asserted that any other 
legislative action (such as, for example, zoning and housing laws) 
contributed to the segregation which is at issue. It is agreed that 
the Denver School Board alone is responsible for whatever state 
action may have contributed to the segregated schools which are 
aclmowledged to exist in Denver. 
2. 
The predominantly minority schools are located in two areas 
of the city referred to as Park Hill and the core city area. The 
District Court considered that a school with a concentration of 70 to 
75% ''Negro or Hispano students" was identifiable as a segregated 
school. Wherever one may draw this line, it is undisputed that most 
of the schools in these two areas are in fact heavily segregated in 
the sense that their student bodies are overwhelmingly composed of 
Negro children. The city wide school mix in Denver is 66% Anglo, 
15% Negro and 20% Hispano. In areas of the city where the Anglo 
population largely resides, the schools are ~ predominantly 
Anglo, if not entirely so. 
The situation in Denver is generally comparable to that in 
other large cities across the country in which there is a substantial 
minority population and where desegregation has not been ordered 
by the federal courts. There is massive segregation in the schools 
of these c ities fully as pervasive as that in southern cities prior to 
3. 
the desegregation decrees of the past decade and a half. The focus 
of the school desegregation problem has now shifted from the South 
to the country as a whole. Unwilling as the process was in most 
places, substantial progress toward achieving integration has been 
2 
made in southern cities. No comparable progress has been made 
in most non-southern cities with large minority population primarily 
because of the de facto/de jure distinction nurtured by the courts 
and accepted complacently by many of the same voices which 
3 
denounced the evils of segregated schools in the South. But if our 
national concern is for those who attend such schools, rather than 
for perpetuating a legalism rooted in history rather than logic, we 
must recognize that the evil of separate schools is no less in 
Denver than in Atlanta. 
4. 
I 
In my view the time has come to abandon a distinction which 
has long since outlived its time, and to formulate constitutional 
principles of national rather than merely regional application. When 
~_!"~wn__! was decided, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the distinction between 
de jure and de facto segregation was consistent with the constitutional 
rationale of that case. The situation confronting the Court, largely 
confined to the southern states, was officially imposed racial segregation 
in the schools extending back for many years and usually embodied 
in constitutional and statutory provisions. 
The great contribution of Brown I was its holding in unmistakable 
terms that the 14th Amendment forbids state-compelled or authorized 
segregation of public schools. Although some of the language was 
more expansive, the holding in Brown I was essentially negative: 
It was impermissible under the Constitution for the states, or their 
instrumentalities, to force children to attend segregated schools. 
The forbidden action was unmistakable de jure, and the opinion in 
5. 
Brown I was construed -for some years and by many courts -as 
requiring state neutrality, allowing "freedom of choice" as to schools 
to be attended so long as the state itself assured that the choice be 
4 
genuinely free of official restraints. 
But the doctrine of Brown I, as amplified by Brown II, did nd 
retain its pristine meaning. In a series of decisions extending from 
1954 to 1971 the concept of state neutrality evolved and was expandkl 
t o the present constitutional doctrine requiring affirmative state 
action to desegregate school systems. The keystone case was Green 
v. <;~unty_~hool Board, 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968), where school 
boards were declared to have "the affirmative duty to take whatever 
steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which 
racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.? The 
school system before the Court in Green was operating in a rural 
and sparsely settled county where there were no concentrations of 
white and black populations, no neighborhood school system (there 
were only two schools in the county), and where none of the problems 
6. 
of an urbanized school district existed. The Court there properly 
identified the freedom of choice program as a subterfuge, and the 
language in Q_reen imposing an affirmative duty to convert to a 
unitary system was appropriate on the facts before the Court. 
There was, however, reason to question to what extent this duty 
applied in the different factual setting of a large city with vast areas 
of residential segregation, presenting problems and calling for 
solutions quite different from those in the less complex rural setting 
of New Kent County, Virginia. 
But the doubt as to whether the affirmative duty concept 
would flower into a new constitutional principle of general application, 
was laid to rest by Swann v. Board of Education, 402 U.s. 1 (1971), 
in which the affirmative duty articulated in Green was applied to 
the urban school system of metropolitan Charlotte, North Carolina. 
In describing the situation as to residential patterns in Charlotte, 
the Court noted the "familiar phenomenon" in the metropolitan areas 
of minority groups being "concentrated in one part of the city" 
( 402 U.S. at 25), and acknowledged that: 
"Rural areas accustomed for half a century to the 
consolidated school system implemented by bus 
transportation could make adjustments more readily 
than metropolitan areas with dense and shifting 
pppulation, numerous schools, congested and 
complex traffic patterns." 402 U.S. at 14. 
Despite this recognltionof a fundamentally different problem from 
that involved in green, the Court nevertheless held that the 
7. 
affirmative duty rule of Green was fully applicable, and prescribed 
for a metropolitan school system with 107 schools and some 84,000 
pupils essentially the same remedy - elimination of segregation 
"root and branch" - which had been formulated for the two schools 
of 1, 300 pupils of New Kent County. 
In ~an~, the Court further noted it was dealing only with 
states having a long history of officially imposed segregation 
and the duty of school authorities in those states to implement 
Brown I. 402 U. S. 5-6. 
8. 
In so doing, the Court failed to admit candidly that the 
evolution of constitutional doctrine from Brown I to Green/Swam 
undercut what logic once supported the de facto/de jure distinction. 
In imposing on metropolitan southern school districts an affirmative 
duty including large-scale transportation of pupils, to eliminate 
separate schools, the Court required these southern districts to 
alleviate conditions which did not result from historic de jure 
segregation. Rather, they resulted essentially from the same 
phenomenon which occurred in northern and western districts: 
segregated residential and migratory patterns which were perpetuated 
or at least not properly counteracted by any public school authority. 
\Vhereas Brown I rightly addressed the elimination of officially 
imposed segregation in that particular section of the country where 
it did exist Swann imposed obligations on southern school districts 
to eliminate conditions which were not regionally unique but were 
similar both in their origins and effects to the rest of the country. 
It is from the perpetuation of this kind of distinction in the Court's 
opinion today that I take exception. 
9. 
II 
The Court's decision today, while adhering to the de jure/ 
de facto distinction, applies the Green/Swann doctrine of "affirmative 
duty" to the Denver School Board despite the absence of any history 
of state-mandated school segregation. The only evidence of state 
action was found imarious decisions of the school board. I concur 
in the Court's holding that the public school authorities are the 
responsible agency of the state, and that the affirmative duty doctrine 
is equally applicable to Charlotte and Denver. I disagree, however, 
with any perpetuation of the "de jure/de facto distinction and the 
resulting tortuous effort to identify "segregative acts" and to 
deduce "segregatory intent." I would hold, quite simply, that 
where segregated public schools exist there is a duty on the duly 
constituted authorities (I will usually eefer to them collectively 
as the "school board") to take appropriate steps to desegreate them. 
A 
My primary reason for urging the abandonment of the 
de jure/de facto distinction is that, in my view of the evolution of 
10. 
the holding in !?rown I into the affirmative duty doctrine, it no 
longer can be justified on a principled basis. In additinn, as this 
case abundantly demonstrates, proof of the facts deemed necessary 
to apply the distinction presents problems of the greatest complexity. 
At the outset, one must try to identify the constitutional right 
whichis being enforced. This is not easy, as the precedents have 
been far from explicit. In Brown I, after emphasizing the importance 
of education, the Court said that: 
"Where the state has undertaken to provide (education) 
it is a right which must be made available to all on 
equal terms. " 347 U. S. at 493. 
In ~!OW!l II, the Court identified the "fundamental principle" 
enunciated in Brown I as being the unconstitutionality of "racial 
discrimination in public education" (349 U.S. at 298), and spoke 
of "the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public 
schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis." 
( 349 U. S. at 300). Although this and similar language is ambiguous 
as to the specific constitutional right, it meant - as a minimum -
11. 
that one has the right not to be compelled by state action to attend 
a segregated school system. In the evolutionary process since 
1954, decisions of this Court have added a significant gloss to this 
original right. Although nowhere expressly articulated in these 
terms, I would now define it as the right to expect that the state 
provide an opportunity for education in an integrated school system. 
The correlative of this right should be the duty imposed upon the 
state - not merely to outlaw dual school systems - but affirmatively 
to take reasonable action consistent with educational goals to provide 
5 
integrated school opportunities. 
It is difficult to perceive a basis for vindicating or denying 
this right, as the case may be, depending upon whether or not a 
court determines that the segregated schools are the product of 
de facto rather than de jure action. If, as said in Swann "segregation 
was the evil" held to be unconstitutional, there is little reason 
for perpetuating the evil in some sections of the country on the 
basis of a formalistic distinction. 
12. 
Public schools are creatures of the state, and whether 
the segregation was state created or state assisted or merely state 
perpetuated school be irrelevant to constitutional principle. The 
School Board exercises month-by-month, year-by-year responsibility 
over the operations of the public school system. It sets policies 
on attendance zones, faculty assignments, school construction, 
closings and consolidations, and myriad other matters. If, after 
such detailed and complete public supervision, segregated schools 
and thus unequal educational opportunities still persist, the 
presumption is very strong that the school board, by its acts or 
omissions, is in past responsible. This responsibility need not 
be proven by acts of segregatory intent which are fast becoming 
too overt and risky for school authorities to engage in. It may 
be proven merely by the effect of the failure of the responsible 
public authority, to exercise the duty, already recognized for 
one section of the country, to reasonably create integrative school 
opportunities. 
13. 
Moreover, if the right implicated ais an opportunity to 
attend schools in an integrated system, it makes littles: sense 
to say that a school board's duty to provide such opportunity exists 
only where there was a history of pre-1 954 laws which mandated 
segregation: 
"The Negro children in Cleveland, Chicago, 
Los Angeles, Boston, New York, or any other area 
of the nation which the opinion classifies under 
de facto segregation, would receive little comfort 
from the assertion that the racial make-up of their 
school system does not violate their constitutional 
rights because they were born into a de facto 
society, while the exact same racial make-up of 
the school system in the 17 Southern and border 
states violates the constitutional rights of their 
counterparts, or even their blood brothers, because 
they were born into a de jure society. All children 
everywhere in the nation are protected by the 
Constitution, and treatment which violates their 
constitutional rights in one area, also violates 
such constitutional rights in another area. " 
Indeed, the Court today recognizes for the first time the 
unsoundness of drawing the line based on past history, but it clings 
tenuously to the unptincipled distinction. It searahes for de ljnre 
action in what the Denver School Board has done or failed to do, 
and even here the Court does not rely upon the results or effects 
14. 
of the Board's conduct but feels compelled to find segregatory intent: 
"We emphasize that the differentiating factor between 
de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation 
to which we referred in Swann is purpose or intent --
to segregate. "(supra p.17T(Italics are the Court's). 
6 
The Court's insistence that the "differentiating factor " between 
de jure and de facto segregation be "purpose or intent", is difficult 
to reconcile in light of the opposite view announced so fiamly in 
In holding there that "motivation" is irrelevant, the Court said: 
"In addition, an inquiry into the 'dominant ' motivation 
of school authorities is as irrelevant as it is fruitless . 
The mandate of Brown II was to desegreate schools, 
and we have said that '[t)he measure of any desegrega-
tion plan is its effectiveness.' Davis v. School 
Commissioners of Mobile CountY,402 U.S. 33, 37. 
Thus, we have focused upon the effect-not the purpose 
of motivation- of a school board's action in determining 
whether it is a permissible method of dismantling a 
dual system. 
"Though the purpose of the new school districts was 
found to be discriminatory in many of these cases, 
the courts' holdings rested not on motivation or 
purposes but on the effect of the action upon the 
dismantling of the dual school system involved. That 
was the focus of the District Court in this case, and 
we hold that its approach was proper." 407 U.S. 
at 462. 
15. 
I can discern no basis in law or logic for holding that the motivation 
of school board action is irrelevant in Virginia and is controlling 
in Colorado. I have noted above the pitfalls in distinguishing Emporia 
because there was a history of state imposed segregation in Virginia, 
and not in Colorado. In fact, it was arguable in Emporia that the 
most recent history - the reasons for the incorporation of Emporia 
7 
into a separate school district - were not segregatory. Rather than 
attempt to adjudicate the largely subjective issue of intent or 
motivation, the Court in Emporia concerned itself with the results 
and found that these were likely to be of more rather than less 
segregation. The rationale of the Emporia case is inconsistent 
with the de jure/de facto distinction, and commends itself in this 
respect both on grounds of principle and practicality. 
B 
There is thus no reason as a matter of constitutional XII 
principle or precedent to adhere to the de jure/de facto distinction 
in school desegregation cases. In addition, there are reasons of 
16. 
policy and prudent judicial administration which point strongly 
towards the adoption of a uniform national rule. The litigation 
heretofore centered in the South already is surfacing in other regions. 
The decision of the Court today, emphasizing as it does, the element 
of segregatory itent, will invite unevenness and confusion in 
numerous additional desegregation cases. 
The issue in these cases will not be whether segregated 
education exists. This will be conceded in most of them. The 
litigation will focus as a consequence of the Court's decision, on 
whether segregation has resulted in any "meaningful or significant" 
portion of a school system from a school board's segregatory intent. 
The complex problems involved in litigating this issue are obvious 
to any lawyer. The results of litigation - often arrived at 
subjectively by a court endeavoring to ascertain the subjective 
intent of school authorities with respect to action taken over many 
years - will be fortuitous, unpredictable and perhaps even 
capricious. 
17. 
The Denver situation is illustrative of the problem. The 
courts below found evidence of de jure violations with respect to 
the Park Hill schools and an absence of such violations with respect 
to the core city schools, despite the fact that actions taken by the 
school board with regard to those two sections was not dissimilaJ: 
~l!fsSCBtkbt It is, for example, quite possible to contend 
that both the construction of Manual High School in the core-city 
area and Barrett Elementary School in the Park Hill area operated 
to serve their surrounding Negro communities and, in effect, to 
merge school mdBix attendance zones with segregated residential 
patterns. Petitioner's Brief, pp. __ . Yet findings even on such 
R 
similar acts will, under the de jure/de facto distinction, continue 
to differ, especially since the Court has not made clearJHcdc what 
suffices to establish the requisite "segregatory itent" for an 
initial constitutional violation. Even if it were to clarify this 
question, wide and unpredictable differences of opinion among 
18. 
judges would be inevitable when dealing with an issue as slippery 
as "intent" or "purpose", and especially when related to scores 
if not hundreds of decisions made by school authorities under varying 
conditions over many years. 
Every act of a school board and school administration, and 
indeed every failure to act where affirmative action is indicated, 
is a form of state action. The most routine decisions with respect 
to the operation of schools, made almost daily, can affect in varying 
degrees the extent to which schools are initially segregated, remain 
in that state, are desegregated, or - for the long term future -
are likely to be one or the other. These decisions include action 
or nonaction with respect to school building construction and location; 
the timing of building new schools and their size; the closing and 
consolidation of schools; the drawing or gerrymandering of student 
attendance zones; the extent to which a neighborhood policy is 
enforced, especially with respect to elementary schools; the 
recruitment, promotion and assignment of faculty and supervisory 
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personnel; policies with respect to transfers from one school to 
another; whether, and to what extend, special schools will be 
provided, where they will be located, and who will qualify to attend 
them; the determination of curriculum, including whether there 
will be "tracks" llhat lead primarily to college or to vocational 
training, and the routing of students into these tracks; and even 
decisions as to social, recreational and athletic policies. 
The Court's discussion in Swann of the effect and complexity 
of decision-making with respect to the construction of new schools 
and the closing of old ones is illuminating: 
"The construction of new schools and the 
closing of old ones are two of the most important 
functions of local school authorities and also 
two of the most complex. They must decide 
questions of location and capacity in light of 
population growth, finances, land values, site 
availability, through an almost endless list of 
factors to be considered. The result of this 
will be a decision which, when combined with 
one technique or another of student assignment, 
will determine the racial composition of the 
student body in each school in the system. Over 
the long run, the consequences of the choices 
will be far reaching. People gravitate toward 
school facilities, just as schools are located in 
response to the needs of people. The location of 
schools may thus influence the patterns of 
residential development of a metropolitan area 
and have important impact on composition of 
innercity neighborhoods. " 402 U. S. 20-21. 
20. 
In Swann the Court did not have to probe into segregatory 
intent and proximate cause with respect to each of these "endless" 
factors. The basis for its de jure finding there was rooted primarily 
in the prior history of the desegregation suit. But in the Denver-type 
case, where no such history exists, a judicial examination of these 
factors will be required under today's decision. This will lead 
inevitably to uneven and unpredicable results, protracted and 
inconclusive litigation, to added burdens on the federal courts, 
and to serious disruption of individual school systems. 
c 
Rather than continue to prop up a distincticm. no longer 
grounded in principle, and which will contribute to the consequences 
indicated above, I suggest that we acknowledge that whenever 
significant school segregation exists there is an adequate element 
of state action. If one goes back far enough, it Els probable that 
all racial segregation in the United states, wherever occurring 
and whether or not confined to the schools, has at sometime been 
21. 
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maintained or supported by government action. But the constitutional 
basis for an on-going finding of state action - regardless of h1tent or 
purpose - rests quite simply upon the fact that public education is 
a function of government and the schools are controlled and operated 
by agencies of the state. This is not, of course, to minimize those 
causes of segregated schools far beyond the domain and control of 
10 
school boards. Yet, as foreshadowed in Swann and as implicitly 
held today, school boards have a duty, which overrides even the 
natural and neutral causes of segregation, to minimize and ameliorate 
these conditions by pursuing an affirmative policy of desegregation. 
It is this policy which must be applied consistently on a national 
basis without regard to a doctrinal distinction which has outlived 
its time. 
L-----------------------------~---------- -~~~-------------------------------------------
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KEYES 
II. 
I set forth in the preceding section the constitutional 
right of each child to expect that public school authorities take 
all reasonable steps to provide him an education in an integrated 
setting. A segregated school system, regardless of history or 
sectional location, stands as prima facie evidence that this 
right has been violated. The question thus becomes what rea-
sonable steps to maximize integration opportunities must school 
authorities undertake, either to overcome allegations of con-
stitutional violations or to remedy those violations which are 
shown to exist. As the Court's opinion virtually compels the 
finding that Denver is a "dual school system," that city will soon 
confront the "affirmative duty" to desegregate its entire system 
''root and branch." Green v. County School Board, 391 U.s. at 
438. Again, the critical question is what ought this constitutional 
duty to entail. 
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A. 
The controlling case is Swann, supra, and the question 
which will confound the Denver School Board is what indeed does 
Swann require. 
B. 
Swann purported to enunciate no new principles, relying 
heavily on Brown I and II and on Green. Yet it affirmed a district 
court order which had relied heavily on "racial ratios" and decreed 
extensive transportation of elementary as well as secondary pupils. 
Perhaps because of the rather far-reaching contours of the Charlotte/ 
Mecklenburg desegregation decree approved by this Court, lower 
federal courts have since read Swann as requiring similar decrees . 
In the context of a large urban area, with heavy residential concen-
tr ations of white and black citizens in different - and sometimes 
widely separated - sections of the school distric t , extensive dis-
persal and transportation of pupils is inevitable if Swann is read 
as expansively as the facts in that case might justify. 
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c. 
To the extent that Swann may be thought to require large-
scale or long-distance transportation of students in our metro-
politan school districts, I frankly state my misgivings. Nothing 
in our Constitution commands or encourages any such disruption 
of public education. Fortunately, Swann also laid down a broad 
rule of reason under which JhrsiqJ_. desegregation remedies must 
remain flexible and other values and interests be considered. Thus 
the Court recognized that school authorities, not the federal judi-
ciary, must be charged in the first instance with the task of de-
segregating local school systems. 402 U.S. at 16. School boards 
in rural areas might adjust more readily to this task than those in 
metropolitan districts "with dense and shifting population, numerous 
schools, congested and complex traffic patterns . . , Id. at 14. Trans-
portation orders were suspect "when the time or distance of travel 
is so great as to either risk the health of the children or signifi-
cantly impinge on the education process." Id. at 31. Finally, the 
age of the pupils to be transported was recognized by the Court in 
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Swann as one important limitation6n the time of student !ravel. Id. 
These factors were supposed to help guide district courts 
in framing equitable remedies in school desegregation cases. And 
the Court further emphasized that equitable decrees are inherently 
sensitive, not solely to the absolute degree of desegregation achieved, 
but to a variety of public and private interests: 
.•. a school desegregation case does not differ 
fundamentally from other cases involving the framing 
of equitable remedies to repair the denial of a con-
stitutional right. The task is to correct, by a hal-
ancing of the individual and collective interest, the 
condition that offends the Constitution. Swann, 
supra, at 15-6. 
Those words echoed a similar expression in Brown II 
349 u. S. at 229: 
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"In fashioning and effecting the decrees, the courts 
will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, 
equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility 
in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting 
and reconciling public and private needs." 
Thus in school desegregation cases, as elsewhere, equity 
counsels reason, flexibility, and balance. I am aware, of course, 
that reasonableness in any area is a relative and subjective 
concept. But with school desegregation, reasonableness would 
seem to embody a balanced evaluation of the obligations of public 
school boards to promote desegregation with other, quite 
important interests which a school board may legitimately assert. 
Neglect of either the obligation or the interests destroys the 
evenhanded spirit with which equitable remedies must be 
approached. Overzealousness in pursuit of any single goal is 
untrue to the tradition of equity and to the "balance" and "flexibility" 
with which this Court has always regarded it. 
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School boards have at their disposal a variety of means 
to assist school desegregation. Many of these can usefully 
employed without damaging state and parental interests in having 
children attend schools within a reasonable vicinity of home. 
Where desegregative steps are possible within the framework of 
a system of ''neighborhood education," school authorities must 
pursue them. For example, boundaries of neighborhood attendance 
zones should be drawn to integrate, to the k extent possible, the 
school's student body. Construction of new schools must not be 
of such a size and at such a location to discourage the prospects 
or likelihood of integration, Swann at 21. Faculty integration 
should be sought throughout the school system, Swann at 19; 
Q~i~~-d states v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 395 U.S. 
225 (1969). Allocation of resources within the school district 
must be made fairly to all schools, regardless of racial composition. 
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An optional majority to minority transfer program, with the 
state providing free transportation to desiring students, is a 
further helpful integrative tool. ,Swann at 26-27. 
The above examples are meant to be illustrative, not 
exhaustive. They should not imply that decisions on faculty 
assignment, attendance zones, school construction, closing 
and consolidation, must be made to the detriment of all neutral, 
non-racial considerations. But the general integrative impact 
of such decisions is a crucial factor in assessing their 
constitutional validity, and 'metx ''neighborhood school plans are 
constitutionally suspect when attendance DB zones are superficially 
imposed upon racially defined :oi1x neighborhoods, and when 
school construction preserves rather than eliminates the 
racial hegemony of given schools." Keyes v. School District 
N o:.._l,_D~_yer _, Colorado F. 2d United states v. 
Boar~~f Education of Tulsa Coun~y, 429 F. 2d __J 1258-1259. 
If these decisions are made consistently with such segregatory 
effect, they clearly violate the mandate of Brown I that no 
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student be denied admission to a school account of his or her 
race. 
c 
The affirmative duty of school officials ought to enc om pas~ 
at a minimum, the obligations to take integrative steps of the 
xk sort outlined in the above section. Such steps would not 
compromise any significant, countervailing state interest. 
Transportation of students to achieve desegregation, however, 
presents a more troublesome problem. It may promise on the one 
hand a greater degree of actual integration while it infringes on 
what others regard as important personal rights. 
~ann itself recognized limits to integrative obligations. 
It noted that a constitutional requirement of "any particular degree 
of racial balance or mixing . . • would be disproved • . . , " and 
sanctioned district court use of mathematical ratios as "no more 
than a starting point in the process of shaping a remedy . . " 
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40~ U.S. at 24, 25. Winston-Salem/Forsyth Board of Education 
v. SeQ_~ 404 U.S. 1221, 1228 (1971) (Chambers opinion of Burger, 
C. J. ) The refusal of the Court to require precise racial balance 
in schools throughout the district or the automatic elimination of 
all ~ "one-race schools, " 402 U. S. at 26, is grounded in a 
recognition that the state, parents, and children do have at stake 
in school desegregation decrees a legitimate and recognizable 
interest. 
That interest might be characterized bluntly as the desire 
of parents and children alike to attend community schools nearby 
home. Dr. James Coleman testified for petitioners at trial that 
"most school systems organize their schools in relation to the 
residents by having fixed school districts and some of these are 
very ethnically homogeneous. " App. 1549a. In Deal v. Cincinnati 
Boar~_Qf Education, 396 F. 2d 55, 60 (1966), the Sixth Circuit 
summarized the advantages of such a neighborhocxl system of 
schools: 
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"Appellants, however, pose the question of whether 
the neighborhood system of pupil placement, fairly 
administered without racial bias, comports with the 
requirements of equal opportunity if it nevertheless 
results in the creation of schools with predominantly 
or even exclusively Negro pupils. The neighborhood 
system is in wide use throughout the nation and has 
been for many years the basis of school administration. 
This is so because it is aclmowledged to have several 
valuable aspects which are an aid to education, such 
as minimization of safety hazards to children in 
reaching sbhool, economy of cost in reducing 
transportation needs, ease of pupil placement and 
administration through the use of neutral, easily 
determined standards, and better home-school 
communication." 
The DIBix neighborhood unit does provide greater ease of 
student access and convenience and economy of public administration. 
These are obvious and distinct advantages, but any constitutional 
legitimacy of such a system vests on more basic grounds. 
Neighborhood schools, J&: neutraD.y administered, represent the 
desires of our citizens for a sense of community in their public 
education. Public schools have been a traditional source of 
strength to our nation, and that strength may in part derive from 
the identification of many schools with the personal features of 
the surrounding neighborhood. Community support, interest and 
dedication to public schools may well run higher with a neighborhood 
- 32 -
attendance pattern: distance may encourage disinterest. Many 
citizens sense a decline in the intimacy of ar our institutions -
home, church and school - which has caused a concommitant 
decline in the fiber and character of our people. I pass no 
judgment on such a vision, but I do believe that this Court should 
not compel by extensive transportation of students what may seem 
to many citizens a further dissolution in the ~ cohesive 
personal fabric of their public schools. 
Closely related to the concept of a community and BBkx 
neighborhood education, are those rights and duties parents have 
with respect to the education of their children. The law has long 
recognized the parental duty to nurture, support and provide 
for the welfare of children, including their education. :Rilmv 
J>ie.E_Ce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534, 535, a unanimous 
court held that: 
"Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 263 U. s. 
390, we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and 
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of 
children under their control. . . . The child is not 
the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him 
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the 
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional 
obligations. " 
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And in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.s. 479, 482 (1965), 
the Court noted that in Pierce, "the right to educate one's children 
as one chooses is made applicable to the States by the force of the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments. " I do not believe this right 
can be confined solely to a parent's choice a: to send a child to 
public or private school. Many parents cannot afford the luxury 
of a private education for their children, and the dual obligation 
of private tuitions and public taxes. Those who may for numerous 
reasons, seek public education for their children should not be 
forced to forfeit all interest or voice in the school their child 
attends. It would, of course, be impractical to allow the wishes 
of particular parents to be controlling. Yet the interest of the parent 
in the enhanced parent-school and parent-child communication 
allowed by the neighborhood unit ought not m to be constitutionally 
ignored. 
It is relevant to observe that in the end the quality of a 
community's schools depends in large' part upon the level of 
public support, especially that of parents of children currently 
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in the schools. In addition to attitudes towards paying increased 
taxes or voting bond issues, the effectiveness of the educational 
process itself is related to the attitude of the parents and to their 
capacity to participate. To the degree that schools can involve 
parents with their children's education, the common end of 
improved schooling is surely served. School beards may permissibly 
conclude that parents whose young children have been transported 
from theirX!.'eb neighborhood to some more :silx distant school, are 
less likely candidates for this type of participation. 
In the understandable national concern for alleviating public 
school segregation, courts may have overlooked the fact that the 
rights and interests of children affected by a desegregation pr ogram 
are entitled to consideration. Any child, white or black, who is 
compelled to:D:DB leave his neighborhood and spend significant 
time each day being transported to a distant school suffers an 
:im:ptx impairment of his liberty and his :pocx privacy. Not long 
ago, James B. Conant, wrote that "[a 1t the elementary school 
level the issue seems clear. To send young children day after 
- 35 -
day to distant schools seem out of the question. " A. community may 
well conclude that the portion of a child's day spend on a bus might 
be used more creatively in a classroom, playground or some other 
school activity. Decisions such as these, affecting the quality of a 
child's daily life, should not lightly be held constitutionally errant. 
To this point I have focused mtinly on the personal interests 
of parents and children which a 1!1 community may permissbly assert 
to be best protected by a neighborhood system of schools. But 
iJo1B.x broader considerations lead me to question just as seriously 
any remedialm requirement of extensive student transportation. 
Any such requirement is obliged to fall disproportionately on 
their 
different districts of our country, depending ontkisdegree of 
~ urbanization, financial resources, and above all, their 
racial complexion. Some districts with 11\ttle or not biracial 
population will experience little or no educational metamorphosis, 
while others, notably in large, biracial metropolitan areas, must 
undertake extensive transportation to a.chieve any meaningful degree 
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of desegregation. While constitutional requirements often occasion 
uneven burdens, never have they touched so sensitive a matter as 
wide differences in the compulsory transportation requirements for 
literally thousands of school children. 
The c onstitutional argument for student transportation also 
overlooks the fact that the remedy exceeds that which may be 
necessary to redress the constitutional evil. Let us use Denver as 
an example. It is doubtful whether absent segreg-atory state action 
of any kind whatever, the schools in Denver would have a sub~tantially 
d ifferent racial:m composition from that which actually exists. I 
do agree that the Denver School Board, by its action and nonaction, 
may be legally responsible to some degree for the extent of 
segregation that exists. But if one assumes a maximum discharge 
of constitutional duty by the Denver Board over the past decades, 
the fundamental problem of residential segregation woold persist. 
It would indeed be a novel application of equitable power - not to 
mention a dubious extension of constitutional doctrine - to apply 
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some retributive theory which would require a greater degree of 
school integration than would have resulted from purely natural 
and neutral non-state causes. 
The transportation of students carries a further infirmity 
as a constitutional remedy. With most constitutional violations, 
the major burden of remedial action falls on offending state 
officials. Public officials who act to infringe personal rights of 
speech, voting, or religious exercise, for example, are obliged 
to cease the offending act or practice and, where necessary, 
institute corrective measures. It is they who bear the brunt of 
remedial action, though other citizens will to varying degrees 
feel its effects. School authorities responsible for segregation 
must, at the very minimum, act to IDilBB: cease se~retaox~ segregatory 
acts. But when the obligation further extends to the baiJp 
transportation of students, the essential burden of affirmative 
remedial action is borne by children who never partook of any 
constitutional violation. 
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Finally, courts in requiring so far-reaching a remedy 
as student transportation, risk setting in motion unpredictable 
No one 
and unmanageable social consequences. tiG':lliB can estimate the 
extent to which dismantling neighborhood education will hasten 
an exodus to private schools, leaving public school systems the 
preserve of the disadvantaged of both races. Or guess how much 
impetus such dismantlement gives the movement from inner -city 
t o suburb, and the further geographical separation of the races. 
ror do we know to what degree this remedy may cause deterioration 
of community and parental support of public schools, or divert 
debate from quality in education to a perennially hassling issue of 
student assignments. I, for one, can make no steadfast predications. 
desegregation 
Yet in &~through extensive student transportation, courts 
have ventured onto E uncertain terrain which may in the end prove 
self-defeating to their own objectives. 
I would not wish to impose any flat prohibition on student 
transportation to achieve desegregation. But a nel.ghborhood system 
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of schools ought, to a greater extent than heretofore, be one 
legitimate community interest respected by district courts in 
framing equal relief. It would be wisest, where possible, to 
permit affected communities to decide this delicate issue of 
student transportation on their own. Some may object that the 
communities may seldom require such transportation. Yet such 
inaction may reflect legitimate, nonracial aspiratl.ons which require 
a c ourt's respect. 
3. 
ift ~visitor from abroad, Xi 
~ ·)-<.b 
without knowledge of past history,.-4Ml..._observe ~real difference 
in the ~[ential patterns of a Denver as compared with an 
~ o-.----~ g.....</ 
.~van; t~r an El Paso~ compared with a Detroit. 
But history has played a dominant role in the development 
I{..A.. ~ 
of constitutional precedent with respect to racial segregation in 
A, A 
the public schools. In every case decided by this Court from 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I) 
to Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S . 
... ~ 
1 (1971) there was a history of state-imposed racial ~;furation 
extending back for many years and often embodied in constitutional 
The great contribution of Brown I was to hold in unmistakable terms 
that the 14th Amendment forbids state compelled or authorized 
~~I~~ ~"'"1 c.-j/ 
~~~~- & 
segregation of public schools. The Court~move forward from 
A .A 
.JL.?L~~- . Brown I e!!t'!n'l.amg - over a penod of years - the negative concept 
~ 
of neutrality to the present constitutional doctrine that school boards 
- -- -··- ... ~ ...... u.u5,u.L oruwn 1 covered a period of 16 years.) 
................ ________________________ _ 
4. 
,JWW have "the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be 
1-o 
necessary to convert a unitary system in which racial discrimination 
A 
J.. 
would be eliminate root and branch." Green v. County School Board, 
A --
391 u.s. 430, 438 (1968). * 
a n - Widespread misunderstanding existed 
during the period among state ~ legislatures, school authorities 
and aspggi,aUy among the lower federal courts. 
., 
*When Brown I was decided it was generally construed as goin~n 
further than outlawing racial discrimination in the sense that no 
child would be denied access to any school, or compelled to attend 
any school, on account of race. Brown II (349 U.S. ) did 
contaiR a hint that school boards were Pe~"Wti.FQQ "to effectuate a 
transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system." (349 U.S. 
at 301). But for a number of years following Brown II and during the 
era of "all deliberate speed", it was widely understo~ that "freedom 
of choise" plans, if neutrally administered, met the standards 
enunciated in the two Brown decisions. (Jay: cite some of the lower 
district courts here, such as the one in the Fourth Circuit applicable 
to Richmond). It was finally made ~l clear, however, in 1aee 
Green - and later in Swann - that an affirmative duty exists to dismantle 
duzl systems and establish unitary systems. The evolution, and 
final maturing of the meaning of Brown I covered a period of 16 years. 
') 
5. 
In the course of this unfolding of the law a distinction 
~e.~ ~~~~l. *""' 
devslGpe-d between de jure and de facto segregation. 'Fhis was gencrally 
. ~ . 
~ d,o.ec.v--IJ!!> ~~\ 
).unde.Petsed to be a ElrawiB!:f ef the line between segregation)mposed 
~~t~-t~ .... ..._r -~/ ~-!.-' 
by state action1and that which resulted from~economic~or privately 
inspired residential patterns. In practice, until fMrly recently, 
the thrust of this distinction was directed toward the southern states 
which traditionally had dual school systems prescribed by 
constitutional and statutory provisions. The test was not whether 
1-kL.~~ 
a school system was in fact segregated, but whetherjthis ~ 
~ -t.e_ ~ .ca-c- .el4.. ~· e:.y c0L. f-:--k> . 
A ra~ulted from some Elemoo.stral;)le iltate action This, in effect, 
was the test applied both by the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals in this case. There was, however, a threshold difference 
in that the asserted state action was confined solely to what the 
school board did or failed to do. The Court of Appeals correctly 
concluded that there is no reason "why state-imposed SH!!;rH!9'Red 
segregation of the sort condemned in Brown should be distinguished 
from racial segregation intentionally created and maintained 
6. 
through gerrymandering, building selection and student 1.'a( transfers" 
by a school board. ( 45 F. 2d 990, __ ). The Court of Appeals then 
went on to find this segregatory intent on the part of the school board 
with respect to the Park Hill schools but t./:;;;j no such intent as 
to the entire Denver school system or the E:ore Area schools. This 
holding is today reversed by the Court, not because of error in 
stating the applicable constitutional rule but rather t>ecause of its 
misapplication. Although the Court's opinion reverses and remands 
with instructions to the District Court to make further findings, the 
effect of the sweeping language of the l!ll!3JD{ majority ·opinion will 
be to compelf a holding that the entire Denver school system - not 
just the Park Hill schools - be desegregated. 
This result is reached despite adherence to the de jure/ de facto 
distinction. Actions and nonaction by the school board was deemed 
to provide the de jure requirement, and" the Court was explicit that 
a school system could not be "fractionated" between some schools 
that are segregated de jure and others only de facto: 
" ... It is clear that a finding of intentionally 
~ segregatory school board actions in a 
meaningful portion of a school system, as in this 
case, is sufficient to create an inference that 
other segregated schooling within the system is 
not adventitious. It establishes, in other words, 
a prima facie case of unlawful segregatory design 
on the part of the school authorities and shifts 
to those authorities the burden of proving that 
other segreated schools within the system are not 
also the result of intentionally segregatory actions. " 
(supra, p. __ ) 
I do not disagree with the Court's basic conclusion that there is 
substantial evidence - certainly enough to justify reexamination by 
the District Court - of systemwide segregation. If the talismanic 
words "de jure" and "de facto" were eliminated, the segregation 
on the basis of neighborhood patterns in Denver would be 
indistinguisable from that in numerous cities which have been 
7. 
compelled affirmatively to eliminate all segregation "root and branch". 
I 
It seems to me that the time has come to abandon a 
distinction which, in my view, is neither sound constitutional 
doctrine nor wise policy. The public schools of this country all 
are funded and operated by state action - by state and local 
governments. The instrumentality ~ immediately in control of 
8. 
the school district is the school board, aclmowledged to be an 
agency of government. Every act of such a board and indeed every 
failure to act, is indisputably state action, as the Court's opinion 
recognizes. The most DIBid:iK1t1dBlx routine decisions with respect 
to the operation of schools, made almost daily by boards and 
officials, can affect in varying degrees the extent to which schools 
remained segregated, are desegregated or - for the long term future -
are likely to be one or the other. These decisions include the more 
mm obvious matters of school building location, size, and timing; 
the drawing or gerrymandering of student attendance zones; the 
extent to which a neighborhood policy is enforced; the recruitment, 
promotion and assignment of faculty and supervisory personnel; 
policies with respect to transfers from one school to another; whether, 
and to what extent, special schools will be provided for talented 
children and for other special educational interests; the determination 
of curriculum, including whether there will be "tracks" that lead 
primarily to college or to vocational training; and even decisions 
9. 
as to social, recreational and athletic policies. 
Of course, no school board can change certain of the 
fundamentals. The population mix varies widely among cities. 
A school board in Washington, D. C. has a vastly different problem 
from one in Phoenix, Arizona. 
Other intractable facts include the age and size of a city, 
whether under state law it may expand its boundaries, the extent 
to idxi:G:l which the inner city is populated by a minority race, the 
degree of "urban flight", the :JOe{ rapidity with li1X which the racial 
mix of the population within the school district changes, and state 
and local laws and ordinances. But whatever the difficulties may 
be, school boards are the agencies in our society which have both 
the opportunity and the responsibility for meeting constitutional 
standards applicable to public education. 
Acknowledging that school boards do act for the state, 
the Court - pursuing the illusion of a constitutional difference 
between de jure and de facto ~ segregation - distinguishes 
between lawful and unlawful board action on the basis of 
10. 
segregatory intent: 
"We emphasize that the differentiating factor between 
de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation trl-' 
to which we referred in W Swann is purpose ~
to XJQ1;Dt segregate." (supra, at p. __ ) --
One may be permitted a sense of surprise that the Court, 
so soon after Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 
(1972) should revert to the view that the controlling fact in a 
segregation is "intent" or "purpose". Precisely the opposite appears 
to have been said in Emporia: 
" 
"In addition, an inquiry into the 'dominant' motivation 
of school authorities is as irrelevant as it is fruitless. 
The mandate of Brown II was to desegregate schools, 
and we have said that '[t ]he measure of any desegrega-
tion plan is its effectiveness. 'Davis v. School 
Commissioners of Mobile CoulltY,402 U. S. 33, 37. 
Thus, we have focused upon the effect-not the purpose 
of motivation-of a school board's action in determining 
whether it is a permissible method of dismantling a 
dual system. 
* * * * 
"Though the purpose of the new school districts was 
mod: found to be discriminatory in many of these 
cases, the courts' holdings rested not on motivation 
or purpose but on the effect of the action upon the 
dismantling of the dual school systems involved. That 
was the focus of the District Court in this case, and 
we hold that its approach was proper." 407 U.S. 
at 462. 
I can perceive of no basis in law or logic for holding that 
the purpose of school board action is immaterial in Emporia, 
11. 
Virginia, and is controlling in Denver, Colorado. It is true that 
the history is markedly different, but if the test - as the Court 
says in:lba: Emporia - is the "effect" of a school B board's action 
it is difficult to see the relevancy of ancient history. 
(Note: At this point I will talk about the difficulties of 
proof if the intent doctrine is to be applied. See my notes in 
this connection and see Jay's memo. Then I will move on to getting 
some help from my Hunton, Williams brief and to E Alex Bickel). 
Hp/:: s 1 c·c l 2 '2 I '1'2 
No. 71-50~ Keyes v. School District 
Memorandum of MR. JUSTICE POWELL. 
I concur in the remand of this case for further proceedings 
f ( :_ ·-l ,1 • .C ·- -· 
in the District Court, but on grounds quite-different from those 
4 -
relied upon by the Court.' )! This is the first school desegregati~n 't~ 
fl ' 
reach this Court which involves a major city outside of the South. 
It comes from Denver, Colorado, a city and a state which have 
r.....~t' 
never operated public schools under constitutional or statutory 
J\ 
provisions which mandated or permitted racial segregation.* 
Nor is it asserted that anybther legislative action (such as, for 
J 
example, zoning and housing laws) contributed to the segregation 
which is at issue in this case.--- Rather, it is agreed by-a-11---concerHed 
that the Denver School Board alone is responsible for whatever 
§tate action may have contributed to the segregated schools which 
*Article I£q< IX, Section 8 of the Colorado Constitution expressly 
prohibits "any classification of pupils ... on account of race or 
color." Although the Court's opinion states that there has never 
been any constitutional or statutory provision for racial segre gation 
in Colorado, most states have had such provisions at various times 
in the past. Certainly, there is no evidence in this record of 
legally enforced or authorized segregation. 
2. 
are acknowledged to exist in Denver. 
The predominantly minority schools (Negro and Hispano) 
are located in two areas of the city referred to as Park Hill and 
the Core area. The Dis trict Court considered that a school with 
a concentration of 70 to 75 % "Negro or Hispano students" wa~ 
identifiable as a segregated school. Wherever one may draw this 
line, it is undisputed that most of the schools in these two minority 
residential areas are in fact heavily segregated in the sense that 
their student bodies are overwhelmingly composed of Negro and 
Hispano children. The city wide school mix in Denver is 66% 
j._ ,~ 
Ango, 15% Nego and 20% Hispano. In areas of the city where the 
•' 
Anglo population largely resides, the schools are predominantly 
, n 
Anglo if not entirely so. :, The situation in Denver is generally 
/I 
comparable to that in other large cities across the country in 
which there is a substantial minority population and where dese gr egat ion 
has not been ordered by the federal courts. There is massive 
segre gation in the schools of these cities fully as pervasive as 
that in southern cities prior to the dese g1·egation decress of the 
3. 
past decade and a halL lit short, -the focu s of the school descgre ga-
.. 1..:... .... ·c: .... -· .. 
tion problem - actue, devisive and intractable - has shiften.from 
\ 
the South to other sections of the country. Unwilling and footdragging 
as the process was in most places, substantial progress toward 
achieving integration has been made in southern cities.* No 
comparable progress has been made in most non - southern cities 
with large minority populations primarily because of the de facto/ 
de jure distinction nutured by the courts and accepted complacently 
by many of the same voices which denounced the evils of segregated 
schools in the South . ** But if our national concern is for Xks those 
who attend such schools, rather than for perpetuating a legalism 
~-f-t_._ ~- 1-t-< . . -~· -L~~-<--- _, 
rooted in past history, the evil is certainly no less in a Denver 
-· \ 
than in an Atlanta. 
*Jay: The publications of the Department of Education (HEW will, 
I believe, give you data as to the extent desegregation has been 
achieved in the South. I believe reports of HEW also will show the 
extent to which schools elsewhere remain segregated. · .. : --
**Jay: Here you could quote the Ribicoff speech of a couple of 
years ago - which is certain to be indexed in the Congressional 
Record or could be obtained for you by the Library by asking 
Ribicoff's office. You should not do it yourself. 
4. 
In my view the time has come to abandon a distinction which 
has long since outlived its time, and to formulate constitutional 
doctrine of national rather than merely regional application. -A~ 
LL~/._;_ ,v· 
the.:time Brown I was decided, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the xNx« 
~ distinction between de jure and de facto segregation was 
~consistent with the constitutional rational of that case. The ., 
situation confronting the Court, largely confined to. tite'-section~ of--
the southern states, was ofiicially imposed racial segregation 
in the schools extending back for many years and usually embodied 
in constitutional and statutory provisions~ The great contribution 
of Brown I was its holding in unmistakable terms that the 14th 
Amendment forbids state-compelled or authorized segregation of 
public schools. Although some of the language was more expansive, 
the holding in Brown I was essentially negative: It was impermissible 
under the Constitution for the states, or their instrumentalities, to 
force children to attend segregated schools. The forbidden action 
was unmistakably de jure, and the opinion in Brown I was construed -
5. 
for some years and 'by many courts - as re :.uirin g; state neutrality, 
allowing "freedom of choice" as to schools to be attended s o lon g as 
a . .) -;..._, ... <L . 1-t'..,- :r-· 
the state itself allowed the choice to be genuinely free of official 
restraints. * 
But the doctrine of Brown I, as amplified somewhat by 
-;J 1-' LA:,c.2 , L -~1 • 
Brown II, :w did not retain its pristine dimensions. In a series 
of decisions extending from 1954 to 1971 the essentially negative 
concept of neutrality evolved and was expanded to the present 
'1--c 
constitutional doctrine requiring affirmative action of desegregate 
school systems. As stated in Green v. County School Board, 391 
U.S. 430, 438 (1968), school boards were declared to have "the 
affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to 
'f-r..; 
convert a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be . \ 
eliminated root and branch. " The school systems before the Court 
in Green was operating in a rural and sparsely settled county where 
there were no concentrations of white and black populations, no 
*Jay: Here cite Deal v. Cincinna': i School Boa rd, the Fourth Circuit 
case involving Richmond, and other like cases - you will find some 
of these in Bickel's book. 
6. 
neighbor:wod school system (there were only two schools in the 
county), and where none of the problems of an urbanized school 
district existed. The Court there properly ident ified the freedom 
t:L. . .._,-£(_ 
of choice program as a~ subterfuge, the language in Green 
/ --
imposing an affirmative duty to convert to a unitary system was 
X]ql!XExpX appropriate on the facts before the Court. There was 
reason to doubt, however, whether ~this language 
-C!. r __,__.__.L L, 
was appropriate and would be applied to the radically different 
:( 
factual setting of a large city with vast areas of residential 
segregation, presenting problems and calling for solutions quite 
different from those in the simplistic XR rural setting of New Kent 
County, Virginia. 
But the doubt as to whether the affirmative duty concept 
would flower into a new constitutional principle of general application, 
was laid to rest by Swann v. Board of Education, 402 U.S. 14 (1971)_, 
in which the affirmative duty articulated in Green was applied to 
the urban school system of metropolitan Charlotte, North Carolina. 
In describing the situation as to r esidential pat.terns in CharloUc, 
the Court noted the "familiar phenomenon" in metropolitan areas 
of minority x groups being "concentrated in one part of the city . . " 
C·-~(__ 
(402 U.S. at 25)\ The--opinion acknowledged that: 
·\ 
"Rural areas accustomed for half a century to the 
consolidated school system implemented by bus 
transportation could make adjustments more r eadily 
than metropolitan areas with dense and shifting 
population, numerous schools, congested and 
complex traffic patterns. " 402 U.S. at 14. 
( ~ Despite this ~ recognition of a fundamentally 
7. 
different problem from that involved in Green, the Court nevertheless 
held that the affirmative duty rule of Green was fully applicable, and 
prescribed for a~ metropolitan school system with 107 schools 
and some 84, 000 pupils essentially the same ::mx remedy - desegregation 
"root and branch" XX!llX ·now - which had been formulated for the two 
schools of 1, 300 pupils of New Kent County. 
In Swann the Court found the requisite "state action", 
although the pre-Brown type of state laws compelling or authorizing 
segregation had long since been repealed or nullified: 
"In addition to finding certain actions of the school 
board to be discriminatory, the (District Court) 
also found that residential patterns in the city and 
county resulted in part from federal, state and local 
governmental action other than school board 
dec is ions. " ('surira p.~::: 'l-):- '-1- ~_· c. L '-- ~~ -·-r 7. 
There was, however, a longiNxEB: history of official segregation 
in the Charlotte schools and evidence that the school authorities 
~;..-L' I - ''-/ ("""(.. •· ·- •. ~ Ll dp-I/ 
had read too expansive a meaning into the Brown directive of 
"all deliberate speed. " 
II 
The Court's decision today, while adhering to the de jure/ 
8. 
de facto distinction applies the Green/ Swann doctrine of "affirmative 
) 
duty" to the Denver School Board despite the absence of any history 
of state mandated school segregation. The only evidence of state 
action was found in various decisions of the school board. I concur 
in the Court's holding that the public school authorities are the 
responsible agency of the state, and that the affirmative duty doctrine 
is equally applicable to Charlotte and Denver. I disagree, however 
with the perpetuation of the "de jure/de facto distinction and the 
t..-( • .....,:, 
resulting tortuous effort to identify "segr~gating acts" and to 
deduce jl "segregatory intent. " I would hold, quite simply, that 
I .J-.L...L-1__<:--
where segregated schools exist there is a duty on the ~duly 
\ 
~~it 
constituted authorities (I will refer tb them collectively as the 
" 
9. 
"school board") to take all appropriate steps to desegregate them. 
A 
My primary reason for urging the abandonment of the flRH 
de jure/ de facto distinction is that, in view of the evolution of the 
holding in Brown into the affirmative duty doctrine, it no longer can 
be justified on a principled basis. In addition, as this case abundantly 
demonstrates, proof of the facts deemed necessary to apply the 
distinction presents problems of the greatest complexity. 
At the outset, one must try to identify the constitutional right 
which is being enforced. This is not easy, as the precedents have 
been far from explicit,f. In Brown I, after emphasizing the importance 
' 
of education, the Court said that: 
( . J_;, , _· ) -L _ ...... ~c.- r- '·, ~ . ) 
"Where the state has undertaken to provide it, it is 
a ·right which must be made available to all '·on equal 
terms. " 347 U.S. at 493. 
In amplifying-its ear-lier-decision-in Brown II, the Court identified 
the "fundamental principle" as being the unconstitutionality of 
·j 
10. 
"racial discrimination in pubr'ic education" (349 U.S. at 298), 
and spoke of "the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission 
to public schools as soon .s: as practicable on a nondiscriminatory 
basis." (349 U.S. at 300). Although this and similar language is 
ambiguous as to the specific constitutional right it meant - as a 
) 
minimum that one has the right not to be compelled by state action 
. \ 
~ 1/.-; ::z... i-.:_.~~ · , 
to atten~ segregated school,s
1 
In the evolutionary process since 
1954, decisions of this Court have added a significant gloss to this 
original right. Although nowhere expressly~ articulated 
in these terms, I would define it as the right to demand that the 
state provide an opportunity for education in an integrated school 
system. The correlative of this right is the duty imposed upon the 
state - not merely to outlaw dual school systems - but affirmatively 
...I.....U.. ~·· l • .. -- . - ~ -
to take all apirPOp-r-iate action to provide integrated school opportunities. 
. '""'~"" 
In a subsequent section of this opinion, I will" refer to the inevitable 
' . 
~::::;!-::;,' ,, , ; -•i:Ji;£~ 
limitations on what a state may do - in terms of the factual conditions 
confronting it and also bearing in mind other rights of equal importance. 
1\, 
11. 
But for purposes of the present analysis, I will assume that 
I have identified the substance of the right in question. 
1-t-- L...., d'---11~ /..o ~ ~ 
~reew~1l!!El basis for vindicating or denying this right, 
1\ .1\ 
as the case may be, depending upon whether or not a court 
determines that the segregated schools are the product of de facto 
rather than de jure action. If, as said in Swann "segregation was 
the R.l!Ridx evil" held to be unconstitutional there is little reason 
for perpetuating the evil in some sections of the country on the 
I - . - /)_ - • 1--
r.u-r~~-~ 
basis of aldistinction,wMeh-1-ras become fcimali-st.iG->~~ 
8:" 
right in every child to attend an integrated school, but its recent 
1\ ' / / 
decisions ~ave ce~ainly leaned in that dire.ct~o~ and 1ave been 
I ,I 
l I 
qualifi primarily \what is feasible. / 
/ But however one defines the constitutional right arti ulated 
m6~t recently in Swann\t should be 1available to all citizens\ ithout 
\ I \ I frobti:E subtleties / 
regard to the ~~ wh1ch no longer are grounded m 
"-' ' 
a defensible principle. Public S«E3d schools are creatures of the 
state, and :G:mlt: whether the segregation ifi-i~s.U€ was state created 
or state assisted or merely state perpetuated should be irrelevant 
to constitutional principle. If the right implicated is an opportunity 
.. • 
~ ,..~~ a--w..~~ ~ 
.. / ' •'"? ) 
to atten~tegrat-ed-teh'tlms, it makes little sense to say that a 
(-------
school board's duty to provide such opportunity ( only' exists 'where 
1.-- ____: ) \ 
the state action is rooted in the ancient history of pre-19 54 laws 
which mandated segregation. Indeed, the Court today recognizes 
for the first time the unsoundness of drawing the line based on past 
history, but it clings tenuously to the unprincipled distinction. 
r:).... . .r.;. ...,~_ /.......,. _. ..... - /.: ~---
It findS--the de jure action in what the Denver School Board has done 
"' 
I 
or failed to do, a4even here the Court does not rely upon the 
/ 
... 9. .· .• 
results or consequences of the Board's conduct but feels compelled 
to find a segregatory intent: 
"We emphasize that the differentiating factor between 
de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation 
XX1WC to which we referred in Swann is purpose or intent 
to segregate. "(supra p. 17) ( 't'k-L::<. ~:-;_~;:.--;k c~: =.c-t · ~ ) 
The Court does not require, however, a segregatory intent with 
respect to the entire school system, and indeed holds that if such 
o<J.c .J' ~--
an intent is found with respect to any schools in a system, the 
"\ 
<:._ .. --..... ' 
burden - normally on the plaintiff's shifts to the defendant :s:Nk ,, 
school authorities to prove a negative: namely, that their purposes 
said: 
Speaking:tim for the Court Mr. Justice Brennan 
) 
"Where school authorities have been found to have 
practiced purposeful segregation in part of a school 
system, they may be e:h.'Pected to oppose system-wide 
desegregation, as did the respondents in this case, 
on the ground that their purposeful segregatory actions 
were isolated and indiuidual events, thus leaving 
plaintiffs with the burden of proving otherwise. But 
at that point where an intentionally segregatory policy 
is practiced in a meaningful or significant segJ;:ment 
of a school system, as fH: in this case, the school 
authorities cannot be heard to xxgr-reclx argue that 
plaintiffs have proved only 'S.as 'isolated and individual' 
unlawfully :s:~ segregatory actions. 
In that circumstance, it is both fair and reasonable 
to require that the school authorities bear the burden 
of showing that their actions as to other segregated 
schools within the system were not also motivated 
by segregatory :ilx intent." (supra, p. 17, 18). 
. 1o. ·· 
The Court has indeeclfC come a lon g ways since Brown I. Starting 
from the solid -- a»d unassailable de jure ground of the discriminatory 
constitutional and statutory provisions of some states, the new 
formulation - still professing fidelity to the de jure doctrine -
l · Lt.~ 1._ • .-... i 1 ~ 'J _ .. _. j-t.. ... ~,._-r~- ,;,_-; t ~ ... ,{:_.:.._ c-;."-r('" - -'--'. 4. , , 
is that the proscribed state. action-exists, despite the ~ absence 
··I 
of any segregatory law~if: (i) segregated schools in fact exis~s'; 
(ii) a court finds that they result from some action or nonaction by 
/ .{_. ..... ~+:::. .) 
~;::z:r-""'"~' 
the school~ action; (iii) 'such action need not XRXk relate to more than 
\ 
c.,:.: ~ ,, 
a "meaninful segment of the school system; and (iv) the school 
/1 
---board cannot prove that its intentions were nonsegregatory. : ~ et, 
_j 
-------- ·------- -- · - ·-
C 
Cour~-till clings to,:he fiction of: distinction which no longe/ 
volves __ a__.n::_y_d __ i::_ff_e r_e__:_n_:_c..-e~.-------- ------------
The Court's insistance that the "differentiating factor" 
between de jure and de facto segregation is "purpose or intent", 
is eepee-t~ difficult to reconcile in light of l'recisely the opposite 
view announced so firmly in Wright v. Council of the City of 




~ - (which is~H indist in guishable from intent~ is irrelevant, the 
Court said: 
"In addition, an inquiry into the 'dominant' motivation 
of school a'tthorities is as irrelevant as it is fruitless. 
The mandate of Brown II was to dese gr egate schools, 
and we have said that '[t]he measure of any desegrega-
tion plan is its effectiveness. ' Davis v. School 
Commissioners of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33, 37. 
Thus, we have focused upon the effect-not the purpose 
of motivation--of a school board's action in determining 
whether it is a permissible method of dismantling a 
dual system. 
* * * * 
"Though the purpose of the new school districts was 
found to be discriminatory in many of these cases, 
the courts' holdings rested not on motivation or 
purposes but on the effect of the action upon the 
dismantling of the dual school system involved. That 
was the focus of the District Court in this case, and 
we hold that its approach was proper. " 407 U. S. 
at 462. 
' ~- .>t-~ "lA-O 
Jt-is--cliffi~lt~er.oeiv~a- basis in law or logic for holdin g that 
the motivation of school board action is irrelevant in~ 
Emporia, Virginia, and is controlling in Denver, Colorado. It 
may be argued, of course, that there was a history of se gregat ion 
laws in Virginia and of arguably recalcitrant action by the local 
f> -1.::~::--~~:;­
school authorities. But it was also arguable in W,right that the 
most recent history - the reasons for the incorporation of Emporia 




attempt to adjudicate the largely subjective issue of intent or 
motivation, the Court in Emporia concerned itself with the ~.§ 
and found that these were likely to be of more rather than less 
segregation. The rationale of the Emporia case is inconsistent 
~ r'~,., '-~"'.._.:.i ,__._ ::r 
with the de jure/ de facto distil;ction, and commends itself both on 
" 
grounds of principl;; and practicality. 
B 
As shown above, there is no reason as a matter of 
constitutional principle or precedent (until today's decision) to 
adhere to the de jure/ de facto distinction in school desegregation 
cases. In addition, there are reasons of policy and prudent 
judicial administration which ~ point strongly towards the 
adoption of a uniform national rule. The situation may be summarized 
generally as follows: After some 18 years of litigation confined 
p rimarily to the southern states, ~ desegregation plans 
have been adopted and affirmative action taken to integrate the 
schools, in varying degrees, in all of the major cities and most 
17. 
of the school districts in the South. The greater problem with 
respect to segregated school systems now lies in the urban areas 
outside of the South, and for the most part in cities and~ 
states which long since have abandoned discriminatory laws and 
ordinances applicable to schools, housing, and zoning. As in 
Denver, the legal structure within k which these school systems 
function is neutral, and yet segregation - varying fro .. ·1 massive to 
fragmentary - is commonplace wherever substantial number of 
minority citizens reside. The litigation heretofore centered in 
the South already is surfacing in other regions. The decision of 
the Court today, based entirely on school board action and inaction, 
will invite the filing of numerous additional desegregation cases. 
It is the business of the courts to decide cases, and 
particularly to vindicate constitutional rights. The problem, 
therefore, is not the litigation itself, but rather the artificial 
l-~ 
framework in which it must be conducted under today's decision. 
The issue in these cases will not be whether segregated education 
exists. This will be conceded in most of them. The litigation 
18. 
will focus, rather, on whether it has resulted in any "meaningful 
or significant" portion of a school system from (i) something the 
school board did or failed to do, and (ii) whether the board had a 
segregatory intent. 
C.~ 1- ""''l- / .... f- . .c..:~ 
The far- reaching problems litigating these 
.. , / \ 
issues are obvious to any lawyer. The results of litigation - often 
arrived at subjectively by a court endeavoring to ascertain the 
subjective intent of school authorities with respect to action taken 
over many years - will be fortuitous, unpredictable and perhaps 
even capricious. 
The Denver case, decided today, is illustrative of the 
problem. Although appellate courts are normally bound by findings 
of fact, especially where the testimony is compendious and involves 
conflicting opinion as well as factual evidence, this Court refused 
to be bound by the findings of the District Court which also had 
been approved by the Court of Appeals. Indeed, the majority 
opinion, apparently concluding that there was no substantial 
evider. ce to support the findings below, held that they were 
"incorrect as a matter of law": 
"Accepting the School Board's explanation the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals agreed 
that a finding of de jure segregation as to the core 
city schools werenot permissible since petitioners 
had failed to prove '(1) a racially discriminatory 
purpose and (2) a casual relationship between the 
acts complained of and the racial imbalance admittedly 
existing in those schools. ' 445 F. 2d at 1006. This 
assessment of petitioners' proof was clearly 
incorrect as a matter of law." (supra p. 16). 
,..-:-: C"V-~ IU.~-
19. 
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With reason, ;ne -m~yjgr~e
1
that the majority of this Court, despite 
not having heard the evidence or seen the witnesses, was nevertheless 
correct in its judgment overruling the factual findings of the courts 
below. The point, however, is that wide and unpredictable 
differences of Iii opinion among judges are inevitable when dealing 
with an issue as slippery as "intent" or "purpose", and especially 
when related to scores if not hundreds of decisions made by school 
authorities under varying conditions over many years. 
Every act of a school board and school administration, and 
indeed every failure to act where affirmative action is indicated, 
is a form of state action. The most r:::-utine decisions with respect 
to the operation of schools, made almost daily, can affect in varying 
degrees the extent to which schools are initially segregated, remain 
EH in that state, are desegregated, or - for the long term future -
20. 
are like ly t o be one or the other. These decisons include action 
or non-action with respect to school building construction and 
location; the timing of building new schools and their size; the 
oa: closing and consolidation of schools; the drawing or gerrymanderin g 
of student attendance zones; the extent to which a neighborhood 
policy is enforced, especially with respect to elementary schools; 
the recruitment, promotion and assignment of faculty and supervisory 
personnel; policies with respect to transfers from one school to 
another; whether, and to what extent, special schools will be 
provided, where they will be located, and who will qualify to attend 
them; the determination of curriculum, including whether there 
will be "tracks" that lead primarily to college or to vocational 
training, and the routing of students into these tracks; and even 
decisions as to social, recreational and athletic p.Bikii policies. 
<J:he Court's discussion in Swann of the effect and complexity 
of decision making with respect to the construction of new schools 
and the closing of old ones is illuminating: 
... ~ 
"The construction of new schools and the 
closing of old ones are two of the most important 
functions of local school authorities and also 
two of the most complex. They must decide 
questions of location and capacity in light of 
population growth, finances, land values, site 
availability, through an almost endless list of 
factors to be considered. The result of this 
will be a decision which, when combined with 
one technique or another of student assignment, 
will determine the racial composition of the 
student body in each school in the system. Over 
the long run, the consequences of the choices 
will be far reaching. People gravitate toward 
school facilities, just as schools are located in 
response to the needs of people. The location of 
,schools may thus influence the patterns of 
·residential development of a metropolitan area 
and have important impact on composition of 
\~nercity neighborhoods. " 402 U.S. ~ 20-21. 
c-2fJ. 
In Swann the Court did not have to probe into~ 
segregatory intent and proximate cause with respect to each of 
.! . I 
these "endless" factors. The basis for its de jure finding there was 
rooted primarily in the priorkmdx history of the desegregation 
the 
suit. But in;benver type case J where no such history exists, a 
judicial examination of these factors will be required under today' s 
1 . ; . L 
/~ <"-- '-- \. -C -~ r( t;..<-< o:.. f-"ic-- L (< ( ·, -c: 
decision. The· c.onsequencesXrut - are quite predictable-in-terms 
1-o 
pf. protracted and inconclusive litigation, and of. added burdens on 
\ 
c~~( /-<!' ....- .1 <-- .., Lt.< ··z. - -.t. -
the federal courts as-we-ll-a£ unnecessary disruption of school 
./ 
.2L-
sy~~tems. Moreover, the predicability of decisons wlte:r>e they w#l 
... 1\ ./ •[(. "-' : . (__ 
~ largely on findings as to purpose or intent will become an 
\ 
even less exact.~9 science, and the school boards and authorities -
which have n so much at stake - will simply not know whether and 
to what extent the Denver rule is applicable. 
c 
Rather than continue to prop up a distinction no longer 
grounded in principle, and which will contribute to the consequences 
indicated above, I suggest that we acknowledge that whenever 
significant school segregation exists there is an adequate element 
of state action. If one goes back far enough, it is probable that 
all racial segregation in the United States, wherever occurring 
and whether or not confined to the schools, has at sometime been 
maintained or supported by government action. * But the basis 
*In Becket v. School Board, 308 F. Supp. 1274, 1304, 1311-1315 
(1968 ), Judge Walter Hoffman - in an appendix to his opi11ion -
compiled a summary of past government segregatory action which 
included examples from a great majority of states. See also 
Racial Isolation in the Public Schools, U. S. Commission on Civil 
Rights 245, 254-259(Tii67); M. Wei11bcrg, Race and Place, 
Office of Education, U. S. Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare (1967). (Jay: I have not checked these). 
l ·z.. ) 
-23-:-
for an on-g-oing f.i11ding of state action - regardless of intent or 
purpose - rests quite simply upon the fact that public education 
is a function of government and the schools are controlled and 
operated by agencies of the state. 
This is not to suggest, of course, that responsibility ir1 an 
odious sense rests primarily upon school boards or other state 
authorities for much of the segregation which still exists throughout 
the country. The causes of segregation in the schools are complex, 
and where blame is appropriate it should be on a national basis 
including past generations. In most cities today there is a high 
degree of residential segregation which results in a tendency toward 
comparable school segregation. Zoning and housing laws often 
contributed in the past to this separation of the races. There has 
loR also been a tendency, muted somewhat in. recent years, for 
different r_acial and ethnic X!ffimtx elements of the population to 
. prefer to live separate and apart. Nor are the residential patterns 
necessarily related to one race or group being minority and the 
other majority. There are cities today in which the XIpGp< population 
is predominantly Ne gro, and the residential patterns remain 
essentially segre gated with the whites being the minority race. 
It is generally agreed, however, that the single most pervasive 
cause of residential segregation wherever it is found is the disparity 
~ 
in economic opportunity and status which continue to be so prevalent. 
·1 
~'~-•-<-h: •'1 t-k.._ )k j '-<J'c _ f..-- , ··'- . 
These factors which combine to separate racial and ethnic groups, ..) 
i\. 
were the underlying catises of the segregation found to exist in 
the Denver public schools. 
Yet, as foreshadowed in Swann and as implicity held Krut 
today, school board have a duty which overridges even the natural 
and neutral causes of segregation, and requires appropriate action 
to minimize and ameliorate these conditions by pursuing an 
affirmative policy of desegregation. It is this policy which mt!St be 
applied consistently on a national basis without regard to a 
doctrinal distinction which has outlived its time. 




The Court's remand in this case requires that the _;,Bistrict c'ourt 
determine whether "the Denver school system is a dual school system." 
If so, "respondent School Board has the affirmative duty to desegregate 
the entire system 'root and branch , ' Green v. County School Board, supra, 
391 U.S. at 438," supra, 22. As the opinion of the sourt virtually compels 
a "dual school system" finding,* the Denver school authorities are face to 
face with the type of desegregation Ol'der now familiar in southern cities ·I'\ 
~ough Green is cited, it is not factually relevant for the reason 
** stated above. The controlling case is Swann, and the question which will 
confront - and confound - the Denver School Board is what indeed does Swann 
C._ ·· A. 
require);f[rt is this question which I will now address. Swann purported to 
TC 
enunciate no new principles, relying heavily on Brown 1." and 2 and on Green. 
A 
* After suggesting that the "deliberate racial segregation policy with respect 
to the Park Hill schools" may constitute the entire Denver system a dual one, 
the majority opinion "observes" that "Denver is not a school district which 
might be divided into separate, identifiable and unrelated units." The opinion 
goes on to "suggest" that "the official segregation in illmc Park Hill affected the 
racial composition of schools throughout the district." Supra, 13, 14. 
,;n,..=('.:.. ~--~-~ ~~~ --- - ,. ,., t •/ 
- -~- .' '" L Yo \.. 
** In Green, a sparsely settled rural county was involved - with only two 
school and 1300 pupils. The city of Denver has 100 square miles, there are 
120 schools serving some 100,000 pupils. \ 
26. 
It did, without discussion, extend the. full sweep of the affirmative duty 
rule of Green to a large metropolitan school district, and it affirmed a 
district court order which had relied heavily on "racial ratios" and decreed 
extensive busing of elementary as well as secondary pupils. Perhaps 
because of the realitively drastic contours of the Charlotte / Mecklenburg 
desegregation decree approved by this Court, lower federal courts have 
since read~~~~~ as requiring similar decrees. In the context of a large 
urban area, with heavy residential concentrations of white and black 
citizens in different - and sometimes widely separated - sections of the 
school district, extensive dispersal and busing of pupils is inevitable if 
~ann_is read as expansively as the facts in that case might justify. 
I suggest that Swann was not intended to result in - nor does anything 
in the Constitution require - such vast disruption of public education in our 
major cities. The Court's decision in Swann can fairly be read -not as 
mandating the massive restructuring of every segregated school system -
but as laying down a broad rule of reason which recognizes that desegregation 
remedies must remain flexible, and that other values and interests must 
be considered. It is ·illuminating to review the unanimous opinionX'.KN" 
written by Chief Justice Burger. It commtned with the reaffirmative of 
B_EC?W_!l__!I'~ emphasis on thc':m: "practical flexibility" of remedies: 
-3-
"In fashioning and effecting the decrees, ihe courts will 
be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, equiiy 
has been characte rized by a practical flexibility in shaping 
its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling 
public and private needs." Brown 2, 349 U.S. at 229, as 
quoted in Swann, 402 U.S. at 12. 
The Chief Justice refe rred to the "massive problem" of converting from 
a dual to a unitary system, and emphasized the duty on school authorities 
.L _. 
nevertheless to fulfill this obligation. But in the same paragraph .there 
·•<c./-<- ., ..... ~( the 
was-a--reference to the "breadth and flexibility" inhere1,t in/equitable powers 
·\ 
of the district cou:rt:s, and then went on expressly to state that: 
" ... a school desegregation case does not differ fundamentally 
from other cases involving the framing of equitable remedies 
to repair the denial of a constitutional right. The task is to 
correct, by __ <l:_ ~al~nci~lg __ g_fJ lle ~n_diyidt1al_ a!lc! collecti'{e)nterest, 
the condition that offends the Constitution." 402 U.S. at 15, 16. 
( ~ ·1-~-L ~'- - c-~·{.._ - L... ~::'- ) Gf Th - .. . ; . /-,.<.{ ~r•--· "- ', t ·-c..·t .. I J e ~ .... '-·........c- .,. t. "·"- i ! -t .....;. __ t· <"'-~--; ...... _4.. _.,.. : .. -•'-" 
X'Ni& Swann opinion then identified the areas of school board -dec isms which 
.•1 l 
influence racial composition, and as to which appropriate action may be taken~ 
new sc hool construction, closing of old schools, faculty assignment, the 
formulation of attendance zones, the pairing or clustering of schools, and 
the formulation of policies on various matters. The court reserved for 
special attention qn the two central issues in the case, the extent to which 
C< •• L'-
racial balance and the employment of pupil transportation (bussing) is re-
1.-v<--
quired. In retro spect, perhaps the members of the Court who joined Swann 
\ 
28. 
will agree that as to these issues the opinion is susceptible of widely 
differing interpretations. The District Court in Charlotte has premised its 
desegregation plan on a "norn" - a desired goal - of achieving racial balance 
of 71 % - 29% in the school system, although recognizing that some variations 
would be "unaviodable. " This Court approved the plan, but expressly stated: 
"If we were to read the holding •Jf the District Court to 
require, as a matter of substantive constitutional right, 
any particular degree of racial balance or mixing, that 
approach would be disapproved and we would be obliged 
to reverse. " 402 U. S. at 24. 
In addressing the related problem of whether any "one-race" schools 
would be tolerated, the decision again was not clear. The Court's opinion 
does identify the goal as achieving "the greatest possible degree of actual 
desegregation, " but recognizes that "no per se rule can adequately 
embrace all the difficulties of reconciling the competing interests 
involved. " 402 U. S. at 26. 
Swann is best known as compelling the transportation of pupils, 
although I suggest that its reputation has out distanced the reasonable 
intendment of what actually was said. The Court recognizing busing 
as "one tool of school desegregation," and approved the District Court's 
~ plan for extensive busing. But the Court ca"tJtioned that: 
"No rigid guidelines as to student transportation can be 
given for application to the infinite variety of problems 
presented in thousands of situations." 402 U.S. at 29. 
29. 
And reference was made e:h1n·essly to the necessity of considering the 
"health of the children" and whether the busing proposed would 
"significantly impinge on the educational process." 402 U.S. at 30, 31. 
B 
If a rule of reas : :1 is to be applied, as I think~ is required, 
where a district court is called upon to decree desegregation it should 
accord due consideration to the following:* 
Racial Balance 
The misunderstanding - and misapplication - of Swann on this 
issue has been profound. As a correct formulation of what is required 
as to racial balance is central to the bus ing and other subordinate issues, 
it is necessary that school authorities and courts understand more clearly 
the effective parameters. A requirement of racial balance, as used 
in desegregation ca,~ es, would mean that the student population of each 
· ~kRxn;mti<x~~d.xi:!:JK~ 
*The matters to be considered in a desegregation case are multidudinous 
and will vary widely depending upon the size, demographic characteristics 
and past action (or non-action) as to segregation. The subjects discussed 
in this part of this opinion are selected as being perhaps the most critical 
in view of Swann and its uncertain progeny in the lower courts. 
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school would reflect substantially the same ratio, in terms of minority 
and majority races, as the total population of the school district. 
We start with the seminal decisions in Brown which contain 
nothing - either in holding or dicta - that supports even the use of racial 
b alance as a starting point. Green did say that there should be no 
identifiable "black school" or "white school", but as w. shown above 
there were only two schools before the Court, affording an unlikely as 
well as unnecessary vehicle for enunciating a principle applL~able to 
the wholly dissimilar situation found in major urbanized districts 
with scores if not hundreds of schools. It was not until Swann that the 
issue of racial balance was expressly considered by the Court. * In 
that and its companion cases the plaintiffs did con tend for a rule 
requiring the substance of the racial balance doctrine. ** 
The Court specifically rejected the demand for a racial 
*Cf. U.S. v. Montgomery County Bd. of Ed., 395 U.S. 225 (1969) 
dealing with faculty desegregation. 
**See, e. g. , Becket v. School Board, 308 F. Supp. 1274, 1276 (E. D. 
Va.) 1969. See also Winter and Sobeloff, J. J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part. (Jay: as I dictate this I don't have the precise 
name of Swann at the Fourth Circuit level. I think it was in 431 F. 2d, 
138. Anyway, this is a ca·se that was appealed to the C:ourt in Swann. 
3/. 
balance test, holding that "any particular degree of racial balance 
or mixing ... would be disapproved ... , "but adding that con-
sideration could be given to "mathematical ratios" as "no more 
than a starting point in the process of ,;haping a remedy .. 
402 U. S. at 24, 26. * The difficulty has resulted from a widespread 
misunderstanding of "hat was intended in Swann. Although it has 
become customary for district courts to pay lip service to the 
admonition against use of racial balance as a standard, many in 
fact have appeared to read Swann - in light of the plan there approved-
as compelling a de facto recognition that balance itself is the goal. ** 
*See Chambers opinion of Chief Justice Burger in Winston-Salem/ 
Forsyth Bd. of Ed. v. Scott, 404 U.S. 1221, 1228 (1971). 
**kt example of this is found in the district court's order 
in Winston-Salem/ Forsyth Bd. of Ed., supra, in which an extensive 
and quite unjustified busing program was ordered to "achieve the 
greatest possible degree of segregation,." pursuant to the court's 
interpretation of Swamu. (Jay: Cite some other examples here -
especially the Augusta, Georgia, case I ruled on last summer -
cite and note that in my opinion I accepted finding that racial 
balance was not decreed. ) 
. ,\,£.,__ --
It should be made explicitly clear that"the Constitution -
I 
and after all this is the touchstone of the rights at issue - does 
~t require racial balance or i-ndeed a school system in which 
every school has some mixing of the races. Quite apart from 
-z-c 
the fact that nG -language--in -the--Gonstitution nor--in -any decision 
d 
~.::-=:"""' 
applying the equal protection clause to other situations involving 
~' 
1'1-<:..-t.- ..... ---t,..l.-4t" -.. -·' , 
racial discrimination require& this,* the Constitution could 
" 
~ 
hardly be construed to require an abffiH>&.if-not impossible re-
sult. Few would suggest, for example, that it would be feasible 
to apply even approximately the population racial balance in a" 
-"' '- '--"" ~--, ~; . ·-,; .;_, ~7~._-c~h.-.-;:_ {--- c; ~r~) 
;c-ity-+ikevWashine:ton or NewarkJto every public :s~ school \ ~ ~ / . 
therein. 
The argument for racial balance ai_se- overlooks the fact 
that the remedy far exceeds that which is necessary to redress 
* Jay: Try to think of some parallel cases. One type of situation 
which comes to mind, and which may be mentioned as an example, 
is that the fundamental cause of racial imbalance in the schools 
today is residential segregation. If the Constitution requires 
homogenization of the population, the way to achieve it would be 
to compel affirmative desegregation of residential patterns -
though admittedly this would be a revolutionary step. W-t~ I .. , -
t:LL z ~<-T" t-._~..._ ._2 < ' ._ __ - '-. ,2- '--j <-I...: y~~- --- 1 c:__c ./ c---._ .. '-... 
. / t I . t .... 
(_If 1-~ -'-- L -L. , f-':__ I~~._:.,_ \,..-,.. ......... ! L - : 
a . 
~· 7. 
the cons titutional evil. Lel us use Denver as an example . Il is 
doubted lhat anyone would contend, absent state action of any 
kind whatever, that the schools in Denver would have a substantially 
different racial composition from that which actually exists. I 
have agreed in Parts I and II of this concurrence that the Denver 
School Board, by its action and nonaction, may be legally responsible 
in some degree for the extent of segregation that exists. It can 
certainly be said that if an affirmative duty existed to ameliorate 
segregation the poard could and should have taken steps toward 
> 
this end. But if one assum~d a maximum discharge of constitu-, 
tiona! duty by the Denver Board over the past decades, the funda-
mental problem of residential segregation would continue to exist 
and it is this situation that causes most of the school segregation. 
It would indeed be a novel application of equitable power - not to 
el,: c.:. f..,-:... --;. . ._.:.__ 
mention a dubious extension of constitutional .,theory - to apply 
some XNxtro retributive theory which would require a greater 
c::e:;--
degree of school integration than would have resulted from purely 
natural and neutral non-state causes. 
) 
ct..£ 1 ~ L 
/6. 
c/ 
It is to be remembered that the racial mix of the population 
varies widely among the cities and counties of this country.* 
The demography ;- .:o constantly varies, especially within the cities 
where population ratios change significantly as citizens move to 
suburban areas and white and black families constantly are on the 
move within the cities. A racial balance established in a school 
system for one year would rarely be valid three or four years later. 
1\ 
An awareness of these facts explains, no doubt, why the 
Court has never projected a mechanistic solution for a problem 
of such delicacy and diversity. Mr. Justice Brennan may well have 
had this in mind in Green when, speaking for the Court, he said: 
"There is no universal answer to the complex 
problems of desegregation; there is obviously no 
one plan tt .it will do the job in every case. The 
matter must be assessed in the light of the 
circumstances present and the options available 
in each instance. " 391 U.S. at 439. 
*The range may well be from school districts which are perhaps 
90% black (Washington, D. C. and Clarendon County, S.C.) to many 
districts which are nearly all WIDi white. For the situation in 
Clarendon County, S. C. see Brunson, v. Board of Trustees, No. 14, 571 
CA 4 June 5, 1970) - Jay: Check to see if you have a better cite 
for this case. -
II. 
d 
I conclude, therefore, that the relevancy of racial balance 
is little more, as Chief Justice Burger noted, than a "starting point 
to decide whether in fact any violation existed". Winston-Salem/ 
Forsyth Bd. of Ed. v. Scott, 404 U. S. at 1229. 
Neighborhood Schools 
The Denver School Board has consistently adhered to a policy 
<!~ . 
based on the advantages of l'IRili!x neihborhood schools.* The 
' 
defense in this case is based prima~ ily on the theory that the 
neighborhood school policy was operated with total neutrality as to 
w ·-z:: ...--~- (~·:· ~: .. ;. -/ l . .. t... T 
race, and that the-lawfulness -of such a policy has-been-recognized 
in the lOth Circuit.** 
f 
**See United States v. Board of Education of Tulsa Co., 429 F. 2d 
/ 1253 (CA 10 1970); Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell, 
~ / 375 N F. 2d 158 (CA 10 1967); and Downs v. Board of Education of 
~~ Kansas City, 336 F.2d 988 (1964). 
(Jft" ~ *The Court of Appeals summarized the Denver policy as ~ 
y.,Y~-- follows: "The goal is a centrally located school which children 
~ 11 living within the boundary lines must attend. Although the Board 1\ r.·y · has no written policy governing the setting of attendance boundaries, 
- _,AJ cT several factors have apparently been employed. Among these 
rtY are current school population in an attendance area, estimated 
growth of pupil population, the size of the school, distance to 
be traveled, and the existence of natural boundaries. The Board 
lj also attempts to draw junior high school and senior high school ~ I boundary lines so that all students transferring from a given .,...--- . ~ school will continue their education together. " App. p. 127a. 
36. 
But the inquiry does not end with the ascertainment that a 
neighborhood policy has been neutrally administered. Under the 
affirmative duty doctrine, a school board cannot ~ rest upon 
neutrality alone. There are many ways in which segregation can 
and should be promoted without dismantling all neighborhood 
schools or even abandoning the neighborhood concept as a goal to 
be attained in conjunction with desegregation and other goals. The 
critical inquiry is how a particular neighborhood school policy 
is structured and operated. Has it been used to encourage or 
stabilize segregation ather than to promote sound educational 
ends, including the minimizing of segregation?* A board should 
have wide flexibility in deciding the various matters which are 
relevant both to preserving the values of neighborhood schools 
and to furthering the desegregation process, including the 
drawing of attendance zones, location of new schools, the closing 
of old ones, student transfer policies, natural boundaries, and 
the differences between the proper treatment of younger as 
contrasted with older children. 
*It is by no means clear in this case that the answer to this 
question is satisfactory, especially as the Denver policy has 
embraced junior hig-h and high schools apparently on the same 
11xi:: basis a s elementary schools. 
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A rule of reas-on, balancing interests and values with 
legitimate goals, must recognize the merit of neighborhood 
schools, especially for children of tender years. Authorities 
on education agree widely as to the advantages of a neighborhood 
system fairly adminish; red. * The geographic neighborhood is 
the most common unit of organization or urban elementary 
schools. ** The neighborhood unit provides for ease of access, 
minimizes costs and time of travel to and from school, and thus 
maximizes the potential e».iracurricular role schools can play 
in the lives both of parents and children. These factors, along 
with the associational benefits of attending school with friends 
which (particularly for elementary school children) relieves the 
*In Deal v. Cinconnati Board of Education, 369 F. 2d 55 (CA 6) 
(1966),"the Court summarizes these advantages: "Appellants, 
however, pose the question of whether the neighborhood system of 
pupil placement, fairly administered without racial bias, comports 
with the requirements of equal opportunity if it never· l-Jeless results 
in the creation of schools with predominantly or even exclusively 
Negro pupils. The neighborhood system is in wide use throughout 
the nation and has been for many years the basis of school , 
administration. This is so because it is acknowledged to have general 
valuable aspects which are an aid to education, such as minimization 
of safc ' y hazards to children in reaching school, economy of cost in 
reducing transporation needs, ease of pupil placement and 
adminis t ration through the use of neutral, easily determined standards, 
and RR better home-school communication." 
r**New York City's relativt:ly recent emphasis on decentralization is evidence of the continuing vitality of the xrei:EhxNR.I'ID neighborhood 
1 or community concept. See New York Times, Sept. 13, 1970, at 1, 
"Col. 2. (Jay: You will find additional and more recent references 
to New York's experimentation, and also to the views of some blacks 
that racially separated schools are desirable, in the Bickel 
xxN:x articles - I believe). 
38. 
the psychological stress of initial adjustment to school, have 
often been noted by educators. * 
It is not without relevance to observe that in the end the 
quality of a community's school depends in large part upon the 
level of public support, especially that of parents of children 
currently in the schools. In addition to attitudes towards paying 
increased taxes of voting bond issues, the effectiveness of the 
educational process itself is related to the attitude of the parents 
and to their capacity to participate. To the degree that schools 
can involve parents with their children's education as such, or 
broaden the parents' own educational horizons, the common end 
*James B. Conant, nationally known authority on the public 
schools, wrote that "[a ]t the elementary school level the issue 
seems clear. To send young children day after day to distant 
schools seems out of the question. " Conant, Slums and Suburbs, 
29 (1961). 
39. 
of improved schooling is surely served. * Parents whose young 
children have been removed, by busing from their neighborhood 
to some remote school many miles distant, are not likely 
candidates for this type of participation. 





"People gravitate toward school facilities, just as 
schools are located in response to the needs of people. 
The location of schools may thus influence the patterns 
of residential development of a metropolitan area and 
have important impact on composition of inner city 
~E;ighborhoods." 402 U.S. at 21. 
d-J~ 
~~ The Court could hardly have included the foregoing in its opinion 
~~? > ~ had it intended to subordinate entirely the values of the rum 
6/ ~ 
I ~ nei borhood school to those of integration. ~tified 
. ~ f In a perceptive column in the Washington Post, December 25, 1972, 
~ '12 colum'.'list William Raspberry addressed the indispensable role of 
, / parents in working closely with the principal and teachers of their 
r· J ::,;::; children's schools, a role usually impossible to assume if one's 
~ / ~ children have been bused away many miles: 
IJI ~ ~ · "Casting a ballot (for school board members)is no substi-
~ VU tute for visiting schools, seeing at first hand what is hap-
~ . / -- pening (or not happening), offering suggestions and volun-
~ teering assistance. 
"It is no accident that education is worse at those schools 
where parental involvement is least. I know that in many 
of the low-income neighborhoods, where the least learning 
is taking place, parents often are too lildl¥ busy, too timid 
or too poorly educated themselves to get very much in-
volved in what's happening at their children's schools. 
t 
"But they'll have to make the time to get involved if they 
eh."Pect their schools to get better. As a matter of fact, 
simply knowing that his or her parents are concerned can ) 
do a great deal to motivate a child to learn." ( i' 1.· c .. ~ . ,, - · · 
40. 
by the Court are self evident. People do gravitate towards schools, 
and in the misinterpretation that has followed Swann many who have 
"gravitated" have been greviously disaPl ointed. Similarly, the 
location of schools does influence residential patterns and school 
boards must ever be mindful of this as they seek not only to promote 
wholesome integration now but to prevent or minimize the ever 
present prospect of re-segregation. 
The point need not be labored. The legitimate interests 
of parents, children, and the state in preserving the advantages 
of neighborhood schools for younger children are genuine and 
merit meaningful consideration. A single-minded pursuit of 
attaining maximum integration without attempting also to protect 
these interests is required neither by the Constitution nor any 
discernible social policy. 
The Interest of Parents and Children 
In the understndable national concern for alleviating the 
injustice of state enforced or tolerated racial segregation in the 
schools, it may be that the courts - as well as others -have over-
looked the fact that the rights and interest of all parents and 
41. 
x children affected by a ,:esegregation program are entitled to 
consideration. A child, white or black, who is compelled to leave 
his neighborhood and spend an extra hour or more each day being 
bused to a distant school, suffers to some significant degree an 
impairment of his liberty and his privacy, both being rights of 
constitutional dimension. The parents of such a child have somewhat 
* 
similar rights as well as legally imposed parental duties. 
* 
The law has long recognized the parental duty to nuture, 
support and provide for the welfare of children, including their 
education. This was explicitly held by a unanimous court in 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 ~ 534, 535 
(1924): 
"Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U. S. 390, we think it entirely plain that the 
Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the 
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the 
upbringing and education of children under their 
control. As often heretofore pointed out, rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged 
by legislation which has no reasonable relation 
to some purpose within the competency of the 
State. The fundamental theory of liberty upon 
which all governments in this Union repose 
excludes any general power of the State to 
standardize its children by forcing them to 
accept instruction from public teachers only. 
The child is not the ND~~X mere creature of the 
State; those who nuture him and direct his destiny 
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to 
recog11ize and prepare him for additional 
obligations. " - _______ ... _______ ,._.,_--
42. 
It is true, of course, that children and parents will attach 
varying degrees of importance to these particular rights in 2clR 
relation to where they live, their socio-economic status, the age 
of the children, the quality and accessibility of the nearest school, 
the extent to which integration already has been achieved and 
whether this supplanted a regime of manifest discrimination in the 
schools. It would thus be impractical to weigh the individual 
views of parents and children or, where the public service of free 
education is provided, to allow the wishes of particular individuals 
to be controlling. But this does not mean k that the responsible 
authorities - including the courts - do not have a duty to consider 
and balance these rights. 
In this process, it would not be inappropriate to bear 
in mind that whatever may have been the sins of prior generations 
in structuring a society in which racial discrimination has been 
so prevalent, it is hardly the duty of courts - or the function of 
43. 
a just society - to impose upon the present generation of children 
an undue burden of bearing the consequences of ancestral guilt. 
Nor should concern for the children of any generation prevent the 
fulfillment of the constitutional rights of minority children w..."r« 
which have been recognized by decisions of this Court. The 
answer - commanded by the Constitution and equity principles of 
fairness - is to balance in accord with a rule of reason the rights 
and interests involved, and to avoid the extremism so often 
inherent in instant solutions or in resolving "now" problems which 
are the product of centuries of history.* 
-------·-------------------------------------
*Jay: I am aware that the above subsection (discussing "Interests 
of Parents and Children") is controversial. I would not be concerned 
with this if I conclude - after further consideration - that this is a 
sound and principled argument. I suggest that you explore it, 
especially looking into the line of "privacy" cases starting with 
Griswold. I am sure that you will find among Justice Douglas' 
numerous dissents, language emphasizing the broad scope of the 
right of privacy. He is strongly opposed to the omnipresence of 
big government directing all daily decisions of our lives. 
Also, take a look at the second Deal case - 419 F. 2d 1387 
at~~. 1391 for a fairly strong statement as to the "constitutional 
rights" of children not to be bused. This was a pre-Swann case, 
and perhaps the language is overly strong. What do you think? 
-3-
/ 
The Ultimate Goal - Equal Educational Opportunity 
If we put aside the legalisms Nfu>d:g~ of rights and duties, 
/?. :/ 
surely there is agreement that the ultimate goal is equal opportunity 
for children of all races to receive the best education the state can 
-)t-- . ..- ----- - - ----·- --·- -- ·--- -- ··- --- . ----- ---.------ ~ 
provide. !\As emphasized in Brown T "education is perhaps the most 
j -- --
·---------
important function of state and local governments. But of course courts 
~-----------------------------------
/ must operate within the framework of law and this Court must apply 
principles derived from the Constitution by our prior precedents. In 
brief summary, the relevant principles in a desegregation case are 
as follows: dual or :sNgxRgxki:rnK segregated school systems are dis-
criminatory and are proscribed by the Equal Protection Clause; and 
school autl:0.rities have an affirmative duty to take appropriate steps 
to desegregate such systems. These principles must be observed and 
applied, not as ends in themselves but as means of achieving the educa-
tional goal. The alternative, then, to any simplistic application of what 
has come to be regarded as the Swann formula, is to recognize - as indeed 
t£-r 
the opinion of the Court in Swann explicitly did - there must be a balancing 
1\ 
of interests and that reasonable discretion must be allowed in the ad-
_:4-: 
,_( 
ministration of a school system so long as the foregoing principle s 





Desegregation cannot properly be the end itself if, for no 
other reason, it is now widely recognized that the best educational 
opportunities x: for all are not achieved solely or even primarily 
by racial integration. There are, of course, educational dis-
advantages to segregation in a pluralistic society. These include, 
as Brown I emphasized, the possible "sense of inferiority" which 
understandably results from any state imposed separation of the 
races. If all vestige of state ~imposition is removed there 
is no reason for any feeling of inferiority merely because one 
attends, by choice or because of residential patterns, a school 
which may be wholly or largely attended by one race. Indeed, 
with the pride in race that all human beings are entitled to have -
whatever their color or ethnic origin - there may well be a greater 
stimulation and sense of belonging in a racially identifiable school 
so long as this is not compelled~ ~ 
(!>-~ 
The other side of this coin - namely compelled integration 
where it wruld not naturally exist - also merits more thought than 
47. 
it may have received. · Compulsion in any form is abhored in a 
free society. It is XN especially unwelcome, and often deeply 
resented, when children in an urbanized community are transported 
long distances to serve a state policy only tenuously related to 
improved education for all. There is a difference between this 
type of transportation, away from neighborhood schools to distant 
ones, and the necessary transportation in rural and other areas 
where schools are not conveniently located nearby. In any event, 
as every school official and teachers knows, the over-zealous 
forcing of desegregation under circumstances which fracture 
others'::ca:crsex: interests causes resentment and bitterness, and 
tends to produce friction, discontent and even discord which 
militate against educational opportunity for all concerned. 
These are intangibles extremely difficult to evaluate. 
But another consideration, not yet addressed specifically by this 
Court, relates to the relative importance of integration of races 
as compared with structui·ing a schoo1 system to minimize the 
imbalance resulting from divergent socio-economic backgrounds. 
48. 
Most authorites now agree that performance in the schools is 
more clearly related to p;: economic status than to race or racial 
discrimination. There is considerable congruence between the 
two but there is not necessary correlation. 
(Note to Jay: At this point - I suggest that you 
develop and incorporate here a paragraph or two 
in the text accompanied by full footnotes, based 
upon the studies and reports now available which 
show in general that integration is not as vital 
a factor in the educational process as had been 
assumed, and that the controlling consideration 
is the socb-economic background of the student. 
l, The principal sources are the Coleman Report 
(1966), a Coleman article in 38 Harvard 
\ Educational Review 7 (1968); the reexamination 
of the Coleman Report by Dr. Thomas F. 
Pittigrew; a new book by Dr. Jenks (I think that 
is his nam-3) which I asked the Library to order 
and which I lent to Larry; and an article by Dr. 
Monihan, which I believe is cited in the Bickel 
articles. 
J . . . . (_ // 
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This, of course, is a delicate and sensitive 
area. I certainly do not want to overemphasize 
it. Indeed, ,we-might omit it all together.! Yet, 
it is certainly relevant to my general theory 
that a rule of reason should be applied, balancing 
all relevant interests. If the best available 
evidence indicates that compelled integration 
is not as productive - in terms of improved 
education - as a proper socio-economic balance 
or the investing of resources to remedy socio-
economic deprivation, than it is foolish- for the 
COUl~ts to ·-insist simplistically on more and more 
forced integration) 
,~·..,. 
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I come now to busing, although little remains to be said 
.--;)1. f--jc ):C: (._ 
if my interpretation of Swann - articulated above - is accepted . 
... t.-~ <- -1.-<. '""·"/ 
The Court in Swann was unquestionably right in describing as 
,\ 
"one tool of school desegregation". The transporting of school 
children is as old as public education, and in rural and some 
suburban settings busing is as indispensable as the providing of 
books. The issue, therefore, is not whether the employment of 
-. ... ) 
busing or other means of transporting children to and from school 
is legal or~ appropriate. Of course it is, where necessary 
to further desegregation or other education objectives. The gut 
issue is when, under what circumstances, and to what extent busing 
may appropriately be used. The answer to this turns - as it does 
so often in the law - upon a sound exercise of discretion under the 
circumstances. Or, putting it differently, the answer will vary 
with fue circumstances and must be compatible with the rule of 
reasoll'5. 
c~ j: /' << .- .f-<. . 
Some courts in an excess or'zeal, m::ty well have ordered 
) 
far more busing of children than was reasonable or justified. 
This is likely to happen particularly in oooatw cases where th r 
Nx:IDr district court erroneously construes ~ as requiring some 
level of racial balance or "the greatest possible degree of actual ----------
2. 
desegregation". The x latter phrase does appear in the Swann opinion ------- .. / . ·• / '-~ ~ . j { I 
~t. jz-;~L ~ • \ ···'-<-~1<"'1."(~~ ·f>t-
(402 U.S. at 26) and if const-r-ued literally ~uld be in some cities · . 
. ......... -:-:.y ·""~ .:::-~- -
. ' r 
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1 an-a-l-most- total disruption of education by the shuttling of children. 
'\ 
Transportation is a logistical problem, and if resources are 
........ 
~~-~.:--
available anything is "possible". If enough buses are provided 
tand-eDu-rts-have-not--been -reluetanLto order them}- the greatest 
possible degree of actual desegregation - namely, complete racial 
balance - can be attained in every school, at least for the year in 
question. But this is an irrational interpretation of Swa1m, as it 
would be of the Constitution itself. The Court was careful to say -------------- - --·---------------
that "no per se rule" was intended; that "no rigid guidelines as to -------- -----------------
student transportation" could be prescribed; that the "health of 
the children" and the relevance of the bm:; ing to "the educational 
,. • I 
. ' ' 
' C' L , [ '· \ 
t.r~· f.,~--1 -
.' - .' 
3. 
process" should be considered· in formulating ai1y busing plan. 
I 
/ ....- t·rA'"l 
'\ -1- j C· ··" "~ ~ ,<- L i- ,'-'-402 U.S. 26, 30, 31. 
II ~ t'·1 ,:_, L 
A fair reading of Swann, indeed it seems to me the only 
\ ! 
\ ' 
reading compatible either with the Constitution or with a rational 
\ I i I 
national policy as to public education, is that a rule of reason must 
\ \ 
be applied with a special caution to any proposal as disruptive of 
. \ ' i ,.. . - - .. · 
--. ~-'--~-'- .. ..£. .;, ·--·\ Ll,f· ~·( .<' '~< •• , < · ·- /-... K ~ ( • • ( ~ -
family life and interests as extensive ,busing solely for desegregation 
!\ ,; "'-1 
purposes. As a ~ minimum, this Court should speak out 
strongly against the unnecessary busing of children in the elementary 
grades. It is at this age level that the neighborhood school ]mf 
pRXKE~ performs its vital educational role. It is with respect to 
children of tender years that the greatest concern exists for their 
physical and psychological health. It is also here, at the elementary 
school, Lat the rights and duties of parents are most sharply 
implicated. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra. Moreover, 
the eveils of segregation - whether compelled or resulting from 
I 
natural causes - are less apparent at the elementary level than 
--- - ---- -
r ,. ~·, 
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when the young attain junior and high school status. There is little 
basis for any feeling of inferiority if the school system tolerates 
no enforced segregation, directly or indirectly, and affirmatively 
-~ t: '-.L ,-( l - £~< L.; c_.( ·-
aSSUreS the opportunity for an integrated school experience at the 
;\ 
junir or high school levels and by the other techniques which are 
now so commonplace. * 
It is true that the Charlotte/ Mecklenburg desegregation plan 
approved by the Court in Swann contemplated extensive busing of 
elementary .::hildren. As district courts have tended to look to 
what in fact was approved rather than to what was said in the opinion 
of the Court, it is important,- m the....inter'est of,clarification -,for 
' ...,.-
Ll.) .. : 
us to say unequivocally that the -Court!s language "IKkX ~ which 
fairly articulates a test of reasonableness is controlling and should 
be followed. 
*There can be full integration of faculties at the elementary level 
without encountering the problems now being discussed. Varying 
degrees of inte gration can often be attained at the elementary level, 
without sacrificing the values of neighborhood schools, by some 
gerrymandering of attendance zones , by allowing voluntary transfers, 
and by arranging common participation in various special programs -
academic, social and athletic. 

I concur in the remand of this case for further proceedings 
in the District Court, but on grounds quite different from those 
relied upon by the Court. This is the first school desegregation to 
reach this Court which involves a major city outside of the South. 
It comes from Denver, Colorado, a city and a state which have 
never operated public schools under constitutional or statutory 
provisions which mandated or permitted racial segregation.* 
Nor is it asserted that anyother legislative action (such as, for 
example, zoning and housing laws) contributed to thE! segregation 
which is at issue in this case. Rather, it is agreed by all concerned 
that the Denver School Board alone is responsible fo:r whatever 
s~~~ may have contributed to the segregated Hchools which 
*Article J6Qr IX, Section 8 of the Colorado Constituticm expressly 
prohibits "any classification of pupils . . . on account of race or 
color. ' ' Although the Court 1s opinion states that there has never 
been any constitutional or statutory provision for racial segregation 
in Colorado, most states have had such provisions at various times 
in the past. Certainly, there is no evidence in this r 1ecord of 
legally enforced or authorized segregation. 
2. 
are acknowledged to exist in Denver. The predominantly minority 
schools (Negro and Hispano) are located in two ar,eas of the city 
referred to as Park Hill and the Core City Area. The District Court 
considered that a school with a concentration of 70 to 75% "Negro 
or Hispano student" was identifiable as a segregated schooL Wherever 
one may draw this line, it is undisputed that most of the schools 
in these two minority residential areas were in fac:t segregated in 
the sense that their student bodies were overwhelmingly composed 
of Negro and Hispano children. The citywide school mix in Denver 
was 66% Anglo, 15%~ Negro and 20% Hispano. In areas of the 
city where the Anglo population largely resided, the schools were 
predominantly "white" if not entirely so. '\ Iri short~' the situation in 
Denver was generally comparable to that in other large cities;teross 
,..,,/r:t-'~t~· 
..... rc:t'' 
the country in .which the;re is a substanUal minority ~~lation. There 
is in fact a segregation br the schools which results from residentl,al 
·patterns which, in turn, are brought about primarily by socio-economic 
""--'--..,.,.---...,..., ... ~ , ...... ,. .. #.~.~ ~.._,..,.,.,~._·y"-•• • ..• ,-.J_,., ~-, , .... ..,_....,.J·~''"<"' '·-·~·- '" ..• -,.,_-.,~- •·-u •• ' 
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In short, the situation in Denver is generally comparable to that 
in other large cities across the country in which i:here is a substantial 
minority population and where desegregation has not been ordered 
by the federal courts. 
This case presents for the first time a clear opportunity 
for this Court to reexamine the distinction betwee:n de jure and de 
facto segregation, a distinction which has been IDik nurtured now 
for nearly a fifth of a century. At the time ~rown _!was decided, 
347 U.S. 483 (1 954), the distinction was supportable both in 
constitutional~ principle and logic. The situation confronting 
the Court, largely confined to the section of the country designated 
as the "South", was state-imposed racial segregatl.on in the schools 
extending back for many years and usually embodied in constitutional 
and statutory provisions. The great contribution of Brown I was 
to hold in unmistakeable terms that the 14th Amendment forbids 
state-compelled or authorized ~segregation of public 
schools. Although some of the language was more E!Xpansive, 
4. 
the holdbg in -g_ro~_! was essentially negative: It was impermissible 
under the Constitution for the states, or their instrumentalities, to 
force children to attend segregated schools. The forbidden action 
was unmistakeably de jure, and the opinion in Brown I was construed -
for some years and by many courts - as requirinl~ state neutrality, 
allowing "freedom of choice ' · as to schools to be attended so long as 
the state itself allowed the choice to be genuinely free of official 
restraints. * But the doctrine of Brown I, as amplified somewhat 
by ~!:o~_!!_,wa: did not retain its pristine JiB dimensions. In a 
series of dec is ions extending from 19 54 t o 19 71 the essentially 
neg-ative concept of neutrality evolved and was expanded to the present 
constitut ional doctrine requiring a:.iliamtX affirmative action t o 
tblaJt&ua desegrate schools systems. As stated in Green v. Count:y 
~c_hool Board1 391 U. S. 430, 438 (196~) , school boards were 
declared to have "the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might 
be necessary to convert a unitary system in which racial~ 
*Jay_:_ :Here cite Deal v. Cincinnati School Board, the Fourth Circuit 
case involving Richmond, and other like cases - you will find some 
of these in Bickel's book. 
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discrimination would be eliminated root and bran•~h. " The school 
system before the Court in Green was a strictly rural one in which 
there were no concentrations of wh ite and black popu1ations, no 
neighborhood school system as there were only two schools in the 
county, and where none of the problems of an urbanized school 
district existed. The Court there properly identified the freedom 
of choice program a.s a subterfuge. The language imposing an 
affirmative duty to convert to a unitary system WEtS certainly 
appropriate on the facts before the Court. If doubt existed, however, 
as to whether the affirmative duty doctrine would be applied in all 
circumstances where state action was found, such doubt was laid 
to rest at by SwallE- v. Board of Education, 402 U.S. 14 (1971) 
which applied the principle articulated in Green to the urban school 
system of metropolitan Charlotte, North Carolina. The situation 
as to residential patterns in Charlotte was described as follows: 
!'The record in this case reveals the famillar 
~ phenomenon that in metropolitan 
:areas are often found concentrated in one part 
of the city. " (supra p. 25) 
6. 
Noting that "segregation was the evil struck down. by Brown I", 
anct citing Qree~ as to the "affirmative duty" to d'esegregate, the 
Court and other measures. 
In so holding, the Court continued to emphasize "state 
action", although the pre-Brown type of state laws compelling or 
authorizing segregation had long since been repealed or nullified. 
The Court's opinion devotes relatively little attention to the finding 
of state action, noting that : 
"In additinn to finding certain actions of th·e school 
board to be discriminatory, the (district court) 
also found that residential patterns in the <:ity and 
county resulted in part from federal, state and local 
governmental action other than school board 
decisions. " (supra p. 7). 
I 
The Court's decision today applies the Green/Swann doctrine 
of "affirmative duty" to the Denver School Board. In doing so, the 
Court adhered to the distinction between de jure and de facto 
segregation and found the necessary action by the Btate in various 
decigions of the school board. I concur in the con<!lusion that the 
7. 
state cannot escape responsibility for the segregaLtion in the Denver 
schools but think the time has» come - indeed, is long overdue -
for abandoning as constitutional doctrine the de jure/de facto 
distinction. 
My reasons for this view are based on prb1ciple, on the 
"'*ukack:Jiti: practicalities of proof, and on sound policy. I will 
address each of these briefly. It is necessary to identify the 
constitutional right which is being enforced. Although Brown I 
said that separate educational facilities ZD "are inherently unequal 
(347 U.S. 495), as noted above -the specific right identified was 
not to be compelled by state action to attend segregated schools. 
In the process of judicial evolution since 1954, decisions of this 
Court have added a significant gloss to the original right so that it 
now includes an obligation on the state - not merely to be neutral 
and leave remedies to private action, but to take appropriate steps 
to eliminate or minimize racial SR@(teakluJ. segregation in the public 
schools. The Court has not gone so far as to find a full constitutional 
8. 
right in every child to attend an integrated school., but its recent 
decisions have certainly leaned in that direction and have been 
qualified primarily by what is feasible. 
But however one defines t e constitutional right articulated 
most recently in Swann, it should be availab e to all citizens without 
snttie subtleties 
regard t o the sx'latbtRs JSllk1d:tJfs which no longer are grounded b 
a defensible principle. Public :lUOAti schools a re creatures o:f the 
state, and lllbl!t whether the segregation in issue was state created 
or state assisted or merely state perpetuated should be irrelevant 
t o constitutional principle. If the right implicated is an oppor tunity 
t o attend integrated Bchools, it makes little sense to say that a 
sch ool board's duty to pr ovide such oppor tunity only exists wher e 
the state action is rooted in the ancient history of pre-19 54 laws 
whlch mandated segregation. Indeed, the Court today r ec ognizes 
for the first time thE! unsoundness of drawing the line based on past 
history, but it clings tenuously to the unprincipled distinction. 
It finds the de jure action in what the Denver School Board has done 
or .failed to do, arrleven here the Court does not 1~ely upon the 
9. 
results or consequences of the Board's conduct but feels compelled 
to find a segregatory intent: 
"We emphasize that the differentiating factor between 
de jure segrElgation and so-called de facto segregation 
JIXIIlllt to which we referred in-. Swann is purpose or inter.t 
to segregate. " (supra p. 17) 
The Court does not require, however, a segregatory intent with 
respect to the entire school system, and indeed holds that if such 
an intent is found with respect to any schools in a system, the 
burden -normally on the plaintiff's shifts to the defendant mlk 
school authorities to prove a negative: namely, that their purposes 
were virturous. SpeakingikH for the Court Mr. / ustice Brennan 
said: 
"Where school authorities have been found to have 
practiced purposeful segregation in part o!f a school 
system, they may be expected to oppose system-wide 
desegregation, as did the respondents in this case, 
on the ground that their purposeful segregatory actions 
were isolated and individual events, thus leaving 
plaintiffs with the burden of proving otherwise. But 
at that point where an intentionally segreg-atory policy 
is practiced in a meaningful or significant segxment 
of a school system, as:tk in this case, the school 
authorities cannot be heard to **!§BHoiK argue that 
plaintiffs have proved only 'Sss 'isolated and individual' 
unlawfully segxetw"*'* ~ segregatory actions. 
In that circumstance, it is both fair and reasmable 
to require that the school authorities bear the burden 
of showing that their actions as to other segregated 
schools within the system were not also motivated 
by segregatory itx intent." (supra, p. 17, 18). 
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The Court has indee~ ccme a long ways since ~·own I. starting 
from the solid and unassailable de jure ground of the discriminatory 
constitutional and statutory provisions of some states, the new 
formulation - still professing fidelity to the de jur.e doctrine -
is that the proscribed state action exists, despite the u:Xk absence 
of any segregatory laws if: (i) segregated schoolH in fact exists; 
( ii) a court finds that they result from some actio:'l or nonaction by 
the school action; (iii) such action need not :uxt relate to more than 
a "meaninful" segment of the school system; and fiv) the school 
board cannot prove that its intentions were nonsegregatory. Yet, 
the Court still clings to the fiction of a distinction which no longer 
involves any difference. 
The Court's insistance that the "differentiating factor" 
between de jure and de facto segregation is "purpose or intent", 
is especially difficult to reconcile in light of precisely the opposite 
view announced so firmly in Wright v. Council of the City of 
~~o~ 407 U.S. 451 (1972). In holding there that "motivation" 
11. 
(which is :bt::t!iiscbbot indistinguishable from intenO is irrelevant, the 
Court said: 
"In addition, an inquiry into the 'dominant' motivation 
of school authorities is as irrelevant as it is fruitless. 
The mandate of Brown II was to desegregate schools, 
and we have said that '[t}he measure of any desegrega-
tion plan is its effectiveness. " Davis v. School 
Commissioners of Mobile County, 402 U.""13. 33, 37. 
Thus, we have focused upon the effect-not the purpose 
of motivation-Qf a school board's action in determining 
whether it is a permissiblH method of dismantling a 
dual system. 
* * * • 
"Though the purpose of the new school districts was 
found to be discriminatory in many of these cases, 
the courts' holdings rested not on motivation or 
purposes but on the effect of the action upon the 
dismantling of the dual school system involved. That 
was the focus of the District Court in this case, and 
we hold that its approach was proper. " 407 U. S. 
at 46?,. 
It is difficult to perceive a basis in law or logic for holding that 
the motivation of school board action is irrelevant in iXlqa1u: 
Emporia, Virginia, and is controlling in Denver, Colorado. It 
may be argued, of course, that there was a history of segregation 
laws in Virginia and of arguably recalcitrant actioll by the local 
school authorities. But it was also arguable in Wright that the 
most recent history -the reasons for the incorporation of Emporia 
into a separate school district were not segregatory. Rather t.han 
12. 
attempt to adjudicate a largely subjective Jd: issue, the Court 
concerned itself the results and found that these produced a probability 
of the E_!Il_l2_0ria case is plainly inconsistent with the de jure/de facto 
distinction, and commends itself both on grounds of principle and 
pra.cticality. 
B 
I come now to the practicalities of proof as a supporting reason. 
for a frank abandonment of a distinction which has been largely 
esmasculated by prior decisions and is no longer supportable on 
principle. Here is the situation which confronts our country and 
p rimarily the federal judiciary: After some 18 years of litigation 
confined primarily to the southern states, desegregation plans have 
been adopted and affirmative action taken to integrate the schools, 
in varying degrees, have occurred in all of the major cities and 
most of the school districts. The greatest problem with respect 
to segregated school systems now lies in the urban areas outside 
13. 
of the fklt South, anc! for the most part in cities ru1d states which have 
long since abandoned conventional forms of de jure action, namely, 
discriminatory laws and ordinances applicable to schools, housing, 
zoning and the like. As in Colorado and Denver the legal framework 
within which the school systems function is neutral, and yet segregation 
in the schools -varying from massive to fragmentary - is commonplace 
wherever substantial number of minority citizens reside. The 
litigiation heretofore focused on the South already is surfacing in 
a number of other regions. The decision of the Court today, based 
entirely on school board action and inaction, will invite the filing of 
numerous desegregation cases. 
particularly to vindicate constitutional rights. Thn problem which 
concerns me, therefore, is not the litigation itself, but rather the 
artificial framework in which it must be conducted under today's 
decision. 
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The issue ir. these cases will not be wheth.~r segregated 
education exists. This will be conceded in most of them. The 
litigation will focus on whether it has resulted in any meaningful 
or significant" portion of a school system from (i) something the 
school board did or failed to do, and (11) whether the board had a 
segregatory intent. The practicalities and problems of proof of 
these issues are obvious to any lawyer. Of greater concern, the 
results - often arrived at subjectively by a court im: endeavoring 
to ascertain the subjective intent of school board members with 
respect to action taken over many years -will be fortuitbus, 
unpredictable and perhaps even capricious. 
The Denver case, decided today, may not bE! typical but it 
illust rates the point. Although appellate courts arEl normally bound 
by findings of fact, especially where the testimony is aw:t:Lpe:i«kw 
compendious and often involves opinion as well as factual evidence, 
this Court refused to be bound by the findings of the district court 
which also had been approved by the Court of Appeals. L'ldeed, 
the majority opinion, apparently concluding that there was no 
substantial evidence to support the findings below, held that they 
wer e "incorrect as a matter of law: " 
"Accepting the School Board's explanation, the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals ag:reed 
that a finding of de jure segregation as to the core 
city schools was nof permissible since petitioners 
had failed to pr-Ove '( 1) a rae ially discriminatory 
purpose and (2) a casual relationship between the 
acts complained of and the racial imbalance admittedly 
existing in those schools.' 445 F. 2d at 1006. This 
assessment of petitioners' proof was clearly--icc 
incorrect as a matter of law. " (supra p. 16). 
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One may or may not agree that a majority of this Court, not having 
heard the evidence or seen the witnesses, was co1rrect in its judgment 
overruling the factual findings of the courts below, The point is 
that this type of disagreement among judges is inevitable when dealing 
·with an issue as slippery as ''intent" or "purpose", and especially 
when related to scores if not hundreds of decision.'3 may be school 
authorities under varying conditions over many years. 
Every act of a school board and school administration, and 
indeed every failure to aet where affirmative action is indicated, 
is a form of state action. The most routine decisons with respect 
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to the operation of schools, made almost daily, can affect in varying 
degrees the extent t o which schools are initially segregated, remain 
in that state, are~ desegregated, or - for the long term 
future - are likely to be one or the other. These decisions inciude 
the more obvious matters such as school building construction, 
location, size and timing; the drawing or gerymandering of student 
attendance zones; the extent to which a neighborhood policy is enforced, 
especially 0: with respect to elementary schools; the recruitment, 
promotion and assignment of faculty and supervis1)ry personnel; 
policies with respect to transfers from one school to ec !1-nother; 
whether, and to what extent, special schools will be provided, where 
they will be located, and who will qualify to attend them; the 
determination of curriculum, including whether there will be 
XDK ''tracks" that lead primarily to college or to vocational training, 
and the routing of students into these tracks; and i:lven deolsmK 
decisions as to social, recreational and athletic policies. 
The Court's discussion in Swann of the eff,act and complexity 
of decision making with respect to the construction of new schools 
and the closing of old ones is illuminating: 
"The construction of new schools and. the 
closing of old ones are two of the most important 
functions of local school authorities and a.lso 
two of the most complex. They must decide 
questions of location and capacity in light of 
population growth, finances, land values, site 
availability, through an a lmost endless list of 
factors to be considered, The result of t:his 
will be a decision which, when combined with 
one technique or another of student assignment, 
will determine the racial composition of the 
student body in each school in the system. Over 
the long run, the consequences of the choices 
will be far reaching. People gravitate toward 
school facilities, just as schools are located in 
response to the needs of people. The location of 
schools may thus influence the patterns o:f 
residential development of a metropolitan area 
and have important impact on composition of 
innercity neighborhoods. " 402 U. S. tix 20-21. 
If we continue to pursue the illustion of a constitutional 
17. 
difference between de jure and de facto segregation, and therefore 
have to probe into and ascertain the intent behind countless decisions 
of school authorities wherever desegregation suits are 1linul:lt# 
brought, the consequences in terms of protracted'., lDI::x::a:1cba: 
inc onclusive and disruptive litigation are quite predictable. 
It seems especially unwise to subject the federa l judiciary and 
especially the public school systems across the country with this 
a 
added burden for the sake of preserving/distinction:s. which no 
18. 
longer serves a purpose. It is to be remembered that 3a!K as 
a court, we must be concerned with enunciating principles and 
rules which can be understood and followed by the courts and, in 
thts case, by the school boards and authorities which have no much 
at stake. 
c 
Public policy, as well as concepts of a rational jurisprudence, 
also supports the abandonment of a double standaJ~d with respect to 
segregated schools. The problem. of racial segregation, of which 
the schools constitut'e an important segment, is a national one of 
large dimensions. It is no longer sectional or regional, and solutions -
as well as public If acceptance thereof - will be fat~ilitated if solutions 
a re sought on a national basis, applying uniformity of IUiiiUl1d.t1dlx 
constitutional rights. 
Professor Bickel has commented on the incongruity of the 
federal courts persisting in drawing the de jure/de facto distinction. 
As he points out: 
"Outside the South . . . school segregation is 
massive, and has, indeed, increased substantially 
in recent years. . . caused mainly by resildential 
patterns. Nevertheless, very few federal courts 
have tried to intervene (and) none has done· so without 
qualification. * 
It is quite true, as IUJJ2k Professor JiHuilsd~UUQ Bickel 
19. 
suggests, that the massive segregation which exists in many of the 
major cities is caused primarily by factors unrelated to government 
action of any kind. This may be less true in somE! of the southern 
cities than in those located elsewhere. Yet, if on1~ goes back far 
enough, it is probable that all racial segregation in the United 
states, wherever occurring and whether or not confined to the 
schools, has at sometime been maintained or supported by 
government action. ** 
*Alexander Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress 
131 (1970). 
**Tn Becket v. School Board, 308 F. Supp. 1274, 1304, 1311-1315 
(196B);·rudge Walter ~Hoffman - in an appendix to his opinion -
compiled a summary of governmental segregatory action which 
included some action by a great majority of the states. See also 
'Racial Isolation in the Public Schools, U. S. Commission on Civil 
Rights ~ 245, 254-259 (1967); M. Weinberg, Race and P lace, 
Office of Education, U. S. Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare (1967). 
20. 
But the principal cause of segregation in the schools is, 
quit e simply, the tendency of racial and ethnic elE!ments of the 
population to live separate and apart. The residential patterns are 
not necessarily related to one race or group being minority and the 
other majority. There are cities today in which the population is 
predominantly Negro, and the residential patterm: remain essentially 
segregated with the whites being the minority rac 1~. The causes of 
this basic segregation are complex and varied, including the desire 
(common to all ethnic and racial groups) to assoc:tate and live together. 
It is generally agreed, however, that the single most fundamental 
cause of residential segregation is the disparity in economic status 
which is so prevalent. These were certainly the dominant causes 
of the segregation found to exist in the Denver public schools. 
Yet, as held in _Swann and t oday in this case, the schools; 
boards have an affirmative duty which overrides the natural and 
neut ral causes of segregation, and requires appropriate action 
to minimize and ameliorate these conditions by pu:rsuing a policy 
of desegregation. It is this policy which must be applied consistently 
21. 
on a national basis without regard to a doctrinal distinction which 
ef?~ 
c~ ~--~_ .. __ J ~~1;2.-1- 3a 
2. 
are acknowledged t o exist in Denver. 
The predominantly minority schools (Negro and Hispano) 
are located in two areas of the city referred to as Park Hill and 
the Core area. The District Court considered that a school with 
a concentration of 70 to 75% "Negro or Hispano students" was 
identifiable as a segregated school. Wherever one may draw this 
line, it is undisputed that most of the schools in these two minority 
residential areas are in fact heavily segregated b1 the sense that 
their student bodies are overwhelmingly composed of Negro and 
Hispano children. The city wide school mix in Dfmver is 66% 
Ango, 15% Nego and 20% Hispano. In areas of the city where the 
Anglo population largely resides, the schools are predominantly 
Anglo if not entirely so. The situation in Denver is generally 
comparable to that in other large cities across th~~ country in 
which there is a substantial minority population and where desegregation 
has not been ordered by the federal courts. There is massive 
segregation in the schools of these cities fully as pervasive as 
ef~ 
that in southern cities prior to the desegregation rbuus of the 
3. 
past decade and a half. In short, the focus of thE1 school desegrega-
tion problem - actue, devisive and intractable - has shiften from 
the South to other sections of the country. Unwilling and footdragging 
a& the process was in most places, substantial p1rogress toward 
achieving integration has been made in southern <!!ties,.* No 
comparable progress has been made in most non--southern cities 
with large minority populations primarily because of the de facto/ 
de jure distinction nutured by the courts and accepted complacently 
by many of the same voices which denounced the 4~Vils of segregated 
schools in the South.** But if our national concern is fortk:s those 
who attend such schools, rather than for perpetua.ting a legalism 
rooted in past history, the evil is certainly no less in a Denver 
than in an Atlanta. 
* .Jay:---ne publications of the Department of Education (HEW will, 
I believe, give you data as to the extent desegregation has been 
achieved in the South. I believe reports of HEW also will show th,~ 
extent to which schools elsewhere remain segregated. 
**.Jay: Here you could quote the Ribicoff speech of a couple of 
years ago - which is certain to be indexed in the Congressional 
R.ecord or could be obtained for you by the Library by asking 
Ribicoff's office. You should not do it yourself. 
4. 
In my view the time has come to abandon a distinction which 
has long since outlived its time, and to formulate: constitutional 
doctrine of national rather than merely regional application. At 
the time Brown I was decided, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the:JdltBE 
.ltisti:Nt: distinction between de jure and de facto segregation was 
inconsistent with the constitutional rational of that case. The 
situation confronting the Court, largely confined to the section of 
the southern states, was officially imposed racial segregation 
in the schools extending back for many years and usually embodied 
in constitutional and statutory provisions. The great contribution 
of J?rown I was its holding in unmistakable terms that the 14th 
Amendment forbids state-compelled or authorized segregation of 
public schools. Although some of the language wa.s more expansive, 
the holding in Brown I was essentially negative: It was impermissible 
under the Constitution for the states, or their instrumentalities, to 
force children to attend segregated schools. The forbidden action 
was unmistakably de jure, and the opinion in Brown I was construed -
5. 
for some years and by many courts - as requiring state neutrality, 
allowing "freedom of choice" as to schools to be attended so long as 
the state itself allowed the choice to be genuinely free of official 
restraints. * 
But the doctrine of Brown I, as amplified somewhat by 
J?!:~~_li1 .., did not retain its pristine dimensions. In a series 
of decisions extending from 1954 to 1971 the essentially negative 
concept of neutrality evolved and was expanded to the present 
constitutional doctrine requiring affirmative action of desegregate 
school systems. As stated in Green v. County School Board, 391 
U.S. 430, 438 (1968), school boards were declarE!d to have ''the 
affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to 
convert a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be 
eliminated root and branch. ' ' The school system!: before the Court 
in q~een was operating in a rural and sparsely sHttled county where 
there were no concentrations of white and black populations, no 
*Jay: Here cite Deal v. Cincinnagi School Board, the Fourth Circuit 
case involving Richmond, and other like cases - you will find some 
of these in Bickel's book. 
5 .. 
neighborhood school system (ther e were only two schools in the 
county), and where none of the problems of an urT:mnized school 
district existed. The Court there properly identified the freedom 
of choice program as a Slll:lblut subterfuge. The la.nguage in Green 
imposing an affirmative duty to convert to a unitary system was 
xppC!!!rpi appropriate on the facts before the Court. There was 
reason to doubt, however, whether appC!!!p*bdeuDui this language 
was appropriate and would be applied to the radically different 
factual setting of a large city with vast areas of residential 
segregation, presenting problems and calling for solutions quite 
different from those in the simplistic u rural setting of New Kent 
':::ounty, Virginia. 
But the doubt as to whether the affirmatiVE! duty concept 
would flower into a new constitutional principle of general application, 
was laid to rest by Swann v. Board of Education, 402 U.S. 14 (1971) 
in which the affirmative duty articulated in Green was applied to 
the urban school system of metropolitan CharlottE!, North Carolina. 
In describing the situation as to residential patte:ms in Charlotte, 
the Court noted the "familiar phenomenon" in metropolitan areas 
of minority a groups being "concentrated in one part of the city. 11 
(402 U.S. at 25). The opinion acknowledged that: 
"Rural areas accustomed for half a century to the 
consolidated school system implemented by bus 
transportation could make adjustments more readily 
than metropolitan areas with dense and shifting 
population, numerous schools, congested and 
complex traffic patterns. " 402 U. S. at 14. 
7. 
iEpiB Despite this xwn~wb:X111JlXii!lJk recognition of a fundamentally 
different problem from that involved in Green, the Court nevertheless 
held that the affirmative duty rule of Green was fully applicable, and 
prescribed for a liDIIIIlor metropolitan school system with 107 schools 
and some 84, 000 pupils essentially the same ax remedy - desegregation 
"r oot and branch 11 lVIDIX now - which had been formulated for the two 
schools of 1, 300 pupils of New Kent County. 
ilx In Swann the Court found the requisite "state action" , 
although the pre-Brown type of state laws compelling or authorizing 
segregation had long since been repealed or nulll.fied: 
" In addition to find ing certain actions of the school 
board to be discriminatory, the (District Court) 
also found that residential patterns in the city and 
county resulted in part from federal, stat '~ and local 
governmental action other than school board 
decisions. "(supra p. 7). 
There was, however, a long:illboai: history of offic:ial segregation 
in the Charlotte schools and evidence that the school authorities 
had read too expansive a meaning into the Brown directive of 
"a ll deliberate speed. " 
II 
The Court's decision today, while adhering to the de jure/ 
8. 
de facto distinction applies the Green/ Swann doctrine of "affirmative 
duty" to the Denver School Board despite the absence of any history 
of state mandated school segregation. The only evidence of state 
action was found in various decisions of the school board. I concur 
in the Court's holding that the public school authorities are the 
responsible agency of the state, and that the affirmative duty doctrine 
is equally applicable to Charlotte and Denver. I disagree, however 
with the perpetuation of the "de jure/ de facto disHnction and the 
resulting tortuous effort to identify "segregating a.cts" and to 
9. 
deduce a "segregatory intent. " I would hold, quite simply, that 
where segregated schools exist there is a duty on the GCDbyx duly 
constituted authorities (I will refer to them colledively as the 
"school board") to take all appropriate steps to desegregate them. 
My primary reason for urging the abandonment of the lin 
de jure/de facto distinction is that, in view of the evolution of the 
holding in Brown into the affirmative duty doctrine, it no longer can 
be justified on a principled basis. In addition, as this case abundantly 
demonstrates, proof of the facts deemed necessary to apply the 
distinction presents problems of the greatest complexity. 
At the outset, one must try to identify the constitutional right 
which is being enforced. This is not easy, as the precedents have 
been far from explicity. In Brown I, after emphasizing the importance 
of education, the Court said that: 
"Where the state has undertaken to provide it, it is 
a right which must be made available to all on equal 
terms. " 347 U. S. at 493. 
In amplifying its earlier decision in Brown n, the Court identified 
the "fundamental principle' · as being the unconstitutionality of 
/ 
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I concur in the remand of this case for further proceedings 
in the District Court, but on grounds that differ from those relied 
upon by the Court. 
This is the first school desegregation case to reach this 
Court which involves a major city outside the South. It comes from 
Denver, Colorado, a city and a state which have not operated public 
schools under constitutional or statutory provisions which mandated 
1 
or permitted racial segregation. Nor has it been argued that any 
other legislative action (such as, for example, zoning and housing 
2 
laws) contributed to the segregation which is at issue. The Court 
has inquired only to what extent the Denver School Board may 
have contributed to the segregated schools which are aclmowledged 
to exist in Denver. 
2. 
The predominantly minority schools are located in two areas 
of the city referred to as Park Hill and the core city area. The 
District Court considered that a school with a concentration of 70 to 
75% "Negro or Hispano students" was identifiable as a segregated 
school. 313 F. Supp., at 77. Wherever one may draw this line, 
it is undisputed that most of the schools in these two areas are in 
fact heavily segregated in the sense that their student bodies are 
overwhelmingly composed of non-Anglo children. The city-wide 
school mix in Denver is 66% Anglo, 14% Negro and 20% Hispano. 
In areas of the city where the Anglo population largely resides, the 
schools are predominantly Anglo, if not entirely so. 
The situation in Denver is generally comparable to that in 
other large cities across the country in which there is a substantial 
minority population and where desegregation has not been ordered 
by the federal courts. There is massive segregation in the schools 
(.<.-~ 
of these ~fully as pervasive as that in southern cities prior to 
3. 
the desegregation decrees of the past decade and a half. The focus 
of the school desegregation problem has now shifted from the South 
·- / ! 
to the country as a whole. 
C--~.<-<:C i-<,..t§Zd!-.~·r-e{ 
Unwilling as the process was in most 
!\ 
places, substantial progress toward achieving integration has been 
3 
made in southern states. No comparable progress has been made 
4 
in many non-southern cities with large minority populations 
primarily because of the de facto/ de jure distinction nurtured by 
the courts and accepted complacently by many of the same voices 
5 
which denounced the evils of segregated schools in the South. 
But if our national concern is for those who attend such schools, 
rather than for perpetuating a legalism rooted in history rather 
~ 
than logic, we must recognize that the evil of separate schools 
.A 
is no less in Denver than in Atlanta. 
4. 
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In my vie~ftho iiMi Aai 8 111!11:8 t8 abandon a distinction which 
f1U§Jlong sinceloutlived its time, and lor; formulate constitutional 
principles of national rather than merely regional application. When 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was decided, 
the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation was consistent 
~:~ 
with the constitutional rationale of that case. The situation confronting 
1\ 
!J::J:.~ c.,f ill c. J r. 
the Court, Fi8 \ fO r •• the southern states, was officially 
imposed racial segregation in the schools extending back for many 
years and usually embodied in constitutional and statutory provisions. 
The great contribution of Brown I was its holding in unmistakable 
terms that the 14th Amendment forbids state-compelled or authorized 
segregation of public schools. 347 U. S. at 488, 493-49 5. Although 
some of the language was more expansive, the holding in Brown I 
was essentially negative: It was impermissible under the Constitution 
for the states, or their instrumentalities, to force children to 
attend segregated schools. The forbidden action was fon\iStll:~ 
5. 
de jure, and the opinion in Brown I was construed - for some years 
and by many courts - as requiring state neutrality, allowing "freedom 
of choice" as to schools to be attended so long as the state itself 
6 
assured that the choice was genuinely free of official restraints. 
But the doctrine of Brown I, as amplified by Brown II, 349 
U.S. 294 (1955), did not retain its pristine meaning. In a series 
of decisions extending from 1954 to 1971 the concept of state 
7 
neutrality evolved and was expanded to the present constitutional 
doctrine requiring affirmative state action to desegregate school 
systems. The keystone case was Green v. County School Board, 
391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968), where school boards were declared 
to have "the affirrr. a~.tive duty to take whatever steps might be 
necessary to convert to a ••• unitary system in which racial 
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch." The school 
syst em before the Court in Green was operating in a rural and 
sparsely settled county where there were no concentrations of 
white and black populations, no neighborhood school system (there 
6. 
were only two schools in the county), and where none of the problems 
of an urbanized school district existed. The Court tA..e properly 
~ 
identified the freedom of choice program as a subterfuge, and the 
'\ 
language in Green imposing an affirmative duty to convert to a 
unitary system was appropriate on the facts before the Court. 
There was, however, reason to question to what extent tbis duty 
applied in th~~ factual setting of a large city with=~~~·..;:_ 
~ ' 
of residential segregation, presenting problems and calling for 
solutions quite different from those in the rural setting of New Kent 
County, Virginia. 
But the doubt as to whether the affirmative duty concept 
would flower into a new constitutional principle of general application..-:!>/ 
was laid to rest by b'wann v. Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), 
in which the affirmative duty articulated in Green was applied to 
the urban school system of metropolitan Charlotte, North Carolina. 
In describing the situation as to residential patterns in Charlotte, 
the Court noted the "familiar phenomenon" in the metropolitan areas 
of minority groups being "concentrated in one part of the city, " 
402 U.S. at 25, and acknowledged that: 
"Rural areas accustomed for half a century to the 
consolidated school system implemented by bus 
transportation could make adjustments more readily 
than metropolitan areas with dense and shifting 
population, numerous schools, congested and 
complex traffic patterns. " 402 U.S. at 14. 
Despite this recognition of a fundamentally different problem from 
that involved in Green, the Court nevertheless held that the 
affirmative duty rule of Green was applicable, and prescribed 
7. 
for a metropolitan school system with 107 schools and some 84, 000 
pupils essentially the same remedy - elimination of segregation 
"root and branch" - which had been formulated for the two schools 
a:,.d •1, 300 pupils of New Kent County. 
In Swann, the Court further noted it was dealing only with 
states having "a long history" of officially imposed segregation 
and the duty of school authorities in those states to implement 
~~ 
Brown I. 402 U.S. at 5-6. In so doing, the Cour~~'Y ·- ---
~~ 
fandidey that the evolution of constitutional doctrine from Brown I 
8. 
to Green/ Swann undercut whatever logic once supported the de facto/ 
de jure distinction. In imposing on metropolitan southern school districts 
as affirmative duty, including large-scale transportation of pupils, 
to eliminate separate schools, the Court required these districts to 
alleviate conditions which in large part did not reSilt from historic , 
state-imposed de jure segregation. Rather , the familiar root cause 
of segregated schools in all the biracial metropolitan areas of our 
country is essentially the same: one of segregated residential and 
migratory patterns the impact of which on the racial composition of 
the schools was perpetuated and rarely ameliorated by action of public 
school authorities. This is a national, not a southern phenomenon. 
And it is largely unrelated to whether a particular state had or did not 
8 have segregatory school laws. 
Whereas Brown I rightly addressed the elimination of state-
imposed segregation in that particular section of the country where 
it did exist, Swann imposed obligations on southern school districts to 
eliminate conditions which are not regionally unique but are similar both 
in origin and effect to conditions in the rest of the country. As the 
remedial obligations of Swann extend far beyond the elimination of the out-
growths of the state-imposed segregation outlawed in Brown, the in-
evitable rationale of Swann points towards a uniform, constitutional 
approach to our national problems of school segregation. 
9. 
II. 
The Court's decision today, while adhering to the de jure/ 
de facto distinction , will require the application of the Green/ Swann 
doctrine of "affirmative duty" to the Denver School Board despite 
the absence of any history of state-mandated school segregation. 
The only evidence of a constitutional violation was found in various 
decisions of the school board. I concur in the Court's position that 
the public school authorities are the responsible agency of the state, 
and that the affirmatj ve duty doctrine is equally applicable in Charlotte 
and in Denver. I disagree, however, with any perpetuation of the de 
jure/ de facto distinction and with leaving to petitioners the initial 
tortuous effort of identifying " segregative acts" and deducing "segregatory 
intent. " I would hold , quite simply, that wtere segregated public schools 
exist , there is a strong prima facie case that the duly constituted 
public authorities (I will usually refer to them collectively as the 
" school board") are sufficiently responsible to impose upon them a 
nationally applicable duty to take appropriate desegregatory measures. 
A r.rih.;C.J 
fL__ t c·f )J , I 
My p i t; reason for ttr~ tits abandonment of the 
" 
~'..u...· ...:a. 
de jure/de facto distinction is that, in "FIIR'IJ.,...!!i:i;eww" of the evolution of 
the holding in Brown I into the affirmative duty doctrine, it no 
longer can be justified on a principled basis. In addition, as this 
10. 
case abundantly demonstrates, proof of the facts deemed necessary 
to apply the distinction presents problems which the courts cannot 
¢~.~twly resolve. 
At the outset, one must try to identify the constitutional right 
precedents 
which is being enforced. This is not easy, as thE¥'~ have 
been far from explicit. In Brown I, after emphasizing the importance 
of education, the Court said that: 
"Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken 
to provide it, is a right which must be made avail-
able to all on equal terms. " 347 U.S. , at 493. 
In Brown II, the Court identified the "fundamental principle" 
enunciated in Brown I as being the unconstitutionality of "racial 
discrimination in public education, " 349 U. S. at 298, and spoke 
11. 
of "the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public 
schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis. " 
349 U. S. at 300. Although this and similar language is ambiguous 
as to the specific constitutional right, it meant - as a minimum -
that one has the right not to be compelled by state action to attend 
9 
a segregated school system. In the evolutionary process since 
1954, decisions of this Court have added a significant gloss to this 
original right. Although nowhere expressly articulated in these 
terms, I would now define it as the right to expect that the state -
once it assumes responsibility for public education - will provide ., 
a reasonable opportunity for education in an integr~_ll._~o-~ sy~t_eni. 
The correlative of this right should be the duty imposed upon the 
state - not merely to outlaw dual school systems - but affirmatively 
to take reasonable action consistent with educational goals to provide ,. ,o 
integrated school opportunities. 
It is difficult to perceive a basis for vindicating or denying 
this right, as the case may be, depending upon whether or not some 
f 
12. 
court determines that the segregated schools are the product of de 
facto rather than de jure action. If, as in Swann "segregation was the 
evil" held to be unconstitutional, 402 U.S. at 15, there is little reason 
for perpetuating the evil in some sections of the country on the basis 
of a formalistic distinction. 
Public schools are XHXS creatures of the state, and whether the 
segregation was state-created or state-assisted or merely state-
perpetuated should be irrelevant to constitutional principle. The school 
~~~~~ 
board exercises mesth ~~-by..y-ear. responl!ibility over the 
A. 
~q~- ~-~~ c:.u-J.JL .:.......__ HI..P ~
,{operations of the public school system. It sets policies on attendance 
zones, faculty employment and assignments, school construction, 
closings and consolidations, and myriad other matters. School board 
decisions [are];;bviousl;}_not the sole cause of segregated school conditions. 
But if, after detailed and complete public supervision, segregated 
schools still persist, the presumption is strong that the school 
board, by its acts or omissions, is in some part responsible. 
Where state action and supervision is so pervasive and where, 
after years of such action, schools remain thoroughly segregated, 
this Court is justified in finding a prima facie case of a consti-
tllr~$ rl 
tutional violation. The burden th • on the school board to 
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It makes little sense to find ;en "' ii1 e l violations 
and the consequent affirmative duty to desegregate solely in those states 
with state-imposed segregation at the time of the Brown decision. The 
history of state-imposed segregation is more widespread in our country 
--J<..C<-Ct:1:t' 'J·'-'· ~ 
than the de jure/ de facto distinction has traditionally cared to s ' ii, 
As one commentator has noted: 
"the three court of appeals decisions denying a 
constitutional duty to abolish de facto segregation 
all arose in cities - Cincinnati, Gary and 
Kansas City, Kansas - where racial segregation 
in schools was formerly mandated by state or local 
law. [Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F .2d 
55 (CA 6 1966), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964); 
Downsv. BoardOfEduc., 336U.S. F.2d988 (CAlO 
1964), cert. denied, 380U.S. 914, Bellv. School 
City, 3'"24F.2d2'09(CA 7 1963), cert. denied, 377 
U.S. 924] . Ohio discarded its statute in 1887, 
Indiana in 1949, and Kansas City not untiLthe 
advent of Brown. If Negro and white parents in 
Mississippi are required to bus their children to 
distant schools on the theory that the consequences 
of past de jure segregation cannot otherwise be 
dissipated, should not the same reasoning apply 
in Gary , Indiana, where no more than five years 
before Brown the same practice existed with 
presumably the same effects." Goodman, De Facto 
School Segregation: A Constitutional and EmRirical 
Analysis, 60 Cal. L. Rev. 275,297 (1972). 
Not only does the de jure/ de facto distinction operate inequitably 
on communities in different sections of the country: it disadvantages 
minority children as well. As the Fifth Circuit stated: 
"The Negro children in Cleveland, Chicago, 
Los Angeles, Boston, New York, or any other area 
of the nation which the opinion classifies under 
de facto segregation, would receive little comfort 
from the assertion that the racial make-up of their 
school system does not violate their constitutional 
rights because they were born into a de facto 
society, while the exact same racial make-up of 
the school system in the 17 southern and border 
states violates the constitutional rights of their 
counterparts, or even their imR.k blood brothers, 
because they were born into a de jure society. All 
children everywhere in the nation are protected by 
the Constitution, and treatment which violates their 
constitutional rights in one area, also violates 
such constitutional rights in another area . " 
Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School 
District, 467 F .2d 142, 148 (CA 5 en bane 1972) 
quoting United States v. Jefferson County Board 
of Educ., 380 F .2d 385 , 397 (CA 5 en bane) (Gewin 
J., dissenting). 12 
14. 
15. 
The Court today does move for the first time toward 
breaking down past sectional disparities, but it clings l 
~f-s 
ten-nously to ~unprincipled distinction. It searches for de jure 
1\ 
action in what the Denver School Board has done or failed to do, 
and even here the Court does not rely upon the results or effects 
of the Board's conduct but feels compelled to find segregatory intent: 
''We emphasize that the differentiating factor between 
de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation 
to which we referred in Swann is purpose or intent 
to segregate." (Court Opinion, p. 17) (italics are 
the Court's). 
The Court's insistence that the "differentiating factor" 
between de jure and de facto segregation be "purpose or intent" 
is difficult to reconcile in light of the opposite view explicitly 
announced as recently as in Wright v. Council of the City of 
Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972). In holdingfixk there that 
"motivation" is irrelevant, the Court said: 
"In addition, an inquiry into the 'dominant' motivation 
of school authorities is as irrelevant as it is fruitless. 
The mandate of Brown II was to desegregate schools, 
and we have said that '[t)he measure of any desegrega-
tion plan is its effectiveness. ' Davis v. School 
Commissioners of Mobile Cou~02 U.S. 33, 37. 
13 
Thus, we have focused upon the effect - not the 
purpose or motivation - of a school board's action 
in determining whether it is a permissible method 
of dismantling a dual system. 
* * * * * 
"Though the purpose of the new school district was 
found to be discriminatory in many of these cases, 
the courts' holdings rested not on motivation or 
purposes but on the effect of the action upon the 
dismantling of the dual school system involved. That 
was the focus of the District Court in this case, and 
we hold that its approach was proper. " 407 U. s. 
at 462. 
16. 
I can discern no basis in law or logic for holding that the motivation 
of school board action is irrelevant in Virginia and controlling in 
Colorado. I have noted above the pitfalls in distinguishing Emporia 
because there was a history of state imposed segregation in Virginia, 
and not in Colorado. In fact, it was arguable in Emporia that the 
most recent history - the reasons for the incorporation of Emporia 
into a separate school district - were not segregatory. 
14 
Rather 
than attempt to adjudicate the largely subjective issue of intent or 
motivation, the Court in Emporia concerned itself with the results 
and found that these were likely to be of more rather than less 
segregation. The rationale of the Emporia case is inconsistent 
17. 
with the de jure/ de facto distinction, and commends itself in this 
respect both on grounds of principle and practicality. 
B. 
There is thus no reason as a matter of constitutional principle 
to adhere to the de jure/ de facto distinction in school desegregation cases. 
In addition, there are reasons of policy and prudent judicial administration 
which point strongly toward the adoption of a uniform national rule. The 
litigation heretofore centered in the South already is surfacing in other 
regions. The decision of the Court today, emphasizing as it does the elusive 
element of segregatory intent, will invite numerous desegregation suits 
in ll7.hti which there can be little hope of uniformity of results. 
The issue in these cases will not be whether segregated 
education exists. This will be conceded in most of them, The litigation 
will focus as a consequence of the Court's decision on whether segregation 
has resulted in any "meaningful or significant" portion of a school system 
from a school board's "segregatory intent." The intractable problems 
involved in litigating this 
18. 
issue are obvious to any lawyer. The results of litigation -often 
arrived at subjectively by a court endeavoring to ascertain the 
b-1'-~ 1-.:s-~­
subjective intent of school authorities with respect to action taken/\ 
over many years - will be fortuitous, unpredictable and 11 1 I 1 
even capricious. 
The Denver situation is illustrative of the problem. The 
courts below found evidence of de jure violations with respect to 
the Park Hill schools and an absence of such violations with respect 
to the core city schools, despite the fact that actions taken by the 
w-.:..->4!_, 
school board with regard to those two sections wa,s not dissimilar. 
It is, for example, quite possible to contend that both the 
construction of Manual High School in the core city area and 
Barrett Elementary School in the Park Hill area operated to serve 
their surrounding Negro communities and, in effect, to merge 
school attendance zones with segregated residential patterns. See 
Petitioner's Brief, pp. 80-83. Yet findings even on such similar 
acts will, under the de jure/ de facto distinction, continue to differ> 
19. 
~ especially since the Court has¢de clear what 
suffices to establish the requisite "segregatory intent" for an 
initial constitutional violation. Even if it were possible to clarify 
this question, wide and unpredictable differences of opinion among 
judges would be inevitable when dealing with an issue as slippery 
as "intent" or "purpose", and especially when related to hundreds 
of decisions made by school authorities under varying conditions 
over many years. 
This Court has recognized repeatedly that it :s:X is "extremely 
difficult for a court to ascertain the motivation, • 1 JJ 1 'iln ~iii 
.-41,ili.lliiffil!ll. •••i'-llli' •. llli'•· ~4 or collection of different motivations, that 
lie behind a legislative enactment, " Palmer v. Thompson, 403 
U.S. 214, 224 (1971); McGinnis v. Royster, u.s. __ , 
(1973); United states v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381 (1968). 
Whatever difficulties exist with regard to a single statute will be 
20. 
( Every act of a school board and school administration, and 
indeed every failure to act where affirmative action is indicated, 
must now be subject to scrutiny. The most routine decisions with 
respect to the operation of schools, made almost daily, can affect 
in varying degrees the extent to which schools are initially 
segregated, remain in that condition, are desegregated, or - for 
the long term future - are likely to be one or the other. These 
decisions include action or nonaction with respect to school building 
construction and location; the timing of building new schools and 
their size; the closing and consolidation of schools; the drawing or 
gerrymandering of student attendance zones; the extent to which a 
neighborhood policy is enforced, especially with respect to 
elementary schools; the recruitment, promotion and assignment of 
faculty and supervisory personnel; policies with respect to 
transfers from one school to another; whether, and to what extent, 
special schools will be provided, where they will be located, and 
who will qualify to attend them; the determination of curriculum, 
21. 
including whether there will be ''tracks" that lead primarily to 
college or to vocational training, and the routing of students into 
these tracks; and even decisions as to social, recreational and 
athletic policies. 
In Swann the Court did not have to probe into segregatory 
.,.J 
intent XHX proximate cause with respect to each of these • "endless" 
factors. The basis for its de jure finding there was rooted primarily 
in the prior history of the desegregation suit. 402 tJ. S. at 5-6. 
But in the Denver-type case, where no such history exists, a 
judicial examination of these factors will be required under today's 
decision. This will e lead inevitably to uneven and unpredictable 
results, protracted and inconclusive litigation, to added burdens 
on the federal courts, and to s erious disruption of individual 
~""' : ... ~ <-~~ - t....~-f._. ~ ............. ~ ......_,__ «-
/L~o-j ~-t,.,-<~~( <~~) 
d !'* ~~ d -'1_/ <f.o (~ ~ . . 
~ ~~Q_~ ~L~a.~'V-' ~._z.-tA4~k.-L. 
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c. 
Rather than continue to prop up a distinction no longer 
grounded in principle, and which will contribute to the consequences 
indicated above, we should acknowledge that whenever significant 
public school segregation exists there is strong prima facie evidence 
~constitutional violation. It is true, of course, that segregated 
"' 
schools - wherever located - are not solely the product of state 
eA,.,-{irr
1 action or inaction. Indeed, as indicated~ there can be little 
doubt that a principal cause of the pervasive school segregation 
found in the major urbans areas of this country, whether in the North, 
West or South, are the socio-economic influencEEwhich have concentrated 
our minority citizens in the inner cities while the more mobile white 
majority disperse to the suburbs. But it is also true that public school 
authorities have continuing, detailed responsibility for the public school 
syste~ and, as one distinguished judge has noted, "where the figures 
[showing segregation in the schools] speak so eloquently, a prima facie 
case of discrimination is established." United States v. Texas Education 
~ LJHff,873 I 
Age~,~F . 2djCA '5li!#2)~ Moreover, as foreshadowed in Swann and 
as implicitly held today, school boards have a duty...--:: ltillt s: u z · h s ?Usn 
22a , · 
ihfl pi M h Uti: RA 1h al u us sf rsh 271 18118 *ioa., to minimize 
Ls ..... tetL! 
and ameliorate conditions by pursuing an affirmative policy 
of desegregation . It is this policy which must be applied consistently 
on a national basis without regard to a doctrinal distinction which 
has outlived its time. 
uratt Jl:i w, 1111 pst 
KEYES 
III 
The preceding section addresses the constitutional right of 
each child to expect that public school authorities take all reasonable 
; .,._ prolftdh•j s c.l..to61 s ~.ste~. 
steps tu tns:il!l:e bim an education in an integrated A85ii~s • se~te 
Se.<~re~c..:t"ecl .s4.oeb, 
.J iisha f!I!R89l iyAh-. regardless of history or sectional location, stande 
as prima facie evidence that this right has been violated. The question 
thus becomes what reasonable steps to maximize integrative oppor-
Je.,. • .,.sfnif, .-. r• • 
tunities must school authorities lindorteb'- either to overcome 11 g c..II':)J:•1U 
~ of constitutional violations or to remedy those violations which 
are shown to exist. In short, what specifically is the nature and scope 
of the remedy? 
As the Court's opinion virtually compels the finding on remand 
that Denver is a "dual school system," that city will soon confront the 
"affirmative duty" to desegregate its entire system "root and branch." 
Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. at 438. Again, the critical 
question is what ought this constitutional duty to entail. 
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A, 
The controlling case is Swann, supra, and the question which 
will confront and confound the District Court and Denver School Board 
i s what indeed does Swann require. Swann purported to enunciate no 
new principles, relying heavily on Brown I and,!! and on 9reen. Yet 
it affirmed a district court order which had relied heavily on "racial 
ratios" and sanctioned extensive transportation of elementary as well 
as secondary pupils. Perhaps because of the far-reaching contours of 
the Charlotte/ Mecklenburg desegregation decree approved by this 
Court, lower federal courts have since read Swann as requiring similar 
17 
decrees. In the context of a large urban area, with heavy residential 
concentrations of white and black citizens in different - and widely 
separated - sections of the school district, extensive dispersal and trans-
portation of pupils is inevitable if Swann is read as expansively as many 
courts have been reading it to date. 
To the extent that Swann may be thought to require large-scale or 
long-distance transportation of students in our metropolitan school districts, 
I record my profound misgivings. Nothing in our Constitution commands 
or encourages any such disruption of public education. Fortunately, 
&wann also laid down a broad rule of reason under which 
desegregation remedies must remain flexible and other values and 
interests be considered. Thus the Court recognized that school 
authorities, not the federal judiciary, must be charged in the first 
instance with the task of desegregating local school systems. 402 
~ .jllt-
Q.Ie• 
U.S. at 16. School boards in rural areas~ adjust more readily 
to this task than those in metropolitan districts "with dense and shift-
ing population, numerous schools, congested and complex traffic 
patterns." Id. at 14. Transportation orders were suspect "when the 
time or distance of travel is so great as to either risk the health of 
the children or significantly impinge on the education process." Id. at 
31. Finally, the age of the pupils to be transported was recognized 
by the Court in Swann as one important limitation on the time of 
student travel. Id. 
These factors were supposed to help guide district courts 
in framing equitable remedies in school desegregation cases. 18 And 
the Court further emphasized that equitable decrees are inherently 
-4 -I.Jt. 
sensitive, not solely to the ••• degree of desegregation achieved, 
"' 
~ 
but to a variety of public and private interests: 
1\ 
... a school desegregation case does not differ 
fundamentally from other cases involving the 
framing of equitable remedies to repair the denial 
of a constitutional right. The task is to correct, 
by a balancing of the individual and collective 
interest, the condition that offends the Constitution. 
Swann, supra, at 15-6. 
Those words echoed a similar expression in _!\rown II 
349 U.S. at 229: 
"In fashioning and effecting the decrees, the courts 
will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, 
equity has been characterized by a practical flexi-
bility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for 
adjusting and rec one iling public and private needs." 
Thus in school desegregation cases, as elsewhere, equity 
counsels reason, flexibility~nd balance. I am aware, of course, 
that reasonableness in any - area is a relative and subjective con-
cept. But with school desegregation, reasonableness would seem to 
embody a balanced evaluation of the obligation/ of public school boards 
to promote desegregation with other, ~~rtant interests which a 
~ 
community may legitimately assert. Neglect of either the obligation or 
the interests destroys the evenhanded spirit with which e-quitable remedies 
17 ....g_ 
19 must be approached. Overzealousness in pursuit of any single 
goal is untrue to the tradition of equity and to the "balance" and 
"flexibility" with which this Court has always regarded it . 
B. -k>. 
<*'~ . ...:/ ~ e:£Jl:;.J-o 
School boards have at their disposal a variety of rre ansr 
~hool desegregation. Many of these can be Woil&iw.Uy employed 
~A,.'..D.f 
~ ;ithout damaging state and parental interests in having children attend 
schools within a reasonable vicinity of home . Where desegregative 
steps are possible within the framework of a system of "neighborhood 
education," school authorities should pursue them. For example, 
boundaries of neighborhood attendance zones should be drawn to inte-
grate, to the extent practicable , the school's student body. Constructicn 
of new schools should be of such a size and at such a location as to en-
courage the li•lii!J!lUil! ill" likelihood of integration, Swann at 21. Faculty 
i~gration should be attained throughout the school system, Swann at 19; 
United states v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 395 U.S. 225 
(1969). An optional majority to minority transfer program, with the 
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state providing free transportation to desiring students, is also a 
helpful adjunct to a desegregated school system. Swann at 26-27. 
It hardly need be said that allocation of resources within the school 
district must be made with scrupulous fairness among all schools. 
The above examples are meant to be illustrative, not ex-
haustive. The point is that the over-all integrative impaet of such 
school board decisions is a crucial factor in assessing their con-
20 
stitutional validity. For example, "neighborhood school plans are 
constitutionally suspect when attendance zones are superficially im-
posed upon racially defined neighborhoods, and when school construction 
preserves rather than eliminates the racial hegemony of given schools. "21 
Keyes v . School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, F.2d --- ---
United States v. Board of Education of Tulsa County, 429 F .2d ---
12 58-12 59. If these decisions are made consistently with such segregatory 
~~ 
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at a minimum, the obligation• to take integrative steps of the sort 
outlined in the above section. Such steps would not compromise any 
significant, 
£,e le.-..e to; Q., 
countervailing state interest.A transportation of students 
presents a vastl! ore, omplex 
'. 
~ 
~ to maximize mtegrahon, however, 
problem. It promises on the one hand a greater degree of actual 
...4»4 • ,...... ...... 22 
desegregation , while it infringes what may fairly be regarded as 
important personal rights. 
The transporting of school children is as old as public educa-
tion, and in rural and some suburban settings~ is as indispensable 
as the providing of books. It is presently estimated that approximately 
half of all American children ride buses to school for reasons unrelated 
to integration. 23 There is a difference, however, in transportation 
~~~ 
plans voluntarily initiated by local school boards and those imposed 
~ 
by a federal court. The former may represent a convenient means of 




t;:o further integration. 24 Yet the Court in Swann was unquestionably 
right in describing bus transportation as "one tool of school desegre-
gation." 402 U.S. at 30. 25 The crucial issue is when, under what 
circumstances, and to what extent such transportation may appropriately 
be ordered. The answer to this turns - as it does so often in the law -
upon a sound exercise of discretion under the circumstances. 
Swannitself recognized limits to integrative obligations. It 
noted that a constitutional requirement of "any particular degree of 
racial balance or mixing ... would be disproved ... , " and sanctioned 
district court use of mathematical ratios as "no more than a starting 
point in the process of shaping a remedy ... " 402 U.S. at 24, 25. 
Winston-Salem/ Forsyth Board of Education v. Scott , 404 U.S. 1221, 
1228 (1971) (Chambers opinion of Burger, C. J.). Thus particular schools 
may be all white or all black and still not infringe constitutional rights 
;-.~Jed 
if the system is genuinely aee Pli~li t9 1i and school authorities are pur-
suing integrative steps short of extensive and disruptive transportation. 
The refusal of the Court to require ••• racial balance in schools 
schools," 402 U.S. at 2 6, is grounded in a recognition that the state, 
parents and children all have at stake in school desegregation decrees · 
legitimate and 
n attend community schools nearest home. Dr. James 
Coleman testified for petitioners at trial that "most school systems 
organize their schools in relation to the residents by having fixed 
school districts and some of these are very ethnically homogeneous." 
App. 1549a. In Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 396 F.2d 55, 
60 (1966), the Sixth Circuit summarized the advantages of such a 
. 26 
neighborhood system of schools: 
"Appellants, however, pose the question of whether 
the neighborhood system of pupil placement, fairly 
administered without racial bias, comports with the 
requirements of equal opportunity if it nevertheless 
results in the creation of schools with predominantly 
or even exclusively Negro pupils. The neighborhood 
system is in wide use throughout the nation and has 
been for many years the basis of school administration. 
This is so because it is acknowledged to have several 
valuable aspects which are an aid to education, such 
as minimization of safety hazards to children in reach-
ing school, economy of cost in reducing transportation 
needs, ease of pupil placement and administration 
through the use of neutral, easily determined standards, 
and better home-school communication." 
' -32 -
~ The neighborhood scho~ovide• greater ease of parental 
and student access and convenience, as well as greater economy of -public administration. These are obvious and distinct advantages, 
but the legitimacy of the neighborhood concept rests on more basic 
27 
grounds. 
Neighborhood schools, neutrally administered, reflect the 
deeply felt desire of citizens for a sense of community in their public 
education. Public schools have been a traditional source of strength 
to our nation, and that strength may derive in part from the identifica-
tion of many schools with the personal features of the surrounding 
neighborhood . Community support, interest and dedication to public 
schools may well run higher with a neighborhood attendance pattern: 
distance may encourage disinterest. Many citizens sense today a 
decline in the intimacy of our institutions - home, church and school -
which has caused a concommitant decline in the unity and communal 
spirit of our people. I pass no judgment on this viewpoint, but I do 
believe that this Court should be wary of compelling in the name of 
-33-
constitutional law what may seem to many a dissolution in the traditional, 
more personal fabric of their public schools. 
Closely related to the concept of a community and neighborhood 
education, are those rights and duties parents have with. respect to 
the education of their children. The law has long recognized the parental 
duty to nurture, support and provide for the welfare of ehildren, includ-
ing their education. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534, 
535, a unanimous court held that: 
"Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390, we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents 
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education 
of children under their control. . . . The child is not 
the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him 
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the 
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional 
obligations." 
And in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965), 
the Court noted that in Pierce, "the right to educate one's children as 
one chooses is made applicable to the States by the force of the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments." I do not believe recognition of this right 
can be confined solely to a parent's choice to send a child to public or 
-34-
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private school. - parents cannot affJrd the luxury of a private 
education for their children, and the dual obligation of private tuitions 
and public taxes. Those who may for numerous reasons, 
education for their children should not be forced to forfeit all interest 
or voice in the school their child attends. It would, of eourse, be im-
practical to allow the wishes of particular parents to be controlling. 
Yet the interest of the parent in the enhanced parent-school and parent-
child communication allowed by the neighborhood unit ought not to be sup-
pressed by force of law. 
It is relevant also to observe that in the end the quality of a 
community's schools depends in large part upon the level of public 
support, especially that of parents of children currently in the schools. 
In addition to attitudes towards paying increased taxes or voting bond 
issues, the effectiveness of the educational process itself is related to 
the attitude of the parents and to their capacity to partic ipate. To the 
degree that schools can involve parents with their children's education, 
the common end of improved schooling is surely served. School boards 
-35-£/ 
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may permissibly conclude that parents whose young children have been 
transported from their neighborhood to some more distant school are 
less likely candidates for this type of participation. 
In the understandable national concern for alleviating public 
school segregation , courts may have overlooked the faet that the rights 
and interests of children affected by a desegregation program also are 
entitled to consideration. Any child, white or black , who is compelled 
to leave his neighborhood and spend significant time each day being 
transported to a distant school suffers 
his privacy. Not long ago , James B. Conant, wrote that "[a] t the 
elementary school level the issue seems clear. To send young children 
28 
day after day to distant schools seems out of the question." A 
community may well conclude that the portion of a child's day spent 
on a bus might be used more creatively in a classroom, playground or 
some other extracurricular school activity. Decisions such as these, 
affecting the quality of a child's daily life, should not l ightly be held 
constitutionally errant. 
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To this point I have focused mainly on the personal interests 
of parents and children which a community may believe to be best pro-
tected by a neighborhood system of schools. But broader considerations 
lead me to question just as seriously any remedial requirement of 
extensive student transportation solely to further integration. Any such 
requirement is obliged to fall disproportionately on different school 
districts of our country, depending on their degree of urbanization, 
financial resources, and their racial complexion. Some districts with 
little or no biracial population will experience little or no educational 
disruption, while others, notably in large , biracial metropolitan areas, 
must at considerable expense undertake extensive transportation to achieve 
the type of integration frequently being ordered by district courts. 29 At 
a time when public education generally is suffering serious financial mal-
nutrition, the economic burdens of such transportation can be severe, re-
quiring both initial capital outlays and annual operating costs in the millions 
of dollars. 30 And while constitutional requirements have often occasioned 
uneven burdens, never have they touched so sensitive a matter as wide dif-
ferences in the compulsory transportation requirements for literally hundreds 
of thousands of school children. 
The argument for student transportation also overlooks the fact 
-37-
that the remedy exceeds that which may be necessary to redress 
the constitutional evil. Let us use Denver as an example. The Denver 
School Board, by its action and nonaction, may be legally responsible 
for some of the segregation that exists. But if one assumes a maximum 
discharge of constitutional duty by the Denver Board over the past de-
~ 31 
cades,-. fundamental problem of residential segregation would persist. 
It would indeed be a novel application of equitable power - not to mention 
a dubious extension of constitutional doctrine - to apply some retributive 
theory which would require a greater degree of forced school integra-
tion than would have resulted from purely natural and neutral non-state 
causes. 
The transportation of students carries a furth,3r infirmity as 
a constitutional remedy. With most constitutional violations, the major 
burden of remedial action falls on offending state officials. Public 
officials who act to infringe personal rights of speech, voting, or religious 
exercise, for example, are obliged to cease the offending act or practice 
and, where necessary, institute corrective measures. It is they who bear 
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the brunt of remedial action, though other citizens will to varying 
degrees feel its effects. School authorities responsible for segregation 
must, at the very minimum, act to cease segregatory acts. But when 
the obligation further extends to the transportation of students, the 
full burden of the affirmative remedial action is borne by children and 
parents who are quite innocent of any constitutional violation. 
Finally, courts in requiring so far-reaching a remedy as 
student transportation solely to maximize integration, risk setting in motion 
unpredictable and unmanageable social consequences. No one can estimate 
the extent to which dismantling neighborhood education will hasten an 
exodus to private schools, leaving public school systems the preserve of 
the disadvantaged of both races. Or guess how much impetus such dis-
mantlement gives the movement from inner-city to suburb, and the further 
geographical separation of the races. Nor do we know t what degree this 
remedy may cause deterioration of community and parental support 
of public schools, or divert dis-.j ssion from the paramount goal of quality 
in education to a perennially hassling debate over who is transported where. 
We do not even know to 
I fl, CA.~ r ·~ 
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what extent racial balancing in public schools will be necessary or ,... 
effective in reducing racial inequality .l I can make no steadfast 
predications. Yet in pursuit of maximum integration through extensive 
tUl'JG.I.,v1ve.JJ 
student transportation, courts have ventured onto ,\"' ' terrain in 
a manner which in the end may prove self-defeating to the desired ob-
jectives. 
I would impose no flat prohibition on student transportation to 
further desegregation. But a neighborhood system of schools ought , to 
a much greater extent than heretofore, be one legitimate community 
interest considered by district courts in framing equitable relief. 
Transportation orders should be applied with a special caution to any 
proposal as disruptive of family life and interests - and ultimately of 
education itself - as extensive intra-city transportation of elementary 
age children solely for desegregation purposes. At a minimum, this 
Court should not require school boards to engage in the unnecessary 
transporting of children in the elementary grades. It is at this age level 
that neighborhood education performs its most vital educational role. 
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It is with respect to children of tender years that the greatest concern 
exists for their physical and psychological health. It is also here, 
at the elementary school, that the rights and duties of parents are 
most sharply implicated. 
While greater transportation of secondary school students 
might be permitted, even at this level the desire of a community for 
racially neutral neighborhood schools should command judicial respect. 
It would be wisest, where there is no absence of good faith, to permit 
affected communities to decide this delicate issue of student transpor-
tation on their own. Legitimate, nonracial aspirations embodied in a 




The existing state of law has failed to shed light and 
provide guidance on two issues, namely: (i) whether and to what 
extent a uniform judicial approach will be taken to our national 
problems of school desegregation and (ii) if so, whether the 
ambiguities of Swann, construed to date almost uniformly in favor 
of extensive transportation , will be redefined to restore a more 
viable balance between the various interests whieh are involved. 
With all deference, it seems to me that the Court today has addressed 
neither of these issues in a way that will lead to a rational, coherent 
national policy with respect to integration in the schools. 
The Court has adhered to the de facto/ de jure distinction 
under circumstances, and upon a rationaLe,. which can only lead to 
J 
increased and inconclusive litigation , and - especially regrettable -
to deferment of a nationally consistent judicial position on this critical 
subject. There is , of course, state action in every school district 
in the land. The public schools have always been funded and operated 
by states and their local subdivisions . It is true that segregated 
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schools, even in the cities of the South, are in large part the product 
of social and economic factors - and the resulting residential patterns. 
But there is also not a school district in the United States, with any 
significant minority school population, in which the school authorities -
in one way or the other - have not contributed in some measure to the 
degree of segregation which still prevails. Instead of :recognizing the 
reality of similar, multiple segregatory causes in school districts 
throughout the country, the Court persists in a distinction whose duality 
operates unfairly on local communities in one section of the country 
and on minority children in the others. 
The second issue relates to the ambiguities of Swannand the 
judicial downgrading of legitimate community interests in framing 
equitable decrees. In the absence of a more flexible and reasonable 
standard than that imposed by district courts, purporting to follow Swann, 
the desegregation which will now be decreed in Denver and other major 
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It is well to remember that the course we are running is a long 
one and the goal sought in the end - so often overlooked - is the best 
possible educational opportunity for all children. Communities deserve 
the opportunity to turn their attention and energies to this goal of quality 
education, free from protracted and debilitating battles over extensive 
student transportation. 
The single most disruptive element in education today is the wide-
spread use of compulsory transportation, especially at elementary grade 
levels. This has risked distracting and diverting attention from basic 
educational ends, dividing and embittering communities, and exacerbating 
rather than ameliorating inter-racial friction and misunderstanding. It 
is time to return to a more balanced evaluation of the interest of our society 
in achieving desegregation-•••• with•••llill• those legitimate 
interests a community may assert in non-racial neighborhood and community 
education. This will help assure that desegregation is aceomplished by 
rational action, better understood and supported by parents and children 
of both races. For the long term, this will promote an enduring quality of 
integration so essential to its genuine success. 
J ....... . , ..... ..... ---- - , - -, ·-
FOOTNOTES (No. 71-507 Keyes) 
1. Article IX, Section 8 of the Colorado Constitution has 
expressly prohibited "any classification of pupils . . . on account 
of race or color. " 
2. See, e. g. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of 
Education, 402 U. S. 1, 23 (1971): "We do not reach ... the 
question whether a showing that school segregation is a consequence 
of other types of state action, without any discriminatory action by 
school authorities, is a constitutional violation requiring remedial 
action by a school desegregation decree. " 
3. According to the 1971 HEW estimate, 43. 9% of Negro 
pupils attended majority white schools in the South as opposed to 
only 27. 8% who attended such schools in the North and West. 
Fifty-seven per cent of all Negro pupils in the North and West 
attend schools with over 80% minority population as opposed to 
32. 2% who do so in the South. 118 Cong. Rec. ~;l.45. 
""'-""' 
- ·---------
4. The 1971 HEW Enrollment Survey dramatized the 
segregated character of public schools in many non-southern 
cities. The percentage of Negro pupils which att1mded schools 
more than 80% black was 91. 3 in Cleveland, Ohio.; 97. 8 in 
Compton, California; 78. 1 in Dayton, Ohio; 78. 6 :in Detroit, 
Michigan; 95. 7 in Gary, Indiana; 86. 4 in Kansas City, Missouri; 
86. 6 in Los Angeles, California; 78. 8 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin; 
91. 3 in Newark, New Jersey; 89. 8 in st. Louis, Missouri. The 
full data from the Enrollment Survey may be found in 118 Cong. 
Rec. S-144-8, Jan. 20, 1972. 
5. As Senator Ribicoff (D. -Conn. ) recognized: 
"For years we have fought the battle of integration 
primarily in the South where the problem was severe. 
It was a long, arduous fight that deserved to be 
fought and needed to be won. 
"Unfortunately, as the problem of raeial 
isolation has moved north of the Mason-Dixon line, 
many northerners have bid an evasive farewell to 
tbe 100-year struggle for racial equality. Our 
motto seems to have been 'Do to sou~rners what 
you do not want to do to yourself. ' 
"Good reasons have always been offered, of 
course, for not moving vigorously ahead in the 
North as well as the South. 
"First, it was that the problem was worse in 
the South. Then the facts began to show that that 
was no longer true. 
''We then began to hear the de facto-de jure 
refrain. 
"Somehow residential segregation in the North 
was accidental or de facto and that made it better 
than the legally supported de jure segregation of the 
South. It was a hard distinction for black children 
in totally segregated schools in the North to under-
stand, but it allowed us to avoid the problem." 
118 Cong. Rec. S. 2542, Feb. 24, 1972. 
6. See, e. g., Bradley v. School Board, :!45 F. 2d 310, 
316 (CA 4 en bane, 1965): 
"It has been held again and again ... that the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibition is not against 
segregation as such. . . . A state or school 
districts offends no constitutional requirement when 
it grants to all students uniformly an unrestricted 
freedom of choice as to school attended, so that 
each pupil, in effect, assigns himself to the school 
he wishes to attend.'' (The case was later vacated 
and remanded by this Court which expressed no view 
~f the merits of the desegregation plans submitted. • 
382 u.s. 103, l05 (1965). 
3. 
4. 
See also Bell v. School City of Gary, Ind., 324 r. 2d 209 (CA 7 
1963); Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F. 2d 988 (CA 10 1964); 
Deal v. Board of Educ., 369 F. 2d 55 (CA 6 196Ei). 
7. For a concise history and commentary of the evolution, 
see generally A. Bickel, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA 
8. As Dr. Karl Taeuber states in his article, "Residential 
Segregation," Scientific American, August 1965 at 14: 
"No elaborate analysis is necessary to conclude 
from these figures that a high degree of resi-
dential segregation based on race is a universal 
characteristic of American cities. This segre-
gation is found in the cities of the North and West 
as well as of the South; in large cities as well 
as small; in nonindustrial cities as well as in-
dustrial; in cities with hundreds of thousands 
of Negro residents as well as those wi.th only a 
few thousand; and in cities that are progressive 
in their employment practices and civil rights 
policies as well as those that are not." 
In his book, Negroes in Cities, Dr. Taeuber stated that residential 
segregation exists "regardless of the character of local laws and 
policies and regardless of other forms of discrimination." Id. at 
outlawing all forms of state-sponsored segregation in 
everything from the spectator section of a courtroom 
to golf courses. The minimal proposition that emerged -
and about time it was that it should emerge -was that 
the state may not, by titlqJ legislation or administratively, 
classify the population along racial lines. " 
10. The term "integrated school system" is used generally 
to denote a system possessing most, if not all, of the following 
characteristics: there would be, of course, no laws, regulations 
or policy supportive of the type of "legalized" segregation con-
demned in Brown (a condition manifestly invalid and no longer 
existing overtly anywhere). The school board would have pur-
sued, within the limits of a rule of reason consistent with educa-
tional goals, the affirmative duty principle enunciated in Green. 
This duty would require that a school board take such appropriate 
affirmative measures to (i) integrate fully faculties and administra-
tion; (ii) scrupulously assure equality of facilities, quality of in-
J, • ..i- -fie. J:.sf·,...; c.'f j 
; (iii) utilize its authority to 
draw attendance zones to promote integration; (iv) locate new 
schools, close old ones, and determine the size and grade categories 
of schools with this same objective in mind; ~suno tho l!li:miaMie" 
. 3 s +!! g · · in ailaletie I QClii?f 
and (vi) resort to such reasonable transportation of pupils, especially 
at the secondary level, as is compatible with sound educational goals . 
These specifications are not intended to be either definitive or 
inclusive ; rather, they are indicative of the characteristics of 
an integrated school system, in which all citizens and pupils 
may justifiably be confident that invidious disc rirn.ination is 
neither practiced nor tolerated. This does not mean - and indeed 
could not mean in view of the residential patterns of most of our 
major metropolitan areas - that every school must have some 
racial mixing. A school which happens to be all white or all black 
is not a " segregated" school in the legal sense if the system itself 
is a genuinely integrated one as described herein. 
The characteristics and affirmative obligations of an 




The author continues: 
"True, the earlier the policy of segregation was ~· '· . 
abandoned the less danger there is that it continues 
to operate covertly, is significantly responsible for 
present day patterns of residential segregation, or 
has contributed materially to present community 
attitudes toward Negro schools. But there is no 
reason to suppose that 1954 is a universally 
appropriate dividing line between de jure segregation 
that may safely be assumed to have spent itself and 
that which may not. For many remedial purposes, 
adoption of an arbitrary but easily administrable 
cutoff point might not be objectionable. But in a 
situation such as school desegregation, where both 
the rights asserted and the remedial burdens imposed 
are of such magnitude, and where the resulting 
sectional discrimination is passionately resented, it 
is surely questionable whether such arbitrariness is 
either politically or morally acceptable. " 
---------------------------------
See Bickel, supra, H» n. 7, at 119: 
"If a Negro child perceives his separation as 
discriminatory and invidious, he is not, in a 
society a hundred years removed from slavery, 
going to make fine distinctions abod the source 
of a particular· separation. " 
13. The Court does not require, however,, k a segregatory 
intent with respect to the entire school system, and indeed holds 
that if such an intent is found with respect to some schools in a 
system, the burden - normally on the plaintiffs - shifts to the 
defendant school authorities to prove a negative: namely, 411111!a 
6. 
that their purposes were benign, anle, pp. 17-18. 
The Court has fef'tlmately come a long wa.y since Brown I. 
discriminatory constitutional and statutory provisions of some 
states, the new formulation - still professing fid•~lity to the de jure 
doctrine - is that desegregation will be ordered despite the absence 
of any segregatory laws if: (i) segregated schools in fact exist; 
(ii) a court finds that they result from some action taken with 
segregatory intent by the school board; (iii) such action need not 
relate to more than a "meaningful segment" of the school system; 
and (iv) the school board cannot prove that its intEmtions with respect 
to the remainder mc of the system were nonsegregatory. 
14. See Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 442 F. 2d 
570, 574 (CA 4 1971) where the court of appeals noted "there was 
no findin g [by the district court] of discriminatory purpose. " 
15. As one commentator has expressed it: 
"If the courts are indeed prepared to inquire into 
motive, thorny questions will arise even if one assumes 
that racial motivation is capable of being proven at 
trial. What of the case in which one or more members 
of a school board, but less than a majority, are found 
to have acted on racial grounds? What if it appears that 
the school board's action was prompted by a mixture of 
motives, including constitutionally innocent ones that 
alone would have prompted the board to aet? What if 
the members of the school board were not: themselves 
racially inspired but wished to please their constituents, 
many of whom they knew to be so? If such cases are 
classified as unconstitutional de jure segregation, there 
is little point in preserving the de jure-de facto 
distinction at all. And it may well be that the difference 
between any of these situations and one in which racial 
motivation is altogether lacking is too insignificant, 
from the standpoint :bo of both the moral Clllpability of 
the state officials and the impact upon the children 
involved, to support a difference in constitutional 
treatment. " Goodman, supra n. 11, at 284-285. 
~In Becket v. School Board, 308 F. Supp. 1274, 
1311-1315 (E. D. Va. 1969), Judge Walter Hoffman compiled 
a summary of past public segregatory action which included 
examples from a great majority of states. He concluded that 
7. 
"only as to the states of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Washington, 
Nevada, and Hawaii does it appear from this nonexhaustive research 
that no discriminatory laws appeared on the books· at one time or 
another. " Id. at 1315. 
------------------
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17. See, ~· ~·, Thompson v. School Board of Newport News, 
F. 2d __ , (1972) where the CA 4 en bane, upheld a 
district court assignment plan where "travel time, varying from 
a minimum of forty minutes and a maximum of one hour, each way, --
would be required for busing black students out of the old City 
and white students into the old City in order to ac ieve a racial 
balancing of the district. " This transportation was decreed for 
.children from the third grade up
1 
~ ~& .. I.Jl..&w-~ 
;t.,....;,, ....... S? ;n A _.._ -t ~..C, • 
In Northcross v. Memphis Bd. of Educ., ·166 F. 2d 890, 895 
(1972), the CA 6 affirmed a district court assignment plan which 
daily transported 14, 000 children with "the maximum time to be 
spent on the buses by any child [being] 34 minutes . . . , " presumably 
each way. But as Judge Weick noted in dissent the CA 6 instructed 
the district judge to implement yet further desegregation orders. 
Plans presently under consideration by that court call for the 
busing of 39, 085 and 61, 530 children respectively, for undetermined 
lengths of time. Id. at 895-6. 
• 
Petitioners before this Court in Potts v. l~lax, No. 72-288, 
u.s. (197 _) contended that the implementation 
of the CA 5's directive in Flax v. Potts, 464 F. 2:d 865 (1972) would 
require bus rides of up to two hours and 20 minutes each day and a 
round trip of up to 70 miles. Pet'n. at 14. While respondents 
contend these figures represent an "astounding inflation, " Response 
tiM-~~~ 
at 7, transportation oh11 lp g1 11 du seems inevitable . ... 
18. 'IDI See United States v. Texas Education Agency, 467 
F. 2d 848, 883 (CA 5 1972) (Bell, J., concurring in an opinion 
in which eight judges joined): 
"In our view the remedy which the district court 
is required to formulate should be formulated 
within the entire context of the opinion in Swann 
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education 
. . . . (emphasis added.)" 
19. The relevant inquiry is "whether the costs of achieving 
desegregation in any given situation outweigh the legal, moral and 
educational considerations favoring it .... It is clear ... that 
the Constitution should not be held to require any transportation 
plan that keeps children on a bus for a substantial part of the day, 
consumes signific ant portions of funds otherwise spendable directly 
on education, or involves a genuine element of danger to the safety 
of the child." School Desegregation After Swann: A Theory of 
Government Responsibility, 39 U. Chi. L. Rev. 421, 422 , 443 (1972). 
20. This should not imply that decisions on faculty assign-
ment , attendance zones, school construction, closing and consoli-
dation , must be made to the detriment of all neutral, non-racial 
considerations. But these considerations can, with proper school 
board initiative , generally be met in a manner that will enhance 
integrative opportunities. 
21. A useful study of the historical uses and abuses of 
the neighborhood school concept isM. Weinberg , Race & Place 
(1967). 
22. In fact , due to racially separate residential patterns 
that characterize our major urban areas it is quit~~ unrealistic to 
think of achieving in many cities substantial "racial balance" 
without a degree of student transportation which would have the 
gravest economic and educational consequences. 
- as Professor Bickel notes: 
"In most of the larger urban areas, demographic 
conditions are such that no policy that a court can 
order, and a school board, a city or even a state 
has the capability to put into effect, will in fact 
result in the foreseeable future in racially balanced 
public schools. Only a reordering of the fmvironment 
involving economic and social policy on the broadest 
conceivable front might have an appreciable impact." 
Bickel, supra, n. 7 at 132. 
23. Estimates vary. Swann, supra, at 2£1, noted that 
"eighteen millinn of the Nation's public school children, 
approximately 39%, were transported to their schools by bus in 
1969-1970 in all parts of the country. " Senator Ribicoff, (D. Conn. ) 
c.- ~L~ 
1M it' i:ll student of this ......... problem, stated that "two-thirds of 
"' 
all American children today ride buses to school for reasons 
unrelated to integration. " 118 Cong. Rec. S. 2543, Feb. 24, 1972. 
24. Historically, _.distant'• tran sportation was wrongly 
S~j,.c!fAT.·oo~~. 
used to promote • • "Negro children were generally 
considered capable of travelling longer distances to school and 
without the aid of any vehicle. What was too far for a white child 
became :x2IEC reasonably near for a Negro child, " Weinberg, supra, 
n. l-.1_ at 8 7, _jAI.,jgilolilr-.!}"Q .. ~i!!!II!I!J1;!Jtf_ ......... R_____ Idilllzli'~!!!:~i·~ 
apt~enre thst tb. nei-glzb±eei sehe 1 nrup' ' ' ; ' 
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This deplorable history has led some to argue that integrative 
bus rides are justified as atonement for past segregatory trips and 
that neighborhood education is now but a code-word for racial 
segregation. But misuse of neighborhood schooling in the past does 
not imply it has no valid non-segregatory uses for the present. 
Nor would wrongful transportation in the past justify detrimental 
transportation for the children of today. 
25. Some communities had transportation plans in effect 
at the time of court desegregation orders. See Swann, supra, at 29, 
n. 11; Davis v. School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33,34-35 
(1971). Courts have used the presence or absence of existing 
transportation in a district as one factor in framing and implementing 
desegregation decrees. See, ~- ~- , Winston-Salem/ Forsyth Bd. 
of Educ. v. Scott, 404 U.S. 1221, 1225 (1971) (Chambers opinion 
of Burger, C. J. ); United states v. Watson Chapel School District, 
446 F. 2d 933 , 937 (CA 8 1971); Northcross v. Board of Educ., 
444 F. 2d 1179, 1182-1183 (CA 6 1971); Davis v. Board of Educ., 
328 F. Supp. 1197, 1203 (E. D. Ark. 1971). Where a school board 
is voluntarily engaged in transporting students, a district court is, 
of course, obligated to insure that such transportation is not 
undertaken with segregatory effect. Where,~ also, voluntary 
transportation programs are already in progress, there may be 
greater justification for court-ordered transportation of students 
for a_c_omparable time and distance to achieve greater integration. 
26. The term "neighborhood school" should not be supposed 
to denote solely a walk-in school or one which serves a children 
only in the surrounding blocks. The Court has noted, in a 
different context, that "the word 'neighborhood' is quite as 
susceptible of variation as the word 'locality. ' Both terms are 
elastic and, dependent upon circumstances, may be equally 
satisfied by areas measured by rods :z: or by miles." Connally v. 
General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 395 (1926). 1n the school 
context, "neighborhood" refers to relative proximity, to a 
preference for a school nearer, rather than more distant from 
home. 
27. I do not imply that the neighborhood concept offers 
the only, or even the most preferable way to organize a school 
system. I do contend that, where a school board has chosen it, 
federal judges should accord it respect in framing remedial decrees. 
28. Slums and Suburbs, 29 (1961). 
29. See n. 22, supra. 
[ 30. In Memphis, for example, which has no history 
1 of busing students, the minimum transportation plan ordered 
by the courts will require, in the School Board's estimate, an 
initial capital expenditure of $1, 664,192 br buses plus an annual 
operating cost of $629,192. The Board estimates that a more 
extensive transportation program to be considered by the district 
court will require initial capital investments of $8,924,000 and 
annual operating costs of $1,783,490. The most drastic trans-
portation plan before the district court requires estimated annual 
operating costs of from $2,354,220, $2,431,710 or $3,463,100 
depending on the Board's transportation arrangements. Northcross 
v. Board of Education of Memphis City Sch., supra, at 898 (Weick, 
J. dissenting). 
)f. s-. "'. ~~ ~~. 
32.. 
/ W-y~ fv t.A,.;/tl-0.( ~-:l ~cJuai)j..o_._ 
~/ls fOlumnist William Raspberry has noted, it 
~~-~ l.o -~~ 
may{ i~' 6lackl f:6 eay--tftat tlw.y cannot be properly educated 
A A. 
ol-o G~~ 
unless they are bused long distances~ ssa!ftet with white 
-\ 
children: 
"It has long seemed insane to me for black 
people to pursue whites from this neighborhood 
to that and clear on out of the county because of 
some unspoken belief that black children could 
not get a proper education in the absence of white 
children." Id. 
Such statements do not diminish the desirability and 
constitutional necessity of maintaining an integrated school system . 
But if the system is genuinely desegregated, racial balance in 
or 
the sense of substantial mixing of races in all Im:k!!IRisXKx a district's 
II 
schools is not mandated by anything in the Constitution. 
55. 
Denver. There is, for the reasons I have indicated, a gap of 
vast and ill defined dimensions between a fair reading of what the 
Court said in ~ann and the way district courts have felt compelled 
to apply it to southern cities. It is important, not just to Denver 
but for the school boards and the courts in other cities which are 
xxxiti awaiting the outcome of this case, for us to acknowledge 
that gap exists, and to endeavor to afford a far more comprehensible 
me.asure of guidance than is now discernible. 
In the absence of a more flexible and reasonable standard 
than that imposed by district courts, professing to follow Swann, 
the desegregation which will now be decreed in Denver and other 
major cities in various sections of the country may well involve 
even more extensive busing than has been witnessed up to this 
time. It is well to remember that the course we are running 
is a long one and the goal sought in the end - oox so often over-
looked -. is the best possible educational opportunity for all 
children. The disrpution of public education over the past eighteen 
years since Brown was necessary in view of the recalcitrancy so 
56. 
so prevalent in theSouth. ' Indeec, the disruption was a price 
necessarily paid by the South to correct the profound injustice of 
affirmatively imposed racial dis<:rimination in the schools. ~ut 
this disruption should not now be imposed needlessly upon the rest 
of the country. Indeed, it cannot be tolerated mueh longer anywhere 
without g-rave consequences to public education gelllerally - in terms 
of the quality :tk of the schooling, its supp,)rt by the pu lie , and 
even its continued ability to attract and retain competent and 
dedicated teachers and ~doinistrat or·s . 
The time has come for the federal courts - ill equipped 
to formulate educational policy - to encourage and allow a far larger 
measure of discretion and control by school board~: and professional 
educational auth orities. 
The single most disruptive element in the hlstory of 
dese.<Ire;;ati :::m is the extensive use oi bus in ::;, especially at elementary 
'!Tade levels. This has distracted and diverted the attention of all 
~oncerned from the basic educational ends, it has divided and 
~~hierewere, in the years of transition after the shock of Brown I's 
reversal of Plessy, the interludes of "massive resi.stance" and 
abortive " interposition". (Jay: You can embroider this a bit). 
L.r .t' , Jr,: f'f:! Rider A , p. 12 Keyes ~3/7/73 
Eut i ~ a school systerr. be arE t!H;; fa1:: iliar in die ia of seg regatio h. 
with a large percentage of its schools all or predominantly atb.:mded 
hy cl ildren of one race; with facultie~:: and administrative perso:anel 
not renuinel:r integ·rated; and with little evidence that over the ~.''9ar E 
the schoo . board has acted affirmatively, in its long-J:-ange planning 
a s wen as current operations, to facilitate and encourage as widely 
a s reasonably practicable an integrated opportunity; t:1en, the Drf'-
sumption is strong that the school board by its acts or omissions has 
failed in its c1uty t ameliorate the consequences of tlw predominant 
residential patterns mentioned above. In view of the pervasiveness 
of state action and responsibility with respect to public schools if 
these indicia of segregation remain in a particular school systerr~, 
th is Court is justified in finding a prim~ facie case of a constitutional 
violation. 
LFP, Jr. :psf 
Jay , consider 
:\n<iing a note 
(to be ~ey~d tc 
the next to t~e 
last sentence in 
the paragraph 
ending on p.ll) 
as follows: 
Rider A, p. 11 Keyes 3/7/7?. 
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9a. The term integrated sc hool s ystem'' is used generally to de note 
a system possessing most, if not all, of the following c tlarac.:ens tics: 
there .voula be, of course, no laws, regulations or _policy .;:uppG tive 
of the type of "legalized" segregation condea.ned in Brm•m {a ccn-
dition manifestly invalid and no longer ex1stir.g overtly any-;vhere; . 
The school board would have pursued, within the limits of a r'..l :~ 
of reason consistent with educational goals, the affirn:tative duty 
principle enunciated in Green. This duty would equire a school 
desegregatory 
board to take SUCh appropriate Qxug;r~and integrativ•~ "r:ea~·.lreS 
::~ s C) integrating fully faculties and administration; (ii) assuri;l{; 
equality of facilities, quality of instruction and curricula opport1L1i~i~s ; 
(iii) utilize its authority to draw, and even gerrymander, attendanc€ 
zcnes to pr omote integration opport•lnities; locate new schoo:s, c -.ose 
o·,d ones, a nd dete r L.ine the s ize and ~!'ade categories ·') f sc l1oo:::: 
w itn t;1i s sa::~e o~j ect ; ve in :r '.. !1j ; assu ::-e lh e eli rY, ina tion co{ :1ll vestiges 
2. 
to sJch reasonable transportation of pupils , e~pecl;:.tlly at t1r; 
Eeconc'.ar y leve'., a::: iE' -::orr_patible ·vita sounj e::l.uca.tior.a'. goals . 
These specifications are not intencl~rl tc "~ eit"ler i efinitive o·· 
inclusive; rather, they are indicative of the characteristics of 
an i.nte!)·rat~!cl sclJ.ool system, in which all citizens and pupils ma)· 
ju~tifiably be confident tha t invidious dfficrir.1ina.tion is nei ther 
practiced nor tolerated. This does not mean- and indeed cculd 
not n:.ean in view of the residential patterns of mos t of our :mzjnr 
ru~tl~opoUtan areas - that every school must have some raciai 
mixinr . school which happens to be all white or a !I black is 
not necessarily a ''sep-regated·' school in the legal sense if thE: 
system itself is a ~<enuinely integrated one as described herein . 
1n such a school system, every pupil - rega rdless of race - rray 
~ave (a) the assur 2.nce of beinv educated in a nondisc rin:inatory 
~nvironro ent , and (b) the further assuranc e - not as a certainty b.1 
a::; q nroilability, dependillf· upon the circurnstanc:eE - of attenrlillf 
one or mcrP. mixed idm:BM:la schools as he prof[re~ses from the 
essentially neighborhood elementary school to the more broadly 
. . high schools . 
commumty-based Junior and senior 
.tuaer A , p. ~ Keyes 
This means that school authorities, consistent with sound educational 
goals, must make and implement their decisions with the view generally 
of enhancing integrated school opportunities. The term "integrated 
school system" presupposes, of course, a total absence of any laws, 
regulations or policies supportive of the type of "legalized" segrega-
tion condemned in Brown . A system would be integrated consistently 
with constitutional standards when the responsible authorities have 
pursued, within the limits of a rule of reason consistent with educational 
goals, the affirmative duty principle most fully articulated up to this 
time in Swann. This duty would assure that Jia:JDalx decisions re-
lating to the most relevant aspects of the operation of a school system 
be taken consistently with sound educational goals, one of which must 
include a conscious effort to further integration. 'I'hese decisions 
would relate, among other thiJ18s, to school attendance zones, selection 
and assignment of faculty and administrative personnel, school con-
struc tion programs, student transportation and the like. There must 
be a scrupulous effort to assure equality of facilities, instruction and 
curricula opportunities throughout the district. 
2. 
The foregoing prescription is not intended to be either de-
finitive and inclusive, but rather an indication of the contour charac-
teristics of an integrated school system in which all citizens and 
pupils may justifiably be confident that racial discrimination is neither 
practiced nor tolerated. This does not mean- and indeed could not 
mean in view of the residential patterns of most of our major metro-
politan areas - that every school must in fact be a.n integrated unit. 
school 
A SIDxbt which happens to be all or predominantly white or all or 
predominantly black is not a "segregated" school i.n an unconstitu-
* tional sense if the system itself is a genuinely integrated one. 
Note to Jay: Somewhere, perhaps keyed to an appropriate point in this 
rider, we might add a note substantially as follows: 
"The terminology customarily used by this Court in Brown 
and subsequent decisions has referred to 'desegregation' 
and the 'duty'to desegregate,' apparently avoiding delibe!l"ate ly 
the term 'duty to integrate.' But all of these cases, until the 
present one, have involved dual systems in the sense that state 
prescribed segregation existed as of 1954. Now, however, that 
a majority of the Court in today' s decision have extended the 
affirmative duty doctrine to a school system which was never 
dual in the sense of that term heretofore used , nothing o:f sub-
stance remains to a distinction between a duty to desegre•gate 
and a duty to integrate. To be sure, Swann purported to hold 
out the hope that once a system had become' unitar~' 
there would be 'full compliance with this Court's 
decision in Brown." 402 U.S. at 31. But the logic--
indeed the holding - of today' s decision will require 
that no school board at any time in the future will be 
free to disregard its duty to maintain, within reason 
and due regard for essential educational goals, the 
type of integrated system generally described above. 
There will, as the Court in Swann suggested (402 
U.S. at 32), dem•graphic changes in our 'growing, 
mobile society' so that few communities will remain 
from year to year in exactly the same factual setting. 
The circumstances will be relevant, of course, to tho 
reasonableness of the action taken by eeheH-alllboflt~ts 
school authorities. It will not, however, relieve therr.\ 
of their constitutional duty. 
3. 
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This means that school authorities, consistent with sound educational 
goals, must make and implement their decisions with the view generally 
of enhancing integrated school opportunities. The term "integrated 
schobl system" presupposes, of course, a total absence of any laws, 
regulations or policies supportive of the type of "legalized" segrega-
tion condemned in Brown . A system would be integrated consistently 
with constitutional standards when the responsible authorities have 
pursued, within the limits of a rule of reason consistent with educational 
goals, the affirmative duty principle most fully articulated up to this 
time in Swann. This duty would assure that .tbur::a:Julx: decisions re-
lating to the most relevant aspects of the operation of a school system 
be taken consistently with sound educational goals , one of whi<:h must 
include a conscious effort to further integration. These decis:lons 
would relate, among other thill8S, to school attendance zones, selection 
and assignment of faculty and administrative personnel, school con-
struction programs, student transportation and the like. There must 
be a scrupulous effort to assure equality of facilities, instruction and 
curricula opportunities throughout the district. 
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The principal reason for abandonment of the ae jur~/de facto 
distinction is that, in view of the evolution of the holding in Brown I 
into the affirmative duty doctrine, it no longer can hi~ justified on a 
principled basis. In decreeing remedial requirements for metropolitan 
school districts, Swann focused on an area where th~~ basic ca.uses of 
segregation in all sections of the country are not only similar,. but 
also largely irrelevant to the existence of historic, state-imposed 
the 
segregation at the time of/Brown decision. Further, the extension 
of the affirmative duty concept to require compulsory student trans-
portation went far beyond the mere remedying of that portion of school 
se!gregation for which former state segregation laws were even 
responsible. Finally, this case abundantly demonstrates that the 
facts deemed necessary to establish de jure discrimination present 
problems which the courts cannot fairly resolve. 
JHW , lll:psf H1<1er A, p . 2 4 Keyes 
c. 
Defaulting school authorities would have, at a minimum, 
the obligation to take affirmative steps of the sort outlined in the 
above section. School boards would, of course, be free to develop and 
initiate further plans to promote school desegregation. In a pluralistic 
society such as ours, it is important that no racial minority feel de-
meaned or discriminated against and that students of all races learn 
to play, work and cooperate with one another in their common pur-
suits and endeavors. Nothing in this opinion is meant to discourage 
school boards from exceeding minimal constitutional standards in 
promoting the recognized values of integrated school conditions. 
A constitutional requirement of extensive student transpor-
tation solely to maximize integration, however, presents a vastly more 
complex problem. It promises on the one hand a greater degree of 
actual desegregation, while it infringes on what may fairly be regarded 
as important community prerogatives and personal rights . The Equal 
Protection Clause does require that racial discrimination find no place 
in the decisions of public school authorities. It does not command 
that school authorities undertake widespread student tra.Ilsportatlon 
solely for the sake of greater integration. 20 
- -- . '--· r-~ '-' I - .... , • v 
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distinction is that, in view of the evolution of the holding in Brown I 
into the affi rmative duty doctrine, it no longer can be justified on a 
princ iple d basis. In decreeing remedial requirements for metropolitan 
school districts , Swann focused on an area where the basic causes of 
segregation in all sections of the country are not only similar, but 
also largely irrelevant to the existence of historic , state-imposed 
the 
segregation at the time of,/Brown decision. Further, the extension 
of the affirmative duty concept to require compulsory student trans-
portation went far beyond the mere remedying of that portion of school 
segregation for which former state segregation laws were even 
responsible. Finally, this case abunda.ntly demonstrates that the 
facts deemed necessary to establish de jure discrimination present 
problems which the courts cannot fairly resolve. 
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Defaulting school authorities would have, at a minimum , 
the obligation to take affirmative steps of the sort outlined in the 
above section. School boards would, of course, be fr ee to dev·elop and 
initiate further plans to promote school desegregation. In a pluralistic 
society such a.s ours, it is important that no racial minority feel de-
meaned or discriminated against and that students of all races learn 
to play, work and cooperate with one another in their common pur-
suits and endeavors. Nothing in this opinion is meant to discourage 
school boards from exceeding minimal constitutional standards in 
promoting the recognized values of integrated school conditions. 
A constitutional requirement of extensive student transpor-
tation solely to maximize integration, however, prf~sents a vastly more 
complex problem. It promises on the one hand a greater degree of 
actual desegregation, while 1t infringes on what may fairly be regarded 
as important community pr erogatives and personal rights. The Equal 
Protection Clause does r equire that racial discrimination find no place 
in the decisions of public school authorities. It does not comm::md 
that school authorities undertake widespread student t ransportation 
solely for the sake of greater integration. 20 
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The foregoing prescription is not intended to be either de-
finitive and inclusive, but rather an indication of the contour charac-
teristics of an integrated school system in which all citizens 1md 
pupils may justifiably be confident that racial discrimination is neither 
practiced nor tolerated. This does not mean - and indeed could not 
mean in view of the residential patterns of most of our major metro-
politan areas - that every school must in fact be an integrated unit. 
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the term 'duty to integrate.' But all of these cases, until the 
present one, have involved dual systems in the sense that state 
prescribed segregation existed as of 19 54. Now, however , that 
a majority of the Court in today' s decision have extended the 
affirmative duty doctrine to a school system which was never 
dual in the sense of that term heretofore used, nothing o:f. sub-
stance remains to a distinction between. a duty to desegre)gate 
and a duty to integrate • To be sure, SWann purported to hold 
out the hope that once a system had become' unitar~' 
there would be 'full compliance with this Court's 
decision in Brown." 402 u.s. at 31. But the logic--
indeed the holding - of today' s decision will require 
that no school board at any time in the future will be 
free to disregard its duty to maintain, within reason 
and due regard for essential educational goals, the 
type of integrated system generally described above. 
There will, as the Court in Swann suggested (402 
U.S. at 32), demegraphic changes in our 'growing, 
mobile society' so that few communities will remain 
from year to year in exactly the same factual setting. 
The circumstances will be relevant, of course, to thtl 
reasonableness of the action taken by eeheH-a1:dho!'tUt\oS 
school authorities. It will not, however, relieve therr\ 
of their constitutional duty. 
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a more balanced evaluation of the recognized interests of our 
society in achieving desegregation with other educational and 
societal interests a community may legitimately assert. This 
will help assure that integrated school systems will be established . 
and maintained by rational action, will be bettl~r understood and 
supported by parents and children of both races, and will promote 
the enduring qualities of an integrated society so essential to its 
genuine success. Indeed, for the long term, a more balanced 
approach may be necessary to prevent serious deterioration of 
the quality of public education so essential to the viability ,of our 
de moe ratic institutions. 
But if, after detailed and complete public supervision, segregated 
schools still persist, the presumption is strong that the school 
board, by its acts or omissions, is in some part responsible. 
Where state action and supervision is so pervasive and whE!re, 
after years of such action, schools remain thoroughly segregated, 
this Court is justified in finding a prima facie case of a consti-
tutional violation. The burden then falls on the school board to 
demonstrate it is operatag an "integrated school system" {note 
10 supra). 
8. 
to Green/Swann undercut whatever logic once supported the de facto/ -- ----
IDe jure distinction. In imposing on metropolitan southern school districts 
as affirmative duty, including large-scale transportation of pupils, 
to eliminate separate schools, the Court required these districts to 
alleviate conditions which in large part did not rerult from historic, 
state-imposed de jure segregation. Rather, the familiar root cause 
of segregated schools in all the biracial metropolitan areas of our 
country is essentially the same: one of segregated residential and 
migratory patteras the impact of which on the racial composition of 
the schools was perpetuated and rarely ameliorated by action of public 
school authorities. This is a national, not a southern phenomenon. 
And it is largely unrelated to whether a particular state had or did not 
8 have segregatory school laws. 
Whereas Brown I rightly addressed the elimination of state-
imposed segregation in that particular section of the country where 
it did exist, Swann imposed obligations on southern school districts to 
eliminate conditions which are not regionally unique but are s imilar both 
in origin and effect to conditions in the r est of the country. As the 
remedial obligations of Swann extend far beyond the elimination of the out-
growths of the state-imposed segregation outlawed in Brown, the in-
evitable rationale of Swann points towards a uniform, constitutional 
approach to our national problems of school segregation. 
9. 
II. 
The Court's dec ision today, while adhering to the de jurE>/ 
de facto distinction, will require the application of the Green/~~ 
doctrine of "affirmative duty ' ' to the Denver &::hool Board despite 
the absence of any history of state-mandated school segregation . 
The only evidence of a constitutional violation was found in various 
decisions of the school board. I concur in the Court's position that 
the public school authorities are the responsible agency of the state, 
and that the affirmative duty doctrine is equally applicable in Charlotte 
and in Denver. I disagree, however, with any perpetuation of the de 
jure/ de facto distinction and with leaving to petitioners the initial 
tortuous effort of identifying "segregative acts" and deducing "segregatory 
intent. " I would hold, quite simply, that wrere segregated public schools 
exist, there is a strong prima facie case that the duly constituted 
public authorities (I will usually refer to them collectively as the 
··school board") are sufficiently responsible to impose upon them a 
nationally applicable duty to take appropriate desegregatory measures. 
-·----- --~·-·-· _ _ _ ! -- ~~---·-
The D.!"incipal reason for abandonrnent of the d~_jur~:(_?:_<:_~~to 
distitlcti 'm is that, ic \' i.t~ 'V Qf the evolution of tl}e holdLn :r in Erown I 
into the affirmative duty doctrine , the distinction no longer carl he 
justLied on a principle. 1Jasis. In decreeing remedica l r equirements 
~·o L~ :".:''larlotte/ >recl<lenburg school district, Swann focused on 
31. Ther:: :may .vel~ be advc:mtages in o:; ;)mmencing the 
integratit·~~ expe rier-ce at an early age, as ymmg children may be 
less likeiy than older chL.::iren and adt:.lts to develop 2..n L.i.hibiting 
!"acial c onsciousness. 'T'hese advantages should be considered ~s 
school boar-:ls r.rta1re the various decisians refer-.eC: to above in tr.is 
0pinion'.r>itc, th? " iew to achieving and !)re:::erTi:--:~ an :U1teg-rate· · -->Cl ooi 
•or m~arl~; '.:·,") 'pca.i.es. ···11e pronlem, es~ec~ally s ince it has focused 
or1 the ' "l:~usL'1 ~ issue ·r. as profounctlv "lisqui~ted the publie '>'.There 
V'' t ::-~ t'-ti"' issue, 
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2. 
require that the legitimate community interests in neighborhood 
school systems be accorded far greater respect. In the balancing 
of interests so appropriate to a fair and just equitable decree, 
transportation orders should be applied with special caution to any 
proposal as disruptive of family life and interests - and ultimately 
of education itself - as extensive transportation of elementary age 
children solely for desegregation purposes. As a minimu,m this 
could should not require school boards engage in the unnecessary 
transportation away from their neighborhoods of elementary age 
children. It is at this~ age level that neighborhood education performs 
its most vital educational role. It is with respect to children of 
tender years that the greatest concern exists for their physical 
and psychological health. It is also here, at the elementary school 
31 
that the r ights of parents and children are most sharply indicated. 
n.J.u~r .&, p . .><: \r>..eyes) ~f:&tjfTS 
Indeed, authorities increasingly are in doubt as to the extent 
to which forced racial balancing in the public schools will be effective 
per se in improving educational opportunity and reducing racial 
inequality. 
Note to Jay: I wonder if we shouldn't put this sentence in the footnote 
citing Jenks as the authority. I haven't read Jenks so be sure what 
I have said is an accurate statements. I do think in the introduction 
or summary at the front of the book which I did read that Jenks 
went even beyond what I have said in this note. But this is as far 
as I would like to go. 
..... , ,._ ., • ._ --- a..&.t"'J ........ 
Here is a rough shot at a draft of a note describing what is 
necessary for a prima facie case: 
:m prima ft'a!::iie cp~&se of constitutional violation exists 
when pervasive segregation is found to exist to a significant degree 
in the particular school district. It is recognized, of course, that 
these terms are relative to provide no precise standards. But 
circumstances, demographically and otherwise, vary from district 
to district and hard and fast rules should not be formulated. The 
existence of a substantial percentage of schools populated by students 
from one race only or predominately so populated, should trigger 
the inquiry. If, upon closer examination, the system appears to 
lack the principal indicia of an integrated school system (as defined 
~pra, p. ), this would suffice to establish a prima facie or 
presumptive violation. 
.......... J:-' 1 .._...._. V J ""'.., I '"" 
There is controversy, increasing in recent years, as to the 
extent to which integration in the schools per se results in a better 
education for anyone. For samples of some of the relevant literature, 
see If Equality of Educational Opportunity, Office of Education, 
U.S. 1leptJnrxH Department of Health Education and Welfare (1966), 
~ known as the "Coleman Report"; Coleman, The Concept of 
Equality of Educational Opportunity, 38 Harv. :lEduc. Rev. 7, 17 
(1968); Coleman on The Coleman Report, Education Researcher, 
March 1972, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 13, published by American 
Educational Research Pssociation, Wash. D. C. ; Cohen, Defining 
Racial Equality in Education, 16 U.C. L.A. L. Rev. 255 (1969); 
and C. Jenks, Inequality (1972). I mention this controversy not to 
endorse l!l any of its implications. Indeed, the time span covered 
vi-
by the studies we too brief and the empirical data too fragmentary 
for final conclusions. Moreover, our society is committed - as 
indeed it must be - to a national policy of integration. But the 
uncertainty of scholars as to the effect of school integration per se 
2. 
upon educational opportunity and achievement is relevant, at least 
peripherally, to the basic assumption of this opinion: that the 
ultimate goal of public schools is not integration but the best available 
educational opportunity for all on equal terms; that school systems 
must be genuinely integrated (as herein defined) but also they must 
be structured for the highest educational achievement for all; and 
that, in structuring such a system, the school authorities must be 
allowed a wide measure of freedom and discretion to consider all 
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11. 
Eut for purposes of the present analysis, I will assume that 
T have identified the substance of the right in question. 
I can perceive no basis for vindicating or denying this right, 
as the case may be, depending upon whether or not a court 
cteter!1' lnes that the segregated schools are the product of de facto 
rather thar1 de jure actlon. Tf, as sa id in ~wan!l "segregation was 
the :tnnl:klK evil'" held to he unconstitutional there is little reason 
for perpetuatinv the evil in some sections of the country on the 
basis of a distinction which has become formalistic rather than 
substantive. 
12. 
court determines that the segregated schools are the product of 
de facto rather than de jure action. If, as in Swann "segregation 
was the evil" held to be unconstitutional, 402 U.S. at 15, there is 
little reason for perpetuating the evil in some sections of the country 
Public schools are creatures of the state, and whether the 
segregation was state-created or state-assisted or merely state-
perpetuated should be irrelevant to constitutional principle. The 
11 
School Board exercises month-by-month, year-by-year responsibility 
~erj•M j_ . · · over the of th~J-~ubhc school system. It sets pohc1es 
on attendance zones, faculty employment and assignments, school 
construction, closings and consolidations, and myriad other matters. Sc), •• ) 
bo,ra ie,c.;s;1r;_l. ;-i1 o~vio ~~~os/., 'l\o+ ~-- S./e.. c.-.-.se.. o~ ~e..lfr'- ..__fed St:.lt••/':" 
...J ~- -..J c: ... .,,r; .. J, 
B...t ~~ 1 .. after a.- detailed and complete public supervision, segregated 
~ 
schools still persist, the presumption is strong that the school 
~ board, by its acts or omissions, is mJpart responsible. Where 
state action and supervision is so pervasive and where, after years 
#JortJ"-jla~~ 
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is justified in finding a -~ prima facie case of a constitutional 
violation. 
~zl» 
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segregation is more widespread in our country than the de jure/ 
h~ 
de facto distinction~to admit. As one commentator has 
noted: 
"the three court of appeals decisions denying a 
constitutional duty to abolish de facto segregation 
all arose in cities - Cincinnati , Gary and 
Kansas City, Kansas -where racial segregation 
in schools was formerly mandated by state or local 
law. [Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ. , 369 F. 2d 
55 (CA 61966), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964); 
Downs v. BoardOfEduc., 336 U.S. F. 2d 988 (CA 10 
I964'}, cert. denied, 380 U. S. 914; Bell v. School 
City, 324 F. 2d 209 (CA 7 1963), cert denied, 377 
U.S. 924]. Ohio discarded its statute in 1887, 
Indiana in 1949, and Kansas City not until the 
advent of Brown. If Negro and white parents in 
Mississippi are required to bus their children to 
distant schools on the theory that the consequences 
of past de jure segregation cannot otherwise be 
dissipated, should not the same reasoning apply 
fil 
stated: 
in Gary, Indiana where no more than five years 
before Brown the same practice existed with 
presumably the same effects. " Goodman, 
De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional 
and ~ Empirijil Analysis, 60 Cal. L. 
Rev. 275, 297 (1972). ~ 1/ 
14. 
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As the Fifth Circuit 
"The Negro children in Cleveland, Chicago, 
Los Angelese, Boston, New York, or any other area · 
of the nation which the opinion classifies under 
de facto segregation, would receive little comfort 
from the assertion that the racial make-up of their 
school system does not violate their constitutional 
rights because they were born into a de facto 
society, while the exact same racial make-up of 
the school system in the 17 Southern and border 
states violates the constitutional rights of their 
counterparts, or even their blood brothers, because 
they were born into a de jure society. All children 
everywhere in the nation are protected by the 
Constitution, and treatment which violates their 
constitutional rights in one area, also violates 
such constitutional rights in another area. " 
Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School 
District, 467 F. 2d 142, 148 (CA 5 en bane 1972) 
quoting United States v. Jefferson County Board 
of Educ. 380 F. 2d 385, 397 (CA 5 en bane) (Gewin 
J. , dissenting) . • 'I} 11-
17. 
with the de jure/ de facto distinction, and commends itself in this 
respect both on grounds of principle and practicality. 
B 
There is thus no reason as a matter of constitutional 
principle to adhere to the de jure/ de facto distinct ion in school 
desegregation cases. In addition, there are reasons of policy 
and prudent judicial administration which point strongly toward 
the adoption of a uniform national rule. The litigation heretofore 
centered in the South already is surfacing in other regions. The 
~ 
decision of the Court today, emphasizing as it does the
11
element 
• ?rr,~~.s J r/ ,-;o___, , _r_ _--d--:-, 
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The issue in these cases will not be whether segregated 
education exists. This will be conceded in most of them. The 
litigation will focus as a consequence of the Court's decision on 
whether segregation has resulted in any "meaningful or significant" 
portion of a school system from a school board's "segregatory 
























Rather than continue to prop up a distinction no longer 
grounded in principle, and which will contribute to the consequences 
-~j!_~ 
indicated above, f' -suggest that we acknowledge that whenever 
-1 
~ f-roJl.· ' 
significant public school segregation exists there is prima facie 
.,.. .,L..,, _v;;..,,. 6 ~ ~~~&::, ~. i; L·&~ •• !(, lo 
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evidenceot;(a constituhOtlal vio~alioo. egregated schools, wherever 
vt. .:.c.-;;. t.t;,] ,. 1 • .1 v, oJ<.t_" il. , . 
'
riV'ol( 
located, are the product of trends and patterns as well as 
public decisions. If one goes back far enough, it is probable that 
all racial segregation in the United States, wherever occurring 
and whether or not confined to the schools, has at sometime been 
16 
maintained or supported by government action. This is not, of 
course, to minimize those causes of segregated schools far beyond 
~Mr.>re.o.te...-,_; the domain and control of school board~ ~as fOreshadowed in 
Swann and as implicitly held today, school boards have a duty, which 
~ ~J::L ~~ 
overrides even the ~l and neutral causes ofJ segregation, to 
~ n 
minimize and ameliorate these conditions by pursuing an affirmative 
policy of desegregation. It is this policy which must be applied 
consistently on a national basis without regard to a doctrinal 
distinction which has outlived its time. 
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t Green/ Swann undercut wha!;..logic once supported the de acto/ de jure 
distin ion. In imposing on metropolitan southern sc ool districts 
as affirmat e duty, including large-scale trantrtation of pupils, 
I 
ate schools, the Court resitired these districts 
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to alleviate condition which in large p¥-t did ~ result from lnif"@P 
/ ./1 
/ 
de jure segregatio:J the~i.fesulted essentially from the same 
/ /\ phenomenon which has occu in northern and western distr · s: 
I 
segregated residential and; tnigra ry patterns which w e perpetuated 
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or at least not proper~j counteracted ic school authority. 
I 
I 
Whereas Brown I ¢~t1y addressed th 
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:s: imposed seg:r;i~tion in that of the country where 
\ 
it did exist,!~ imp ed obligations on southe 0scho~districts 
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_, / to elimh>ate ~on - ions which are not regionally uniq \~' e 
V similar bot(in origin and effect to the rest of the countr\. '· 
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b ut for purposes of the present analysis, I will assume that 
T have identified the substance of the right in question. 
I can perceive no basis for vindicating or denying this right, 
as the case may be , depending upon whether or not a court 
:leterrr ines that the segr egated schools are the product of de facto 
rather than de jure action. U, as said in ~;van~ "segregation was 
the ffYR:idK: evil '' held to r.e unconstitutional there is little reason 
for perpetuatin!! the evil in some sections of the country on the 
basis of a distinction which has become formalistic rather than 
substantive. 
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court determines that the segregated schools are the product of 
de facto rather than de jure action. If, as in Swann "segregation 
was the evil" held to be unconstitutional, 402 U.S. at 15, there is 
little reason for perpetuating the evil in some sections of the country 
Public schools are creatures of the state, and whether the 
segregation was state-created or state-assisted or merely state-
perpetuated should be irrelevant to constitutional principle. The 
c 
School Board exercises month-by-month, year-by-year responsibility 
over the ?er@•M of th4:>ublic school system. It sets policies 
on attendance zones, faculty employment and assignments, school 
construction, closings and consolidations, and myriad other matters. Sc), •• J 
bo,n:) ie,c.;s;!):J.l c;';t o~lliO ~AS./*4 "'ho+ ~L S./e. c.-...sc. ~~~ .Sc. ~ .. ,.._feJ ScJ..,/fi}' 
....J ~- J c: ... .,,r; .. J. 
6~ ~t 1 ' after a.- detailed and complete public supervision, segregated 
~ 
schools still persist, the presumption is strong that the school 
~ board, by its acts or omissions, is mlpart responsible. Where 
state action and supervision is so pervasive and where, after years 
#I 0 ,.., ""j Ia/~ 





lli:L~ : /._ f~t;L ~ ~>f~.?...u:L<--
~
,.· 
is justified in finding a .~ prima facie case of a constitutional 
violation. 
noted: 
' r % e !i'h ri@¢'H llli ateet~ an flPI twilL§ 1 
"the three court of appeals decisions denying a 
constitutional duty to abolish de facto segregation 
all arose in cities - Cincinnati , Gary and 
Kansas City, Kansas -where racial segregation 
in schools was formerly mandated by state or local 
law. [Deal v~ Cincinnati Bd. of Educ. , 369 F. 2d 
55 (CA 61966), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964); 
Downs v. BoardOfEduc., 336 U.S. F. 2d 988 (CA 10 
~ cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914; Bell v. School 
City, 324 F. 2d 209 (CA 7 1963), cert denied, 377 
U.S. 924]. Ohio discarded its statute in 1887, 
Indiana in 1949, and Kansas City not until the 
advent of Brown. If Negro and white parents in 
Mississippi are required to bus their children to 
distant schools on the theory that the consequences 
of past de jure segregation cannot otherwise be 
dissipated, should not the same reasoning apply 
13. 
in Gary, Indiana where no more than five years 
before Brown the same practice existed with 
presumably the same effects. " Goodman, 
De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional 
and ~ Empiriil Analysis, 60 Cal. L. 
Rev. 275, 297 (1972). ~II 
14. 
+ j a ... i~r6:e:f- :fit e '7?' ats:::tt ; 11 r. re Q6 
A~~f~Zj~~on ~communities in different sections of the country(.:; 
stated: 
As the Fifth Circuit 
"The Negro children in Cleveland, Chicago, 
Los Angelese, Boston, New York, or any other area 
of the nation which the opinion classifies under 
de facto segregation, would receive little comfort 
from the assertion that the racial make-up of their 
school system does not violate their constitutional 
rights because they were born into a de facto 
society, while the exact same racial make-up of 
the school system in the 17 Southern and border 
states violates the constitutional rights of their 
counterparts, or even their blood brothers, because 
they were born into a de jure society. All children 
everywhere in the nation are protected by the 
Constitution, and treatment which violates their 
constitutional rights in one area, also violates 
such constitutional rights in another area. " 
Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School 
District, 467 F. 2d 142, 148 (CA 5 en bane 1972) 
quoting United States v. Jefferson County Board 
of Educ. 380 F. 2d 385, 397 (CA 5 en bane) (Gewin 
J. , dissenting) .• II /L-
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with the de jure/ de facto distinction, and commends itself in this 
respect both on grounds of principle and practicality. 
B 
There is thus no reason as a matter of constitutional 
principle to adhere to the de jure/ de facto distinction in school 
desegregation cases. In addition, there are reasons of policy 
and prudent judicial administration which point strongly toward 
the adoption of a uniform national rule. The litigation heretofore 
centered in the South already is surfacing in other regions. The 
~ 
decision of the Court today, emphasizing as it does the!\element 
o 7'tt.,cr-s < ,.-./~~ a.x- • .-+-:-, 
~b I ---;r ·""1 cr--rw '>A--
of segre gatory :.litK intent, will inviteA UB€'• etmess ami c.on£niiilQJl. 
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in numerous J:ddiH6fte:l aeseg1 egatien ga:ees. L-1 -~~k, 
The issue in these cases will not be whether segregated 
education exists. This will be conceded in most of them. The 
litigation will focus as a consequence of the Court's decision on 
whether segregation has resulted in any "meaningful or significant" 
portion of a school system from a school board's "segregatory 
intent. " The intractable problems involved in litigating this 
a~temp~ '" c ::djn:Hcate ::he :ar~ely Sll'hjective iss·Je Jf intent or 
'l:ot ivation , the >.1u~t i.r ~~~E::>ri~_-::0rce:-ne~l itself .vith the results 
and f·wnd t'"lat these ··rere li1{ely t o ')e of ~,or~ rat he r than les s 
'3e!.;J·egation. The r ati onale of the -r'1':por ia case is inconsistent 
with the de jure/ :-:e 'acta ::listincti·:m, and c ~J~"".r'.ends itself both on 
IT')'Jr:ds ::.f principre and pr.~ctica lity . 
As shown above , there is n o reason as a matter of 
constitutional principle or precedent (until today's decision) to 
adhere to the de jure/ de facto distinction in school desegregation 
cases. In addition, there are reasons of policy and prudent 
judicial administration which ~ point strongly towards the 
adoption of a uniforn1 national rule. The situation may be summarized 
Q;enerally as follows : After some 18 years of litigation confined 
p rimarily to the southern states, 9esft~ desegregation plans 
have been adopted and affirmative act ion tal<en t o integrate the 
schools, in varying degrees, in all of the major cities and most 
17. 
of the school districts in the South. The greater problem with 
respect to segregated school systems now lies in the urban areas 
outside of the South, and for the most part in cities ancbisd:Jita:ec 
states which long since have abandoned discriminatory laws and 
ordinances applicable to schools, housing, and zoning. As in 
Denver, the legal structure within k which these school systems 
function is neutral, and yet segregation - varying from massive to 
fragmentary - is commonplace wherever substantial number of 
minority citizens reside. The litigation heretofore centered in 
the South already is surfacing in other regions. The decision of 
the Court today, based entirely on school board action and inaction, 
will invite the filing of numerous additional desegregation cases. 
It is the business of the courts to decide cases, and 
particularly to vindicate constitutional rights. The problem, 
therefore, is not the litigation itself, but rather the artificial 
framework in which it must be conducted under today's decision. 
The issue in these cases will not be whether segregated education 
exists. This will be conceded in most of them. The litigation 
-~- - - - -- - - --
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will focus, rather, on whether it has resulted in any "meaningful 
or significant" portion of a school system from (i) something the 
school board did or failed to do, and ( ii) whether the board had a 
segregatory intent. The far reaching problems litigating these 
issues are obvious to any lawyer. The results of litigation - often 
arrived at subjectively by a court endeavoring to ascertain the 
subjective intent of school authorities with respect to action taken 
over many years - will be fortuitous, unpredictable and perhaps 
even capricious. 
The Denver case, decided today, is illustrative of the 
problem. Although appellate courts are normally bound by findings 
of fact, especially where the testimony is compendious and involves 
conflicting opinion as well as factual evidence, this Court refused 
to be bound by the findings of the District Court which also had 
been approved by the Court of Appeals. Indeed, the majority 
opinion, apparently concluding that there was no substantial 
evidence to support the findings below, held that they were 
"incorrect as a matter of law": 
"Accepting the School Board's explanation the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals agreed 
19. 
that a finding of de jure segregation as to the core 
city schools werenot permissible since petitioners 
had failed to prove '(1) a racially discriminatory 
purpose and (2) a casual relationship between the 
acts complained of and the racial imbalance admittedly 
existing in those schools.' 445 F. 2d at 1006. This 
assessment of petitioners' proof was clearly 
incorrect as a matter of law." (supra p. 16). 
With reason, one may agree that the majority of this Court, despite 
not having heard the evidence or seen the witnesses, was nevertheless 
correct in its judgment overruling the factual findings of the courts 
below. The point, however, is that wide and unpredictable 
differences of 111 opinion among judges are inevitable when dealing 
with an issue as slippery as "intent" or "purpose", and especially 
when related to scores if not hundreds of decisions made by school 
authorities under varying conditions over many years. 
Every act of a school board and school administration, and 
indeed every failure to act where affirmative action is indicated, 
is a form of state action. The most routine decisions with respect 
to the operation of schools, made almost daily, can affect in varying; 
degrees the extent to which schools are initially segregated, remain 
Jllll in that state, are desegregated, or - for the long term future -
20. 
In Swann the Court did not have to probe into S!t!§XRiai!CK:f 
segregatory intent and proximate cause with respect to each of 
these "endless" factors. The basis for its de jure finding there was 
rooted primarily in the priorkisdx history of the desegregation 
the 
suit. But in;benver type case where no such history exists, a 
judicial examination of these factors will be required under today's 
decision. The consequences iJDt are quite predictable in terms 
of protracted and inconclusive litigation, and of added burdens on 
the federal courts as well as unnecessary disruption of school 
20. 
are likely to be one or the other. These decisons include action 
or non-action with respect to school building construction and 
location; the timing of building new schools and their size; the 
aa closing and consolidation of schools; the drawing or gerrymandering 
of student attendance zones; the extent to which a neighborhood 
policy is enforced, especially with respect to elementary schools; 
the recruitment, promotion and assignment of faculty and supervisory 
personnel; policies with respect to transfers from one school to 
another; whether, and to what extent, special schools will be 
provided, where they will be located, and who will qualify to attend 
them; the determination of curriculum, including whether there 
will be "tracks" that lead primarily to college or to vocational 
training, and the routing of students into these tracks; and even 
decisions as to social, recreational and athletic pDit policies. 
The Court's discussion in Swann of the effect and complexity 
of decision making with respect to the construction of new schools 
and the closing of old ones is illuminating: 
21. 
systems. Moreover, the predicability of decisons where they will 
be largely on findings as to purpose or intent will become an 
even less exacting science, and the school boards and authorities -
which have B so much at stake - will simply not know whether and 
to what extent the Denver rule is applicable. 
c 
Rather than continue to prop up a distinction no longer 
grounded in principle, and which will contribute to the consequences 
indicated above, I suggest that we acknowledge that whenever 
significant school segregation exists there is an adequate element 
of state action. If one goes back far enough, it is probable that 
all racial segregation in the United states, wherever occurring 
and whether or not confined to the schools, has at sometime been 
maintained or supported by government action. * But the basis 
*In- Becket v. School Board, 308 F. Supp. 1274, 1304, 1311-1315 
(1968), ,Judge Walter Hoffman - in an appendix to his opinion -
compiled a summary of past government segregatory action which 
included examples from a great majority of states. See also 
Racial Isolation in the Public Schools, U. S. Commission on Civil 
Rights 245, 254-259 (1967); M. Weinberg, Race and Place, 
Office of Education, u. S. Department of Health,.. Education and 
Welfare (1967). (Jay: I have not checked these). 
---·-
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for an on-going finding of state action - regardless of intent or 
purpose - rests quite simply upon the fact that public education 
is a function of government and the schools are controlled and 
operated by agencies of the state. 
This is not to suggest, of course, that responsibility iB an 
odious sense rests primarily upon school boards or other state 
authorities for much of the segregation which still exists throughout 
the country. The causes of segregation in the schools are complex, 
and where blame is appropriate it should be on a national basis 
including past generations. In most cities today there is a high 
degree of residential segregation which results in a tendency toward 
comparable school segregation. Zoning and housing laws often 
contributed in the past to this separation of the races. There has 
Dl also been a tendency, muted somewhat iB recent years, for 
different racial and ethnic :&1l:mbt elements of the population to 
prefer to live separate and apart. Nor are the residential patterns 
necessarily related to one race or group being minority and the 
23. 
other majority. There are cities todaY in which theXJPDIK population 
is predominantly Negro, and the residential patterns remain 
essentially segregated with the whites being the minority race. 
It is generally agreed, however, that the single most pervasive 
cause of residential segregation wherever it is found is the disparity 
in economic opportunity and status which continue to be so prevalent. 
These factors which combine to separate racial and ethnic groups, 
were the underlying casses of the segregation found to exist in 
the Denver public schools. 
Yet, as foreshadowed in Swa~ and as implicity held mul 
today, school board have a duty which overridges even the natural 
and neutral causes of segregation, and requires appropriate action 
to minimize and ameliorate these conditions by pursuing an 
affirmative policy of desegregation. It is this policy which must :~ 
applied consistently on a national basis without regard to a 
doctrinal distinction which has outlived its time. 
8. As Dr. Karl Taeuber states in his article ,''Residential 
Segregation," Scientific American, August 1965 at 14: 
''No elaborate analysis is necessary to co~lude 
from these figures that a high degree of resi-
dential segregation based on race is a universal 
characteristic of American cities. This segre-
gation is found in the cities of the North and West 
as well as of the South; in large cities as well 
as small; in nonindustrial cities as well as in-
dustrial; in cities with hundreds of thoU~ands 
of Negro residents as well as those with only a 
few thousand; and in cities that are progressive 
in their employment practices and civil rights 
policies as well as those that are not." 
In his book, Negroes in Cities, Dr. Taeuber stated that residential 
segregation exists "regardless of the character of local laws and 
policies and regardless of other forms of discrimination." Id. at 
10. The term "integrated school system" is used generally 
to denote a system possessing most, if not all, of the following 
characteristics: there would be, of course, no laws, regulations 
or policy supportive of the type of "legalized" segregation con-
demned in Brown (a condition manifestly invalid and no longer 
existing overtly anywhere). The school board would have pur-
sued, within the limits of a rule of reason coneistent with educa-
tional goals, the affirmative duty principle enunciated in Green. 
This duty would require that a school board take such appropriate 
affirmative measures to (i) integrate fully faculties and administra-
tion; (ii) scrupulously assure equality of facilities, quality of in-
struction and curricula opportunities; (iii) utilize its authority to 
draw attendance zones to promote integration; (iv) locate new', 
schools, close old ones, and determine the aize and grade categ:ories 
\ 
\ 
of schools with this same objective in mind; (v) assure the elimination 
r[)f all vestiges of segregation in athletic and recreational activities; . 
and (vi) resort to such reasonable transportation of pupils, especially 
at the secondary level, as is compatible with sound educational goals . 
These specifications are not intended to be either definitive or 
inclusive; rather, they are indicative of the characteristics of 
an integrated school system, in which all citizens and pupils 
may justifiably be confident that invidious discrimination is 
neither practiced nor tolerated. This does not mean- and indeed 
could not mean in view of the residential patterns of most of our 
major metropolitan areas - that every school must have some 
racial mixing. A school which happens to be all white or all black 
is not a "segregated" school in the legal sense if the system ifself 
is a genuinely integrated one as described herein. 
The characteristics and affirmative obligations of an 
integrated school system are spelled out more fully in Section 
III, infra. 
-- -- ---1--------;.-________ ------------ --- --
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It should be made explicitly clear that the Constitution-
and after all this is[ the touchstone of the rights at issue - does 
not require racial balance or indeed a school system in which 
every school has some mixing of the races. Quite apart from 
the fact that no language in the Constitution nor in any decision 
I 
applying the equal Ilrotection clause to other situations involving 
racial discriminati~n requires this,* the Constitution could 
hardly be construed to require an absurd if not impossible re-
suit. Few would suggest, for example, that it would be feasible 
to apply even approf-mately the population racial balance in a 
city like Washington or Newark to every public :Biduuddh school 
therein. 
The argument for racial balance also overlooks the fact 
that the remedy far exceeds that which is necessary to redress 
Jay: Try to think of some parallel cases. One type of situ~l.tion 
which comes to mind, and which may be mentioned as an exall\lple, 
is that the fundamental cause of racial imbalance in the schoo1a1 
today is residential segregation. If the ConstitUtion requires 
homogenization of the population, the way to achieve it would be 
to compel affirmaUlve desegregation of residential patterns -
though admittedly ,is would be a revolutionary step. 
b. 
the constitutional evil. Let us use Denver as an example. It is 
doubted that anyone would contend, absent state action of any 
kind whatever, thalt the schools in Denver would have a substantially 
different racial composition from that which actually exists. I 
have agreed in Parts I and II of this concurrence that the Denver 
School Board, by its action and nonaction, may be legally responsible 
in some degree for 1 the extent of segregation that exists. It can 
certainly be said that if an affirmative duty existed to ameliorate 
segregation the board could and should have taken steps toward 
this end. But if one assumed a maximum discharge of constitu-
1 
tiona! duty by the Denver Board over the past decades, the funda-
mental problem of Jesidential segregation would continue to exist 
and it is this situation that causes most of the school segregation. 
It would indeed be a novel application of equitable power - not to 
mention a dubious eXtension of constitutional theory - to apply 
some uDmi retribufive theory which would require a greater 
degree of school integration than would have resulted from purely 
natural and neutral npn-state causes. 
c/ 
It is to be remembered that the racial mix of the population 
varies widely among the cities and cotmties of this country.* 
The demography also constantly varies, especially within the cities 
where population ra~ios change significantly as citizens move to 
suburban areas and white and black families constantly are on the 
move within the citi,s. A racial balance established in a school 
system for one year 1would rarely be valid three or four years later. 
An awareness of these facts explains, no doubt, why the 
Court has never projected a mechanistic solution for a problem 
of such delicacy and ~iversity. Mr. Justice Brennan may well have 
had this in mind in Green when, speaking for the Court, he said: 
"There is no universal answer to the complex 
problems of dbsegnlgation; there is obviously no 
one plan that will do the job in every ease. The 
matter must l1e assessed in the light of the 
circumstances present and the options available 
in each instance." 391 u.s. at 439. 
*The range may well he from school districts which are pemaps 
90% black (Washington, D. C. and Clarendon County, S. C. ) to many 
districts which are m~arly alllllld white. For the situation in 
Clarendon County,--S. C. see Brunson, v. Board of Trustees, No. 14, 571 
CA 4 June 5, 1970) - !Tar: Cheek to see if you have a better cite 
for this ease. 
d 
I conclude, therefore, that the relevancy of racial balance 
is little more, as Chief Justice Burger noted, than a "starting point 
to decide whether in fact any violation existed". Winston-Salem/ 
Forsyth Bd. of Ed. 'V· Scott, 404 U. S. at 1229. 
Neighborhood School~ 
The Denver School Board has consistently adhered to a policy 
based on the advanta~s of Bibb: neihborhood schools.* The 
defense in this case J:s based primarily on the theory that the 
neighborhood school policy was operated with total neutrality as: to 
race, and that the lawfulness of such a policy has been recognizeci\ 
in the lOth Circuit.**\ 
**See United States v . Board of Education of Tulsa Co. , 429 F. 2d 
1253 (CA 10 1970); BJara of-EdUcation of Oktahoma City v. Dowell, 
375 If F. 2d 158 (CA 10 1967); and-Downs v. Board of Education:of 
Kansas City, 336 F. 2? 988 (1964). 
*The Court of Appeals summarized the Denver pollcy as m!iml 
follows: "The goal is \a centrally located school whieh children 
living within the boundary lines must attend. Although the Board 
has no written policy 'overning the setting of attendance boundaries, 
several factors have ~pparently been employed, Among these 
are current school ~ulation in an attendance area, estimated 
growth of pupil populapon, the size of the school, distance to 
be traveled, and the existence of natural boundaries. The Board 
also attempts to draw. 1~unior high school and senior high school 
boundary lines so that all students transferring from a given 
school will continue th
1 
ir education together." App. p. 127a. 
The 
defense in this ease is ~fM'f n...t,.., .... n .... - ........ - .. 
e. 
But the inqub!·y does not end with the ascertainment that a 
neighborhood policy ~as been neutrally administered. Under the 
affirmative duty doc~rine, a school board cannot rest upon neutrality 
alone. There are many ways in which desegregation can be promoted 
I 
without dismantling ~ll a neighborhood schools or even abandoning 
the coocept as a goa~ to be attained in conjunction with other goals. 
The critical inquiry f.s into how a particular neighborhood school 
policy is structured fiD-d operated. The drawing of the attendance 
I lines is a critical factor. A board also has wide flexibility in 
deciding the various 1matters mentioned earlier in this opinion, 
including the loeati~of new schools, the closing of old ones, 
student transfer polikies, natural boundaries and the like. 
A rule of rea~on, balancing interests and values, must 
recognize the merit br neighborhood schools, especially for 
I 
children of tender yJars. Authorities on education agree widely 
I 
as to the advantages of a uk neighborhood system fairly 




F. 2d 55 (CA 6}(1966}, tile Court summarized these advantages: 
I 
(Copy Begin to End, page 60. ) 
As Deal was decided pJ."'ior to Green and Swann , it is no longer 
permissible merely to ~perate a neighborhood "without racial 
bias. " A school board must discharge its affirmative duty, but 
the advantages of neighborhood schools are no less as a result 
of these decisions and they deserve due consideration by a school 
board in discharing its duty. This is especially true with respect 
to elementary schools for all of the reasons so obvious to anyone 
* who has been either a parent or a teacher of elementary age children. 
In a perceptive column in the Washington Post, December 25, 1972, 
columnist William Raspberry addressed the indispensable role of 
parents in working clos~ly with the principal and teachers of their 
children's schools, a ro~e usually impossible to assume if one's 
children have been bused away many miles: · 
"Casting a ballot (for school board members)is no substi-
tute for visiting schools, seeing at first hand what is hap-
pening (or not hapMning), offering suggestions and volun-
teering assistance. , 
"It is no accident that education is worse at those schools 
where parental involvement is least. I know that in many 
of the low-income nbighborhoods, where the least learning 
I is taking place, parents often are too mdiJ busy, too timid 
or too poorly educat~d themselves to get very much in-
volved in what's happening at their children's schools. 
I 
"But they'll have to f.lake the time to get involved if the-y 
expect their schools[ to get better. As a matter of fact. 
simply knowing that this or her parents are concerned can 
do a great deal to motivate a child to learn." 
t. ~-
In the Court'~ IIJit opinion in Swann, it was recognized that: 
"People gravitate toward school facilities, just as 
schools are lbcated in response to the needs of people. 
The location pf schools may thus influence the patterns 
of residential development of a metropolitan area and 
have important impact on composition of inner city 
neighborhood~." 402 U.S. at 21. 
The Court could hardly have included the foregoing in its opinion 
had it intended to su~ordinate entirely the values of the neighborhood 
school to those of in~egration. The truths identified by the Court 
are self evident. liiiiDplx People do gravitate towards schools, and 
in the misinterpretanon that has followed Swann many who have 
gravitated have been ldisappointed. Similarly, the location of schools 
does influence residential patterns and school boards must ever 
be mindful of this. 
Ke1es 
The Interest of Parents and Childeen 
In the understandable national concern for alleviating the injustice 
of state enforced or tolerated racial segregation in the schools, it may 
be that the courts - as well as others -have overlooked the fact that 
other interests are implicated. These are the rights and interests of 
the parents and children; without regard to race, who are most directly 
concerned by desegregatil.on decrees. The law has long recognized the 
parental duty to nuture, support and provide for the welfare of children. 
There can be no doubt that this embraces such matters as when, where 
and how they are educated. In Pierce . v . ,,,, Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 
510 (1924), 534, 535, a unanimous court held: 
(Copy from that opinion, Begin to End, 
starting at bottom of p. 534 over to 
point marked End on p. 53 5.) 
The parental rights and duties described by the Court are correlative, and 
the prescribed duty can hardly be discharged if the parent is denied the 
right to exercise some participation in matters that affect the child's 
interest. As the Court stated so strongly in Brown , few interests in our 
society are as vital as that of education. All of this is not to say -and we 
-3-
The Ultimate Goal - Equal Educational Opportunity 
If we put aside the legalisms ~ of rights and duties, 
surely there is agreement that the ultimate goal is equal opportunity 
for children of all races to receive the best education the state can 
provide. As emphasized in Brown 1 "education is perhaps the most 
important function of state and local governments. But of course courts 
must operate within the framework of law and this Court mast apply 
principles derived from the Constitution by our prior precedents. In 
brief summary, the relevant principles in a desegregation case are 
as follows: dual or ••er•eakiu« segregated school systems are dis-
criminatory and are proscribed by the Equal ProClection Clause; and 
school autlurities have an affirmative duty to take appropriate steps 
to desegregate such systems. These principles must be observed and 
applied , not as ends in themselves but as means of achieving the educa-
tiona! goal. The alternative, then, to any simplistic application of 'oWl at 
has come to be regarded as the Swann formula, is to recognize - as indeed 
the opinion of the Court in Swann explicitly did - there must be a balanc img 
of interests and that reasonable discretion must be allowed in the ad-
-40-
IV. 
I come now to the extent to which district courts may 
decree the compulsory transportation of pupils in an attempt 
to achieve a desegregated school system. The Court in Swann 
was unquestionably right in describing such transportation as 
"one tool of school desegregation." The transporting of school 
children is as old as public education, and in rural and some 
suburban settings it is as indispensable as the providing of books. 
The issue, therefore, is not whether the employment of busing or 
other means of transporting children to and from school is legal 
or appropriate, where necessary to further desegregation or other 
educational objectives. The crucial issue is when, under what 
circumstances, and to what extent busing may appropriately be 
used. The answer t0 this turns - as it does so often in the law -
upon a sound exercise of discretion under the circumstances. Or, 
putting it differently, the answer will vary with the circumstances 
and must be compatible with the rule of reason. 
Transportation is a logistical problem, and if resources are 
available, anything is "possible.·· If enough buses are provided 
-41-
(and courts have not been reluctant to order them), the greatest 
possible degree of actual desegregation - namely, complete 
racial balance -~be attained in every school, at least for the 
year in question. But this is an irrational interpretation of Swann, 
as it would be of the Constitution itself. The Court was careful 
to say that "no per se rule" was intended; that "no rigid guidelines 
as to student transportation" could be prescribed; that the "age" 
and ' 'health of the children" and the relevance of the busing to 
"the educational process" should be considered in formulating 
any busing plan. 402 U.S. 26, 30, 31. 
I would hope this would mean that a rule of reason must be 
applied with a special caution to any proposal as disruptive of 
family life and interests - and ultimately of education itself - as 
extensive intra-city transportation of elementary age children 
solely for desegregation purposes. At a minimum, this Court 
should not require school boards to engage in the unnecessary 
transporting of children in the elementary grades. It is at this 
age level that neighborhood education performs its vital educational 
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role. It is with respect to children of tender years that the 
greatest concern exists for their physical and psychological 
health. It is also here, at the elementary school, that the rights 
and duties of parents are most sharply implicated. While greater 
transportation of secondary school students might be permitted, 
even at this level the desire of a community fort racially neutral 
neighborhood schools should command judicial respect. 
It is true that the Charlotte/ Mecklenburg desegregation 
plan approved by the Court in Swann contemplated extensive busing 
of elementary children. As district courts have tended to look to 
what in fact was approved rather than to what was said in the opinion 
of the Court, it is important for us to reiterate that Swann fairly 
articulates a test of reasonableness which is controlling. 
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schools, even in the eities of the South, are in lar ge part the 
product of social and economic factors - and the resulting 
residential patterns. But there is also not a school district in 
the United States, with any significant minority school population, 
in which the school authorities - in one way or the other - have not 
contributed in some measure to the degree of segregation which 
still prevails. Instead of recognizing the reality of similar multiple 
segregatory causes in school districts throughout the country, 
the Court persists in a distinction whose duality operates unfairly 
on local communities in one section f>f the country and on minority 
children in the others. 
The second issue - relating to the ambiguities of Swann -
means that the District Court, upon making the findings which are 
foreshadowed by today' s opinion, will be obligated to apply Swann 
to the city of Denver. There is, for the reasons I have indicated, 
a gap of vast and ill defined dimensions between a fair reading of 
what the Court said in Swann and the way district courts have felt 
compelled to apply it. It is important, not just to Denver but for 
the school boards and the courts in other cities which are awaiting 
L ~·dc.t' tt, e· ..,_ 10 . 
This means that school authorities, Cij&istent w~ ienerally ·---t. • .. " 
with a view of enhancing integrated school opportunities. 
The term "integrated school system" presupposes, of course, 
a total absence of any laws, regulations or policies supportive of 
the type of "legalized" segregation condemned in Brown. A system 
would be integrated in accord with constitutional standards if the 
responsible authorities had taken appropriate steps to (i) integrate 
-faculties and administration; (ii) scrupulously assure equality 
of facilities, quality of instruction and curricula opportunities 
throughout the district; (iii) utilize their authority to draw attendance 
J 
zones to promote integratio~pv) locate new schools, close old ones, 
and determine the size and grade categories with this same objective 
undertake the transportation of students, this also must be with 
<-1£iorfv..;t;~ .J 'Wtt 
integrative ] in mind. 
2. 
The fore going prescriptio~ is not intended to be ._ either 
definitive or all-inclusive, but rather an indication of the contour 
characteristics of an integrated school system in which all citizens 
and pupils may justifiably be confident that racial discrimination 
is neither practice nor tolerated. 
not mean - and indeed could not mean in view of the residential 
patterns of most of our major metropolitan areas - that every school 
must in fact be an integrated unit. A school which happens to be all 
or predominantly white or all or predominantly black is not a 
"segregated" school in an unconstitutional sense if the system itself 
is a genuinely integrated one. 
p · 
A e8ftt!l~~ P8'!UiPem-t:nt that school boards operate an 
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-------. .,!-- -- ) 0 (' m~cf1J tit< c.., •. ~rr .... .t .... :'k.J ,..cl'",.c'tt~~r 
integrated' school system( provides the best assurance that racial 
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se .. ,..c.l 
- for "segregatory intent. " To 
so}lfbern school ci.i.Stricts 
/ 
clvJ; ~~ 
the Court's reluctance {o apply candidly such~ nationy.r.ide. ' cJ B....~.. to fi:i:T' f. I 0) ·--:-J 
. .. . ·--··----~ 
@ \• TThe terminology customarily usea' by this Court in Brown and 
subsequent gecisions has referred to "desegre tion" and the 
"duty to desegregate, " apparently avoiding de berately the, 
1 term "duty to integrate. " But all of these c es, until the present 
\ one, have involved dual systems in the sen e that state prescribed 
\ seg.Fegation existed as of 1954. Now, h~ ver, that a, fnajority 
\\.. of. the Court in today'.s decision has extended the affirmative duty 
doctrine to a school system which was never dual in' the sense of 
, that term as heretofore used, nothing of substanc~' remains to 
a distinction between a duty to desegregate and ~/duty to integrate. 
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Defaulting school authorities would have, at a minimum, 
cJ-r~ r >;. J, v~ 
the obligation to take aif'In au, e steps of the sort outlined in 
the above section. School boards would, of course, be free to 
develop and initiate further plans to promote school desegregation. 
In a pluralistic society such as ours, it is important that no racial 
minority feel demeaned or discriminated against and that students 
of all races learn to play, work and cooperate with one another in 
their El!IX common pursuits and endeavors. Nothing in this opinion 
.. , f'c. 
is meant to discourage school boards from exceeding i'll ; h,m~/ 
3t .. ~J-J~ ~ 
constitutional•lllllil•ill• in promotin~ro:::cognized values of 
constitutional requirement of extensive student transportation 
solely to maximize integration, however, presents a vastly more 
complex problem. It promises on the one hand a greater degree of 
actual desegregation, while it infringes on what may fairly be 
regarded as impqrtant community prerogatives and personal rights. 
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to Green/Swann undercut whatever logic once supported the de facto/ 
In imposing on metropolitan southern school districts 
including large-scale transportation of pupils , 
to eliminate eparate schools, the Court required these districts to 
ns which in large part did not result from historic , 
segregation. Rather , the familiar root cause 
of segregated schools in all the biracial metropolitan areas of our 
one of segregated residential and 
--·~ / .... . rl 
not a southern phenomenon . And i' is rgely unrelated to whether a 
g 
particular state had or did not have segre tory school laws. 
Whereas Brown I rightly addressed th elimination of state-
imposed segregation in that particular section o 
it did exist , Swann imposed obligations on southern chool districts to 
eliminate conditions which are not regionally unique but re similar both 
in origin and effect to conditions in the rest of the country. 
medial obligations of Swann extend far beyond the elimination o 
growths of the state-imposed segregation outlawed in Brown ,j~~.--,-• 
~~ ~~ """'di--~  
.Id1 s ·J · a t ' I p~a uniform , constitutional approach to our natio 
problems of school segregation. 
9. 
II 
The Court's decision today, while adhering to the de jure/ 
~ - ~ 
(c~ .. ~e ..  facto distinction, fe:peshaeews applicli::i.on of the Green/ Swann 
doctr e of "affirmative duty" to the Denver School Board despite 
the absen e of any history of state-mandated school segregation. 
nee of a constitutional violation was found in various 
~ 
decisions of the chool board. I concur in the Court's position that 
orities are the responsible agency of the state, 
and that the affirmative uty doctrine is equally applicable~ Pllllit:l!l8 
1•iolMi~in Charlotte and Denver. I disagree, however, with 
any perpetuation of the de jure e facto distinction .and with 
leaving to petitioners the initial to uous effort:!' i:~?-fttM...t 
' 
"segregative acts" and ._.deduc';'tse~ tory._ intent. " I 
exist, there is a strong prima facie case that ly constituted 
A 
public authorities (I will usually refer to them coli tively as 
the "school board") are sufficiently respon~ible~ -1-o 
~~;;ip~~~- ..,..~!!:l!t-
~~~~~ 
~er!. p n :Kaes 
/o . .._The term "integrated school system" is used generally to denote 
a system possessing most, if not all , of the following characteristics: 
there would be, of course, no laws, regulations or policy supportive 
of the type of "legalized" segregation condemned in Brown (a con-
dition manifestly invalid and no longer existing overtly anywhere). 
The school board would have pursued, within the limits of a rule 
of reason consistent with educational goals , the affirmative duty 
principle enunciated in Green . This duty would requif~ifs'chool 
de zg:egah1!! e../lij>, .. five 
board • take such appropriate~ftkxpg si · h!!J * " s measures 
• 1,..(") -~*~ih~f lt" d d . . t t" ( "")~, 1 liHI rli y acu 1es an a m1ms ra wn; u1assur  
equality of facilities, quality of instruction and curricula opportunities ; 
{iii) utilizit:-authority to draw~ attendance 
j "tc._jrr.:f-; O"'- j 
zones to promote ·utsg *" 11 
( I v') 
T1e ; locate new schools , close 
" 
old ones, and determine the size and grade categories of schools 
(v \ 
with this same objective in mind; assure the elimination of all vestiges 
2. 
tv,) 
of segregation in athletic and recreational activities; and resort 
" 
to such reasonable transportation of pupils, especially at the 
secondary level , as is compatible with sound educational goals. 
These specifications are not intended to be either definitive or 
inclusive ; rather , they are indicative of the characteristics of 
an integrated school system, in which all citizens and pupils may 
justifiably be confident that invidious discrimination is neither 
practiced nor tolerated. This does not mean- and indeed could 
not mean in view of the residential patterns of most of our major 
metropolitan areas - that every school must have some racial 
mixing. A school which happens to be all white or all black is 
not Rliiiiiill il3 a "segregated" school in the legal sense if the 
system itself is a genuinely integrated one as described herein. ... 
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however, pose the question of whether the neighborhood system of 
pupil placement, fairly administered without racial bias, comports 
with the requirements of equal opportunity if it nevertl-J.eless results 
in the creation of schools with predominantly or even exclusively 
Negro pupils. The neighborhood system is in wide use throughout 
the nation and has been for many years the basis of school Jeote.rc.-l. 
administration. This is so because it is acknowledged to have goRe I al 
valuable aspects which are an aid to education, such as minimization j 
of safety hazards to children in reaching school, economy of cost in 
reducing transporation needs, ease of pupil placement and 
administration through the use of neutral, easily determined standards, 
and HR better home-school communication." 
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(KEYES) 
In Swann the Court properly emphasized a concern for 
"basic fairness" in fashioning a desegregation decree. This must 
mean - indeed the Constitution requires - that the remedies decreed 
must be fair to all children, their parents and the school authorities 
who will have to administer the decree. A court of equityXlfx does 
not correct one injustice by imposing another. 
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[December -, 1972] 
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opmwn of the 
Court. 
This school desegregation case concerns the Denver, 
Colorado, school system. That system has never been 
operated under a constitutional or statutory provision 
that mandated or permitted racial segregation in public 
cducation. 1 Rather, the _gravamen of this action, 
brought in June 1969 in the District Court for the 
District of Colorado by parents of Denver school chil-
dren. is that respondent School Board alone. by usc of 
various techmque~l'l,uch as the manipulati~ of student 
(Datfendance zones,~hool site selection an~ neighbor-
hood school policy, ~d Q.f maintained racially or 
ethnically (or both racially m1d ~ segregated 
schools throughout the school district, entiffing peti-
'honers to a decree ct1rcctmg desegregation of the entire 
school district. 
1 To the contr:u~- , Art. IX, § 8, of the Colorado Con~titution ex-
pre,;~]~- prohibit::; "any clas;:;ifira t ion of pupils ... on account of 
rare or color." A~ carl~- as 1927, til(' Colorado Supreme Court held 
1 hat a Dennr practice of excluding black students from school pro-
grams at Manual High School and More~· Junior High School vio-
lated state hw. Jones v. JVcwlon, S1 Colo. 25, 253 P. 38(3 (1927). 
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The boundaries of the school district are co-terminus 
with the boundaries of the City and County of Denn"r. 
There were in 1969 119 schools~ with 96.580 pupils 
in the school system. In early 1969, the respondent 
School Board adopted thref' resolutions designed to de-
segregate the schools in the Park Hill area in the north-
cast portion of the city. Following an election " ·hich 
producPcl a Board majority opposed to the resolutions. 
the resolutions 'wre rescinded and replaced " ·ith a Yol-
untary student transfer program. Petitioners then filed 
this action. requesting that an injunction be issued against 
the rescission of the resolutions and that the respondent 
School Board be ordered to desegregate and afford equal 
educational opportunity "for tlH' School District as a 
whole.'' App .. at 32a. The District Court found that by 
the construction of a ne"·· f0iat1vely small elementary 
school. Barrett. m the niicklfc of the ~egro community 
w~f ~Hill. by the gerrymandering of student at-
tei1Cfancc zones~)y the usc of so-called "optional zones.'' 
a11d by the excessiw USE' of mobile classroom units, 
among other things. the respondent School Board had 
engaged o\·er almost a decade after 1960 in an 111lcon-
stifubonaT pohcy of deliberate racial segregation wi!h 
respeet to the Park [ hll schools.: 'l'he court thereforE' 
orclrred the Board to desegregate thosE' schools through 
the implementation of the three rescinded resolutions. 
303 F. Rupp. 270 (1960); 303 F. Rupp. 280 (Hl69). 
Segregation in Denver schools is not limited. howf'YCr. 
to the schools in the Park Hill area.. and not satisfied 
"ThNP :lrr 92 <>lemrntar~· ,:rhook 1.5 junior high ~c·hool". 2 junior-
,:pnior high . .:rhool<.:. and 7 ,:pnior high ,:c·hool". Tn :Hldition. tlw Honn! 
op<>r:it<'" :Ill OpportunitY ::.:!'hool. ~ ~ ~fNropolit:1n Youth EduC"ation 
Ccntc•r. and an Airrraft Tr:1ining F:1cility. 
:: The ~o-cai!Pd "Park Hill -c·hooV' :ll'<' BaiT<>It. Strdman, Hni!Ptt. 
Smith. Philip~, and Park Hill Flrm<>ntary Schook and Smilry Junior 
High Si·hool. F:1"l High Srhool "<'!'\'<'." thp ar<>a but i" lo(':1tPd out-
~idr of it. (Srr appendix.) 
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with their succe~s in obtaining relief for Park Hill. peti-
tioners pressed their prayer that the District Court order 
de~egregation of all ~egregated schools in the city of 
Denver. particularly the heavily segregated schools in 
the core city area.'' But that court concluded that its 
fin cli;;g of a purposeful and systematic program of racial 
segregation affecting thou~a nels of students m the 
Parf\: H1lf area did not. in itself. impose on the 
School Board an affirmative duty to eliminate segrega-
tion throughout the school ciistnct. Instead. the court 
fractiOnated the chstnct and heid that petitioners must 
make a fresh showing of de ju1·e segregation in each ~a 
of the clty for \Yiuch they seck relief. Moreover. tlw 
District Court held that its finding of intentional ~egrega­
tion in Park Hill " ·as not in any sense material to the 
question of segregatory intent in other areas of the city. 
rnder this restrictive approach. the District Court con-
cluded that petitioners' evidence of intentionally dis-
criminatory School Board action in areas of the district 
other than Park Hill was insufficient to "dictate the con-
clusion that this is de jure segregation which ca11s for 
an all-out effort to desegregate. It is more like de facto 
\
segregation. \Yith respect to '"hich the rule is that the 
court cannot order desegregation in order to proYide a 
better balance." 313 F. Supp .. a.t 73. 
Xc\'ertheless, the District Court went on to hold that 
the proofs established that the segregated core CitY 
schools " ·ere educationally inferior to lnc-pr(:dominantly 
"w~r "Anglo" schools r;- other part~ of the dis-
trict-that is, "separate facilities ... unequal in the 
·• The oo-eall <•d ·' ('orr ('it\· ~rhool~'' whirh :trr ~aid to br sr~re~:1ted 
are Boui<'Yard. Hr~·ant-\Yrb~tc•r. Columbin r. Crofton. Ebert, Elm-
wood, El~·ri:l, F:1irmont, Fain·irw. Garclf'n l'larr, Gilpin. Greenler. 
H:trrington, ~1itrhell , RmrdlrY. Rw:tm'l'a. Whittirr . W~·att, and W~-­
man Elemrnt nr~· School~: B:1krr. Co!r. :md ~Iorr~- .Junior High 
Schools: and East , We"t. :tnd ~1anual Hi~h Schools. (See appendix.} 
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quality of education pro,·idecl." !d., at 83. Thus. the 
court held that, under the doctrine of Plessy Y. F-e;guson, 
163 U. S. 537 ( 1896), respondent School Board constitu-
tionally "must at a minimum offer an equal educational 
o])'j)'O"rtunity," ibid., and. therefore, although all-out de-
segregation "could not be decreed, .. . the only feasible 
and constitutionally acceptable program-the only pro-
gram v .. ·hich furnishes anything approaching substantial 
equality-is a system of desegregation and integration 
"·hich provides compensatory education in an integrated 
environment." 313 F. Supp., at 96. The District Court 
then formulated a varied remedial plan to that end n·hich 
\Yas incorporated in the Final Decree." 
Respondent School Board appealed. and petitioners 
cross-appealed, to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit. That court sustained the District Court's find-
ing that the Board engaged in an unconstitutional policy 
"The first of the District Co\1!'1 ·~ four opinions. ::!0::! F. Supp. 279, 
wn~ filed .ltd,· 31, HJ69. nnd gmntrd petitioners' npplication for a 
prrlimin.u:-• injunction. TlH' 8rrond opinion. 30::! F. Supp. 2~9. was 
filrrl Au~ust 14, 1969. :111d mndr ~upplemental findings nnd con-
elu~ions. Thr third opinion. 31:~ F. Supp. 61, filed l\Iarch 21. 1970, 
wn~ the opinion on thr merit~. The fourth opinion , 313 F. Supp. 90, 
m1~ on rem eel~· and w.1~ filrd J\1n,· 21 , 1970. Thr District Court 
filrd nn unreported opinion on Oetobrr 19. 1971, in which rrlief was 
rxtendrd to Hallett and Strdman Elrmentar~· School:; which were 
found b)' thr court in ib .Tul,· 31. 1969. opinion to be purposefully 
~rgregatcd but wrrr not imludrd within thr ~rope of the three 1969 
Ilo:nd resolution~. The Court of Appc:tlo filed fi,·e unreported opin-
ions: on Augu:'t .5 , 1969. neal ing prelimin[lr~· injunction:': on Au-
gu~t 27 , 1969 . ~t:1~·ing prcliminar~· injunetion ; on September 15, 
19(i9, on motion to amrnd ~ tn~·: on October 17, 1969 , den~·ing Mo-
tion~ to Dismis.•: and on l\farrh 26. 1971 , granting staY. l\lR. Jus-
TICE BRENNAN, on August 29. 1069, filed [Ill opinion rrin~t[lting pre-
liminary injunction, 396 P. S. 1215 (1969), and on April 26, 1971, 
thi~ Court entered a per r·uriam order ,·:trating the Court of Appeals' 
St[l ~·, 402 U. S. 182 (1971). 
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of deliberate racial segregation with respect to the Park 
Hill schools and affirmed the Final Decree in that respect. 
As to the core city schools, however, the Court of Ap-
p~ reversed the lega1 deterrl1Ii1atlon of the D1strict 
Court that those schools were mam tamed m vwla tion 
o,f the Fourteenth Amendment because of the unequal 
ed'i:icahonal opportunity afforded, and therefore set aside 
so much of the Final Decree as required desegregation 
and educational improvement programs for those schools. 
445 F. 2d 990 ( 1971). In reaching that result, the Court 
of Appeals also disregarded respondent School Board's 
deliberate racial segregation policy respecting the Park 
Hill schools and accepted the District Court 's finding 
that petitioners had not proved that respondent had a 
like policy addressed specifically to the core city schools. 
We granted petitioners' petition for certiorari to re-
view the Court of Appeals' judgment insofar as it re-
versed that part of the District Court's Final Decree as 
pertained to the core city schools. 404 U. S. 1036 ( 1972). 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals in that respect 
is modified to vacate instead of reverse the Final Decree. 
The respondent School Board has cross-petitioned for 
certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
insofar as it affirmed that part of the District Court's 
Final Decree as pertained to the Park Hill schools. 
School District A-o. 1, etc. v. Wilfred Keyes et al., No. 
71-572. The cross-petition is denied. 
I 
Before turning to the r~:imar uestion we decide today, 
a \\'Ord must be said about the District Court's method 
of defining a "segregated" school. Denver is a tri-
ethnic, as distinguished from a bi-racial, community. 
The overall racial and ethnic composition of the Denver 
public schools is 66 7c Anglo. 14 ~~ Kcgro and 20 '/'o His-
71-.501-0PT~IO)[ 
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pano.G The District Court. in assessing the question of 
de jure segregation in the core city schools. prelimi-
narily resolved that :X egroes and Hispanos should not 
be placed 111 the same category to establish the segre-
gated character of a school. 313 F. Supp.. at 69. 
Later, in determining the schools that were likely to 
produce an inferior edueational opportunity. the court 
concluded that a school \Yould be eonsidered inferior 
only if it had "a concentration of either Xegro or His-
pano students in the general area of 70 to 7;) percent.'' 
!d., at 77. We intimate no opinion whether the Dis-
trict Court's 70 to 75 /r requirement was correct. The 
District Court used those figures to signify educationally 
inferior schools. and there is no suggestion in the record 
that those same figures \H're or would be used to define a 
"segregated" school in the de jure context. \\That is or is ----------not a segreg~l10ol \Yill nece~sari!Y depend on the fa<js 
of each particular case. In adcliton to the racial and eth-
nic composition of a school's student body, other factors 
such as the racial and ethnic composition of faculty and 
staff and the community and administration attitudes to-
"Thr partir;; h:tn' u~rd thr 1rnn" ". \nglo." "::\rgro." and "Hi:::-
p:mo" throughout 1 he rreord. IY<' ;:h:111 thrrrforr u.-'r tho.-r trrms. 
"Hisp::mo" is thr term n~rd b,· thr Color:tdo Drpartmrnt of Edn-
ration to rcfrr to n per.-on of Spani,.:h. :\Trxir:111, or Cnh:m hcriUtge. 
Color:1do DPp:trtmrnt. of Fcltwation. Human Rt>btion" in C'olorado . 
. \ Hi,tori c:li Hrcord 208 (HHiS). In thr Sontlmr,.:t. thr "Hi;:-
pano,.:" are morr rommonl,· rrfc·rrrd to "" ' ·Chicano,.:'' or " :\fc.xican-
Amrrir:1n~." 
The more sprC'ifiC' rac·iaJ :tnd ethnic· c·ompo,.:ition of the· Drm·rr 
pnblir "rhool~ i,.: a,.: folio\\'": 
A nolo .Ycom I /i.~/)11/W 
Pupils \'o. ('' ( "\"o. (' I r "\"n. c;. 
Eknwntary 81.119 fil.S 8.201 l.'i.2 12 ,570 2:1.0 
Junior High 1..J.,S..J.:" fi~.l 2$0:l 18...J. :J.SriS 17.0 
Rrnior High l-t.SS2 72.S 2.4..J.2 12.0 8.101 15.2 
Tot:1l G3,-H9 (i.'i.l nu:l2 l..J..l 19 .. 129 20.2 
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\mrd the school must be taken into consideration. The 
District Court has recognized these specific factors as ele-
ments of the definition of a "segregated'' school, id., at 
74. and ,,.c may therefore infer that the court \Yill con-
sider them again on remancl. 
\Ye conclude. however. that the District Court erred 
in separating Kegroes and Hispanos for purposes of 
dcfimng a "segregated" school. \Ye haYe held that His-
panos constitute an" identifiable class' for purpose;-Qf 
the Fourteenth Amendment. HernanCtez Y. Texas, 34'7 
r. fZ 475 (1954). See also United States Y. Texas Edu-
cation Agency. -F. 2d - (C.·\.5 1972) (en bane): 
Cisneros Y. Corvus Christi Independent School District, 
- F. 2cl - (CA5 1072) (en bane); Alvardo Y. El 
Paso Independent School District, 445 F. 2d 1011 (CA5 
1971); Soria. , .. Oxnard School District, 328 F. Supp. 
155 (CD Cal. 1971); Romero Y. Weakley. 226 F. 2d 390 
(C:\9 Hl55). Indeed. the District Court recognized this 
in classifying predominantly ITispano schools as "sel!re-
gated'' schools in their 0\\'11 right. But there is also 
much evidence that in the Southwest Hispanos and 
Xegroes have a great many things in common. The 
United States Commission on CiYil Rights has recently 
published two Reports on Hispano education in tlw 
Southwest.' Focusing on students in the States of Ari-
zona. California. Colorado. N e\Y Mexico. and Texas. the 
Commission concluded that Hispanos suffer from the 
same educational inequities as Xegroes and American 
Indians.8 In fact, the District Court itself recognized 
7 rnitrd Stntr~ Commi,:,:ion on Ci\·il Right~. :vrrxirnn-Amerirnn 
Eduration Stud~-. Ethinir l,:ol:dion of :\frxir::m-.-\merir:tns in the 
PubliC' School~ of thl' Southwe"t (..\.pril Hl71): rnitPd States Com-
mi""ion on Ci\·il Tiight~. ::\fPxi(':11!-.-\merican Education Series, Tlw 
1-nfini,;hrd Education (Ort ohrr 1 970). 
R Thn Connni~sion'~ fir,:t Heport. on p. 41, i"llll111l:trizes its finding~: 
"The bnsic finding of thi,: rrport i~ that minorit)· students in the 
Southwe.>t-l\Texicnn-Amrriean~, bbrkci, American Indians-do not 
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that "one of the things \Yhich the Hispano has in common 
\Yith the Negro is economic and cultural depri\·ation 
and discrimination." 313 F. Supp. , at 69. This is agree-
ment that, though of different origins, Negroes and His-
panos in Denver suffer identical discrimination in 
treatment when compared " ·ith the treatment afforded 
Anglo students. In that circumstance, we think peti-
tioners are entitled to have schools " ·ith a combined 
predominance of Negroes and Hispanos included in the 
category of "segrega tee!' ' schools. 
II 
In our view, the only other question that requires our 
decision at this time is that subsumed in uestion 2 
of the Questions Presentee y petitioners. namely, 
whether the District Court and the Court of ~ls 
a])l)hed an mcorrect legal standard in addressin )eti-
tioners' contention t at respondent School Board en-
gaged in an unconstitutional policy of deliberate 
segregation in the core city schools. Our conclusion 
is t1iat those courts did not apply the correct standard 
in addressing that contention. 
P etitioners apparently concede for the purposes of this 
case that in the case of a school system like Denver's, 
where no statutory dual system has ever existed. plaintiffs 
must prove not only that segregated schooling exists but 
also that it was brought about or maintained by inten-
tional state action. Petitioners proved that for almost a 
decade after 1960 respondent School Board had engaged in 
an unconstitutional policy of deliberate racial segregatiqn 
in the Park Hill schools. Indeed , the District Court 
founCfthatowtrtb]etween 1960 and 1969 the Board 's policies 
with respect to those northeast Denver schools sho\Y an 
obtain the benefit s of public education at a rate equal to that of 
their Anglo classmates." 
71-507 -OPINION 
KEYES v. SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.1 , DENVER, COLO. 9· 
undeYiating purpose to isolate Negro students" in segre-
gated schools "while preserving the Anglo character of 
r other l schools." 303 F. Supp., at 294. This finding 
did not relate to an insubstantial or trivial fragment 
of the school system. On the contrary, respondent 
School Board was found guilty of following a deliberate 
seg1:e"gation policy at schools attended, in 1969, by 
37.69"7r· of Denver's total X egro school population, in-
cluding one-fourth of the Xegro elementary pupils, o\·er 
tv>o-thirds of the Xegro junior high pupils, and over 
t\Yo-fifths of the Negro high school pupils.9 In addition , 
9 The Board was found guilt~· of intentional srgreg;ttionist acts of 
one kind or another \\·ith re:.:JWC't to the ~rhools listed below. (As to 
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Senior High 4:2.55% of all Negro senior high pupils 
Total 37.69% of all Kcgro pupib 
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therr \Yas uncontrowrted e\·idrnce that teachers and 
staff had for years been assigned on a minority teacher-
to-minority school basis throughout the school system. 
Respondent argues, ho,,·evrr. that a finding of state-
imposed segregation as to a substantial portion of the 
school system can be Yiewecl in isolation from the rrst 
of the district, and that e.-en if state-imposed segregation 
does exist in a substantial part of the Denver school 
system, it does not follow that the District Court could 
predicate on that fact a finding that the entire school 
system is a dual system. ·we do not agree. We haYc 
never suggested that plaintiffs in school desegregation 
cases must bear the burden of provmg the elements of 
de JUre segregation as to each and e.-ery school or each 
and every student"" withinilic school system. Rather, 
,,.e have held that where plaintiffs prove that a "Ci:iiTent 
conchtwn of segi·egatecl schooling exists \nt111n a school 
district where a dual system \Yas com 1e1lecl or authorized 
by statute at the time o our decision in Brown Y. Board 
of I:'ducat1'on, 347 r. S. 483 (1954) (Brown /). tlw 
State automatically assumes an ''affirmati.-e du t~ '"to 
eff£e~cJt~u~a7te~a~r.tr=a~n~s~Itr.I~o~n~to~~a~ra~c~I~a~ll~y~n~o~n~c~h~sc~r~I~,n~~ato;f 
school system." Brown Y. Board o) E'Bucatwn. M0 (r. S. 
294, 301 (1955) (Brown II). sec also Green Y. County 
School Board, 391 U. S. 430. 437-438 (Hl68). that is, 
to eliminate from the public schools "·ithin their school 
system "all vestiges of state-imposed segregation." 
Swann Y. Charl.otte-J11ecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 lT. S. 1. 15 (1971). 
This is not a c~e. hom'ver. \Yhere a statutory dual 
sy~effi" has eYer exist~e~ertheless. \Yhere plaintiffs 
pron' that the sc.h...ool authorities ha.-e carried out a sn-
te~tic nrogram of ';grrgatio'"'; affecting a substantial por-
tion of the students. schools. teachers and facilities "·ithin 
the school system. it is only common sense to conclude 
that there exists a predicate for a finding of the exist0nce 
71-507-0PJ.i\IO:\ 
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of a dual school system. Several considerations support 
this conclusion. First, it is obvious that a practice of 
concen tra ti ng ~ egroes in certain schools by structuring 
attendance zones or designating "feeder'' schools on the 
basis of race has the reciprocal effect of keeping other 
nearby schools predominantly "·hitc.'" Similarly, the 
practice of building a school-such as the Barrett Ele-
mentary School in this case- to a certain size and in a 
ccrtai n location. •-.-.MM-.Jii.-'-'illli8••....tll•••!6!!ii•Mt.,. __ >c:-----w .. .-.-..~.""·ith conscious knowledge that it would be a 
segregated school."' 303 F. Supp., at 285. has a substantial 
reciprocal effect on the raci.:tl composition of other nearh~-
schools. So also. the usc of mobile classrooms. the draft-
ing of student transfer policies. the transportation of stu-
dents, and the assignment of faculty and staff. on racially 
identifiable bases, have the clear effect of earmarking 
scl'!_ools according to their racial composition. and this. in 
turn. together with the clements of student assignment 
and school construction. may haYe a profound reciprocal 
effect on the racial composition of residential neighbor-
hoods " ·ithin a metropolitan area. thereby causing fur-
ther racial concentration within the schools. \\-e 
reeognizecl this in Swann " ·hen '"e said: -
"They f school authorities l must decide ques- ! 
tions of location and capacity in light of popula-
tion grO\Yth, finances. land values. sitE' availability. 
through an almost endless list of factors to be 
' 0 . \~ a fo rmN St·hool Hoard J>rr~idrnt who te~tified for the re-
~pondrnt~ put. it: "Onrr yon C'h:tlll!<' 1hr bottnd:t r~· of :m~· onr school, 
it i~ :tffeet inl! all thr ~<"hook ... " Tr~timmt~· of :\Jr~. Lois Heath 
.Tohn~on on dirrrt rxamination. App .. at 9.'ila-952a. 
8imilarh· . .T udl!o \Yi~clom ha~ re(· rnt I~· ~t:t trd: 
" Infection :tt onr "rhool infrrt" all ,-rhooJ,. To take thr moo't simpl r 
rx:tmplc, in a. t,,.o ~rhool ~~·~tcm, all hln('k~ at one ~rhool me:tns :tll 
or almo,:t all whites at thr othrr." [;niter! States\'. Texa.s Ed1tca-
tion Agency, - F. 2d -,- (CA5 1972) . 
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considered. The result of this \Yill be a decision 
which, when combmecl " ·ith one technique or 
another of student assignment, will determine the 
racial composition of the student body in each 
school in the system. Over the long run. the con-
sequences of the choices " ·ill be far reaching. 
I 
teor le gravitate_ to,Yan..l school fac1htws , just as 
schools are located in response to the needs of 
people. The location of schools may thus influ-
ence the patterns of residential development of a 
metropolitan area and have important impact on 
composition of inner-city neighborhoods. 
"In the past, choices in this respect have been 
used as a potent weapon for creating or maintaining 
a st~-:segregated school system. In addition to ---the classic pattern of building schools specifically 
intended for Negro or white students, school author-
ities have sometimes, since Brown, closed schools 
which appeared likely to become racially mixed 
through changes in neighborhood residential pat-
terns. This \Yas sometimes accompanied by build-
ing new schools in the areas of white suburban 
expansion farthest from Negro population centers 
in order to maintain the separation of the races 
\Yith a minimum departure from the formal prin-
ciples of 'neighborhood zoning.' Such a policy does 
more than simply influence the short-run compo-
sition of the student body of a ne\Y school. It 
may well promote segregated residential patterns 
\\·hich, ·when combined ·with 'neighborhood zoning,' 
further lock the school system into the mold of 
separation of races. Upon a proper shmYing a dis-
trict court may consider this in fashioning a remedy." 
402 U. S., at 20-21. 
(, In short, common sense dictates the conclusion that 
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beyond the particular schools which are the subjects 
of those actions. This is not to say, of course. that 
there can never be a case in "·hich the geographical 
structure of or the natural boundaries '"ithin a school 
district may have the effect of dividing the district into 
separate, identifiable and unrelated units. Such a de-
termination is essentially a question of fact to be resolved 
by the trial court in the first instance. but such cases 
must be rare. In the absence of such a determination, 
proof of state-imposed segregation in a substantial por-
tion of the district will suffice to support a finding by 
the trial court of the existence of a dual system. Of 
course, where that finding is made. as in cases involving 
statutory dual systems, the school authorities have an 
affirmative duty "to effectuate a transition to a racially 
nondiscriminatory school system." Brown II, supra,. 
at 301. 
On remand, therefore, the District Court should de- J 
cide ~he :first instance whether respondent School 
Board's ~!eliberate racial segregation policy '"ith respect 
to the Park Hill schools constitutes the entire Denver 
school system a dual school system. We observe that 
on the record now before us there is indication that 
Denver is not a school district which might be divided 
into separate, 1 en 1 a le and unrelated units. The Dis-
tnc our s ate , m 1ts summary of fin ings as to the 
Park Hill schools, that there was "a high degree of inter-
relationship among these schools, so that any action by 
the Board affecting the racial composition of one '"ould 
almost certainly have an effect on the others." 303 F. 
Supp. , at 194. And there was cogent evidence that the 
ultimate effect of the Board's actions in Park Hill '"as 
not limited to that area: the three 1969 resolutions 
designed to desegregate the Park Hill schools changed 
the attendance patterns of at least 29 schools attended 
by almost one-third of the pupils in the Denver school 
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system.11 This suggests that the official segregation in 
Park Hill affected the racial composition of schools 
throughout the district. 
On the other hand, although the District Court did 
not state this or indeed any reason why the Park Hill 
finding was disregarded \\·lwn attention \Yas turned to 
the core city schools-beyond saying that the Park 
Hill and core city areas \Yere in its vie''" "different"-
the areas, although adjacent to each other. are separated 
by Colorado Boule,·arcl. a six-lane high,my. From tlw 
record, it is difficult to assess the actual significance of 
Colorado Boulevard to the Denver school system. Th0 
Boule,·ard runs the length of the school district. but at 
least t\YO elementary schools. Teller a.nd Steck, have at-
tendance zones which cross the Boulevard. Moreover. the 
District Court. although referring to the Boulevard as "a 
natural di,·icling line ." 303 F. Supp .. at 282. did not feel 
constrained to limit its consideration of de jure segrega-
tion in the Park Hill area to those schools east of the 
Boulevard. The court found that by building Barrett 
Elementary School west of the Boulevard and by estab-
lishing Colorado Boulevard as the eastern boundary of 
the Barrett attendance zone. the Board \Yas able to 
maintain for a number of years the Anglo char::tcter of 
the Park Hill schools. This suggests that Colorado 
Boulevard is not to be regarded as the type of barrie1· 
that of itself could confine the impact of the Board 's ac-
tions to an identifiable area of th e school district. 1wrhaps 
because a major high,Yay is generally not such an effective 
buffer between adjoining areas. Cf. Davis \'. Board of 
School Commissioners of Mob ile County, 402 r. S. 33 
( Hl71 ). Bot this is a factual question for resolution by 
the District Court on retnancl. In any e\·ent. inquiry 
\\·hcther the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
11 SrC' tlw rhrtrt at 4-1-.'i F. 2d lOOS- 1009. which imli catC'~ th:1t 
31./G/ pupil" attPmlccl the ~r hoo!:• affected b:~· th<' re:-;o lution~. 
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applied the correct legal standards in addressing peti-
tiottcrs' contention of deliberate segregation in the core 
city schools is not at an end even if it be true that 
Park Hill may be separated from the rest of the Denver 
school district as a separate, identifiable and unrelated 
unit. 
III 
The District Court procecded on the premise that the 
finding as to the Park Hill schools was irrelevant to the 
consideration of the rest of the district. and began itf' 
examination of the core city schools by requiring that 
petitioners pro\'e all of the essential elements of de jure 
segregatiOn-that IS, sta1'ecl simply. a current c0117lition 
of seg;:egation--re;ulting from intentional state action 
directed specifically to the core city schools. The 
segregated character of the core city schools could 
not he and is not denied. Petitioners' proof shO\Yed 
that at the time of trial 22 of the schools in the core-
city nrt'a \H'rc less than 30}; in .\nglo enrollment and 
11 of the schools "·ere less than 10 5{ Anglo.'" Peti-
tioners also introclueccl substantial eYidence demon-
strating the existence of a disproportionate racial and 
ethnic composition of faculty and staff at these schools. 
On the question of segregator~' intent. petitioners 
presented evidence tendi~ to sho\\· that the Board, 
through its actions over a period of years, intentional1y 
created and maintained the segregated character of the 
core city schools. Respondents countered this eYiclence 
by arguing that the segneg ion ii1 these schools is 1,~ 
re,31lt o a racia .z neu ra 1eighborhood school policy'' 
and the acts of \Yhich petitioners complain are explicable 
1
" Tn addition to thr:;r 22 ~ehool..:. "rr :n::l F. Supp., at 7S. two 
mon• "chool..:, Elni:1 anrl Smrd!!'~· Elcmrnta IY School~. became lc . :s 
1 hnn 80% .\n~lo n ftrr thr Di~i rid Court'~ clcci,ion on the merit~. 
Thr,-r two ~chao!~ wrrr tlul" inl'!ncl!'cl in thr Ji,-t of ~rgrrgatcd schools . 
313 F. Supp. , at 92. 
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'"ithin the bounds of that policy., Accepting the School 
Board's explanation, the District Court and the Court 
of Appeals agreed that a finding of de jure segregation 
as to the core city schools \\·as not permissible since peti-
tioners had failed to prove " ( 1) a racially discriminatory 
purpose and (2) a casual relationship bet,Yeen the acts 
complained of and the racial imbalance admittedly ex-
isting in those schools." 445 F. 2d, at 1006. This as-
sessment of petit{oners' proof was clearly incorrect as 
a. matter of la,y\ Z-. ~
~titioners had already proYed the exist-
ence of intentional school segregation in the Park Hill 
schools, this crucial finding vYas totally ignored \Yhen 
attention turned to the core city schools. Plainly, a 
finding of intentional segregation as to a 11ortion of a 
school system is not devoid of probative value in assess-
ing the school authorities' intent with respect to other 
parts of the same school system. On the contrary, 
where, as here. the case involves the same school board, 
a finding of intentional segre ation on its part in one 
po~tion of a school system is hig ly relevant. to the 
issue oT the board's intent with res ecttOOtliersere-
gated schools m t 1e system. This is merely an applica-
tion -;±- the -wen-settled evidentiary principle that "the 
prior doing of other similar acts, whether clearly a 
part of a scheme or not, is useful as reducing the possi-
bility that the act in question was done with innocent 
intent." II Wigmore, Evidence 200 (3d eel. 1940). 
"EYidence that similar and related offenses "·ere com-
mitted ... tend [s] to show a consistent pattern of con-
duct highly relevant to the issue of intent." Nye & 
.Vissen v. United States, 336 U. S. 613, 618 (1949). 
And "[t]he foregoing principles are equally as appli-
cable to civil cases as to criminal cases, ... " II Wigmore, 
supra, at 300. See also McCormick, Evidence 329 
(1954). 
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"Moreover, in some instances, a finding of illicit intent ~ 
may relate to so substantial a portion of the item under 
consideration that it justifies an inference of illicit intent 
as to the remainder. See, for example. the cases cited in 
II ,,~igmore . supra, at 301-302. Applying that principle 
to school desegregation cases, it is clear that a finding..sf 
intentionally segregatory school board actions in a mean-
ingful portion of a school system, as in this case. is suf-
ficient to create an inference that other segregated school-
ing within the system is not adventitious. It establishes, 
in other words. a prima facie case of unlawful segregatory 
design on the part of school authorities, and shifts to 
those authorities the burden of proving that other segre-
gated schools within the system are not also the result 
of intentionally segregatory actions. This is true even 
if it is determined that different areas of the school 
district should be vie,Yed independently of each other 
because, even in that situation, there is high probability 
that where school authorities have effectuated an inten-
tionally segregatory policy in a meaningful portion of 
the school system, similar impermissible considerations 
have motivated their actions in other areas of the sys-
tem. We emphasize that the differentiatin factor be-
t~1 de jure segrega wn an so-called de facto 
segregation to which we referred in Swann 1:' is purpose 
or j!_ltent to segregate. Where school authorities have 
been found to have practiced purposeful segregation 
in part of a school system, they may be expected to 
oppose system-\Yide desegregation. as did the respond-
ents in this case, on the ground that their purposefully 
segregatory actions were isolated and individual events, 
thus leaving plaintiffs \Yith the burden of proving other-
wise. But at that point " ·here an intentionally segrega-
tory policy is practiced in a meaningful or significant 
1 " 402 U.S. 1, 11-18 (1911). 
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segment of a school system. as in this case. the school 
authorities can not be heard to argue that plaintiffs haw 
pro,·ecl only "isolated and individual" unla,yfully segre-
gatory actions. In that circumstance, it is both fair and 
reasonable to require that the school authorities bear the 
burden of showing that their actions as to other segregated 
schools within the system \\·ere not also moti,·atcd hy 
segrcgatory intent. 
This burden-shifting pri nci plr is not ne\Y or nowl. 
·~
There arc no hard and fast standards goycrning the 
allocation of the burden of proof in every situation. 
The issue. rather. "is merely a question of policy ancl 
fairness based on experience in the different situationR." 
IX \Yigmore, Evidence ~ 2486 (3d eel. Hl40). In the 
context of racial segregation in public education, the 
courts, including this Court, have recognized a -variety 
of situations in which "fairness" and "policy'' require 
state authorities to bear the burden of explaining actions 
or conditions \\·hich appear to be racially motiYated. 
Thus, in Stemm, supra, 402 U. S .. at 18. \Ye obscn·ecl 
that in a system " ·ith a "history of segregation.'' "where 
it is possible to identify a '\,·hite school' or a 'Xegro 
school' simply by reference to the racial composition 
of teachers and staff. the quality of school buildings 
and equipment, or the organization of sport aetivities, 
a prima facie case of Yiolation of suhstanti,·c constitu-
tional rights under the Equal Protection Clause is 
shown." Again. in a school system \\·ith a history of 
segregation. the discharge of a disproportionate]~· large 
number of Xegro teachers incident to desegregation has 
been held to raise an inference of discriminatio11 which 
"thrusts upon the School Board the burden of justifying 
its conduct by clear ancl co1wincing eYiclence.'' Cham-
bers '\'. Hendersonville City Board of Education, 3G4 
F. 2cl 189, 193 (CA4 1966) (en bane). See also United 
States Y. Jefferson County Board of Education, 872 F. 
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2d 836. 887-888 ( C\.5 1966). aff'cl en bane, 380 F. 2d 
:38,) ( 1967). cert. denied. 389 U. S. 840 (1967); Xorth 
Carolina Teachers' Association "· Asheboro City Board 
of Education, 393 F. 2d 736, 743 (CA4 1968) (en bane); 
Williams Y. Kimbrough, 295 F. Supp. 578. 585 C\YD La. 
1969); Bonner Y. Texas City Independent School D1's-
trict, 305 F. Supp. 600. 621 (SD Tex. 1969). Nor is 
this burden-shifting principle limited to former statutory 
dual systems. See. e. g., Davis Y. School District of the 
City of Pontiac, 309 F. Supp. 734. 743. 744 (ED ::\1ich. 
1970). aff'd. 443 F. 2d 573 (CA6 1971). cert. denied, 
404 r. f'. 913 ( 1971); [; nited States Y. School District 
Xo. 7.51, 301 F. Supp. 201. 228 (XD Ill. 1969), mod. on 
other grounds, 432 F. 2cl 1147 (CA7 1971). cert. denied, 
402 1.~. S. 943 (1971). Indeed, to say that a system has 
a "his tory of segregation" is merely to say that a pattern 
of intentional segregation has been established in the 
past. Thus. be it a statutory dual system or an allegedly 
unitar~' system 'Yhere a meaningful portion of the system 
is found to be intentionally segregated. the existence of 
subsequent or other segregated schooling within the 
smne system justifies a rule imposing on the school 
authorities the burden of proving that this segregated 
schooling is not also the result of intentionally segre-
gatory acts. 
In discharging that burden. it is not enough. of conrsc .. 
that th0 school authorities rel t~)'OJJSome allegedly lo_g-
-~ . racml y neutral explanation for their actions. Their ~ 
burde~1ce proof sufficient to support a finding 
that segregatory intent was not among the factors 
that motivated their actions. The courts below at-
tributed much significance to the fact that many of the 
Board's actions in the corC' city area antedated our cle-
f( 
cision in Brown. \Ye re.iect any suggestion that remote-
ness in time has any relevance to the issue of i7i'tent. If 
th~tions of &:hool allTiiO'i·ities were to ~y degree moti-
71-.jO/-OPINION 
::!0 T\EYF.~ v. SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, DE~VER, COLO. 
Yater! by segregatory intent and the segregation resulting 
from those actions continues to exist. the fact of remote-
ness in time certainly docs not make those actions any 
less "intentional." 
This is not to say. however. that the prima facie case 
may not be met by evidence supporting a finding that a 
lesser degree of segregated schooling in the core city area 
" ·ould not have resulted even if the Board had not acted 
as it did. In Swann, '"e suggested that at some point 
in time the relationship between past segregatory ;cl,s 
and pre~'egation may become so attenuated as to 
be incapable of supporting a finding of de jure segregation 
" ·arranting judicial intervention. 402 r. S .. at 31-32. 
See also Hobson Y. Han sen, 269 F. Supp. 401. 495 (DC 
Hl67) , aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 132 U. S. App. 
D. C'. 372. 408 F. 2d 175 (1969)_, ., \Ve made it clear, 
hO\YeYer, that a connection bet\Yeen past ·segregatory acts 
ai;ct'Jxesent segregati~ay be pre;elrt even ,\·l1ei"1 not 
apparent and th~t -cl~se -e~an~ination is required before 
;onC"hfcling that the connection does not exist. Inten-
J 
~ 
tiona] school :segreo-ation in the past may have been a 
factor in creating a natura environmen or t 1e growth 
of further segregatiOn. 1us, if respondent c ool Board 
c~gregatory intent, it can rebut the prima 
facie ca:-e only by shmYing that its past segrcgatory acts 
did not create or contribute to the current segregated 
condition of the core city schools. 
'' It may be that tlw Di;;trict Court and Court of Appeals were 
appl~·ing thi~ test in holding that prtitioner~ had fa iled to proYe 
that thr Board'~ actions "caused" thr rurrrnt condition of segrega-
tion in the rare rity ~chook But if so, certa in!~· plaintiffs in a school 
dr~rgrrgation casr are not required to proYr "cause" in the sense 
of ''non-attenuation." Thn t i ~ a factor which becomes relevant 
on!)· after past intentional actions rc.,tdting in segregat ion ha,·e been 
e"lablisheu. At th:tt stagr, the burden becomes the ~chool author-
itir,;' to show that the currrnt sr.g rcgation i" in no mt)' thr result 
of tl10~e past scgrcgator~· actions. 
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The respondent School Board invoked at trial its 
"neighborhood school policy" as explaining racial and 
ethnic concentrations \Yithin the core city schools. arguing 
that since the core city area population had long been 
Negro and Hispano, the concentrations were necessarily 
the result of residential patterns and not of purposefully 
segregatory policies. \Ye h e no occasion to consider in 
this case ·whether a "neighborhood school policy" of itself 
wiil justify racial or ethmc concentrations in the ~ce 
ofafl]-;-·(fi~that school mill"1orities have committed acts 
constituting de jure segregation. It is enough that "·e 
hold that the mere assertion of such a policy is not dis-
positive where. as in this case, the school authorities have 
been found to have practiced de jure segregation in a 
meaningful portion of the school system by techniques 
that indicate that the "neighborhood school" concept has 
not been maintained free of mauipulation. Our obser-
vations in ~vaJ0 supra, at 28, are particularly instruc-
tive on this score: 
"Absent a constitutional violation there would be 
no basis for judicially ordering assignment of stu-
dents on a racial basis. All things being equal, "·ith 
no history of discrimination, it might well be desir-
able to assign pupils to schools~. 
But al 1mgs are no equa 111 a sys em that has 
been deliberately constructed and maintained to 
enforce racial segregation. . . . 'Racially neutral' 
assignment plans proposed by school authorities to 
a district court may be inadequate; such plans may 
fail to counteract the continuing effects of past 
school segregation resulting from discriminatory lo-
cation of school sites or distortion of school size in 
order to achieve or maintain an artificial racial sepa-
ration. \Yhen school authorities present a district 
court \\·ith a 'loaded game board.' affirmative action 
in the form of remedial altering of attendance zones 
. ,. 
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is proper to achien• truly non-discriminatory assign-
ments. In short. an a!'signment plan is not ac-
ceptable simply becaul'e it appears to be neutral.' ' 
Thus. respondent School Board haYing been found to 
have practiced deliberate racial segregation in schools at-
tended by 0\·cr one-third of the Xcgro school population, 
that crucial finding establ islws a prima facie case of in-
tPntional segregation in the core cit.v schools. Tn such 
case. respondent's neighborhood school policy is not to be 
determinati\·e "simply because it appears to be neutral." 
IY 
In summary. the District Court on remand. firsL, \\"ill 
afford respondent School Board the opportunity to proYe 
its contention that the Park Hill area is a separate. 
ideiltifiablc and unrelated section of the school district 
that should be treated as isolated from the rest of the 
district. If respondent School Board fails to JH'o\·e that 
contention, the District Court, second, \Yill determine 
\\"hether respondent School Board's conduct oYer almost 
a decade after Hl60 in carrying out a policy of deliberate 
racial segregation in the Park Hill schools constitutes 
the entire school system a dual school system. J.L.i!le f 
J?istrict Court determines that the Denver school system 
is a dual school system. respondent c 100 Board has 
~y to desegregate the entire system 
"root and branch.'' ounty School Bonn, supra, 
30T u~cc-"Ut"438. If the District Court determines, 
ho\Yever. that the Den \·cr school system is not a dual 
school system by reason of the Board's actions in Park 
Hill. the court. third, \\·ill afford respondent School Board 
the opportunity to rebut pctitio11ers' prima facie case 
of intentional segregation in t'he ~ore city schools raised 
by the finding of intentional segregation in the Park Hill 
schools . There. the Board 's burden is to sho\\" that its 
policies and practices with respect to school site location, 
,. 
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school size. school renovations and additions, student at-
tendance zones, student assignment and transfer options, 
mobile classroom units. transportation of students, as-
signment of faculty and staff, etc., considered together 
and premised on the Board's so-called "neighborhood 
school'' concept. either "·ere not taken in effectuation of 
a policy to create or maintain segregation in the core city 
schools. or, if unsuccessful in that effort. \vere not factors 
in causing the existing condition of segregation in these 
schools. Considerations of "fairness" and "policy" de-
mand 110 less in light of the Board's intentionally segre-
gatory actions. If respondent Board fails to rebut peti-
tioners' prima facie case. the District Court must, as in 
the case of Park Hill, decree all-out desegregation of 
the core city schools. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is modified to 
vacate instead of reverse the parts of the Final Decree 
that concern the core city schools. and the case is re-
manded to the District Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion."' 
It is so ordered. 
).1R. JrsncE WHITE took no part in the decision of 
this case. 
n ':Ve therefore do not rPach and intimate no YiP\Y upon tllf' 
mC'rit~ of the holding of the Di~trict Court, premi:::ed upon its pr-
roneous finding that. the situation "i;: morC' like de facto segregation," 
813 F. Supp., at 73, that ne,-crtheiC'i'S, although all-out desegregation 
"could not be decreed, ... the only feasible and constitutional!~· 
acceptable program ... i~ a sy;:tem of desegregation and integra-
tion which provides compensator~· education in an integrated en-
Yironment." Id., at 96. 
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JVIR. Jui::iTICE PowELL concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. (1~( /'~',)~ 
I concur in the remand of this case for further pro- J · & 
ceedings in the District Court, but on grounds that differ ·~0 ~v 
from those relied upou by the Court. / V 
This is the first school desegregation case to reach this 
Court which involves a major city outside the South. It 
comes from Denver. Colorado. a city and a State which 
have not operated public schools under constitutional or 
statutory provisions which mandated or permitted racial 
segregation.' Xor has it been argued that any other 
le islati ve actions (such as zoning and housing laws) 
contributei!)to the segregation which is at issue." The 
1 Article IX, § 8, of the Colorado Con~titution has expres~ly pro-
hibitl'd "any cla~~ification of pupils . . . on account of rncc or 
color." 
"Sec, e. g .. Sll'ann "· Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education. 
402 U. S. 1, :2:3 (1971) : 
"We do not rt>ach . . tlw que~tion whNhcr a ~hawing that ~chool 
;;egregation i~ :1 con~ecptenre of othE'r t~·pp~ of .:;tatr action, without 
an~· di~rriminator~· action h~· ~chool authoritif',.:, i~ a constitutional 
\'iolation rrquiring rrmcdial arti011 b~· a ,.;rhool c]p,;pgregation clE'rrE'E'. '' 
Tlw term .. ~tatr action." :1" u"ed IH'rein , thu,.: rt>fer,.; to ac·tion~ of tlw 
;tppropriatt' puhlic ~rhool attthorit iP;: . 
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Court has inquired only to what extent the Denvet< 
/ 
School Board may have contributed to the school segrega-
tion which is acknowledged to exist in Denver. 
The predominantly minority schools are located in twQ 
areas of the city referred to as Park Hill and the core 
city area. The District Court considered that a school 
with a concentratiou of 70 to 75 r.;'t "X egro or Hispano 
students" \\'as identifiable as a segregated school. 313 
F. Supp .. at 77. Wherever one may draw this line. it ~.; 
undisputed that most of the schools in these two are~./3 
are in fact heavily segregated in the sense that their stu-
dent bodies are overwhelmingly composed of non-Anglo 
children . The city-,vide school mix in Denver is 665'( 
Anglo. 14 ;/r Negro. and 20o/r Hispano. In areas of the 
city where the Anglo population largely resides. the 
schools are predominantly Anglo. if not entirely so. 
The situation in Denver is generally comparable to 
that in other large cities across the country in which there 
is a substantial minority population and where desegre-
gation has not been ordered by the federal courts. There 
is segregation in the schools of these cities[ fulli y 
as pervasive as that in southern cities prior to the dese -
regation decrees of the past decade and a half. The focus 
·of the school desegfPgation probl~m has no' s ifted from 
the South to the country as a whole. Unwilling and 
footclragging as the process \vas in most places. substan.-
tial progress toward achieving integration has been made 
in southern States." Xo comparable progress has been 
made in many nonsouthern cities with large minority 
a Aerording to rhr 1971 HEW r~timate. ~~.9% of Xegro pupil,; 
: :1ttmded majorit)· white ~rhoob in tlw South as oppo,;ed to onl)· 
:27.89( who attended ~ueh ~rhool~ in the i\orth and We,;t, Fift)·-
,;p,·rn perrenr of all :\egro pupil:< in the :\'orth and We,;t attend 
"('hool" with owr 1-:0o/,- minorit1· population a,; opposed to :32.2% 
·. who do ~o in tlw South. 111' Co ng. Rer. 81~5. 
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populations ' primarily because of the de facto / de jure 
distinction nurtured by the courts and accepted com-
placently by many of the same voices vvhich denounced 
the evils of segregated schools in the South:' But if our 
national concern is for those who attend such schools, 
rather than for perpetuating a legalism rooted in history 
rather than present reality, we must recognize that the 
evil of operating separate schools is no less in Denver 
than in Atlanta. 
·L The 1971 HEW Enrollment Survey dramatized the segregated 
charactE'r of public school ~~·~tern~ in man~· nonsouthern citi~. The 
]>rreentage of :\egro pupil~ which attended ~chool~ more than 80% 
black wa~ 9L3 in Cleveland, Ohio; 97.1:' in Compton, California; 
78.1 in Da~·ton , Oh10; 78.6 in Detroit, :\[ichigan; 95.7 in Gary, 
[ndiana; 86.4 in Kansas Cit~·, i~Ii"::;ouri; 8fi .6 in Lo::< Angele::;, Cali-
fornia ; 78.8 in :VIilwaukee, Wi~consin; 91.3 in Newark, New .Ter::;ey; 
1'9.8 in St. Louis, Mi,souri. Tlw fu ll data from the Enrollment Sur-
ve~· rna~· be found in 118 Cong. Rrc. Sl-!..J.-1-!8, .Tan. 20, 1972. 
''A" Senator Ribicoff (D.-Conn.) rrrognizrd: 
"For ~·rar~ we haYP fought the battlr of intrgration primarily in 
tlw South whrre the problrm wa::; ;:;evE'rE'. It wa::; a long, arduou::; 
fight that dE':::E'rvro to bE' fought and neE'dE'CI to bE' won. 
'·UnfortunatE'!~·. a::; the problE'm of racial i"olation ha,; mo,·rd north 
of the \Ia~on-Dixon line. man~· northernrr~ have bid an rvasive 
farewrll to the 100-year ,;trugglP for racial equalitY. Our motto 
;:;rrms to h;we brrn ·Do to ,;outhemers "·hat you do not want to do 
to ~·our~elf.' 
' ·Good rE'a"ons ha\'e ahn1~·~ been offNed, of roursr, for not moving 
dgorou~l~· ahead in the Xorth a,; wrll a::; the South. 
"First, tt wa~ that the problPm was wor"e in thr South. Then 
the fact~ began to ~how that that wa::; no longer true. 
"We then brgan to hear thr de facto-clr jurr refram. 
"Somehow residrnt ial segregat ton Ill the i\ ort h was acrtclrntal or 
de facto and that made it bE'ttcr than thr I E>ga ll~· ,;upported clr jure 
~Pgrrgat ion of thE' South. It wa~ a hard distinction for blaek children 
111 totally sf'greglltrd ~rhool~ in tht' :\orth to under~tand , but it 
allowrd u~ to a\'Oid thr prob!Pm." llS C'ong. Rrc . S:2542, Feb. 24, 
1972. 
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In my view we should abandon a distinction which long 
since has outlived its time, and formulate constitutional 
principles of national rather than merely regional appli-
cation. When Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 
483 (1954). was decided. the distinction between de jure 
and de facto segregation was consistent with the limited 
constitutional rationale of that case. The situation con-
fronting the Court, largely confined to the outhern 
States. was officially imposed racial segregation in the 
schools extending bark for many years and usually em-
bodied in constitutional and statutory provisions. 
The great contribution of Brown I was its holding in 
unmistakable terms that the Fourteenth Amendment 
forbids state-compelled or authorized segregation of pub-
lic schools. 347 e. S .. at 488 . 493- 495. Although some 
of the language was more expansive. the holding in 
Brown I was essentially negative: It was impermissible 
under the Constitution for the States. or their instru-
mentalities. to force children to attend segregated schools. 
The forbidden action was de jure, and the opinion in 
Brown I was construed- for some years and by many 
courts-as requiring only state neutrality. allowing "free-
dom of choice" as to schools to be attended so long as the 
State itself assured that the choice was genuinely free of 
official restraints." 
"8<'c·, e. g .. B radley , .. !',chool Board. :345 F. 2d :no, :316 (CA4 
en bane. 1965) : 
··It ha~ b<'E'n lwld again and again . . that thr Fourteenth 
AmPndmPnt prohibition 1 ~ not aga inst ~rgrpgation as such. . . . 
A ;;tatE' or school district offpnd<i no const itutional rcquirPmcnt 
when it grants to all ~t udcnt~ uniform!~· a n unre~tr i ct E'd freedom of 
choice as to school attmdcd, i<O that eac h pupil , in effect, assign~ him-
~elf to thP ~chao) hE' wishPs to at t E'ncl. ' ' (The case was latN vacatect 
71-501-CO{\('lJJ{ & DISSE~T 
KEYES v. SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, DENVER, COLO. 5 
But the doctrine of Brow11 !, as amplified by Brown Ii, 
349 1:. ~- 294 ( 1955), did not retain its original meaning. 
fn a series of decisions extending from 1954 to 1971 the 
concept of state neutrality was transformed into the 
present constitutional doctrine requiring affirmative 
state action to desegregate school systems.' The keys 
stone case was Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 
430. 438 ( 1968), where school boards were declared to 
have "the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might 
be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which 
racial discrimination would be eliminated root and 
branch. " The school system before the Court in Green 
\\·as operating in a rural and sparsely settled county 
where there were no concentrations of white and black 
populations, no neighborhood school system (there v,:ere 
only two schools in the county), and none of the 
problems of an urbanized school district.~ The Court 
properly identified the' freedom of choice program 
there as a subterfuge. and the language in Green impos-
ing an affirmative duty to convert to a unitary system 
~-as appropriate on the facts before the Court. There 
was. however, reason to question to what extent this duty 
would apply in the vastly different factual setting of a 
and rrmandrd b~- thi~ Court , which ('XprE>~~ed no virw on the mrrib 
of thr dr~rgrrgation plan~ ~ul>mittrd.) :31-\2 U. S. 103, 105 (1065). 
Srr al~o Bell \'. School City of Gary. Ind .. :324 F. 2d 209 (CA7 196:3) ; 
Doll'ns v . Board of Educ. , :{:36 F. 2d 9Sf' (CAlO 1964): Deal v. 
Board of Edu('., :)69 F. 2d 55 (CAfl 196fl) . 
7 For a ronci~r hi,;ton· and cummPntary on the E>Yolutwn. ~E'e gen-
rrall~ · A. BirkE>l , TIJP Suprrmr Court and tlw Idea of l'rogres~ , pp. 
12fr-130 (1970) . 
' Srr abo the companion ca ,;r~ in Raney 1· . Board of Education . 
:391 ll . S. H :3 (196R) , and Monroe v . Board of Comm'rs. :391 U.S. 
450 (l96R), neither of ll'hich mvolvPd large urban or mrtropolitan 
arra~. 
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large city with extensive areas of residential segregation. 
presenting problems and calling for solutions quite dif-
ferent from those in the rural setting of Xew Kent 
Cou11ty. Virginia. 
But the doubt as to whether the affirmative duty con-
cept v,;ould flower into a new constitutional principle of 
general applicati011 was laid to rest by Swann v. Board 
of Education, 402 "C". ~. 1 (1971). in \Yhich the affirma-
tive duty articulated in Green \ms applied to the urban 
school system of metropolitan Charlotte. Xorth Carolina. 
ln describing the residential patterns in Charlotte. the 
( 'ourt noted the "familiar phenomenon" in the metro-
politan areas of minority groups being "co ncentrated i11 
one part of tht> city." 402 C . S .. at 25. and ackno,,·ledgecl 
that: 
"Rural areas accustomed for half a century to the 
consolidated school system implemented by bus 
transportation could make adjustments more readily 
than metropolitan areas with dense and shifting pop-
ulation . numerous schools. congested and complex 
traffic patterns. " 402 L'". S .. at 14. 
Despite this recognition of a fundamentally different 
problem from that involved in Green, the Court never-
theless held that the affirmative duty rule of Green was 
applicable. and prescribed for a metropolitan school sys-
tem with 107 schools and some 84.000 pupils essentially 
the same remedy-elimination of segrega ti011 "root and 
branch ··_,,·hich had been formulated for the t\\·o schools 
and 1.300 pupils of Xew Kent County. 
In Swann, the Court further noted it was dealing only 
\\·ith States having "a long history '' of officially imposed 
segrega tion and th e duty of school authorities in those 
;-;tatl'S to implemrnt Brown 1. 40:2 ~C :-l., at 5- 6. l11 so 
doing. thP ( 'ourt refrain<'cl <'VC' Il from considering wh ether 
t ht> <'volution of ronl"titutioJlal dortrine from Brown I to, 
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Green / Swarm undercut whatever logic once supported 
the de facto / de jure distinction. In imposing on metro-
politan southeru school districts an affirmative duty. en-
tailing large-scale transportation of pupils. to eliminate 
segregation in the schools. the Court required these dis-
tricts to alleviate conditions v,:hich in large part did not 
result from historic. state-imposed de jure segregation. 
Rather. the familiar root causr of segregated schools in all 
the biracial metropolitan areas of our country is essen-
tially the same: one of segregated residential and migra'" 
tory pattems the impact of which on the racial composi-
tion of the schools \\'aS often perpetuated and rarely 
ameliorated by action of public school authorities. This 
is a national. not a southern phenomenon. And it is 
largely unrelated to whether a particular ~tate hacl or did 
not ha vr segregatory school la,,·s." 
Whereas Brown I rightly decreed the elimination 
of state-imposed segregation in that particular section of 
the country \vhere it did exist. Swann imposed obligations 
on southern school districts to eliminate conditions which 
are not regionally unique but are similar both in origin 
and effect to conditions in the rest of the country. As 
"A~ Dr. Karl TaPUbC'r ,-tatt·~ in hi~ article, Rr:'idPntial 8Pgrrg:ttion, 
Scirmifir AmPrican, August 19(15, at 14 · 
"No Plaboratp anal~·sis is necrss:u~· to concludE' from thrsE' figurp::; 
that a high dPgrPE' of rP~idPntial "PgrPgation basPd on race· i~ a uni-
vrrsal charaetPristic of Amrrican citir~. Thi~ ::;pgregation i" found 
Ill the citiE'~ of thf' :\forth and Wrst a~ wrll as of tilE' South; in largE' 
cit if'~ a:< wrll a;; small; in nonindu"'trial cit if'::< as WE'll a;; indu"'trial; in 
rit iE':s with hundrE'cls of thou:'and~ of .:\I'E'gro rPsidPnts a:; well a:; those 
with on!~ · a fpw thou:<and: and in cit iPs that are progrP:<si,·p in thPir 
E'mplo~·mpnt practice and rivil right" policie" a:< WE'll a;; thosr that 
are not." 
In hi~ book. :\pgror,.; in C'ItiC':' (l9ti5). Dr. TaPul)('r ::<tatE'd that n·:'i-
d<'ntial ::;q~;r<'gation rxi"'" "rrgardlr"s of thr charactC'r of lora! law" 
:1nd polirir~ and rrgarrllr"" of othrr form" of dit'crimination. '' ld .. 
at :)f) 
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the remedial obligations of Swann extend far beyond 
the elimination of the outgrowths of the state-imposed 
segregation outlawed in Brown, the rationale of Swann 
points inevitably towards a uniform. constitutional ap- · 
proach to our national problems of school segregation. 
n 
The Court's decision today. while adhering to the 
de jure/ de facto distinction, will require the application 
of the Green/ Swann doctrine of "affirmative duty" to the 
Denver School Board despite the absence of any history 
of state-mandated school segregation. The only evidence 
of a constitutional violation was found in various de-
cisions of the school board. I concur in the Court's posi-
tion that the public school authorities are the responsible 
agency of the State, and that if the affirmative duty doc-
trine is sound constitutional law for Charlotte. it is 
equally so for Denver. I would not. however, perpetuate 
the de jure/ de facto distinction nor would I leave to peti-
tioners the initial tortuous effort of identifying "segre-
gative acts" and deducing "segregatory intent.'' I would 
hold. quite simply, that where substantially segregated 
public schools exists. there is a prima facie case that t'he 
duly constituted public authorities (I will usually refer 
to them collectively as the "school board") are sufficiently 
responsible '" to impose upon them a nationally applicable 
burden to demonstrate they are operating a genuinely 
nondiscrimna tory school system. 
'"A pnma facir catie ~ con~titutional viOlation rx1~t~ when ~egre­
~afion IS found to exist to a ~ignificant degree in thP particular 
"chao! di~trict. It i::; recognized , of cour:oe , that thi::; term i::; rrlatin• 
;mel pro,·ides no precisP "tandarcl::;. But circumstance~. demograph-
icall.\· <Inc! otherwise, var~· from district to di~trict and hard and 
fa::;t rule:; tihould not be formulated. The existence of a sub~tantial 
percentage of ::;chool" populat r d b~ · "t udent::; from onp race on!~· or 
predon1inatrly ~o .JlopuiHted , ;;hqul(! n:1~ger thr ·mlJIIlry, 
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The principal reason for abandonment of the de jure/ 
de facto distinction is that. in view of the evolution of 
the holding in Brown I into the affirmative duty doctrine. 
the distinction no longer can be jm:tified on a principled 
basis. In decreeing remedial requirements for the 
Charlotte/ Mecklenburg school district. Swann dealt 
\Vith a metropolitan. urbanized area in which the basic 
cauEes of segregation \\·ere generally similar to those in 
all Eections of the country. and also largely irrelevant 
to the existence of historic. state-impoEed segregation at 
the time of the Brown decision. Further. the extension 
of the affirmative duty concept to require compulsory 
student transportation \.vent well beyond the mere rem-
edying of that portion of school segregation for which 
former state segregation laws were ever responsible. 
Moreover. as the Court's opinion today abundantly dem-
onstrates. the facts deemed necessary to establish de jure 
discrimination present problems of subjective intent 
which the courts cannot fairly resolve. 
At the outset. one must try to identify the constitu-
tional right which is being enforced. This is not easy. 
as the precedents have been far from explicit. In 
Brown I, after emphasizing the importance of education. 
the Court said that: 
"Such an opportunity. \>,·here the state has under-
taken to provide it. is a right which must be made 
available to all on equal terms." 347 lJ. S .. at 493. 
In Brown II, the Court identified the "fundamental prin~ 
ciple" enunciated in Brown I as being the unconstitu-
tionality of "racial discrimination in public education.'' 
349 U. S .. at 298. and spoke of "the personal interest 
of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon 
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at 300. Although this and similar language is ambiguous 
as to the specific constitutional right. it means- as a mini-
mum-that one has the right not to be compelled by 
state action to attend a segregated school system." In 
the evolutionary process since 1954. decisions of this 
Court have added a significant gloss to this original right. 
Although nowhere expressly articulated in these terms. 
I would now define it as the right. derived from the Equal 
Protection Clause. to expect that the State-once it as-
sumes responsibility for public education- will provide a 
reasonable opportunity for education in an integrated 
school system. This means that school authorities. con-
sistent with the generally accepted educational goal of 
attaining quality education for all pupils. must make and 
implement their customary decisions with a view toward 
<'nhancing integrated school opportunities. 
The term "integrated school system'' presupposes. of 
course. a total absence of any laws. regulations or policies 
supportive of the type of "legalized '' segregation con-
demned in Brown. A system would be integrated in 
accord with constitutional standards if the respon sible 
authorities had taken appropriate steps to ( i ) integrate 
faculties and administration; ( ii) scrupulously assure 
equality of facilities. quality of instruction and curricula 
opportunities throughout the district; (iii) utilize their 
authority to draw attendance zo nes to promote integra-
tion; and ( iv J locate new schools. close old ones. and 
11 See Bickel, 8upra. n. 7. at 11~->: 
"It [ thr problem of ~;ch ool de,rgregat ion I ha~ not bern that :<im -
plr . . becau~e the laconic opinion in Brou·n v Board of Educa-
twn wa:< it"elf not that ,; Jmpl r. Onr ,;train in it became ev idr nt in 
,;ub:<equrnt drcisions outlawing a ll form:; of :;tate-:;pon:;ored ~egrega­
tton in ('VP r~·thing from thr "Jlrctator ><rrt ion of a courtroom to golf 
cour:;e,;. The minimal propo,ition tl1<1t r mrqz;ed-and a bout time 
it wa~ t hat it :;hould rmrrgr-wa,; that tlw :< tate rna~· not, by lrgii;]a-
tlon or ;tdmin i,trat iwl~·. rJa,;~;if\ tiH' population along racia l line,,''' 
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determine the size and grade categories with this same 
objective in mind. Where school authorities decide to 
undertake the transportation of students. this alw must 
be ,,·ith integrative opportunities in mind. 
The foregoing prescriptio11 is not intended to be either 
definitive or all-inclusive. but rather an indication of 
the COiltour characteristics of an integrated school sys-
tem in which all citizens aile! pupils may justifiably be 
confident that racial cliscrimiilation is neither practiced 
nor tolerated. An integrated school sy~tem does not 
mean- and indeed could not mean in view of the resi-
dential patterns of most of our major metropolitan 
areas-that every school must in fact be an integrated 
unit. A school which happens to be all or predominantly 
white or all or predominantly black is not a "segregated" 
school in an unconstitutional sense if the system itself is 
a genuinely integrated one. 
Having ~chool boards operate an integrated school sys-
tem provides the best assurance of meeting the constitu-
tional requirement that racial discrimination. subtle or 
othenYise. will find no place in the decisions of public 
school officials. Courts .i uclging past school board actions 
with a view to their general integrative effect will be best 
able to assure an absence of such discrimination while 
avoiding the murky, subjective judgments inherent in 
the Court's search for "segregatory intent .. , Any test 
resting on so nebulous and elusive an element as a 
school board's segregatory "intent'' provide~ inadequate 
assurance that minority children will not be ~hart­
changed in the decisions of those entrusted \vith the non-
discriminatory operation of our public schools. 
Public schools are creatures of the State. and whether 
the segregation is state-created or state-assisted or 
merely state-perpetuated should be irrelevant to consti-
tutional principle. The school board exercises pervasive 
and continuing responsibility over the long range plan-
7':1-.507-COXC'UH & DISSEKT 
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ning as well as the daily operations of the public school 
system. It sets policies on attendance zones. faculty 
m ployment and assiglunen ts. school construction. clos-
ings and consolidations. and myriad other matters. 
:-lchool board decisions obviously are not the sole cause 
of segregated school conditions. But if. after detailed 
and complete public supervision, substantial school segre-
gation still persists. the presumption is strong that the 
.school board, by its acts or omissions. is in some part 
n'sponsible. Where state actioll and supervision are so 
pervasive and where , after years of such action. schools 
remain thoroughly segregated. this Court is justified ill 
finding a prima facie case of a constitutional violation. 
The burden then must fall on the school board to demoll-
strate it is operating an " integrated school system." 
It makes little sense to find prima facie violations and 
the consequent affirmative duty to desegregate solely in 
those States with state-imposed segregation at the time 
of tlw Brown decision. The history of state-imposed 
segregation is more widespread in our country than the 
de jure/ de facto distinction has traditionally cared to 
rceogmze. As one commentator has noted . 
"the three court of appeals decisions denying a con-
stitutional duty to abolish de facto segregation all 
arose in cities-Cincinnati. Gary and Kansas City. 
Kansas- where racial segregation in schools was 
formerly mandated by state or local Jaw. [Deal v. 
Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F. 2d 55 (CA6 1966), 
cert. denied. 377 e. :-l. 924 ( 1964); Do'W!lS v. Board 
of Educ. , 336 F. 2d 988 ( CAlO 1964). cert. de-
nied. 380 l'. S. 914. Bell \'. School City, 324 F. 2d 
209 ( CA7 1963). cert. denied. 377 F. S. 924.] Ohio 
discarded its statute in 1887. Indiana in 1949. and 
Kansas City not until the advent of Bmwn. If 
1\iegro and white parents in Mississippi are required 
to bus their children to distant schools on the theory 
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that the consequences of past de jure segregation 
cannot otherwise be dissipated. should not the same 
reasoning apply in Gary, Indiana, where no more 
than five years before Brown the same practice 
existed with presumably the same effects." Good-
man. De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional 
and Empirical Analysis. 60 Cal. L. Rev. 275, 297 
(Hl72).'" 
X ot only does the de jure/ de facto distinction operate 
inequitably on communities in different sections of the 
country: more importantly. it disadvantages minority 
children as \Yell. As the Fifth Circuit stated: 
"The "X egro children in Cleveland, Chicago, Los 
Angeles, Boston, X ew York. or any other area of the 
nation which the opinion classifies under de facto 
segregation. would receive little comfort from the 
assertion that the racial make-up of their school sys-
tem does not violate their constitutional rights be-
cause they were born into a de facto society. while 
the exact same racial make-up of the school system 
in the 17 southern and border states violates the 
constitutional rights of their counterparts, or even 
.~~ Thr author cominur,.; · 
'·Trur, thr Parlirr the polic~ · of ~cgregat ion Wati abandoned the less 
danger thPrr i~ that it continurti to operatr roverti~·, is ~ignificantly 
rPspom;ible for present da~· pattern~ of residential ~egregation , or ha~ 
rontributed materially to pre~ent rommunit~· at titudes toward Negro 
~rhool~ . But there i~ no rea::;on to ::;uppo::;e that 1954 is a universally 
;tppropriatP diYtding !me bet\\'PPn dP jurr segrega tiOn that may 
~a fpJ~· be as::;umed to hav0 ~pPnt itsrlf and that which may not . 
For man~· rPmrdial purpo~r~. adoptwn of an a rbitrar~· but rasily 
administ rablr eutoff point mtght not be objrctionablr. But in a 
~it uation such as school d~rgregation, where both the nghts a ·srrted 
and thr remedial bnrc!Pn~ impo~ed are of such magnitudr, and wherr 
the rp~ulting ~c·rtional di~rrimination i ~ pa ::;sio natei~· resented, it is 
~mp]~· que~tionabh• whethrr ~11ch arbit rarine::;~ ~~ r tthrr politically 
01 moral! ~· arreptablr " 
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their blood brothers, because they were born into 
a cle jure society. All children everywhere in the 
nation are protected by the Constitution. and treat-
ment which violates their constitutional rights in 
one area. also violates such constitutional rights in 
another area.·· Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independ-
ent School District, 467 F. 2d 142, 148 ( CA5 en bane, 
1972) quoting United States v. Jefferson County 
Board of Educ. , 380 F. 2d 385. 397 ( CA5 en bane) 
Gewin. J .. dissenting).' ' 
The Court today does move for the first timr toward 
breaking down past sectional disparities, but it clings 
tenuously to its distinction. It searches for de jure 
action in what the Denver School Board has done or 
failed to clo, and even here the Court does not rely upon 
the results or effects of the Board's conduct but feels com-
pelled to find segregatory intent: " 
"vVe emphasize that the differentiating factor be~ > 
tween de jure segregation and so-called de facto 
"' Srr Birkrl. supra. 11. 7. at 11\J: 
··If :1 :'\rgro child prrrri1·r~ hi~ ~<'parat 1011 a::: di:::crimlllator~ · and 
invidiou:::, ]l(' i::: not, in a ~ocirt .1· a hundrrd ~·rar:; rrmon•d from 
~l<ll' rr_, .. going to makr finr di~tinrtion:; about thr ~ourcr of a par-
ticular ~rparation. '' 
'' Thr Comt toda~· doP~ not requirP, howPvrr, a ~E'grrgator\ intrnt 
with n·~pE'rt to thr rntirr ~rhool ~~·~trm, and imlrrd holds that if ,;uch 
an JnU•nt i~ found \Yith rr~prrt to :::omr :::choob 111 a "~·:;trm, thr bur-
drn-normall~· on the plaintifL;-~hift" to the defrndant "rhool au-
thoritir~ to pron· a negatin•: namrly. that thPir purpo~r~ wrrr 
lwnign. Old <' . pp . 17-lS. 
Tlw Court ha::: rom<· a long W<\~· ~Jn<·r BTou·n I. Starting from 
t hr una~~ailahiP de JUre ground of tlw di:::crnninaton· ron~titutionaf 
and ~tatutor~ · pr01·i:::1on::: of ,.;om<' Stat<'", the llP\Y formulation-~till 
profr~:::ing fidelitY to tlw dt' jure doetnnr-1::: that dP:::rgregation will 
br ordPrwl dr~pitP til(' ab;-;Pn<·<• of am· ,.;pgrrgaton· law~ if: (1) ~rgrr­
gatt•d ,r!Jool~ in fact rxi"t: (11) a romt find' that the~ · re~ult from 
:<Oll1P art1on taken II'Jth ~pgrrgator~· Jllt<'nt h~· th<' 'rhool board;· 
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segregation to which we referred in Swann is pur- ~ 
pose or intent to segregate." (Court Opinion, p.@ ) ) ) ...- .... 
1 
< C"/ 
(italics are the Court's) . , ~o
The Court's insistence that the "differentiating factor" 
between de jure and de facto segregation be "purpose 
or intent" is difficult to reconcile with the language in so ( 
recent a case as Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, ? 
407 F. R. 451 ( 7972). In holding there that "motiva-
tion'' is irrelevant. the Court said: 
"In addition, an inquiry into the 'dominant' motiva-
tion of school authorities is as irrelevant as it is fruit-
less. The mandate of Brown II was to desegregate 
schools. and we have said that '[t]he measure of 
any desegregation plan is its effectiveness.' Davis 
v. School Commissiorn ers of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 
33, 37. 
"Thus, we have focused upon the effect-not the 
purpose or motivation-of a school board's action 
in determining whether it is a permissible method 
of dismantling a dual system. 
"Though the purpose of the new school district was 
found to be discriminatory in many of these cases, the 
courts' holdings rested not on motivation or pur-
poses but on the effect of the aj ion upon the dis-
mantling of the dual school system involved. That 
was the focus of the District Court in this case, and 
we hold that its approach was proper.') 407 U. S., 
at 462. 
I can discern no basis in law or logic for holding that 
the motivation of school board action is irrelevant in 
(iii) ,;uch actio n rrlate~ to a ny "' rn ra ningful ~egment '' of the school 
''·' ·~trm : and (iv) thP :'ChooJ board cannot provp that its int entions 
ll'ith r!'~j)('Ct to the rpmaindrr of 1 hr ~y~trm wrre nonsegregatory. 
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Virginia and controlling in Colorado. It may be argued, 
of course. that in Emporia, a prior constitutional viola-
tion had already been proven and that this justifies the 
distinction. The net result of the Court's language, how-
ever, is the application of an effect test to the actions of 
southern school districts and an intent test to those in 
other sections. at least unti l an initial de jure finding for 
those districts can be made. Rather than straining to 
perpetuate any such dual standard. \\'e should hold forth-
rightly that significant segregated school conditions in 
whatever section of the country are a prima facie viola-
tion of constitutional rights. As the Court has noted 
~lsC'where: 
"Circumstances or chance may well dictate that 110 
persons in a certain class will serve on a particular 
jury or during some particular period. But it taxes 
our credulity to say that mere chance resulted in 
there being no members of this class among the over 
six thousand jurors called in the past 25 years. The 
result bespeaks discrimnation , whether or not it u•as 
a conscious decision on the part of any individual jury 
commissioner.'' Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 
482 (1954). (Emphasis added .) 
B 
There is thus no reason as a matter of constitutional 
principle to adhere to the de jure/ de facto distinction in 
school desegregation cases. In addition. there are rea-
sons of policy and prudent judicial administration which 
point strongly toward the adoption of a uniform national 
rule. The litigation heretofore centered in the South 
already is surfacing in other regions. The decision of 
the Court today, emphasizing as it does the elusive 
element of segregatory intent. 'vill invite numerous deseg-
regation suits in which there can be little hope of uni-
formity of resull, 
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The issue in these cases \vill not be whether segregated 
education exists. This will be conceded in most of them. 
The litigation will focus as a consequence of the Court's 
decision on whether segregation has resulted in any 
"meaningful or significant" portion of a school system 
from a school board's "segregatory intent.'' The intrac-
table problems involved in litigating this issue are obvious 
to any lawyer. The results of litigation-often arrived 
at subjectively by a court endeavoring to ascertain the· 
subjective intent of school authorities with respect .to· 
action taken or not taken over many years-will be· 
fortuitous. unpredictable and even capricious. 
The Denver situation is illustrative of the problem. 
The courts below found evidence of de jure violations· 
\Yith respect to the Park Hill schools and an absence of 
such violations with respect to the core city schools. 
despite the fact that actions taken by the school board 
with regard to those two sections were not dissimilar. 
It is. for example, quite possible to contend that both 
the construction of Manual High School in the core city· 
area and Barrett Elementary School in the Park Hill area 
operated to serve their surrounding Negro communities 
and. in effect. to merge school attendance zones with 
segregated residential patterns. See Petitioner's Brief, 
pp. 80- 83. Yet findings even on such similar acts will, 
under the de jure/de facto distinction. continue to differ, 
especia.lly since the Court has never made clear vYhat 
uffices to establish the requisite "segregatory intent" for 
an initial constitutional violation. Even if it were pos-
sible to clarify this question. wide and unpredictable 
differences of opinion among judges would be inevitable 
when dealing with an issue as slippery as "intent" or 
"purpose.·· especially when related to hundreds of 
decisions made by school authorities under varying con~ 
rlitions ovPr many ,Vf'arfl . 
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This Court has recognized repeatedly that it is "ex-
tremely difficult for a court to ascertain the motivation, 
or collection of different motivations. that lie behind a 
legislative enactment." Palmer v. Thompson, 403 "G. S. 
214. 224 ( 1971); McGinnis v. Royster, -l". S. -.-
(1973); United States v. O'Brien, 391 C 8. 367. 381 
( 1968) . Whatever difficulties exist with regard to a sin-
gle statute will be compounded in a judicial review of 
years of administration of a large and complex school 
system_,-. Every act of a school board and school ad-
ministration. and indeed every failure to act where affirm-
ative action is indicated, must now be subject to scrutiny. 
The most routine decisions with respect to the operation 
of schools. made almost daily, can affect in varying de-
grees the extent to which schools are initially segregated. 
remain in that condition. are desegregated. or-for the 
long term future-are likely to be one or the other. These 
decisions include action or nonaction with respect to 
school building construction and location; the timing of 
building new schools and their size; the closing and con-
' ·'A~ onr commentator ha~ rxprr~~<'d it: 
'·If thr courts are indred prrparrd to inquirr mto motive, thorn~· 
qur:::tion:-: will arise rven tf on<' a,:~umr"' that racial motivation i~ 
rnpablr of bPing proven at trial. What of the ca~e m which one or 
mon• mrmbers of a school board, but lr~~ than a majority, arr found 
to havr artrd on racial ground~ 1 What if it apprar~ that thr ~chool 
board'~ action was promptrd b_,- a mixturr of motives, including con-
,:titutionall~- innocent onr"' that aiOIH' would havr promptrd thr board 
to art') What if tlw membrr::: of thr ,:chool board werr not them-
srlvr" racial!~- in"'pired but "'i"'hrd to plra~e thetr con~tituent,: , man~· 
of whom thr~· knew to br so? If such rase::: arr clas~ified as un-
con:::titutional dr jure srgrrgatton, there j,: little point m presrrving 
thr dr jurr-de facto distinction at aiL And It may well be that thr 
diffrrrncr brtween am· of t he~r ~ituat10ns and one m whtch racial 
motivation IS altogrt hrr lackmg i" too in,:ignificant. from the "'land-
point of both thr moral culpabilitY of t IH• ~tat<' official~ and thr 
impact upon the childrrn invoh-rd, I o 'llj)port a difference Ill co n-
stitutional trratmcnt." Goodman. supra. n, 11 , at :284-2R5. 
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,.;olidation of schools; the drawing or gerrymandering of 
student attendance zones; the extent to which a neigh~ 
IJOrhood policy is Pnforcc'd; the recruitment. promotion 
and assif!;nlnent of faculty and supervisory persOJlllf'l; 
policies with respect to transfPrs from one school to 
Ullothrr; \Yhether. and to what rxtPJlt. special schools \Yill 
])(' provided. ,,·here thf'y will be located. and who will 
qualify to attf'JH! them; the d<'termination of curriculum. 
includi11g wlwtlwr there \\·ill lw "tracks" that lead pri-
IJlarily to collq;e or to vocational training. and the rout-· 
i11g of stmknts i11to these tracks; and even decisions as 
to ~ocial. rf'creational and athletic policies. 
l11 8u·ann thP Court did 11ot have to probe into segre~ 
gatory i11tent and proximate cause with respect to each 
of thrsP ''endless" factors. Thr oasis for its de jure find~ 
ing tlwrP \\· a~ rooted primarily in the prior history of the 
desegregation suit. 40:2 C :--\., at 5- (1. But in a case of 
the present type. \Yhere no such history exists. a .i udicial 
examination of these factors will be required under to-
day·~ decision. This " ·ill lead inevitably to uneven and 
unprC'clictahlP results. to protracted and ineonclusiYe liti~ 
gation. to added burdens on the federal courts. a1HI to 
SC' riou s disruption of individual school systems. ] n the 
ahsC'nCr' of national and ob.wctive standards. school boards 
anrl admini~trators \\·ill remai11 in a state of uncertainty 
allCI dimrray. speculating as to what is requirPd and \\·hen 
litigation \\·ill f'trikP . 
Hather than continue to prop up a distinction no longer 
grounclpd in principk. and contributing to the consC'-
qtiC'JlC'<'S itlflirated abovr. \\ '(' should ackno\\·leclgP that 
\\'hC'JH',·er sign ifica11t public school Pcgregation exists there' 
i~ prillla facir e\·idencr of a eonstitutional violation. It 
is true'. of course. that segregated schools- wherevrr 
located- are 110t solely the product of the actio11 or 
inaction of public school authoriti<·s. lndPed. as i11rli-
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cated earlier, there can be little doubt that principal 
causes of the pervasive school segregation found in the 
major urban areas of this country. whether in the ~orth, 
\\-' est. or South. are the socio-economic influences which 
have concentrated our minority citizens in the inner 
cities while the more mobile white majority disperse to 
the suburbs. But it is also true that public school au-
thorities have continuing, detailed responsibility for the 
public school systems"; and, as Judge John Minor 
Wisdom has noted. "where the figures [showing 
segregation in the schoolsJ speak so eloquently, a 
prima face case of discrimination is establishPd.'; 
United States v. Texas Education Agency, 467 F. 2d 848. 
873 (CA5 en bane 1972). Moreover, as foreshadowed in 
Swann and as implicitly held today, school boards have a 
duty to minimize and ameliorate segregated conditions 
by pursuing an affirmative policy of desegregation. It is 
this policy which must be applied consistently on a na-
tional basis without regard to a doctrinal distinction 
which has outlived its time. 
III 
The preceding section addresses the constitutional ob- ) ' 
ligation of public authorities in the school districts 
throughout our country to operate integrated school sys-
tems. When the schools of a particular district are 
tn Indeed , if one• goes back far enough , 1t i~ probable that all racial 
:segregation, wherever occurring and whether or not confined to the 
schools, has at :;orne time been supported or maintained b~- govern-
ment action. In Becket v. School Board, 308 F. Supp. 1274, 1311-
1315 (ED Va. 1969) , Judge Walter Hoffman compiled a summary 
of pa;;t public segregatory act10n which mcluded examples from a 
great majority of States. He concluded that ·'only as to the states 
of Maine , New Hampshire, Vermont, Washington, Nevada , and 
Hawaii docs it appear from th1~ nonexhaustive research that no dis-
criminatory laws appeared on thr book~ at one time or another." 
!d.. , at 1315, 
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found to be substantially segregated. there is a prima 
facie case that this obligation has not been met. The 
burden then shifts to the school authorities to demon-
strate that they have in fact operated an integrated 
system as this term is defined above. supra, p. - . If 
there is a failure successfully to rebut the prima facie 
case, the question then become what reasonable affirma-
tive steps district courts may require to place the school 
system in compliance \\'ith the constitutional standard. 
ln short. what specifically is the nature and scope of the 
remedy? 
As the Court's opinion virtually compels the finding on 
remand that Denver is a "dual school system," that city 
·will then be under an "affirmative duty" to desegregate 
its entire system "root and branch." Green v. County 
School Board, 391 r. S., at 438. Again, the critical ques-
tion is what ought this constitutional duty to entail. 
A 
The controlling case is Swann, supra, and the question 
which will confront and confound the District Court and 
Denver School Board is what indeed does Swann require. 
Swann purported to enunciate no new principles, relying 
heavily on Brown I and II and on Green. Yet it affirmed 
a district court order which had relied heavily on "racial 
ratios" and sanctioned transportation of elementary a~ 
well as secondary pupils. Lower federal courts have since 
read Swann as requiring far-reaching transportation de-
ofler,.,_ __ ..:..c:_re:....:e:.=s_' __ ' "to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual 
17 Sel' , r. Q., Thompsou v. School Board of Ne1cport Neu·s. -
F . 2d -,- (1972), wl1f're tlw CA4 en bauc, upheld a di:strict court. 
a~:;ignment plan where "travel timr , var~·ing from a minimum of 
fort)· miuutl'~ and a maximum of onr hour , rach wa~·. would be re-
quired for bu~iug black student~ out of thr old Cit~· and white stu-
dent,; into thr old Cit~· 111 ordrr to achirn' a racial balancing of the 
.s 
• 
il-507-COKCUH & DISSEYT 
22 KEYES v. SCHOOL DISTHICT :\0. 1, DEKVER, COLO. 
desegregation. '' 402 U. S .. at 26. In the context of a 
large urban area, with heavy residential concentrations 
of white and black citizens in different- and widely 
:;:eparated-:;:ections of the :;:chool district, exten:;:ive dis~ 
persal and transportation of pupils is inevitable if Swann 
is read as expansively as many courts have been reading 
it to date. 
To the extent that Swann may be thought to require 
large-scale or long-distance transportation of students in 
our metropolitan school districts. I record my profound 
misg1vmgs. Nothing in our Constitution commands or 
encourages any such disruption of public education. 
Fortunately, Swann alw laid down a broad rule of reason 
under which desegregation remedies must remain flexible 
and other values and interests be considered. Thus the 
Court recognized that school authorities, not the federal 
judiciary, must be charged in the first instance with the 
task of desegregating local school systems. 402 U. S., at 
16. School boards in rural areas might adjust more 
readily to this task than those in metropolitan districts 
di ~t ri ct." Thi~ tran,.;portat10n was decrec•d for children from the t hird 
gradr up , involving children as ~·otmg as right ~·ea rs of age. 
In Northrross \'. Memphis Bd. of Educ., 466 F . 2d 890, 895 
( 197:2) , thr CA6 affirmrd a di ~ tri ct court assignment plan which 
c!ail~ · tnmsportrd 14,000 children with "t lw maximum time to br 
,.;prnt on tlw bu,;p~ b~ · any child fbemg I :3~ minut e~. . . ," pre-
~umabl~· each wa~·. But a" Judgr Weick Jtotrd in di:osent the CA6 
ln~ tructrd the district judge to impl r mrnt ~·rt furtlwr de:oegrrga tion 
orde r ·. Pl a n~ prr::;rntl~· undrr con~idrrat ion b~- that court call for 
thr bu::;ing of 39,01:;5 and 61 ,530 children rr::; prct tvely , for undrtrr-
mined lengt h::: of tune. / d., a t 895-986. 
Petitionrrs before this Court in PottiS v. Flax. X o. 72-288, cert. 
deniPd, - U. S. - (197-), cont ended that tlw implementat ion 
of t he CA5 '~ dirPct iw in Flax v . Potts. ~6~ F . 2d 865 (1972), would 
rrquire bus rid!'~ of up to two hours and 20 minutes rach day a nd 
a round trip of up to 70 mil es. Pet ttion , at 14. While respondents 
contend these figure~ rrprrscn t a n · ·a~t ouncling mflation ," R r::;ponse, 
~t 7, transportatiOn of an tr rattonal magni tude ::;pem ::; inevita ble .. 
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"with dense and shifting population. numerous schools, 
congested and complex traffic patterns." /d., at 14. 
Transportation orders are suspect "when the time or 
distance of travel is so great as to either risk the health 
of the children or significantly impinge on the education 
process. I d., at 31. Finally. the age of the pupils to 
be transported was recognized by the Court in Swann 
as one important limitation on the time of student 
travel. Ibid. 
These factors were supposed to help guide district courts 
in framing equitable remedies in school desegregation 
cases.'' And the Court further emphasized that equitable 
decrees are inherently sensitive. not solely to the degree 
of desegregation to be achieved. but to a variety of other 
public and private interests. 
. . . a school desegregation case does not differ 
fundamentally from other cases involving the fram-
ing of equitable remedies to repair the denial of a 
constitutional right. The task is to correct, by a 
balancing of the individual and collective interest, 
the condition that offends the Constitution. Swann, 
supra, at 15-16. 
Those words echoed a similar expression in Brown II, 
349 U. S .. at 229: 
11111 fashioning and effecting the decrees, the courts 
will be guided by equitable principles. Tradition-
ally. equity has been characterized by a practical 
flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility 
"Srr ['11ited States, .. Texas Educatwu Agency. 467 F. 2d ~48, 883 
(C'A5 197:2) ( Brll. .f.. concurring in an opimon 111 ll'hirh ~rven other 
.indge~ iomrd) : 
"]n onr ,·iew the rcnwcl~· winch tlw (h~trict court i~ rf:'quired to 
formnlatr shonid be formniatecl ll'ithin the entirl' context of the 
opmion m Swann \'. Charlotte- !If etklenburg Board of Educa-
t iolt . • • • I_Empha~i,- added. [" 
- -. -
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for adjusting and reconciling public and priv&te 
needs." 
·Thus in school desegregation cases. as elsewhere. equity 
counsels reason. flexibility and balance. See. e. y. , Lemon 
v. Kurtzman - U. S. - ( 1973 ) L I am aware, of 
course, that reasonableness in any ar~a is a relative and 
subjective concept. But with school desegregation, rea-
sonableness would seem to embody a balanced evaluation 
of the obligation of public school boards to promote deseg-
regation with other, equally important educational inter-
ests which a community may legitimately assert. Neglect 
of either the obligation or the interests destroys the even-
handed spirit with which equitable remedies must be 
approached.H' Overzealousnes" in pur uit of any single 
goal is untrue to the tradition of equity and to the "bal-
ance" and "flexibility" with which this Court has always 
regarded it . 
B 
Where school authorities have defaulted in their duty 
to operate an integrated school system, district courts 
must insure that affirmative desegregative steps ensue. 
Many of these can be taken effectively without dam-
aging state and parental interests in having children at-
tend schools within a reasonable vicinity of home. 
Where desegregative steps are possible within the frame-
work of a system of "neighborhood education." school 
authorities must pursue them. For example. bound-
19 The relevant mquiry is .. whether the co~t~ of achieYing de~egre­
gation in any given :;ituatwn outweigh the legal. moral and educa-
tional con~iderations favoring it . . . . It ~ ~ clrar . . that thP 
Const itution should not be held to require any tran:;porta tion plan 
that keeps children on a bu~ for a substantial part of the da~· , con-
::;ume:; sign ifi cant portion:-: of funds otherwise spendablr directly on 
educat ion , or mvolves a genume element of danger to the sa fety of 
the child.'' School Desegregation After Swann: A Theor~· of Gov-
('rnment Respomi!bility, :39 U. Chi L. RPv. 421. 42:2, 443 (1972). 
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aries of neighborhood attendance zones should be drawn 
to integrate. to the extent practicable. the school's stu-
dent hody. Construction of new schools should be of 
such a size and at such a location as to encourage the 
likelihood of integration. Swann, at 21. Faculty integra= 
tion should be attained throughout the school system, 
Swann, at 19 ; United States v. Montgomery County 
Board of Education, 395 U. S. 225 ( 1969). An optional 
majority to minority transfer program. with the State 
providing free transportation to desiring students. is also 
a helpful adjunct to a desegregated school system. 
Swann, at 26-27. It hardly need be repeated that alloca-
tion of resources within the school district must be rr.ade 
with scrupulous fairness among all schools. 
The above examples are meant to be illustrative, not 
exhaustive. The point is that the over-all integrative 
impact of such school board decisions must be assessed by 
district courts in deciding whether the duty to desegregate 
has been met. For example. "neighborhood school plans 
are constitutionally suspect when attendance zones are 
superficially imposed upon racially defined neighborhoods, 
and when school construction preserves rather than elimi-
nates the racial hegemony of given schools.''"" Keyes 
v. School District LYo. 1, Denver Colorado,- F. 2d -. 
United States v. Board of Education of Tulsa County, 
429 F. 2d - . 1258-1259.~ 
( This does not imply that decisions on faculty assign-
ment. attendance zones. school construction. closing and 
consolidation , must be made to the detriment of all neu-
tral. nonracial considerations. But these considerations 
ran. with proper school board initiative, generally be 
met in a manner that will Pnhance the degree of school 
desegregation . 
"r' A usrful ~tud~ · of the hi~torical u~e~ and a bu~es of the neighbor-
hood school romept is .M. Weinbrrg . Iher & Placr (1967) . 
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Defaulting school authorities would have. at a mini-
mum , the obligation to take affirmative steps of the sort 
outliuerl in the above section. School boards would. of 
course. be free to develop and initiate further plans to 
promote school desegregation . In a pluralistic society 
such as ours, it is essential that no racial minority feel 
demeaned or discriminated against and that students of 
all races learn to play . work , and cooperate with one 
another in their common pursuits and endeavors. Noth-
ing in this opi11ion is meant to discourage school boards 
from exceeding minimal constitutional standards in pro-
moting the recognized values of integrated school 
conditions. 
A ronstitutional requirement of extensive student 
transportation solely to achieve([0tegrati£?? however. 
presents a vastly more complex problem. It promises 
on thf' one hand a greater degree of actual desegregation , 
while it infringes on what may fairly be regarded as 
important community aspirations and personal rights. 
The Equal Protection Clause does indeed require that 
racial discrimination not be tolerated in the decisions 
of public school authorities. It does not command that 
sehool authorities undertake widespread student trans-
portation solely for the sake of maximizingetegr;tiOli·.n 
"' In fact. duf' to racia ll~ · ~f'pa ratf' re::;idential patterns that r har-
nrtrnzr our major urban arra~ it I::; qu ite unreali:;tic to think of 
achiPYing in mam· ritif'::; ::;ub::;tantJal intf'gration throughout t he 
:;rhool di::;triet with out a drgref' of ::;tudf'nt tran::;portation which 
would ha\·f' thf' gravr::;t f'conomir ancl educat iona l con::;eq uence::;, 
A,; Profp::;::;or Birkel notr~ . 
'· In mo~t of the larger urban area::;, demographic cond itions a re ~uch 
that no polir~· that a court ran ord er , and a :::chool board, a city or 
rYen a ~tHtP has the capabilit y to put into effect, will in fact re::;ult 
in t]](' forPsreable future in racia ll y balanced public ::;choob. Only 
!I rrordrnng of the Pnvironment mvoh·ing economic and social policy-
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This obviously does not mean that bus transportation 
has no place in public school systems or as a permissible 
desegregative tool. The transporting of school children 
is as old as public education, and in rural and some 
suburban settings it is as indispensable as the providing ~ 
of books. It is presently estimated that approximately 
half of all American children ride buses to school for 
reasons unrelated to integration."" At the secondary 
level in particular, where the schools are larger and serve 
a wider, more dispersed constituency than the elementary. 
school. some form of public or privately financed trans-
portation is often necessary. There is a difference. how-
ever. in transportation plans voluntarily initiated by local 
school boards for educational purposes and those im-
posed by a federal court. The former usually represent a ~ 
necessary or convenient means of access to the school 
nearest home; the latter often require lengthy trips for no 
purpose other than to further integration."3 Yet the 
on the broade::<t conceivable front mtght have an a ppreciable impact." 
Bickel , supra. n. 7, at 13:2 . 
"" E::;timate;; vary. Swauu, supra, at :29, noted that "eighteen mil-
lion of the Xation 's public school children, approximately 39%, were 
transported to their school::: by bus in 1969-1970 m aU parts of the 
country. '' Senator Ribicoff (D.-Conn.) a thoughtful student of this 
problem, ::;tated that " two-thirds of all American children today ride 
bu::;es to school for rea~ons unrelatrd to integration." 118 Cong. Rec. 
82543, Feb. :24, 1972. 
"" Hi~to ri ca ll~ - . di;;tant transportal ion wa~ wrongly used to pro-
m ott> ~egregation. ";\iegro childrr n were generally considered cap-
able of tra\·elling longer di"ta n ce~ to school a nd without the a id of any 
vehicle . What was too far for a white child became reasona bly nrar 
fo r a ~egro ehild," Weinberg, supra, n . 2~
Thi~ deplorable ht ::;tor~ · hns led ~orne to a rgue that mtegra tive bus 
ridrs an· justified a,- a tonem<•nt for past ~egregator~· trips and that 
neighborhood education 1" now but a code-word for racial segrega-
tion . But misuse of tran:;portatwn 111 the pa~t does not imply neigh-
borhood ::;chooling ha:; no valid non~egregatory use:; for the _present. 
X or would wrongful tra nsport a \ion Ill t he pa~t .i n~t ify detrimental 
t ran><porta twn for the children of t orla \'. 
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Court in Swann was unquestionably right in dPscribing 
bus transportation as "onP tool of school desegregation." 
402 r. S .. at 30."~ The crucial issue is when. under what 
circumstances. and to what extent such transportatioll 
may appropriately bP orclen .. d. The answer to this 
turns-as it does so often in the law-upon a sound exer-
cise of discretion under the circumstances. 
Swann itself recognized limits to integrative obliga-
tions. It noted that a constitutional requirement of "any 
particular degree of racial balance or mixing ... would 
be disproved . ... " and sanctioned district court use 
of mathematical ratios as "no more than a starting point 
in the process of shaping a remedy .... " 402 l!. S., at 
24. 25. Thus particular schools may bP all white or 
all black and still not infringe constitutional rights 
if the system is genuinely integrated and school authori-
ties are pursuing integrative steps short of extensive and 
disruptive transportation. The refusal of the Court to 
require racial balance in schools throughout the district 
or the automatic elimination of all ''one-race schools.' ' 
40:2 r. S .. at 26, is grounded in a recognition that the 
State. parents. and children all have at stake in 
24 Sotn(' communit ie~ had t ra n~port a tion plan~ in dfert a I I h(• time 
of court de~egregation order~. Sc•r 8wam1, ~upra. at :29, n. 11; Davis 
\'. School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 402 U. S. :33, 34-:35 (1971). 
Comt ~ ha I'P u~ed t lw pre~enC'r or ab~rn<·c· of PXi~t ing t ra n~porta I ion 
in a di~tnct a~ one factor 111 frami11g and tmplementing; de~rgregation 
decree~. 0'nited States , ._ Watwn Chapel :)chua! Distnct. -l4() F. 2d 
9:n. 9:37 (CA.S 1971) ; Northcro~s v. Board of Educ .. .J.4+ F . 2d 1179, 
11K1-118:3 (CA6 1971); Davis ,._ Board of Educ .. :328 F. Supp. 1197, 
1203 (ED Ark . 1971). When• a ~rhool board t;; Yoluntaril~· engagrd 
Ill tran;;portmg students, a dt~tnct rourt 1~, of course, obligated to 
in~ure that ;,;urh transportation t:; 1101 unclrrtakrn \\'It h :;egrega tor~· 
eff<·ct. Wherr , al~o, voluntary tran~portation programs are already 
in progre~" · thrre may be grPat<'r .iu"'tificatwn for court-ordrrPcl trans-
port at ion of :;tudrnt::; for a comparable time aurl distance to arh1ew 
~reater integration, 
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school desegregation decrees legitimate and recognizable 
interests. 
The personal interest might be characterized as the 
desire that children attend community schools near 
home. Dr. James Coleman testified for petitioners at 
trial that "most school systems organize their schools in 
relation to the residents by having fixed school districts 
and some of these are very ethnically homogeneous." 
App. 1549a. In Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 
396 F. 2d 55. 60 (1966), the Sixth Circuit summarized 
the advantages of such a neighborhood system of 
schools: "5 
"Appellants, however, pose the question of whether 
the neighborhood system of pupil placement. fairly 
administered without racial bias. comports with the 
requirements of equal opportunity if it nevertheless 
results in the creation of schools with predominantly 
or even exclusively Negro pupils. The neighbor-
hood system is in wide use throughout the nation 
and has been for many years the basis of school 
administration. This i'3 so because it is acknowl-
edged to have several valuable aspects which are an 
aid to education, such as minimization of safety haz-
ards to children in reaching school, economy of cost 
in reducing transportation needs. ease of pupil 
placement and administration through the use of 
~ 5 Thr trrm "neighborhood ~chool'' ~hould not be supposetl to 
denote solei~· a walk-in :::chool or on<' which serves children only in 
the :;mrounding blocks. The Court has noted, in a different con-
text, that "the word 'neighborhood' is quite as susceptible of varia-
tion a~ thr word ·localit~· · Both terms are elastic and, dependent 
upon circum:;tance:::. may be equall~· satisfied by areas measmed by 
rods or b~· mile~ . " Connally v. Geueral Canst. Co., 269 U. S. :385, 
395 (1926) . In the ;,chool context , "neighborhood" refers to relative 
proximity , to a preference for a school nearer. rather than more 
distant from home. 
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neutral, easily determined standards, and better 
home-school communication." 
The neighborhood school does provide greater ease of 
parental and student access and convenience, as well as 
greater economy of public administration. These are 
obvious and distinct advantages. but the legitimacy of 
the neighborhood concept rests on more basic grounds."0 
Xeighborhod school systems. neutrally administered, re-
flect the deeply felt desire of citizens for a sense of com-
munity in their public education. Public schools have 
been a traditional source of strength to our Nation, and 
that strength may derive in part from the identification of 
many schools with the personal features of the surround-
ing neighborhood. Community support, interest and 
dedication to public schools may well run higher with a 
neighborhood attendance pattern: distance may encour-
age disinterest. Many citizens sense today a decline in 
the intimacy of our institutions-home, church, and 
school-which has caused a concomitant decline in the 
unity and communal spirit of our people. I pass no 
judgment on this viewpoint. but I do believe that this 
Court should be wary of compelling in the name of con-
stitutional law what may seem to many a dissolution in 
the traditional. more personal fabric of their public 
schools. 
Closely rPlated to the concept of a community and 
neighborhood education. are those rights and duties par-
Puts have >vith respect to the education of their children . 
The law has long recognized the parental duty to nurture, 
support. and provide for the welfarP of children, includ-
"" 1 do not implY that th0 Iwighborhood roncept offer:; the onl.'·, 
or <'V<'II tlJP mo~t prrfrrnbl0 wa~· to organizr a ~chool system. I do 
cont0nd that. whrrr a ,;rhool board hn>" rho~en it , frderal judgrs 
"Jwuld arrord 1t rP;<pPrt 111 framing rrnwdial drcrPes . 
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ing their education. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
U. S. 510, 534. 535. a unanimous Court held that: 
"Under the doctrine of Meyer v. 1Yebraska, 262 
1!. S. 390. we think it entirely plain that the Act 
of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of 
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and 
education of children under their control. . . . The 
child is not the mere creature of the state; those who 
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, 
coupled with the high duty. to recognize and pre-
pare him for additional obligations.'' 
And in GriswoLd v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 482 
(1965) . the Court noted that in Pierce, "the right to edu-
cate one's children as one chooses is made applicable to 
the States by the force of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.'' I do not believe recognition of this 
right can be confined solely to a parent's choice to send 
a child to public or private school. Most parents can-
not afford the luxury of a private education for their 
children. and the dual obligation of private tuitions and 
public taxes. Those who may for numerous reasons 
seek public education for their children should not be 
forced to forfeit all interest or voice in the school their 
child attends. It would. of course. be impractical to 
allow the wishes of particular parents to be controlling. 
Yet the interest of the parent in the enhanced parent-
school and parent-child communication allowed by the 
neighborhood unit ought not to be suppressed by force 
of law. 
In the understandable national concern for alleviating 
public school segregation , courts may have overlooked 
thP fact that the rights and interests of children affected 
by a desegregation program also are entitled to consid-
eratiou. Any child. white or black. who is compelled to 
leavP his neighborhood and spend significant time each 
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day being transported to a distaut school suffers an im-· 
palrment of his liberty ahd his privacy. Not long ago , 
James B. Conant wrote that "[aJ t the elementary school 
level the issue seems clear. To send young children day 
after day to distant schools seems out of the question."~' 
A community may well conclude that the portion of a 
child's day spent on a bus might be used more creatively 
in a classroom. playground. or some other extracurricular 
school activity. Decisions such as these, affecting the 
quality of a child's daily life. should not lightly be held 
constitutionally errant. 
To this point I have focused mainly on the personal 
interests of parents and children which a community may 
believe to be best protected by a neighborhood system 
of schools. But broader considerations lead me to ques-. 
tion just as seriously any remedial requirement of exten-
sive student transportation solely to further integration. 
Any such requirement is certain to fall disproportionately 
on the school districts of our country, depending on 
their degree of urbanization, financial resources. and their 
racial composition. Some districts with little or no bi-
racial population will experience little or no educational 
disruption. while others, notably in large, biracial metro-
politan areas. must at considerable expense undertake 
extensive transportation to achieve the type of integra-
tion frequently being ordered by district courts.~ ·' At a 
time when public education generally is suffering serious 
financial malnutrition, the economic burdens of such 
transportation can be severe. requiring both initial capital 
outlays and annual operating costs in the millions of 
dollars."" And while constitutional requirements have 
" ' Slum~ and Suburb~, 29 (19!11) . 
"' Ser n. :22, supra. __.9 A 
""In \lem\mi~ , for rxample , which ha::; no hi::;tory of hu-ing ~tu­
rlent~ . tlw minimum transportation plan orderPd b~ · t11P comts will 
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often occasioned uneven burdens. never have they touched 5 
so sensitive a matter as ,,·ide differences in the compulsory 
transportation requirements for literally hundreds of 
thousands of school children. 
The argument for student transportation also overlooks 
the fact that the remedy exceeds that which may be 
necessary to redress the constitutional evil. Let us use 
Denver as au example. The Denver School Board, by 
its action and nonaction , may be legally responsible for 
some of the segregation that exists. But if one assumes 
a maximum discharge of constitutional duty by the 
Denver Board over the past decades. the fundamental 
problem of residential segregation would persist."" It 
is indeed a novel application of eq uitable power- not to 
mention a dubious extension of constitutional doctrine-
to require so much greater a degree of forced school in-
tegration than would have resulted from purely natural 
and neutral nonstate causes. 
The compulsory transportation of students carries a 
further infirmity as a constitutional remedy. \Vith most 
constitutional violations. the major burden of remedial 
action falls on offending state officials. Public officials 
\\"ho act to infringe personal rights of speech. voting. or 
religious exercise, for example. are obliged to cease the 
offending act or practice and. where necessary . institute' 
corrective measures. Tt is they who bear the brunt of 
rPquire. in thP School Board'~ P~timate, an initial capit;d expPnditmP 
of $1 ,66-!,192 for bu~e~ plu~ an annual operating ro~t of $()29.192. 
The Board r,;t imatp~ that a more Pxtrnsivp tran;;portation program 
to be considPred b~· the di~t n et court II' ill rPqmre initial capital in-
,·estment ;; of $:3 ,924,000 and :111nual operating rost,.: of .'1.7~:3,490. 
The mo~t dra~tir tran~portat ion plan beforr the district court rrquirp,.; 
e,.:timatrd annual operating ro,.:t:.: of from $2,:354,220, $2 ,-±:ll.7JO. or 
sa,.w:uoo dl·pending Oil thr Board'~ tfHil:;j)Ortation armngPmrnt~. 
Northcrass \'. Board of Eduration of Mrmphi8 Cit!! 8ch .. Sl),Jira. at e;, . 
S98 (WPick . .f . di~srnting). ' 1 
'" ~C'P 11. 9 . .supra. 
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remedial action. though other citizens will to varying (k-
grees feel its effects. School authorities responsible for 
segregation must. at the very tuinimum. act to cc>ase seg-
regatory acts. But when the obligation furthc>r extends 
to the transportation of students. the full burden of thr 
affirmative remedial action is borne by children and par-
ents ,,·ho did not participate itt any constitutional 
violatiotl. 
Finally. courts in requiring so far-reaching a remedy 
as studc>nt transportation solely to maximize intrgration. 
risk setting in motion unpredictable and unmanageable 
social consequences. Xo one can estimate the extent 
to which dismantling neighborhood education will hasten 
an exouus to private schools. leaving public school sys-
tems the preserve of the disadvantaged of both races. 
Or guess how much impetus such dismantlement gives 
the movement from innercity to suburb. and the further 
geographical separation of the races. X or do v.·e kno"· 
to what degree this remedy may cause deterioration of 
community and parental support of public schools. or 
divert attention from the paramount goal of quality in 
rducation to a perennially devisive debate OYer ,,·ho is 
to be transported where."' 
The problem addrc>ssed in this opinion has pc>rpkxecl 
courts. school officials. other public authorities. and stu-
dents of public education for nearly two df'nades. The 
problem. especially sincr it has focused on thr "busing 
issue ... has profoundly disquieted the public wherevc•r 
extensive transportation has been ordered. I make no 
pretf'ttsr of knowing the best answers. Yet. the issue in 
this and like cases comes to this Court as one of eott-
Ptitutional la\\'. As to this issue. r have 110 doubt \\·hat-
., Tndc·Pd . authoritir~ inrrra~in12:!~· arr in doubt n,; to thr· c·xtrnt 
to which grt>atrr racial balancing in public .-;rhool" will IJp 11c·r·p,;~an · 
or rffpctivP in rrducing ra('ial mrqual1t~· . ::-;c'<' , e. (! .. ( ' .. JPnk.: ,. 
lnrquality. pp. :25:~-:.W5 (197:2) , 
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ever. There is nothing in the Constitution, its history 
or-until recently-in the jurisprudence of this Court 
that mandates the employment of forced transportation 
of young and teenage children to achieve a single interest, 
as important as this interest may be. We have strayed, 
quite far as I view it. from the rationale of Brown I 
and II , as reiterated in Swann, that courts in fashioning 
remedies must be "guided by equitable principles'' which 
include the "adjusting and reconciling [of] public and 
private needs,'' Brown II , 349 F. S., at 229. 
I urge a return to this rationale. This \\'Oulcl result, 
as emphasized above. in no prohibition on court-ordered 
student transportation in furtherance of desegregation. 
But it would also require that the legitimate community 
interests in neighborhood school systems be accorded far 
greater respect. In the balancing of interests so appro-
priate to a fair and just equitable decree. transporta-
tion orders should be applied with special caution to 
any proposal as disruptive of family life and interests-
and ultimately of education itself- as extensive transpor-
tation of elementary age children solely for desegregatio11 
purposes. As a minimum. this Court should not re-
quire school boards to engage in the unnecessary trans-
portation away from their neighborhoods of elementary 
age children. It is at this age level that neighborhood 
education performs its most vital educational role. It 
is with respect to children of tender years that the 
greatest concern exists for their physical and psycholog-
ical health. It is also here. at the elementary schooL 
that the rights of parents and ehildrPIJ are most sharply 
implicated."2 
"" Thrrr ma~· well br adn1ntagl·~ in commrnring til(' intrgrati\'P 
l'Xperirner~ at an rarl~· agr , a.-< youn11: rhildrrn ma.1· bP lr~8 likrl~· 
than oldrr rhildrPn and adult~ to drnlop an inhibiting racial ron-
~rtou~nr~~. Thr~r advantagP:< ~hould br con:<idrrpd a" "rhool board~ 
makr thr variou~ drri::<ion~ with tlw , · jpw to al'hil·ving nnd ]H('"rn·-
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\Vhile greater transportation of secondary school stu-
dents might be permitted. even at this level the desire of 
a comm.unity for racially neutral neighborhood schools 
should command judicial respect. It would ultimately 
be wisest. where there is no absence of good faith. to 
permit affected communities to decide this delicate issue 
of student transportation on their own. Legitimate, 
nonracial aspirations embodied in a neighborhood school 
concept are entitled to j uclicial respect. 
IV 
The existing state of law has failed to shed light and 
provide guidance on t\\·o issues. addressed in this opin-
ion. namely: ( i) whether and to what extent a uniform 
judicial approach should be taken to our national prob-
lems of school desegregation and ( ii) if so. whether the 
ambiguities of Swann, construed to date almost uni-
formly in favor of extensive transportation. should be 
redefined to restore a more viable balance among the 
various interests which are involved. \Vith all deference, 
it seems to me that the Court today has addressed neither 
of these issues in a way that will lead to a rational. 
coherent national policy with respect to integration in 
tlw schools. 
The Court has chosen. rather. to adhere to the de facto / 
de jure distinction under circumstances. and upon a 
rationale. vvhich can only lead to increased and incon -
clusive litigation. and-especially regrettable-to defer-
ment of a nationally consistent judicial position on this 
critical subject. There is. of course. state action in every 
school district in the Janel. The public schools have 
ing an 1ntrgratrd ~rhool ~.~·~trm. Supra. p. -. But in the bal-
ancing of nil n•lr1·ant interrA~. thP advantage~ of an earl~· integra-
l iw PXpl'riencl' mu~t and in all fairne~;; ~boule!. be weighPd agnin~t 
othPr rplr1·am adYantagr~ <tnd cli~adnllltagr~ and in light of tl](l 
rlrnwgraphir rhnrartPri~tir~ of tlw particular community , 
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al\\'ays been funded and operated by States and their 
local subdivisions. It is true that segregated schools. 
c·ven in the cities of the South. are in large part the 
product of social and economic factors-and the resulting 
residential patterns. But there is also not a school dis-
trict in the 1Jnited States, with any significant minority 
8chool population. in which the school authorities-in 
one way or the other-have not contributed in some 
measure to the degree of segregation which still prevails. 
Instead of recognizing the reality of similar, multiple 
segregatory causes in school districts throughout the 
country. the Court persists in a distinction whose duality 
operates unfairly on local communities in one section of 
th<> country and on minority children in the others. 
The second issue relates to the ambiguities of Swann 
and the judicial disregard of legitimate community and 
individual interests in framing equitable decrees. fn the 
absence of a more flexible and reasonable standard than 
that imposed by district courtv after Swann, the 
desegregation which will now be decreed in Denver and 
other major cities may well involve even more extensive 
transportation than has been witnessed up to this time. 
It is well to remember that the course we are running 
is a long one and the goal sought in the end-so often 
overlooked-is the best possible educational opportunity 
for all children. Communities deserve the freedom and 
the incentive to turn their attention and energies to this 
goal of quality eel uca tion. free from protracted and 
debilitating battles over court-ordered student transpor-
tation. The single most disruptive element in educa-
tion today is the widespread use of compulsory trans-
portation . especially at elementary grade levels. This 
has risked distracting and eli verting attention from basic 
educational ends, dividing and embittering communities, 
and exacerbating rather than ameliorating inter-racial 
friction an(t misunderstandinp:. [t is time to return to 
71-507-COl\CUH & DISSE~T 
38 KEYES 1'. SCHOOL DISTHICT J\""0. 1, DENVER, COLO. 
a more balanced evaluation of the recognized interests / ~ 
of our ~ociety in achieving d_esegregation with_ other legi~i:... / ~
mate mterests a commumty may assert IJC_nonr~cial_J ~--
neighborhood and community education . This will help 
assure that integrated school systems will be established 
and maintained by rational action, and will be better 
understood and supported by parents and children of 
both races. For the long term, this will promote the 
enduring qualities of an integrated society so essential 
to its genuine success. 
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MR. JusTicE PowELL concurnng in part and dissenting 
m part. 
I concur in the remand of this case for further pro-
ceedings in the District Court, but on grounds that differ 
from those relied upon by the Court. 
This is the first school desegregation case to reach this 
Court which involves a major city outside the South. It 
comes from Denver. Colorado, a city and a State which 
have not operated public schools under constitutional or 
statutory provisions which mandated or permitted racial 
segregation. 1 Kor has it been argued that any other 
legislative actions (such as zoning and housing laws) 
contributed to tlw segregation which is at issue." The 
1 Article IX, § 8, of the Colorado Con~titution has expressly pro-
hibited ·•any classification of pupils . .. on account of race or· 
color." 
t Sec, e. g .. S1cann \'. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educatwu .. 
402 u. s 1, 23 ( 1971 ) 
"Wr do not reach .. . tlw que~twn whether a showing that ~chooi 
segregation i~ a con;;equencc of other t~·pe::< of :;tate actwn, Without 
an~· discriminator~· actwn b~ · ;;chool authorit1e;;, IS a con~titutionai 
vwlation requiring remedial action b~· a ~chool de::<egregation drcret:> .'" 
Tlw tt:>rm "~tate action,'' as u;;t:>d ht:>rein. thu~ rder:< to actions of 1 he· 
appropriatP public ;;choo] anthoriti<'s. 
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C'ourt has inquired only to what extent the Denver 
public school authorities may have contributed to the 
school ~egregation which is acknowledged to exist in 
Denver. 
The predominantly minority schools are located in two 
areas of the city referred to as Park Hill and the core 
city area. The District Court con~idered that a school 
with a concentration of 70 to 75 o/r "Negro or Hispano 
students'' was identifiable as a segregated school. 313 
F . Supp., at 77. Wherever one may draw this line, it is 
undisputed that most of the schools in these two areas 
are in fact heavily segregated in the sense that their stu-
dent bodies are overwhelmingly composed of non-Anglo 
children. The city-wide school mix in Denver is 66 o/r 
Anglo. 14% Negro. and 20 o/r Hispano. In areas of the 
city where the Anglo population largely resides. the 
schools are predominantly Anglo, if not entirely so. 
The situation in Denver is genera.lly comparable to 
that in other large cities across the country in which there 
is a substantial minority population and \.,·here desegre-
gation has not been ordered by the federal courts. There 
is segregation in the ~chools of many of these cities fully 
as pervasive as that in southern cities prior to the deseg-
regation decrees of the past decade and a half. The focus 
of the school desegregation problem has now shifted from 
the South to the country as a whole. Unwilling and 
footdr·agging as the proce~s \vas in most places, substan-
tial progress toward achieving integration has been made 
111 outhern titates ." ~o comparable progress has been 
made in many nonsou thern cities \Vith large minority 
:, According to thr 1971 HEW e~t nnatr , 43.9~ of :\Tegro puptls 
at t<•ndrd majonty \vhitr school ~ In the South a~ oppo~ed to only 
'27.8% \\'ho attended ~urh srhoob in the North and We~t. Fifty-
scvr n prrrent of all :\Tegro pupil" 111 the North and We~t attend 
"chool" with over SO% minority population as opposrd to 82.2% 
who do "o in the South. 11/o: Cong. Hrl' . 81~5. 
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, populations ' primarily because of the de facto / de jure 
. distinction nurtured by thE> courts and accepted com-
placently by many of the same voices which denounced 
the evils of segregated schools in the South .'' But if our 
national concern is for those who attend such schools, 
rather than for perpetuating a legalism rooted in history 
rather than present reality, we must recognize that the 
evil of operating separate schools is no less in Denver 
than in Atlanta . 
1 ThE' 1971 HEW Enrollment 8un·e~· drama.tizf'd thE' segregatf'd 
character of public :-:rhool ~~·:-: tern '"' in man~· non,.;outhPrn citiP:-:. Thr 
perrpntagr of 1\pgro pupil,.; which a ttPnded ::;choob more than 80% 
black wa:-: 91.3 in CJpn•land . Ohio ; 97.8 in Compton, California ; 
78.1 in Da~·ton, Ohio: 78.11 m DC'troit , :\Iichigan : 95.7 in Gar~· . 
Indiana; 86.4 in Kan::;a:-: Cit~·, :\Iis,.;ouri; 86.6 in Lo~ AngriPs, Cali-
fornia ; 78 .8 in :\Iilwaukrc, Wiscon,.; in ; 91.:3 in- Newark, New .T rm·~·: 
i-:9.8 in St. Loui,.; , .'di~,.;ouri . Thr full data from the Enrollmrnt Sur-
n·~· rna~ · br found in 118 Cong. RPe . SH+-148, .Jan. 20. 1972. 
r. A~ Senator Ribicoff (D.-Conn .) rrcogmzrd : 
"For ~·rar~ wr have fought the battle of mtpgratton primaril~· in 
thr South wherE' thP problem was ,.;rverr. It wa~ a long, arduou~ 
fight that dr:'en·rd to bP fought and nePdr d to br woiL 
"Unfortunate!~·. a~ thr problrm of ra c~al 1:-:olatwn ha:-: moved north 
of the :\[a~on-Dixon I inr, man~· nort }l('rner::; have bid an Pnt,.;ivP 
farewell to thP 100-~·rar ~truggle for racial rqualit~·. Our motto 
"<'E'lll" to havP brrn ·Do to "outlwmer" what ~·ou do not want to do 
to your~rlf. ' 
"Good n•a"on" havp alwa~·~ bPPII offprrd, of cuur,.;e, for Ilot movlllg 
\ · igorou"l~· ahead in the 0Jorth a~ wrll a~ thr South. 
'' Fir"t. It wa'"' that thr probl em wa" wor'"'e 111 tlw South. Thr n 
~hl' fart~ brgan to "how that thnt wa~ no longer trm· 
" WP thrn began to hrar tlw d<• fneto-d<· jure refi·a m 
"Somrhow rp,.:idPntial "egrrga tion in th(• :\orth 11·a" aceJdent:ll ur 
rlr facto and that mall r It bPttrr than thr lrgall~· "npported dr juri:' 
~egrrgafion of the South. It wa,.: a hard di::<t mrtion for blnrk children 
lll tot a l!~ · "('grPgHtPd "chool" m th<• :\orth to undeiAand. but it 
allowed II ." to n1·oid tlw prohiPm " 118 C'ong Hrc S:Z-542. Frb. 2-+ . 
197'2 . 
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I 
Tn my view we should abandon a distinction which long 
since has outlived its time, a.nd formulate constitutional 
principles of national rather than merely regional appli-
cation. When Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 
483 ( 1954), was decided, the distinction between de jure 
and de facto segregation was consistent with the limited 
constitutional rationale of that case. The situation con-
fronting the Court, largely confined to the souther11 
States. was officially imposed racial segregatiou in the 
schools extending back for many years and usually em-
bodied in constitutional and statutory provisions. 
The great contribution of Brown I was its holding in 
unmistakable terms that the Fourteenth Amendment 
forbids state-compelled or authorized segregation of pub-
lic schools. 347 U. S., at 488. 493-495. Although some 
of the language v,;as more expansive. the holding in 
Brown I was essentially negative: It was impermissible 
under the Constitution for the States. or their instru~ 
mentalities, to force children to attend segregated schools. 
The forbidden action was de jure, and the opinion in 
Brown I was construed-for some years and by many 
courts-as requiring only state neutrality, allowing "free-
dom of choice" as to schools to be attended so long as the 
~tate itself assured that the choice was genuinely free of 
official restraints .'; 
·~See, e. u .. Bradley v . Srhool Hoard. :3-!5 F. :2d :no. 316 (CA-l 
en banr. 1965) · 
" It ha;:; been held agam and agnm , that the Fourteenth 
.\mendment prohibition i~ not ngain~t ~rgregation n~ :-;uch 
A ~tntr or ~rhool di~tri c t offend~ no eon;:;titutwnal requirement 
whrn it grant;:; to all ~tudrnt~ uniformly an unre;:;tnctrd freedom of 
cho1cr n:< to ;:;chool attendrd, ~o that each pupil , m etfrct, a"~Igns him-
~df to the ~chool he wi"hr" to attrnd ." (The ca:sc wa ;:; later vacated. 
il-50i-CONCUH & DlSSEP:T 
Kl!:YES v. SCHOOL DISTHIC'T XO. l. DENVEH, COLO fi 
But the doctrine of Brown I , as amplified by Brown Il , 
349 U.S. 294 (1955), did not retain its original meaning. 
Tn a series of decisions extending from 1954 to 1971 the 
concept of state neutrality was transformed into the 
present constitutional doctrine requiring affirmative 
state action to desegregate school systems.' The key-
stone case was Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 
430, 438 ( 1968), where school boards were declared to 
have "the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might 
be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which 
racial discrimination would be eliminated root and 
branch. " The school system before the Court in Green 
was operating in a rural and sparsely settled county 
where there were no concentrations of white and black 
populations, no neighborhood school system (there \\'ere 
only two schools in the county), and none of the 
problems of an urbanized school district. ' The Court 
properly identified the freedom of choice program 
there as a subterfuge, and the language in Green impos-
mg an affirmative duty to convert to a unitary system 
was appropriate on the facts before the Court. There 
was, however, reason to question to what extent this duty 
would apply in the vastly different factual setting of a 
and r('manded by thi~ Court, which expre~~ed no VIE'W on the mc•nt~ 
of tlw dP~egregation plan~ ~ubm1tted.) :382 U. S. 10:3, 105 (1065) , 
See abo Bell v. School City of Gary. Ind., 32-l F. 2d 209 (CA7 1963) ; 
Downs \'. Board of Educ., :3:3() F. 2d 988 (CAIO 196+); Deal v . 
Board of Educ .. . 369 F . 2d 55 (CAll 1966) 
' F'or a conci,.:e hi~tor~ · and comment a r~· on the evolution, ,.;pe gpn-
c ·rnll~· .-\. Bickel , The SuprPme Comt. and the Idea of Progre~::; , pp 
12()-j;{Q ( 1970) 
' ~!?P abo the compamon ca~P" in Raney \' . Board of Rducatwn . 
:391 U. S. ++:3 (196S) , and !1louroe \'.Board of C'omm'ro. :391 t: . S. 
+50 (19(iS). neither of which uwoh·pd large' urbnn or metropolitan 
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large city with extensive areas of residential segregation. 
presenting problems and calling for solutions quite dif-
ferent from those in the rural setting of ~ ev,· Kent 
County. Virginia. 
But the doubt as to whether the affirmative duty con-
cept would flower into a new constitutional principle of 
general application was laid to rest by Swann v. Board 
of Education, 402 U. 8. 1 ( 1971), in which the affirma-
tive duty articulated in Green was applied to the urban 
school system of metropolitan Charlotte. North Carolina. 
In describing the residential patterns in Charlotte, tlw 
Court noted the "familiar phenomenon" in the metro-
politan areas of minority groups being "concentrated in 
one part of the city,'' 402 U. S .. at 25. and acknowledged 
that : 
"Rural areas accustomed for half a century to the 
consolidated school system implemented by bus 
transportation could make adjustments more readily 
than metropolitan areas with dense and shifting pop-
ulation, numerous ~?Chools. congested and complex 
traffic patterns.' ' 402 F. S .. at 14. 
Despite this recognition of a fundamentally different 
problem from that involved in Green, the Court never-
theless held that the affirmative duty rule of Green was 
applicable, and prescribed for a metropolitan school sys-
tem with 107 schools and some 84.000 pupils essentially 
the same remedy-elimination of segregation "root and 
branch "-which had been formulated for the two schools 
and 1,300 pupils of New Kent County. 
In Swann, the Court further noted it was dealing only 
with States having "a long history'' of officially imposed 
segregation and the duty of school authorities in those 
i-itates to implement Brown I. 402 U. S .. at 5-6. In so 
doing. the Court refrained even from considering whether 
the evolution of constitutional doctrine from Brown 1 to 
il-507-CONCUl~ & DISSENT 
KEYES 11 . SCHOOL DISTRICT NO . 1. DENVEH , COLO "' I 
Green! Swann undercut whatever logic once supported 
the de facto/ de jure distinction. In imposing on metro-
politan southern school districts an affirmative duty. en-
tailing large-scale transportation of pupils, to eliminate 
segregation in the schools. the Court required these dis-
tricts to alleviate conditions which in large part did not 
result from historic, state-imposed de jure segregation. 
Rather, the familiar root cause of segregated schools in all 
the biracial metropolitan areas of our country is essen-
tially the same : one of segregated residential and migra-
tory patterns the impact of which on the racial composi-
tion of the schools was often perpetuated and rarely 
ameliorated by action of public school authorities. This 
1s a national, not a southem phenomenon. And it is 
largely unrelated to whether a particular State had or did 
not have segregatory school laws." 
Whereas Brown I rightly decreed the elimination 
of state-imposed segregation in that particular section of 
the country where it did exist, Swann imposed obligations 
on southern school districts to eliminate conditions which 
are not regionally unique but are similar both in origin 
and effect to conditions in the rest of the country. As 
''A::< Dr. Karl Taeuber ::Hate;; in hi" article , He"Identwl Segregation. 
Scientific American, Augu~t 1965, at 14 : 
•· No elaborate analysis is nece:;:;ary to concludt• from the~c figure~ 
that a high degree of re:sidential ~egregation bH~ed on rnre 1" a uni-
ver~al charactenstic of American citie~. This segregat ion 1,; found 
in the cities of the North and We"t a;; well a:; of the South; m large 
W1e~ a;; well as small ; in nonindu~trial citie:; a" well a,; mdu"trial ; m 
cine~ with hundreds of thousand::< of ~egro resident.' a~ well ns tho::;e 
wtth on!~- a few thousand; nne! m citie::< thHt are progre:<:>i\'C' in their 
emplo~·ment pmctice nne! cn·il nghts polirie" a;; well a:< tho~e thnt 
are not." 
1n lu ,; book, 1'\egroe" in C'nie:< (1965), Dr. Tneub('f :<tilted that re"i-
drnwd "egregntion exJ:;t:< "regardle::;~ of the character of local law~ 
and polif'JP:< and regarrllP:<::; of othn form:< of rli:<cnmmation ." /rl .. 
;It :~I), 
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the remedial obligations of Swann extend far beyond 
the elimination of the outgrowths of the state-imposed 
segregation outlawPd in Brown , the rationale of St~'aJIII 
points inevitably towards a uniform . constitutional ap-
proach to our national problem of school segregation , 
TT 
The Court's decision today, >vhile adhering to th<:i 
de jure/ de facto distinction, will require the application 
of the Green/ Swam1 doctrine of "affirmati ve duty " to the 
Denver School Board despite the absence of any history 
of state-mandated school segregation . The only evidence 
of a constitutional violation was found in various de~ 
cisions of the school board. I concur in the Court 's posi-
t1on that the public school authorities are the responsible 
agency of the State, and that if the affirmative duty doe-
trine is sound constitutional law for Charlotte. it 1s 
eq ually so for Denver. I would not , however. perpetuate 
the de jure/ de facto distinction nor would I leave to peti-
tioners the initial tortuous effort of identifying "segre-
gative acts" and deducing "segregatory intent.'' I would 
hold. quite simply, that where segregated public schools 
exist within a school district to a substantial degree. there 
is a prima facie case that th e duly constituted publi c> 
a uthorities (I will usually refer to them collectively as 
the "school board") are sufficiently rPsponsible 1" to im-
pose upon them a nationally applicable burden to demon-
10 
A pnma facw ca~e of con~t ttutton ;t! \·iolatJon ext,.:t,.: \\'hen ~egre­
gatlon J,.: found to <I ,.:u!J:;tnntwJ urgrep in the :;chool,; of a par-
t! C'II iar dtstnct. It 1,.: rrcognizPd. of com :;r , that thi" trrm i" rPin-
t l\'l' and proYide:; no prrei"r standa rd:;. But rircumstanrP"', clemo-
.gmphl r and othr rwi ,.:e, \·an· from di:;t ri ct t o di,.:trict a nd hard and 
ia:;t rule,.: ,.:hould not be formula trd. The rxi~ten ce of a suh~tantial 
pr rcent agr of ::;chool " popul<lted b~- st ude nt " from onr ntrr onl~· or 
ptw!ominate l ~· "o populated. should trigger thr mquiry . 
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strate they nevertheless are operating a genuinely inte-
grated school system. 
A 
The principal reason for abandonment of the de jure/ 
de facto distinction is that. in view of the evolution of 
the holding in Brown 1 into the affirmative duty doctrine. 
the distinction no longer can be justified on a principled 
basis. In decreeing remedial requirements for the 
Charlotte/ Mecklenburg school district. Swann dealt 
with a metropolitan. urbanized area in which the basic 
causes of segregation were generally similar to those in 
all sections of the country. and also largely irrelevant 
to the existence of historic. state-imposed segregation at 
th e time of the Brown decision. Further. the extension 
of the affirmative duty concept to require compulsory 
sturlent transportation went well beyond the mere rem-
edying of that portion of school segregation for which 
former state segregation laws were eve responsible. 
Moreover. as the Court's opinion today abun ant y c em-
onstrates. the facts deemed necessary to establish de jure 
discrimination present problems of subjective intent 
which the courts cannot fairl~"y_:_r.:es::o::..;l.:.v:::.e.:... :-::---:~------
At t e ou se . o ry o 1 entify the const1tu~ 
tiona] right which is being enforced. This is 110t easy. 
as the precedents have been far from explicit. In 
Bro11m I, after emphasizing the importance of education. 
th e Court said that · 
":::luch an opportunity. where the state has under-
taken to provide it. is a right which must be made 
available to all on equal terms." 347 G. S .. at 493. 
In Brown 11, the Court identified the "fundamental prin-
ciple·· en uncia ted in Brown 1 as being the unconstitu-
tionality of "racial discrimination in public education.' · 
349 r. S .. at 298, and spoke of "the personal interest 
of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon 
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as practicable 011 a nondiscriminatory basis. " 349 U. S., 
at 300. Although this and similar language is ambiguous 
as to the specific constitutional right, it means- as a mini -
mum-that one has the right not to be compelled by 
state action to attend a segregated school system.ll In 
the evolutionary process since 1954, decisions of this 
Court have added a significant gloss to this original right, 
Although nowhere expressly articulated in these terms, 
I would now define it as the right, derived from the Equal 
Protection Clause. to expect that once the State has as-
sumed responsibility for education, local school boards 
will operate integrated school systems within their re-
spective districts. This means that school authorities. 
consistent with the generally accepted educational goal of 
attaining quality education for all pupils, must make and 
implement their customary decisions with a vie~· toward 
enhancing integrated school opportunities. 
The term "integrated school system" presupposes. of 
course, a total absence of any laws. regulations or policies 
supportive of the type of "legalized'' segregation con-
demned in Brown. A system would be integrated in 
accord with constitutional standards if the responsible 
authorities had taken appropriate steps to ( i) integrate 
faculties and administration; (ii) scrupulously assure 
equality of facilities, quality of instruction and curricula 
opportunities throughout the district; (iii) utilize their 
authority to draw attendance zones to promote mtegra-
tion; and ( iv) locate ne",; schools, close old ones. and 
11 8l'f' Bickf'l, oupra. n. 7. <1t 11~: 
' 'It rtJw problem of ~chool desl:'gregationl ha~ not bl'en that sim-
ple . . brcausl:' the laconic opinion in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tio11 wa~ 1tself not tha t simpll' . Onr strain in It became r,·ident in 
subsequent dcciswns outlawing all forms of state-spon~orrd segrega-
tion m e , ·f' r~·t hing from the spectator src tion of a courtroom to golf 
eour::;rs. Tlw mmimal propo~ition that emrrgrd-and about time 
lt wa~ that It should emergr- waH that tlw statr rna~· not , b~· legisla-
tion or admimstratively, class1fy the popnlation alo11g rarml Jines.'' 
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determine the size and grade categories with this same 
objective in mind. Where schbol authorities decide tcJ 
itll(iertake the transportation of students. this also must 
be with integrative opportunities in mind. 
The foregoing prescription is not intended to be either 
definitive or all-inclusive. but rather an indication of 
the con tour characteristics of an integrated school sygM 
tem in which all citizens and pupils may justifiably be 
confident that racial discrimination is neither practiced 
nor tolerated. An integrated school system does not 
mean-and indeed could not mean ih view of the resi:. 
dential patterns of most of our ma]or metropolitan 
areas-that every school must in fac~ be an . integrated 
unit. A schooi which happens to be all or predominantly 
whitE' or all or j)recibminantly black is not a "segregated" 
school in an unconstitutional sense if the system itself is 
a genuinely integrated one, 
Having school boards operate an integrated school sys-
tem provides the best assurance of meeting the constitu-
tional requirement that racial discrimination. subtle or 
otherwise. will find no place in the decisions of public 
school officials. Courts judging past school board actions 
with a vie>v to their general integrative effect will be best 
able to assure au absence of such discrimination while 
avoiding the murky, subjective judgments inherent in 
the Court's search for "segregatory intent." Any test 
resting on so nebulous and elusive an element as a 
school board's segregatory "intent" provides inadequate 
assurance that minority children will not be short-
changed in the decisions of those entrusted with the non-
rliscriminatory operation of our public schools. 
Public schools are creatures of the State, and whether 
the segregation is state-created or state-assisted or 
merely state-perpetuated should be irrelevant to consti~ 
tutional principle. The school board exercises pervasive 
and continuing responsibility over the long range plan= 
/( 
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ning as well as the daily operations of the public school 
system. It sets policies on attendance zones, faculty 
employment and assignments. school construction, clos-
ings and consolidations. and myriad other matters. 
School board decisions obviously are not the sole cause 
of segregated school conditions. But if. after detailed 
and complete public supervision, substantial 8chool segre-
gation still persists, the presumption is strong that the 
school board , by its acts or omissions. is in some part 
responsible. Where state action and supervision are so 
pervasive and where. after years of such action. seg-
regated schools continue to exist within the district 
to a substantial degree. this Court is justified in find-
ing a prima facie case of a constitutional violation. 
The burden then must fall on the school board to demon-
strate it is operating an "integrated school system.'' 
It makes little sense to find prima facie violations and 
the conseque11t, affirmative duty to desegregate solely in 
those States ;vith state-imposed segregation at the time 
of the Brown decision. The history of state-imposed 
segregation is more widespread in our country than the 
de jure/ de facto distinction has traditionally cared to 
rceogmze. As one commentator has noted: 
" the three court of appeals decisions denying a con-
stitutional duty to abolish de facto segregation all 
arose in cities-Cincinnati. Gary and Kansas City. 
Kansas-where racial segregation 111 schools was 
formerly mandated by state or local law. [Deal v. 
CinC?:nnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F. 2d 55 (CA6 1966), 
cert. denied. 377 I'. S. 924 ( 1964); Downs"· Board 
of Educ. , 336 F. 2d 988 (CAlO 1964). cert. de-
nied. 380 C S. 914. Bell \'. School City, 324 F. 2d 
209 (C'A7 1963). cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924.] Ohio 
discarded its statute in 1887. Indiana in 1949, and 
Kansas City not until the advent of Brown. If 
~egro and white parents in Mississippi are required 
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to bus their children to distant schools on the theory 
that the consequences of past de jure segregation 
cannot otherwise be dissipated. should not the same 
reasoning apply in Gary. Indiana, where no more 
than five years before Brown the same practice 
existed with presumably the same effects." Good-
man. Dt> Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional 
and Empirical Analysis, 60 Cal. L. Rev. 275·, 297 
(1972) .1 " 
Kot only does the de jure/ de facto distinction operate 
jnequitably on communities in different sections of the 
country~ more importantly. it disadvantages minority 
children as well. As the Fifth Circuit stated : 
"The X egro children in Cleveland. Chicago. L6s 
Angeles. Boston. X ew York. or any other area of the 
nation which the opinion classifies under de facto 
segregation. would receive little comfort from the 
assertion that the racial make-up of their school sys-
tem does not violate their constitutional rights be-
cause they were born into a de facto society, while 
the exact same racial make-up of the school system 
m the 17 southern and border states violates th~ 
'~ Tlw author rontmur~ : 
·'T rur, the (•a rlier the polic.' · of :;egregation wa~ abandoned the less 
danger thrrr i~ that it rontinur~ to oprrMr ro,·ertl~·. i~ ,;ignificantly 
n•;.;ponsihlr for pn•,;ent da~· pattern>' of re,;id r ntial >'egrrgation , or has 
eontributrd rnatrriall .'· to pre~ent communit~· attitudr~ tO\\·arcl Xegro 
,:('hool ,;. But therr 1 ~ no rra~on to ;-;uppo,;r that 195-+ i~ a uni\'er,;ally 
appropnatr di,·iding lin r brn,·een clr jurr ,;eg regation that ma~· 
"af(')~ · lw ~~~~mned to haw• ~pent it self and that which may not. 
For man~· remrclial purpu;-;e~. adoption of an arbitrar~· but ea,;il~· 
admint~t rabl e ('Utoff pomt might not br objertionable But in a 
"ttuat1on ~ urlt a,; ~rhool d~rgregation. whrre both tlt r nghto: a~srrted 
and the rrmrdial burdrn,; impo~rd nrr of such magnitude, and whrre 
1 hr re,;ult ing ,;pet tonal di"cnmma tion i,; pa~,.;iona tel~· re,;rnted. it 1 ~ 
.~urel~' quc;-;tionable whrtlwr ~u ch arLitrarinPs~ J,..: dthcr politically 
or morally aec·c•ptablr " 
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constitutional rights of their counterparts, or even 
their blood brothers, bec~us~ they were born into 
a de jure society. Ali- chilarel1 everywhere jn the 
nation are protected by the Constitution. aiH1 treat-
ment v,·hich violates their constitutional rights ii1 
one area. also violates such constitutional rights in 
another area.'' Cisnero.s v. Corp?fS Christi Independ-
ent School District, 467 F. 2d 142. 148 (CA5 en bane, 
1972) quoting United States v. J_efferson County 
Board of Bduc., 380 F. 2d 385. 397 (CA5 en bane) 
Gewin, J.. dissenting) ,'" 
The Court today does move for the first time toward 
breaking down past sectional disparities, but it clings 
tenuously to its distinction. It searches for de jure 
action lll what the Denver School Board has done or 
failed to do . and even here the Court does not rely upo11 
the results or effects of the Board's conduct but feels coni-
pelled to find segregatory intent : '" 
"We emphasize that the differentiating factor be-
tween de jure segregation and so-call<'d de facto 
'" Set· Birkrl , oupra. 11 7, at 119 : 
"If a Negro rhild prrcr1ve~ hili ;;eparation a~ di~rrmunator~· and 
im·1diou,.;, hr 1 ~ not , m a ~ociet~· a hundrrd .H'ar~ n•movrcl from 
,.;laver~·. gomg to makt' fine cli~tinction~ nbont thr ''lllll'l'l' of n pnr-
ticular ~:>rparat ion " 
,. Thr Court toda~· dor,.; not rf'quirC' , huwt·n·r. a ~pgrC'gatur\· mt<'111 
1\'ith rr~pC'ct to thC' r ntire ~rhool ;; ~ ·,.;trm . and i1tdrrd hold,.; 1 hat if ,.; nch 
an 1ntr nt 1 ~ fou nd \\'tth rr~prct to ~omr sehoul~ 111 a ~,·~trm. th C' bnr-
den-normalh· on thr plamtiff~-l:' hift ::; to thr cldPndant ~chou! all-
thoritJr,.; to pro,·r a nrga tivf': namelv. that thPtr 1111rpo,.;<•:; w<·n· 
hf'mgn, ante. pp 17- li\. 
Thr Conrt ha ::; COlllC' a long wa~· ~ I Ill'<' 8 rull' ll !. :::\tart ing from 
the una ~,.;n il abl P de ;ure ground of tlw di;;cmnin;tton· <·on~titlltional 
and statutor~· proVI;;ion,.; of ~onw Statt·~. tlw liP\\' formul<ttion-~till 
profe,.;wtg fideltt~· to thr de ;ure clortrinC'-i~ that dr,.;<·gn'gation will 
be orderPd de:;pttP the ab"rncP of an~· ,.;t•gn·ga 1 or~· !a"'" if: ( i) "l'grr·-
g'ated ~ehoo],.; in fact PXi<'t : (it) a cou.rt find~ that tht';· rP,.;u[t frun~ 
71-507-CONCllR & DISSENT 
KEYES v. RCHOOL DISTRICT ).'0. 1, DEI\TEH. COLO 15 
segrcga tion to \\'hich we referred in Swann is pur-
pose or intent to segregate. '' (Court Opinion, p. 18) 
(italics are the Court's 1. 
The Court's insistence that the "differentiating factor '' 
between de jure and de facto segregation be "purpose 
or intent" is difficult to reconcile with the language in so 
recent a case as Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia , 
407 P . S. 451 ( 7972). In holding there that "motiva-
tion'' is irrelevant. the Court said: 
" In addition, an inquiry into the 'dominant' motiva-
tion of school authorities is as irrelevant as it is fruit-
less. The mandate of Brown II was to desegregate 
schools. and \Ve have said that '[t]he measure of 
any desegregation plan is its effectiveness.· Davis 
v. School CommissioneTs of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 
33. 37. 
"Thus. we have focused upon the effect-not thf' 
purpose or motivation- of a school board's action 
in determining whether it is a permissible method 
of dismantling a dual system. 
" Though the purpose of the 11ev\' school distnct was 
found to be discriminatory iu many of these cases. the 
courts' holdings rested not on motivation or pur-
}Joses but on the effect of the action upon the dis-
mantling of the dual school system iilvolvecl. That 
"·as the focus of the District Court in this case, and 
we hold that its approach was proper. 407 1 r . S .. 
a.t 462. 
T can discern tJO basis in law or logic for holding that 
the motivation of school hoard action is irrelevant in 
~0 111<' ~1ctw n tak011 II'Jth <'l'gregntur.\· llltl'nt h~· the "rhool hoard : 
(ni) <'Uch actwn rPint<'" to nnY "meaningful ~egment" of tlw ~chool 
"·''"l<'m ; aJHi (!\') tlw .,chool ho;Jrd ca nnot pro,·p that It<' Jlltl'ntion :< 
,,·it h n ·~p(•rt to the rernaindPr of t h<• <'\":<t<·m wen· l!Oil~<·grrgatory, 
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Virginia and controlling in Colorado. It may be argu0cl. 
of course. that in En17J0ria a prior constitutional viola-
tion had already been proven and that this .JUStifies the 
distinction. The net result of the Court's language. ho\\·-
C'ver. is the application of an effect test to the actions of 
southem school districts and an intent test to those in 
othC'r sections. at least until an initial de jure finding for 
those' districts can be made. Rather than straining to 
perpetuate any such dual standard. we should hold forth-
rightly that significant segregated school conditions in 
\vhatever section of the country are a prima facie viola-
tion of constitutional rights. As the Court has noted 
t>lse"·here : 
"Circumstances or chance may well dictate that no 
persons in a certain class will serve on a particular 
jury or during some particular period. But it taxC's 
our credulity to say that nwre chance resulted iu 
there being no members of this class among the over 
six thousand jurors called in the past 25 years. The 
result bespeaks discrimnation, whether or not it was 
a, co11scious decision on the part of any individual JUry 
r·o111tnissioner." Hernandez v. Te::ras, 347 C S. 475. 
482 ( 1954) . (Emphasis ac!clec! l 
B 
There is thus 110 reason as a matter of constitutiOnal 
principle to adhere to the de jure/ de facto distinction in 
school desegregation cases. In addition. there are rea-
sons of policy and prudent judicial administration which 
point strongly toward the adoption of a uniform national 
rule. The litigation heretofore centered in the South 
already is surfacing in other regions. The decision of 
the Court today, emphasizing as it does the elusive 
element of segregatory intent, will invite numerous deseg-
regation suits in which there can be little hope of uni-
fQrmit:v of re15ult , 
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The issue in these cases will not be whether segregated 
education exists. This will be conceded in most of them . 
The litigation will focus as a consequence of the Court 's 
decision on vvhether segregation has resulted in an y 
"meaningful or significant" portion of a school system 
from a school board's "segregatory intent." The intrac-
table problems involved in litigating this issue are obvious 
to any lawyer. The results of litigation-often arrived 
at subjectively by a court endeavoring to ascertain the 
subjective intent of school authorities with respect to 
action taken or not taken over many years-will bE' 
fortuitous. unpredictable and even capricious. 
The Denver situation is illustrative of the problem. 
The courts below found evidence of de JUre violations 
with respect to the Park Hill schools and an absence of 
such violations with respect to the core city schools. 
despite the fact that actions taken by the school board 
with regard to those two sections were not dissimilar. 
It is, for example. quite possible to contend that both 
the construction of Manual High School in the core city 
area and Barrett Elementary School in the Park Hill area 
operated to serve their surrounding Negro communities 
and. in effect. to merge school attendance zones with 
segregated residential patterns. See Petitioner's Brief, 
pp. 80-83. Yet findings even on such similar acts will , 
under the de jure/de facto distinction. continue to differ . 
especially since the Court has never made clear what 
suffices to establish the requisite "segregatory intent'" for 
an initial constitutional violation . Even if It were pos-
sible to clarify this question. \\·ide and unpredictable 
differences of opinion among judges '":ould be inevitable 
when dealing with an issue as slippery as "intent'" or 
"purpose." especially when related to hundreds of 
decisions made by school authorities Ulldf'r varying eon-
ditions over many vears 
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This Court has recognized repeatedly that it is "ex-
tremely difficult for a court to ascertain the motivation, 
or collection of different motivations. that lie behind a 
legislative enactment. ' ' Palmer V. Thornpson, 403 e. S. 
214, 224 (1971); McGinnis v. Royster, - r . S. -.-
(1973); United States v. O'Brien , 391 C R. 367, 381 
( 1968). Whatever difficulties exist vYi th regard to a sin-
gle statute will be compounded in a judicial review of 
years of administration of a large aiid complex school 
system."' Every act of a school board and school ad-
ministration. and indeed every failure to act where affirm-
ative action is indicated, must now be subject to scrutiny. 
The most routine decisions with respect to the operation 
of schools. made almost daily, can affect in varying de-
grees the extent to which schools are initially segregated. 
remain in that collClition, are desegregated. or-for the 
long term future- are likely to be one or the other. These 
uecisions include action or nonaction with respect to 
school building construction and location; the timing of 
building new schools and their size; the closing and con-
solidation of schools; the drawing or gerrymandering of 
' ·' A~ onr comm('ntaror ha~ rxpn·~:-;ed it. 
"If thr court~ arr mdrrd prrp:HPd to inq111re mto mottw. thorn)· 
qurstions will ari~r e1·en 1f onr a::-:~umr~ that ra(·ial motn·atwn i~· 
rapablr of bemg provrn at trtal. What of thr case 111 1Yh1rh one or 
morr mrmbrr" of a ~rhool board , but lrss than a majorit)·, are found 
to haw actrd on racwl ground~·> What if it appPars that the :;rhool 
hoard 's actwn ll"a~ promptrd bY a mixt11n· of motll"e~ . mcluding con-
;;titlltJOnall)· innocrnt one:-; that alone 1\"0illd han' promptrd the board 
to act 9 What 1f thr members of the tichool board ,,·rrr not thrm-
~rh·es raciall)· m~pirrd but \\'l::<hrd to plra~<· thrir (·onst1tuent::< , many 
of II' hom t hr)· knew to bP :,:o '1 If such ra~r~ a rr da~:;ifird a~ un-
con~htutional de Jurr spgrPgatlon , thrrc i~ littlr poult 1n pre:;prving 
thr de .ime-dr facto cli>'tinction at all. And 11 ma)· 1\"PII br thnt thP 
diffcrrnrr betll"rrn an)· of t he~c ~1tuation~ and one 111 wh1rh racJal 
mot1ntwn IS altogrthrr lacking 1~ too m:;ignificant. from rhr ~tand­
pomt of both thr morn! l'ulpabllitl" of the· ~tatP officwl~ and the· 
llll]Xl.et upon thr children im·oh·rd , to ~upport a diffPrPncr in ron--
stttutwnal trra tment " Goofjman , supra. 11 11. at :?X+-2H5_ 
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student attendance zones; thr extent to which a. neigh-
borhood policy is enforced; the recruitment. promotion 
and assignment of faculty and supervisory personnel: 
policies with respect to transfers from one school to 
another; whetlwr. and to ·what extent. special schools will 
be provided. where they will be located. and who ''"ill 
qualify to attend them; the determination of curriculunL 
including whether there will be "tracks" that lead pri-
marily to college or to vocational training. and the rout-
ing of students into these tracks; and even decisions as 
to social. recreational and athletic policies. 
ln Swan 11 the Court did not have to probe in to segre-
gatory intent and proximate cause with respect to each 
of these "endless'' factors . The basis for its de jure find-
ing there was rooted primarily in the prior history of the 
desegregation suit. 402 l ' . :-i .. at 5-6. But in a case of 
the present type. where no such history exists. a judicial 
examination of these factors will be required under to-
day 's decision. This will lead inevitably to uneven and 
unpredictable results. to protracted and inconclusive liti -
gation. to added burdens on the federal courts. and to 
serious disruption of individual school systems. ln tlw 
absence of national and objective standards. school boards 
and administrators will remain in a state of uncertainty 
and disarray , speculating as to what is required and when 
litigation will strike . 
(' 
Rather than continue to prop up a distinction no longer 
grounded in principle, and contributing to the conse-
quences indicated above. we should acknowledge that 
whenever public school segregation exists to a sub-
stantial degree there is prima facie evidence of a con-
stitutional violation by the responsible school board. lt 
is true. of course. that segregated schools- wherever 
located- are not solf'ly tlw product of the actio11 or 
inaction of publie school authoriti<•s. IndP<'d . as indi-
/ 
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cated earlier. there can be little doubt that principal 
causes of the pervasive school segregation found in the 
major urban areas of this country. whether in the Xorth. 
vVest. or South. are the socio-economic i11fluences '"hicb 
have concentrated our minority citizens in the inner cities 
while the more mobile white majority disperse to the sub-
urbs. But it is also true that public school boards have 
continuing. detailed responsibility for the public school 
system \\'ithin their district 'n and, as Judge John Minor 
\Visclom has noted. "v.:here the figures lsho\\·ing 
segregation in the schoolsj speak so eloquently. a 
prima face case of discrimination is established.'' 
United States v. Texas Education Agency, 467 F. 2d 84 . 
873 ( CA5 en bane 1972). Moreover, as foreshadowed in 
Swann and as implicitly held today. school boards have a 
duty to minimize and ameliorate segregated conditions 
by pursuing an affirmative policy of desegregation. It is 
this policy which must be applied consistently on a na-
tional basis without regard to a doctrinal distinction 
\Yhich has outlived its time. 
T11 
The preceding section addresses the constitutional ob-
ligation of public authorities in the school districts {J ._.. 
throughout our country to operate integrated school sys- \ 
terns. When the rhools of a particular district a·~
u; Indl'ed , if one gor~ back far rnough, n ~~ probable that all rac~al 
~egregat ion , whereyer ocrurnng and whet her or not confined to thr 
::;chook ha,; at ~orne time been ~upportrd or maintained b~· go,·rrn-
mrnt al'tion . In Berket , .. &·hoot Board. :m~ F. Supp. 127·1- , 1:311 -
J:ns (ED \'a . 1969) , .Tudgr Waltrr Hotfm;ln eompi!Pd a ,;ummar~· 
of pa,;t publ!e ,;egregator~· action whirh mcludPd Pxampl{'~ from a 
great ma.iority of Starr,;. He roneluded that "on!~· a:o: to the ,;tatr~ 
of l\Iame. \few Hnmp~h1n• , \'ermont. \\ra~hmgton. :'-JrYada. and 
Hawaii cloP~ ir apprar from tbi~ nonexhaustive re~earch that nodi:'-
erimnwtor~· law:,: :1ppenrrd on thr boob at onp tim(' or anotlwr_" 
!rl., at 1:315. 
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found to be substantially segregated, there is a prima 
facie case that this obligation has not been met. The 
burden then shifts to the school authorities to demon~ E 
strate that they have in fact operated an integ 1 a 
system as this term is defined above, supra, p. -;(· If · 
there is a failure successfully to rebut the prima facie 
case. the question then becomes what reasonable affinnac 
-tive~steps district courts may require to place the school 
system in compliance \vith the constitutional standard. 
In short. what specifically is the nature and scope of the 
·emedy'? 
As the Court's opinion virtually compels the finding on 
remand that Denver is a "dual school system,'' that city 
will then be under an "affirniative duty" to desegregat<:' Je___ 
its entire system "root and branch.' ' Green v. County 
School Board, 391 U. S .. at 438. Again, the critical ques-
tion is what ought this constitutional duty to entail. 
A 
The controlling case is Swan'/1, supra, and the questiOn 
which will confront and confound the District Court and 
Denver School Board is what indeed does Swann require . 
Swann purported to enunciate no new principles, relying 
heavily 011 Brown I and !I and on Green. Yet it affirmed 
a district court order which had relied heavily on "racial 
ratios" and sanctioned transportation of elementary a~ 
\\·ell as secondary pupils. Lower federal courts have often 
read Swann as requiring far-reaching transportation de-
crees 17 " to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual 
17 See, e. g .. Thompson v. Sehoul Board of Xell'port Nell'~. -
F . 2d -,- (1972), where the CA4 en ba11c. uph<'ld a di~tnct court 
a~~IgJUnPnt plan when• "travel time, varying from a mmimum of 
fort~ · mmutP~ a nd a maximum of one hour, pach wa)·, would hP rP-
4UirPd for bu~mg black ~tudents out of the old Cit~· and white stu-
qrnt,.; into the old City 111 order to arlm•ve a nicml balancmg of the 
desegregation." 402 1:. S., at 26. In the context of a 
large urban area. with heavy residential concentrations 
of white and black citizens in different-and widely 
separated-sections of the school district, extensive dis-
persal and transportation of pupils is inevitable if Swann 
ansively as many courts have been rPading.,)<' 
To_the extent that Swann may be thought to require 
large-scale or long-distance transportation of students in 
our metropolitan school districts. I record my profound 
mis 1vmgs. Xothing in our Constitution commands or 
encourages any such disruption of public education. 
Fortunately, Swann also laid down a broad rule of reason 
under '"'hich desegregation remedies must remain flexible 
and other values and interests be considered. ~Thus thP 
Court recognized that school authorities. not the federal 
judiciary, must be charged in the first instance with tht> 
task of desegregating local school systems. 402 U. ~., at 
16. School boards in rural areas might adjust mon· 
readily to this task than those in metropolitan distnct8' 
distnct. " Thi:; tran:sportation wa~ drcrred for children from the th1rd 
grade up, involving children ~~~ young as right yrar:s of 11gr. 
In Northcross v. Memphis Bd. of Educ. , 466 F. :2d R90, ~95 
( 197:2), the CA6 affirmed a di~trict court 11:s:signment pl11n wlmh 
dail~· tmn:sportrd 14,000 children with "the maxnnum tnnP to bP· 
~prnt on the bu:se,; b~· an~· child I bring I :34 minutr~. . ," prr-
~umabl~· rach wa~·. But '" .Judgr Weick notrd in dt:s:srnt the CA6 
tn"tructPd the di::;trict judgr to implement ~·et furth<'r dr~rgrrgation 
ordrr~. Plan~ presrntl~· undrr con~ideration b~· that court call for 
t hr bu:sing of :39,01'5 and 61,5:30 children re,;prctiwl~·, for undrtrr-
mmrd length,; of timr. !d .. at R95-98fi. 
Prtitioner,; brfor<' thi:s Court in Potts \'. Fla.r . Xo 7:2-2i'tl, cert. 
denird, - r. S. - (197-), contended that thr implrmrntatwn 
of th<' C'A5'~ clirectiw in Flax , .. Potts. 464 F. :2d ~65 ( 197:2), would 
n•qutrP bu,; ridr~ of up to two hour,; and :20 minutp~ each da~· and 
a round trip of up to 70 miiP~ . Petitio11 , at 14. Whilr re~pondents 
contend thr~e figurr::: rrpr<'~rnt an "a::;tounding mflat ion," He,;pon~e. 
(ll (. tl':ln~portat\on of :1 ~ignifi('ant magnitur]p >'('<'Ill~ l!lP\' Itab](' , 
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"with dense and shifting population. numerous schools, 
congested and complex traffic patterns.'' !d., at 14. 
Transportation orders are suspect "when the time or 
distance of travel is so great as to either risk the health 
of the children or significantly impinge on the education 
process. !d., at 31. Fina.lly, the age of the pupils to 
be transported was recognized by the Court in Swann 
as one important limitation on the time of student 
travel. Ibid . 
These factors were supposed to help guide district courts 
in framing equitable remedies in school desegregation 
cases." And the Court further emphasized that equitable 
decrees are inherently sensitive. not solely to the degree 
of desegregation to be achieved. but to a variety of other 
public and private interests : 
. . . a school desegregation case does not differ 
fundamentally from other cases involving the fram-
ing of equitable remedies to repair the denial of a 
constitutional right. The task is to correct. by a 
balancing of the individual and collective interest. 
the condition that offends the Constitution . 8wann . 
. ;;upra, at 15- 16. 
Those words echoed a similar expression in Bro11•11 ll , 
349 U. S., at 229 : 
" In fashioning and effecting the decrees . the court1:5 
will be guided by equitable principles. Tradition-
ally, equity has been characterized by a practical 
flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility 
1
' Se<' L'nited States " · Texa~; Education Agency. -l-117 F . :.!d i\-l-8. Xc\~{ 
(CA5 1972) (Bell. .J ., concurring m an opinion in wluch ~<' \'<' ll ot lwr 
Judg<'~ jo inrd): 
" ln our \' I<'W the r<'m<'dy which tlw district court 1 ~ n•quin'd to 
formula!<' ~ houlcl bt• formulat('d within tlw entire route.rt or the 
opmwn Ill Swamt , . Charlotte-Mer-klenburg Board of Er/ucn-
tim'. . . . LEmphasi~ aclcl<·d.j" 
50 -
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for adj usti11g and reconciling public and private 
nreds." 
Thus in school desegregation cases, as elsewhere, equity 
counsels reason. flexibility a11d balance. See. e. g., Lemon 
v. Kurtzman.- V. S.- (1973). I am aware. of 
course. that reasonableness in any area is a relative and 
subjective concept. But with school desegregation, rea-
sonableness would seem to embody a balanced evaluation 
of the obligation of public school boards to 
_.._. ___ _, ~1 with other. equally important ucational inter-
ests which a community may legitimately assert. Xeglect 
of either the obligation or the interests destroys the even-
hancfecf spirit with which equitable remedies must be 
approached.'" Overzealousness in pursuit of any singlP 
goal is untrue to the tradition of equity and to the "bal-
aiiCl' .. ami "flexibility" ~hich this Court has alwayy 
:;,--r~'at'(lt>(~ +t. 
B 
Where school authorities have defaulted in their duty 
to operate an integrated school system. district courts 
lllust insure that affirmative dcsegregative steps ensue 
~Iany of these can be taken effectively without dam-
aging state and parental interests in having children at-
tend schools within a reasonable vicinity of home. 
vYhere clesegregative ste]JS are possible within the frame-
work of a system of "neighborhood education." school 
authorities 
" ' Tlw rp}(•,·ant inquir~· i~ "ll'hNhrr th(• co~t~ of arhl('nng: dr~<·g:rP­
g:ation in <In~· giwn ~ituation outwrigh tlw }(•gal. moral and f'durn-
t ion a} ('Oll:<tdrra t ion,: fa ,·oring: It . • . It i~ c!Pa r . t h;lt t hP 
Con~tttutton "hould not br hrld to rpquir<' am· tran~portation plan 
that k<'f'Jl~ childn•n on a bu" for a "ub"tantial part of thl' da~·. ron -
.-nttnf'~ ~igntfieant portion~ of fund" oth<'nYi"P "PPndabk dirPctly on 
('ducat IOII. or ill\·oln·~ a gc·nuinr Plrmrnt of dangPr to thr ~afl't~ · of 
th<• C'hild." Srhool Dr"rgrrgntion Aft<'r :Swann: .-\ Tlwor_,. of Co,·-
\'rnmrnt Rr·~pon~ihtlit,\·. :39 (". Chi L J{r,·. -t!l. -tU. -H:~ ( HJ/:2) . 
KEYES 11. SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1. DEXn:n. <'OLO 2 .~ 
aries of neighborhood attendance zones should bf' drawn 
to integrate . to thE' extent practicablE'. the school's stu-
dent body. Construction of new schools should bP of 
such a size and at such a Ioca tion as to encourage the 
likelihood of integration. Swann, at 21. Faculty integra-
tion should be attained throughout the school systPm. 
Swann, at 19; United States v. Montgomery County 
Board of Education, 395 U. S. 225 ( Hl69) . .-\.n optional 
majority to minority transfer program. ,,·ith the Statf' 
providing free transportation to desiring students. 1s also 
a helpful adjunct to a desegregated school system. 
8wann. at 26-27. It hardly need be repeatPd that alloca~ 
tion of resources within the school district must be marl<' 
\Yith scrupulous fairness among all schools . 
. The above examples are meant to bP illustrativr. not 
f>Xhaustivc. The point is that the over-all integrative 
impact of such school board df'cisions must be assessed by 
district courts in deciding whether the duty to desegregate 
has been met. For example. "neighborhood school plans 
arf' constitutionally suspect whf'n attendancE' zotH'S an' 
superficially imposed upon racially defined twighborhoods. 
and when school construction presPrvf's rather than elimt-
nates the racial hegemony of gi w n schools ... "'' K eyfs 
v. School District Xo. 1, Denver Colorado,- F . 2d -, 
l 'n'ited States v. Board of Education of Tulsa County, 
429 F. :2d -. 1258- 1259. This does not imply that 
deci t: ions on faculty assignment. attendance zones. school 
construction. closing and consolidation. must be made 
to the detrinwnt of all nf'utral. nonracial considPrations 
But these considerations can. 11·ith proper school board 
initiative. generally bf' met in a manner that will rnhance 
the degree of school dPsegregatio11 
""A \l~pful ~tud~· of tlw lu~tonral \1~('~ and ah\I~P~ or tlH• ll (' lghhoi·-
hoorl ~rhool eoncf'pt 1~ \I WrmiH•rg , Hac-<' (\: Plarr t 19()7 l , 
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Ddaulting school authonties \\·ould have. at a mini-
mum. the obligation to take affirmative steps of the sort 
outlined in the above section. School boards would. of 
course. be free to develop and initiatr further plans to 
promote school desegregation. In a pluralistic society 
such as ours. it is essent1al that no racial minority frel 
demeaned or discriminatC'd against ami that students of 
a ll races learn to play. work. ancl cooperate with on<' 
another in their cmnmo11 pursuits and endeavors. :\'oth-
ing in this opinion is meant to discourage school boards 
from exceeding minimal constitutional standards in pro-
moting the recognized values of integrated school 
('Ondition~ . 
A r·o11stitutional requ1rr men t of extensive. student / 
transportation so lely to achieve' integration~
presents a vastly more eomp lex problem. It promisf's 
on the one hand a greater degree of actual desegregation. 
while it infringes on what may fairly be regarded as 
important community aspirations and personal nghts. A 
The Equal Protection Clause does mcleed require that 
racial discrimination not be tolerated in tlw deciswns 
of public scho.ol authorities. k )Poes not command that L f3._u._:T z_}--
school authonties undertake widespread student trans- -
portation solely for the sakr of maximizing integration ."' 
"' In !art, dur to rarialh· ~rpar:ttc• I'P~a!Pnnal pattrrns that rhar-
H<'IE'rihc' our major urban an·n~ 11 t,; quttP unreah~tH· to thmk of 
ac·htr1·i ng in mam· eittr~ ~uh~tantwl tntrgration throughout the· 
~rhool dtst nrt ll'lthout a dr12:n·c · of ~~ udPnt tran~portat ion ll'hieh 
ll'ould haYr the gravr~t pronomtr and Pducational r·on~rqll<'llf'f'~ 
.-\ s l'rofr~,.:or Birkf'l notP~ 
·Tn mo~t of the lar~er urban :tl'<'a~. d!'mogra phte rondttton::; arr ~urh 
that no policy that a romt ran onl<>r. and a ~rhool board, a rtty ot· 
<'l·rn :1 ~tat<' ha,.: tlH~ rapabi!Jt~ · to put into ptfpct, will m fart rr~ult 
111 thP for<'"<'P:!ble futurp 111 raet : tll~ · balatH'Pd puiJIH· ::;e hool.-<. Only 
i l l'('ordf'ring of t hP Pll\' II'Ollm c· nt tn1·oj l'lllg Pc·onomH· and ~oet:d po!Jr\' 
')'" _, 
This obvio sly doE's not nwan that bus transportatiOn ~~ 
has no placE' i 1 public school systems orA&tl a permJssJbl~  
desegregative ~· The transporting of school children 
is as old as public f'ducation, ami in rural and som(' 
suburban settings it 1s as indispensable as the providing 
of hooks. It is presently estimated that approximatE'ly 
half of all American children ride buses to school for 
reasons unrE'lated to integration."" At the secondary 
lE'vel in particular, wherE' thE' schools are larger and servP 
a wider. more dispersed cottstituency than the elE'mentary 
school. some form of public or privately financed trans~ 
portatibi1 is often nE'cessary . 'rhere is a differencE'. how-
ever . in transportation plattS voluntarily initiated by local 
school boards for educational purposes and those im-
posed by a federal court. Thf' former usually represcn t a 
nE'cessary or convE'nient means of access to the school 
nearest honw; the latter often requirE' lengthy trips for no 
purpose otlwr than to furth('r tntegration "" Yet tlw 
on thr hroade~<t roncPJY:tblr front m1ght have an appn~etahk impact " 
B1rkPl, supra. n. / , at J:l:2 
"" E~tunatr~ 1·ar~·. Swami. !iUpra. at :2\:!. not re! that "rlght<•<•n mil-
lion of thr :\atwn '~ public ~<rhool children, approx1matrl~· ::!9%, ,,·en· 
transpo.rtrd to their ~rhoob 1)\· bu~ 111 HHi9-l970 m all part~ of thl' 
cot tnt r~· ." ::knator H ibH·off (D .-Conn.) a thoughtful ~tudrnt of t hi~ 
proiJirm .... tatPd that "two-thu·d,.; of all Ampncan childrrn todaY ridr 
bu,.;r~ to ::;rhool for re;Json::; llllrPhttPd to Illt~·gration . .. Ill' Cong. RPr 
8254:3. FPh 24. 19/2 
"" Ht::'tonralh , dt~tant t ran~porta t ion wa~ wronglY ttsrd 1 o pro-
motP ~<rgrpgation . ":\pgro ch!ldrr!J w<·n· genrrall~· con~Idrrrcl t'a]l· 
aiJIP of trawllmg longPr dt~tanrr~ to ~chool and II'Ithout thr mel of an~ 
1·rhicle What 1\'a~ too far for <I 11·hitP ch tlcl bPcamP rra~ottabl~· near 
lor a :\egro child." iVPmbt>r~~:. wpra. tl. 20. at ,-;7 
Th1" dPplorablr ht~tor~· ha~ lPd ~ontt• to argur that mtpgratn·p btt~ 
ndp,; arp Jlt~tifiPd a~ atottrmPttt for pa:;t ~Pgregator~· tnp~ and that 
ttetghborhood educattott "' ttOII' hut a codP-worcl for racwl :;cgrcgn-
t tOll. But mi~tt:'P of tra tt~port at tOll 1 n t hr pa~t cloP~ ttot tmpl~· ttcigh-
horhood ~chool ing ha,; no nil id IIOil~rgn·ga tor~ · u~r" for t lw pre~ent 
'\or would 1\Tongful t rall~]lortat 1011 Itt the pa ... r Jlt~t1f1· dNnlll<'tHal 
ti'<Jtl~port;ttJOtt for thP dllldrett of torl<ll . 
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('ourt in Swanu was unquestionably right in describing 
bus transportation as '' one tool of school desegregation." 
40:2 ·c S .. at 30."' The crucial issue is when. under \\'hat 
circumstances. anJ to what extent such transportation 
may appropriately be orc!Ned. Tlw answer to thi 
turns-as it does so often in the law- upon a sound exer• 
cisr of discretion under the circumstances. 
Swann itself recognized limits to desegregative obliga-
tions. It noted that a constitutional requirement of "any 
particular degree of racial balance or mixing .. . \Vould 
l1f' disproved . . ," and sanctwned district court usP 
of mathematical ratios as " no more than a startmg point 
in the process of shaping a remedy. . 402 e. S .. at 
24. 25. Thus particular schools may be all \d1lte or· 
all black and st1ll not mfringt• constitutional nghtl:' 
Jf the system is genu1nely integrated and school authori-
ties are pursuing integrative steps short of extensive and 
disruptive transportation. Thr refusal of thr Court to 
require racial balance 1n schools throughout the distnct 
or the au tom a tic c limination of all "one-race schools. " 
402 r. S .. at 26. IS grounded 111 a recognition that the 
~tate . parents. and children all have at stake m 
"' :-lorn<' C'OI11111\lllittr~ had tr;\ !l ~ port at ton plan~ in df<·C't at tlw t!tlH' 
of C'Olll't ciC'~egrrgatiOII ordrr~. Srr ::iu'Q111l, oupra. at 29, n. 11, DaVIS 
1· . &hoof Crmnn'rs of Mobile ('ounty, -!0:2 ll. S. :3:3 , :3-1--:35 (1971) 
( 'ou rt ~ ha 1·r· u~rd t lw pr<'~I'IH'f' or a IJ"·n<·<· of PXI~t l!lg t rn 11~port at tun 
in a dt~tl'l!'l a ~ on<· faetor Ill framing and tmplemPnting dPsPgrrga tton 
dPCI'PP>'. l "tuted States ,._ ll'ats1111 Chapel School Di8tnct. 4-!0 F . :2d 
H:n. 9:37 (l':\1' 1971) : Xorthcro:;:; 1'. Board of Educ., 4-!-! F 2d 1179, 
11S:2-11S:) (('..\() 1971): Da 1•18 , .. Board of Educ .. :3:2.-.: F . Supp. 1197 , 
1:20:) (ED .-\rk. 1971) Wh C' rr ;t .--rhool board ~ ~ ,·oluntanl~- r ngagrd 
111 t ran>'porting ~t udrnt>', a d1,;tnrt C'Ol! rt I>', of <·our~<'. obluratrd to 
Jll>'lll'r that ~uch tran"port atto n I>' not uncl!'rtakrn wtth ~rgrrga tor~· 
Pffr!'t. \YhC'r<'. abo, 1·olunt ; tr~· tran"portation programs arr alrra cl~ 
111 progn'""· tlt<'n' ma~· hr grratc·r Jll>'ltfi!'attull for rourt-orc!Nrd tran"-
port;ltton of ~tuc!Pnt" fur a I'OIIIfJ!lrah!e till/!' a11d rhstance to arhwq·· 
~J'(·;tter !lltr·grat ton_ 
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school desegregatiOn decrf'es legitimate and recogmzablf' 
interests. 
The personal m terest might be characterized as the 
desire that children attend community schools near 
home. Dr. James Coleman testified for petitioners at 
trial that "most school systems organize their schools m 
relation to the residf'nts by having fixed school districts 
and some of these are very ethnically homogeneous." 
App. 1549a. In Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 
396 F. 2d 55, 60 ( H)66). the ~ixth Circuit summarized 
tlw advantageR of Ruch a neighborhood system of 
Rchools: "·· 
":\.ppellants. however. pose the question of whether 
the neighborhood system of pupil placement. fairly 
aclministerf>d without racial bias. comports with the 
requirements of equal opportunity if it nevertheless 
rf>sults in the creation of schools with predominantly 
or f'W lt exclusively :\egro pupils. The neighbor-
hood systr>m IS in wide use throughout the natio11 
and has been for many years the basis of school 
administration. This is so because it is acknowl-
edged to have several valuablE' aspects which are an 
aid to f'clucation. such as minimization of safety haz-
ards to children in rcachmg school. economy of cost 
in reducing transportation needs. ease of pupil 
placement and admtnistratwn through the use of 
"'' Tlu· tl'rm "tll'ighhorhood ~chool '' ~hould not be ~uppo~Pd tu 
r!t•notP ~olel.1 · a ll'alk-m sehool or onr ll'htrh :;ern·~ <·hildren on!~· 111 
thP ~IIITo11mhng blocks. Thr ( 'omt ha~ not<'d, m <1 thtfrrrnt con-
trxt, that "thr ll'l>rd ·neighborhood' 1~ q11JtP a~ ""~rPpttblr of varla-
tton a~ tlw ll'ord ·Joraht~· Both term,.; arp p]a,.;ttr and , deprndrnt 
upon C'Il'C'IIm~tanr<'~ . ma~· bt· rq11alh· ,.;atisfiPcl b~· nrra:; mrm;urrd b.1 
rocb ur bl' tniiP~ " Collllal/ !J \' Oe11era/ Co11,;t. Co .. :2fi9 lJ . 8. :385. 
:)95 tl9:2ti) In thr ~rhool rontPxt. "IIPt).!;hhorhood" refer~ to relatll'<' 
proxtmtt.l' , to a prf'i'PrPIICP for :1 ~<'hool ll!' :ll'Pr. rathN t haJJ mon· 
r!I~t:tiii from honk. 
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neutral, easily determined standards, and bette!' 
home-school communication ,. 
The neighborhood school docs provide greater ease of 
parental and student access and convenience, as well as 
greater economy of public administration. These are 
obvious and distinct advantages. but the legitimacy of 
the neighborhood concPpt rests on more basic grounds."'' 
.\'eighborhod school syst<'ms. neutrally administered. rf'-
fiect the deeply felt desire of citizens for a sense of com-
munity in their public Nlucation. Public schools havP 
heen a traditional source of strength to our :'\ation. and 
that strength may clerivC' in part from the identification of 
many schools IYith the personal features of the surround-
ing neighborhood. Community support. interest and 
dedication to public schools may lYell run higher with a 
neighborhood attendance pattern: distance may encour-
age disinterest. Many citizens sense today a decline in 
the intimacy of our institutions- home. church. and 
school- which has caused a concomitant decline in the 
unity and communal spirit of our people. I pass no 
judgment on this viewpoint. but I do believe that this 
Court should be wary of compelling in the name of con-
stitutional la11· what may seem to many a dissolution in 
the traditional. more personal fabric of their public 
schools. 
Closely related to tlw concept of a community and 
neighborhood education. are those rights and duties par-
ents have with respect to the education of their children. 
The Jaw has long recognized the parental duty to nurture. 
support. and provide for the welfare of children. includ-
""I do 11ot nnp]y that thr IH' tghborhood l'OIH'P]lt mu~t hr PmbodiPd 
lit rvpry ~rhool ~Y:>tPm . But \\'hrn• a ~rhool board ha~ rhot<Pil it . 
fedrral .im\gP~ ~hould accord 1t rl'~p<· <·t 111 framlllg rPnwdtal deer<·<·~. 
i 1- 507-CONCUR & DISSENT 
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mg their education. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
r . S. 510. 534. 535. a unanimous Court held that : 
{lUnder the doctrine of Meyer v. f..' ebraska, 262 
r. S. 390. we think it entirely plain that the Act 
of 1022 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of 
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and 
Pducation of children under their control. . . The 
child is not the mere creature of the state; those who 
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, 
coupled with the high duty. to recognize and pre-
pare him for additional obligations." 
And in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 1.!. S. 479. 482 
( 1965). the Court noted that in Pierce, "the right to edu-
cate one's children as one chooses is made applicable to 
the States by the force of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments." r do not believe recognition of this 
right can be confined solely to a parent's choice to send 
a child to public or private school. Most parents can-
not afford the luxury of a private education for their 
children. and the dual obligation of private tuitions and 
public taxes. Those who may for 11umerous reasons 
seek public education for their children should not be 
forced to forfeit all interest or voice iu the school their 
child attends. It would. of course, be impractical to 
allow the \·vishes of particular parents to be controlling. 
Yet the interest of the parent i11 the enhanced parent-
school and parent-child communication allowed by the 
neighborhood unit ought not to he suppressed by forre. 
of ]a,,· 
In the understandable natwnal concern for alleviating 
public school segregation . courts may have overlooked 
the fact that the rights and interests of children affected 
hy a desegregation program also are entitled to consid-
eration . Any child. white or black . who is compelled to. 
]Pave his nei~hborhood and sprnd sig11ificant tinw f'ach 
71- 507-CO:\Cll.R & DISSE:\1 
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day being transported to a distant school suffers an ime 
pairment of his liberty and his privacy. Xot long ago . 
James B. Conant wrote that "laJ t the elementary school 
level the issue seems clear. To send young children clay 
after day to distant schools seems out of the questioil." "' 
A community may well conclude that the portion of a. 
child 's day spent on a bus might be used more creatively 
in a classroom. playground. or some other extracurricular 
school activity. Decisions such as these. affecting the 
quality of a child's daily life. should not lightly be held 
constitutionally errant. 
To this point I have focused mainly on the personal 
interests of parents a.nd children which a community may 
believe to be best protected by a neighborhood system 
of schools. But broader considerations lead me to ques-
tiOn just as seriously any remedial requirement of exten-
sive student transportation solely to further integration. 
Any such requirement is certain to fall disproportionately 
on the school districts of our country. depending on 
their degree of urbanization . financial resources. and their 
racial composition. :-iom0 districts with little or no bJ-
racial population >Yill experience little or no educational 
disruption. while others. notably in large. biracial metro-
politan areas. must at considerable expense undertake 
extensive transportation to achieve the type of integra-
tion frequen tly being ordered by district courts."' At a 
time \vhen public education generally is suffering seriou~ 
financial malnutntion. the econonuc burdens of such 
transportation can be severe. requiring both initial capital 
outlays and annual operating costs in the millions of 
dollars."'' And whilf' eonstitutional requirements hav0-
., Shtm,- a nd Submh,-. 2!:) ( 19fil) 
"·' 8<·<' 11. :21 , supra . 
"" ln \[<·mpht,- , for <'xamplr , whil'h ha ,- no hi~ton· of hu~Jng ~111-
r!Pnt :<, th r mmimum tran"portatJon plan ordPrPd b~ · tlw comt::: will. 
'11-501-COXCUTI & DISSE:'\T 
KEYES v. SCHOOL DlSTHICT l\0. l. DK\\'EH, COLO. :~:~ 
often occasioned uneven burdens, never have they touched 
so sensitive a matter as wide differences in the compulsory 
transportation requirements for literally hundreds of 
thousands of school children . 
The argument for student transportation also overlooks 
the fact that the remedy exceeds that \Vhich may be 
necessary to redress the constitutional evil. Let us use 
Denver as an example. The Denver School Board, by 
its action and nonaction. may be legally responsible for 
some of the segregation that exists. But if one assumes 
a maximum discharge of constitutional duty by the 
Denver Board over the past decades. the fundamental 
problem of residential segregation would persist."" It 
Is indeed a novel application of equitable power-not to 
menti011 a dubious extension of constitutional doctrine-
to require so much greater a degree of forced school in~ 
t<'gration than would havC' resulted from purely natural 
and neutral nonstate causes. 
The compulsory transportation of students carries a 
further infirmity as a constitutional remedy. With most 
COilstitutional violations. the major burden of remedial 
action falls on offending state officials. Public officials 
who act to infringe personal rights of speech. voting. or 
religious exercise. for example. are obliged to cease the 
offending act or practice and, where necessary. institute 
eorrective measures. It is th<:'y who hear the hrunt of 
rPqlllrr, 111 t hr Sc·hool Boa rei'~ <'~tunatr , an tmtwl capital rxprndl111n• 
of $l,H6-!,192 for bu~r~ plu~ an Hnnu<tl operating ro~t of ~629.192 
Tlw Board r~tunatr:< that a morr r;o.1rn~in• tran~portatwn program 
to lw ron~tclrrrd b~· thr di~t nC't romt will rrqutre mitial capital m-
\'<'mnPnts of 8:3.92-!,000 nne! annual oprrating co~t~ of $1,7tl:3,-!90 
Thr mo~t clra~ttr tran:<portatwn plan beforP thr clistnrt ('0\11'1 rpquirr:< 
r:<t unntrd annual oprrating ro:<t~ of from $2,:35-!,220. 82,.-1:31 ,710. or 
:S8,..J.o:3JOO dPpe nding 011 thr Board',; tran,;portntion arrangrmrnts 
.\' orthcross \·. Bua.rd of Ed u!'ation of !11 em phis ('ity Srh .. -~II Jira. 
II. 17 , HI K9K (\>\'pjc·k .. J., dt~:<Plllllli!) 
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renwdial action. though othPr citizens \ Ill to varying d(•-
grePs feel its effects. School author· ies responsible for 
segregation must. at the very minin m. act to ceasE> seg-
rpgatory acts. But when tlw obli ation further extends 
to the transportation of students the full burd0n of the 
affirmativE> remedial action is bor:ne by children and par-
ents who did not participatE> in any constitutional 
violation . 
Finally. courts in requiring so far-reaching a remedy 
as student transportation solely to maximize integration .. 
risk setting in motion unpredictable and unmanageable 
social consequences. Xo one can estimate the extent 
to \\·hich dismantling neighborhood education will hasten 
an exodus to private schools. leaving public school sys- r-:-\ !2 
tems the preserve of the disadvantaged of both races~~ 
-------~" guess how much impetus such dismantlement gives / ~ 
the movement from innercity to suburb. and the further L- ';;~ · .. 
1
A p., 
geographical separation of the races. ~r: do we,\know ..... ; ,_ ~ 
to what degree this remedy may cause deterioration of ~ ~ 
community and parental support of public schools. or 
1 divert attention from the paramount goal of quality tn lie educatiOn to a perennially devisive debate over who is 
to be transported vvhere. 0 
The problem addressed in this opinion has perplexed ~
rourts. ~chool_officials, othe_r public authorities. and stu-  
dents of pubhc educatwn for nearly two decades. Thr ,;-/ J- . 
problem. especially since it has focused on the "busing /J _ . ty-rf 0 
issue." has profoundly disquieted the public wherever ~ 
extensive transportation has been ordered. I make no 
pretense of knowing the best ans\\'ers. Yet. the issue in 
this and like cases comes to this Court as one of con-
"titutional law. As to this issue. I have no doubt what-
Pver. TherP is nothing in tlw Constitution, its history 
or- until recently- in the jurisprudence of this Court 
that mandates the employment of forced transportation 
Qf yQung and tPenagP rhilclren to achievp a singlE> interPst, 
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as Important as this interest may be. We have strayPJ. 
quite far as I view it. from the rationale of Brou!ll 1 
and I I, as reiterated in Swann, that courts in fashioning 
remedies must be "guided by equitable principles'' which 
include the "adjusting and reconciling [of! public and 
private needs." Brown ll , 349 U. S., at :229. 
I urge a return to this rationale. This would result, 
as emphasized above. in no prohibition on court-ordered 
student transportation in furtherance of desegregatioll. 
But it would also require that the legitimate community 
interests in neighborhood school systems be accorded far 
greater respect. In the balancing of interests so appro-
priate to a fair and just equitable decree. transporta-
tiOJI orders should be applied >vith special caution to 
a11y proposal as disruptive of family life and interests-
and ultimately of education itself- as extensive transpor-
tation of elementary age children solely for desegregation 
purposes. As a minimum. this Court should not re-
quire school boards to engage in the unnecessary t.rans-
JlOrtation away from their neighborhoods of elementary 
age children .'' It is at this age level that neighborhood 
education performs its most vital educational role . 'It 
.is \\'ith respect to children of tender years that th e 
greatest concern exists for their physical and psycholog-
ical health. It is also here, at the elementary school. 
that the rights of parPnts and ch1ldren arP most sharply 
lrn p licatc'd .'" 
"Thrre ma~· \\'ell hP advaniage:, in rommf'ncing th<• intrgratin• 
<'XJlf'nf'ncr~ at an Parly agf' , as ~·oung children ma.1· br IP~s likt> l~ · 
I han oleiN rlulclrrn and adult ::; to dt>vt> lop an lllhibiting racial ron-
~rJou :-:n p~:-:. ThP:<r advantagE's should bt> consiclert>d a;:; :<chool board:-: _ 
makf' llw vanous decisions with thr Vlf'W to arh1enng and prt'"E'rv- \ 1 0 
n1g an mtegra trd school ~y::;tem . Supra, p. ~L-=--
a ncmg of all rrlrYant mtere~t", thr advantage" of an earl~· mtrgra -
tivr rxpPnrnc!' must , and 111 all finrnrs;; ~hould, lw weighPd aga1n~t 
othrr rrlPYant advantage;:; and disadvantag<'"-and in l1glu of llw 
cif'mograplur rharactrnsrir~ of thf' partwular r·ommnnlll' , 
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'While greater transportation of secondary school stu-
dellts might be permitted. even at this level the desire of 
a community for racially neutral neighborhood schools 
should command judicial respect. It vvould ultimately 
he wisest. where there is no absence of good faith. to 
permit affected conununities to decide this delicate issu 




The existing state of law has failed to shed light and 
provide guidance on two issues. addressed in this opiu-
ion. namely: ( i) whether and to what extent a uniform 
judicial approach should be taken to our national prob-
lems of school desegregation and ( ii) if so. whether the 
ambiguities of Swann, construed to date almost uni-
fonnly in favor of extensive transportation. should be 
redefined to restore a more viable balance among the 
various interests which are involved. With all deference. 
it seems to me that the Court today has addressed neither 
of these issues in a v,:ay that will afford adequate guid-
ance to the courts below in this case or lead to a rational. 
coherent national policy with respect to integration in 
the schools. 
The Court has chosen. rather. to adhere to the de facto/ 
de jure distinction under circumstances. and upon a 
rationale. which can only lead to increased and iucon-
clusive litigation. and-especially regrettable-to defer-
ment of a nationally consistent judicial position on this 
critical subject. There is. of course. state action in every 
school district in the lallcl. The public schools have 
ahYays been funded a11d operated by States and their 
local subdivisions. 1 t is true that segregated schools. 
c·ven i11 the cities of the South. are in large part the 
product of social and economic factors- aud the resulting 
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residential patterns. But there is also not a school dis-
trict in the United States. with any significant minority 
school population. in which the school authorities-ill 
Oile way or the other-have not contributed in somfi 
measure to the degree of segregation which still prevails. 
Instead of recognizing the reality of similar. multiple 
segregatory causes in school districts throughout the 
country. the Court persists in a distinction whose duality 
operates unfairly on local communities in one section of 
the country and on minority children in the others. 
The second issue relates to the ambiguities of Swann 
and the judicial disregard of legitimate community and 
individual interests in framing equitable decrees. fn the 
absence of a more flexible and reasonable standard than 
that imposed by district courts after Swann, thf~ 
desegregation which will now be decreed in Denver and 
other major cities may well involve even more extensive 
transportation than has been witnessed up to this time. 
It is well to remember that the course \Ve are running 
is a long one and the goal sought in the end-so often 
overlooked-is the best possible educational opportunity 
for all children. Communities deserve the freedom ancl 
the incentive to turn their attention and energies to this 
goal of quality education. free from protracted and 
debilitating battles over court-ordered student transpor-
tation. The single most disruptive element in educa~ 
tion today is the widespread use of compulsory trans-
portation. especially at elementary grade levels. This 
has risked distracting and diverting attention from basic 
educational ends. dividing and embittering communities. 
and exacerbating rather than ameliorating inter-racial 
friction and misunderstanding. It is time to return to 
a more balanced evaluation of the recognized interests 
uf our society in achieving desegregation with other edu-
eational and societal interests a community may legiti-
mately assert. This w·ill help assure that integrated 
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school Ey!"tems \\·ill bP establishc'd a11d maintained by 
rational action. will be better understood and supported 
hy parents and chilrlrf'n of hoth races. and will prornote 
the rnduring qualities of an i r1tegratrd society so PSS<'n-
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MR. JusTICE PowELL concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
I concur in the remand of this case for further pro-
ceedings in the District Court. but on grounds that differ 
from those relied upon by the Court. 
This is the first school desegregation case to reach this 
Court which involves a major city outside the South. It 
comes from Denver, Colorado, a city and a State which 
have not operated public schools under constitutional or 
statutory provisions 'vhich mandated or permitted racial 
segregation.1 Kor has it been argued that any other 
legislative actions (such as zoning and housing la\VS) 
contributed to the segregation which is at issue." The 
1 Article IX, § 8, of the Colorado Con~titution ha>; cxpres~ly pro-
hibited "any classification of pupils .. on account of race or 
color ." 
1 Sec, e. g .. Stcann Y. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educatwu .. 
-102 U. S 1, 23 (1971) 
··wr do not reach .. , til<' que:;twn whether a showmg that :schoor 
~egregation i~ a con~equencc· of other t~·pe~ of state action , Without 
an~· diijcriminator~· action b~· ijchool authoritie:s , IS a constitutional 
v10lation requiring remedial action b~· a :school de,;egrrga tion dl.'crl.'e :r 
Tlw trrm .. ~tatf' action,'' a~ u~l.'d lwrf'in, thu~ rf'fN,; to action~ of the· 
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Court has inquired only to ·what extent the Denver 
public school authorities may have contributecl to the 
school segregation which is acknowledged to exist in 
Denver. 
The predominantly minority schools are located in two 
areas of the city referred to as Park Hill and the core 
city area. The District Court considered that a school 
with a concentration of 70 to 75o/r "Negro or Hispano 
students'' was identifiable as a segregated school. 313 
F . Supp., at 77. Wherever one may draw this line, it is 
undisputed that most of the schools in these two areas 
are in fact heavily segregated in the sense that their stu-
dent bodies are overwhelmingly composed of non-Anglo 
children. The city-v.:ide school mix in Denver is 66o/r 
Anglo, 14o/c Negro. ancl 20o/r Hispano. In areas of the 
city where the Anglo population largely resides. the 
schools are predominantly Anglo. if not entirely so. 
The situation in Denver is generally comparable to 
that in other large cities across the country in which there 
IS a substantial minority population and where desegre-
gation has not been ordered by the federal courts. There 
is segregation in the schools of many of these cities fully 
as pervasive as that in southern cities prior to the deseg-
regation decrees of the past decade and a half. The focus 
of the school desegregation problem has now shifted from 
the South to the country as a whole. Unwilling and 
footdragging as the process was in most places. substan-
tial progress to\vard achieving integration has been made 
lll southern States." );To comparable progress has been 
made in many nonsouthern cities "·ith large minority 
., Acrordmg to thP 1971 HEW <'~tm1atP, 43.9 % of ~Pgro pupils 
attl'ndPd majont~· whit<' school,; m thP South m; oppo,;ed to only 
27 .8';i( who attPnded >'urh ~rhoob in tllf' Xorth and We,;t. Fifty-
:<C'\·en pl'rrPnt of all "NPgro pupil:< Ill tlw ::\forth and WP~t attend 
"<"hool>' with ovPr SO% minority population a~ opposed to 82.2% 
1\'ho rio ,;o in the South . llk ( 'ong . Her . Sl-t5 
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, populations 1 primarily because of the de facto / de jure 
. distinction nurtured by the courts and accepted com-
placently by many of the same voices >vhich denounced 
the evils of segregated schools in the South.·' But if our 
national concern is for those who attend such schools, 
rather than for perpetuating a legalism rooted in history 
rather than present reality, we must recognize that thP 
evil of operating separate schools is no lrss in Denver 
than in Atlanta. 
1 Thr 1971 HEW EnroJlmrnt Surwy drama.tizf'd thr srgrcg;ated 
eharartrr of public ~rhool ~~·~tern,; in man~· nonsouthern citi~. ThP 
JH'rrrntage of 1\rgro pupib which attrndrd :;chool~ morr than 80% 
black wa~ 91.3 in Clrvrland. Ohio; 97.8 in Compton , California: 
78.1 in Da~·ton, Ohio: 78.fi m Drtroit, :\[ichigan ; 95.7 in Gar~· , 
Indiana: 86.-! in Kan:;a~ Cit~·. :\Ii,;l:;ou ri ; 86.6 in Lo~ Angrlrs, Cali-
fornia: 7~.8 in :\Iilwaukrr , Wiscon,; in; 91.:3 m Newark, New .ler~ry: 
S9 .~ in St. Loni:s, .\fis:-<ouri. Thr fnll data from the Enrollment Snr-
n·~· ma~· br found in 118 Cong. Rrc. S14+--148 . .Tan. 20, 1972. 
''As Senator Ribicoff (D.-Conn.) rPcogmzrd: 
"For ~·pa r:-< wr haw fought thr battlr of mtegratwn primaril~· in 
thP South whPrP thr problrm was ,;evere. It was a long , arduou:-< 
fight that dr:-<rn·ed to br fought and nrrded to be won 
"lf nf ortuna tel~·, a::: t lw problrm of ra cial !<:'olatwn ha:-< moved north 
of the .\fa,;on-Dixon linr , man~· northrrner::: have bid an P \'a~iw 
farrwrll to thr 100-~·ear strugglr for racial equalit~· . Our motto 
srrm" to havP brrn ·Do to "o ntllPl'll('l'~ what ~·on do not wanr to do 
1 o your,;p]f' 
uGood rrasons havr ahn1~·" hr<•JJ off<•rrd, of cour"P, for not mov111g 
, · ig;orou"!~· :till' ad in t hr North a,.; wrll a" t hr South. 
'·Fir"t. 1t wa:-< that thr problrm wa:-< wor:::r m thr South . ThPn 
~lw facts brgan to "how that that w:t:-< no longer trnt". 
" W<· tlwn began to !war tlw d<• farto-dP jurr rpfram 
"Somrhow rl'~idrntial :-<Pgrrg:lt 1011 in t lw :\ ort h wa" acc1dPntal or 
dr facto and that madr it brt trr than tlw lpgal!Y :-<upportPd dr jure 
:-;egrl'gation of the South. It ,,·a ,.; a hard di::;tmction for black chilclrrn 
Ill totall~· ~rgrPgatPd :-<chools 111 till' \'orth to under:-<tand, but it 
allowrd us to :n-oid thl' problrm ·· 111' Cong Hrc 825-!Z. Frb. 24 , 
197'2, 
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I 
[n my vie\V we should abandon a distinction which long 
since has outlived its time, and formulate constitutional 
principles of national rather than merely regional appli-
cation. When Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 
483 ( 1954), was decided, the distinction between de jure 
and de facto segregation was consistent with the limited 
constitutional rationale of that case. The situation con-
fronting the Court, largely confined to the southem 
::)tates. was officially imposed racial segregation in the 
schools extending back for many years and usually em-
bodied in constitutional and statutory provisions. 
The great contribution of Brown I was its holding in 
unmistakable terms that the Fourteenth Amendment 
forbids state-compelled or authorized segregation of pub-
lic schools. 347 U. S., at 488. 493-495. Although some 
of the language was more expansive, the holding in 
Brown I was essentially negative: It was impermissible 
under the Constitution for the States. or their instru-
mentalities, to force children to a.ttend segregated schools. 
The forbidden action was de jure, and the opinion in 
Brown I \Yas construed-for some years and by many 
courts-as requiring only state neutrality , allowing "free-
dom of choice" as to schools to be attended so long as the 
State itself assured that the choice was genuinely free of 
official restraints .'; 
·~ Se<~, e. g .. Bradley v. School Hoard. :~45 F. :2d :HO, 316 (CA4 
en bane. 1965) · 
"It ha,: been lwlcl again and agam . that the Fourteenth 
.\menclment prohib1tion i~ not again~t ;;egregation a~ such 
A ,.;tatr or school cli~trirt otfrncl~ no constitutwnal requirement 
\\'hen it grants to all student::; uniform]~· an unre::;tncted freedom of 
ch01cr a::< to tiChool attPnded, ~o that each pupil , m effect, a,:sJgnR him-
.-;df to the ,.;chool hP \\'i,.;he,.; to attend ." (The ca:;P wa,; later vacated 
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But the doctrine of Brown I, as amplified by Brown II, 
349 F. S. 294 (1955), did not retain its original meaning. 
Tn a series of decisions extending from 1954 to 1971 thE' 
c.oncept of state neutrality was transform0d into the 
present constitutional doctrinE' requiring affirmative 
state action to desegregate school systems.' The key-
stone case was Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 
430, 438 ( 1968), vvhere school boards were declared to 
have "the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might 
be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which 
racial discrimination would be eliminated root and 
branch." The school system before the Court in Gree11 
\\·as operating in a rural and sparsely settled county 
where there were no concentrations of white and black 
populations, no neighborhood school system (there were 
only two schools in the county), and none of thE' 
problems of an urbanized school district :' The Court 
properly identified the freedom of choice program 
there as a subterfuge, and the la11guage in Green impos-
mg an affirmative duty tD convert to a unitary system 
was appropriate on the facts before the Court. There 
was. however, reason to question to what extent this duty 
would apply in the vastly different factual setting of a. 
and n·manded by thi~ Court, which rxpres~ed no nrw on tlw mC'nt:-; 
of tlw dP~egregation plan~ ~ubmittrd.) :382 U. S. 10:3, 105 (1D65) . 
SeP abo Bell v. School City of Gary. Ind., :32-! F. :2d 209 (CA7 1963) ; 
Downs , .. Board of Educ .. :3:3() F. 2d 988 (CAlO 19o.J.): Deal v. 
Board of Educ .. 369 F . 2cl 55 (CAH 1966) 
' For a concise Jm;tor~ · and comnwnt<u~· on the PYolution, ,.;er grn-
( • rall~· ..\ .. B1ckel. Tlw SuprPmP Comt. and thr ldPa of Progrr~~. pp 
12f)-no t 1970l 
'Ser nbo thP companion ea~P~ 111 ltauey \'. Board of Educatw11 , 
:)91 U. S . H :3 (196R), and !llouroe \'.Board of Comm 'rs. :391 U. S . 
.J.50 (196.S). neither of which 111voh·rd largC' urban or mrtropolitan 
"l'('ll,.; , 
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large city with extensive areas of residential segregation, 
presenting problems and calling for solutions quite dif-
ferent from those in the rural setting of ~ ew Kent 
County. Virginia . 
But the doubt as to whether the affirmative duty con-
cept would flower into a new constitutional principle of 
general application was laid to rest by Swann v. Board 
of Education, 402 U. S. 1 ( 1971), in v.:hich the ~ 
~ duty articulated in Green was applied to the urban 
school system of metropolitan Charlotte. North Carolina. 
In describing the residential patterns in Charlotte, the 
Court noted the "familiar phenomenon" in the metro-
politan areas of minority groups being "concentrated in 
one part of the city,'' 402 U. 8 .. at 25. and acknowledged 
that : 
1'Rural areas accustomed for half a century to thr 
consolidated school system implemented by bus 
transportation could make adjustments more readily 
than metropolitan areas with dense and shifting pop-
ulation. numerous 9<)hools. congested and complex 
traffic patterns. ' ' 402 U. S .. at 14. 
Despite this recognition of a fundamentally different 
problem from that involved in Green, the Court never-
theless held that the affirmative duty rule of Green \vas 
applicable , and prescribed for a metropolitan school sys-
tem with 107 schools and some 84.000 pupils essentially 
the same remedy-elimination of segregation "root and 
branch "-which had been formulated for the two schools 
and 1.300 pupils of Ne'" Kent County . . _ ~ 
In Swann, the Court further noted it was ~ only 
with States having "a long history'' of officially imposed 
segregation and the duty of school authorities in those 
:-itates to implement Brown /. 402 U. S .. at 5- 6. In so 
doing. the Court refrained even from consideriug whether 
the evolution of constitutional doctrine from Brow11 I to 
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Green! Swann undercut whatever logic once supported 
the de facto/ de jure distinction. In imposing on metro-
politan southern school districts an affirmative duty. en-
tailing large-scale transportation of pupils, to eliminate 
segregation in the schools. the Court required these dis-
tricts to alleviate conditions which in large part did not 
result from historic, state-imposed de jure segregation . 
Rather, the familiar root cause of segregated schools in all 
the biracial metropolitan areas of our country is essen-
tially the same: one of segregated residential and migra-
tory patterns the impact of which on the racial composi-
tion of the schools was often perpetuated and rarely 
ameliorated by action of public school authorities. This 
1s a national. not a southem phenomenon. And it is 
1argely unrelated to whether a particular State had or dirl 
not have segregatory school laws." 
Whereas Brown I rightly decreed the elimination 
of state-imposed segregation in that particular section of 
the country where it did exist. Swann imposed obligations 
on southern school districts to eliminate conditions which 
are not regionally unique but are similar both in origin 
and effect to conditions in the rest of the country. As 
"A~ Dr. Karl TaPuber ~tatE'~ in hi~ article, HP~IdE'ntml Segrpgation. 
SciPntific AmPrican , Augu~t 1965, at 14 : 
•·No elaboratE' analysis is nccp:;:;ary to conclude from the~c figure~ 
that a high degrE'e of rPsidPntial ~egrPgation ba~E'd on racE' 1~ a uni-
ver~al characteristic of American citiP;;. Thb segregation t:; found 
in ti1E' r1tiE'S of thE' North and WP:::t as WE'll as of the South: in largE' 
CltiE'~ as WE'll a::: small ; in nonindu:;trial cities a::: \YE'll a::: mdu:::trial; m 
ritie~ with hnndrE'c!s of thousands of NPgro resic!Pnt::; a:< \\'E'll as those 
wtth onl~· n fp"· thousand ; and m cit if's that are progrp~:;iw in their 
Pmplo~·mpnt practicE' and cn·il rights polirie,.: a,; wpl) a:-: tho::;E' that 
;trE' not ." 
lll Ill:; book . l'\egroE'~ in C'tri<'~ ( 19(i5) , Dr. TaPub<·r ,.:tated that r!':::t-
dE'tltial segrPgation f'XI,.:t,; ·' regardlf'HS of thE' charactE'r of lora! hnv~ 
and poliriP~ and rf'gard!P~~ of otlwr form~ of diHrrtmuwtton ." !!/ .. 
;t t :~t) . 
8 KEYES v. SCHOOL DISTTUCT ~0. 1, DEXVEH. COLO 
the remedial obligations of Swann extend far beyond 
the elimination of the outgrowths of the state-imposed 
segregation outlawPd in Brown, the rationale of Su•ann 
points inPvitably towards a uniform. constitutional ap-
proach to our national problem of school segregation, 
TI 
The Court's decision today, >vhile adhering to the 
de jure/ de facto distinction, will require the application 
of the Green/ Swami doctrine of "affirmative duty '' to the 
Denver School Board despite the absence of any history 
of state-mandated school segregation. The only evidence 
of a constitutional violation was found in various de· 
cisions of the school board. I concur in the Court's posi-
tJon that the public school authorities are the responsiblP 
agency of the State. and that if the affirmative duty do('-
trine is sound constitutional law for Charlotte. it lS 
0qually so for Denver. I >Yould not , however. perpetuate> 
the de jure/ de facto distinction nor would I leave to peti-
tioners the initial tortuous effort of identifying "srgrt'~ 
gative acts" and deducing "segregatory intent.' ' l would 
hold. quite simply, that where segregated public schools 
0xist within a school district to a substantial degree. then• 
is a prima facie case that the duly constituted public> 
a uthorities ( r will usually refer to them collectively as 
the "school board") are sufficiently respo11sible "' to im-
pose upon them a nationally applicable burden to demon-
'"A pnma factc• cm.;p of eon~titutlona! \·ioiatton ext~t~ when ~rgn•­
gatlon 1~ found to a ~ub~tant m! drgrre in the ~chool ~ of a par-
ticula r dt~tnct. It 1 ~ rero~~:nizrd. of coun;c·, thnt thi~ trrm '" rrl a-
t tn· and proYide" no prPri,.;r ~tandard;;. But rirrum;;taiW<'>' , drmo-
gra phtr nne! otherwi~r. var~· from di~trirt to di~trirt and hard and 
l:lt<t rul r;; ~houkl not hP formulatrd. Thr exi~tenre of :1 suh,.;tantial 
prrcrntagr of ,.;rhoob populat Pd b~ · "tudPnt,.; from onr racr on!~· or 
prN!ominatriY ~o populatPd. ~hould trigger thr mquiry . 
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strate they nevertheless are operating a genuinely inte-
grated school system. 
A 
The principal reason for abandonment of the de jure! 
de facto rlistinction is that, in view of the evolutio11 of 
the holding in Brown I into the affirmative duty doctrinE'. 
the distinction no longer can be justified ou a principled 
basis. ln decreeiug remedial requirements for the 
Charlotte/ Mecklenburg school district. Swann dealt 
with a metropolitan. urbani7.ed area in which the basic 
causes of segregation were generally similar to those in 
all sections of the country, and also largely irrelevant 
to the existence of historic, state-imposed segregation at 
the time of the Brown decision. Further, the extension 
of the affirmative duty concept to require compulsory 
student transportation went well beyond the mere rem-
edying of that portion of school segregation for which 
former state segregation laws were ever responsible. 
Moreover. as the Court's opinion today abundantly dem-
onstrates. the facts deemed necessary to establish de jure 
discrimination present problems of subjective iutent 
'"hich the courts cannot fairly resolve. 
At the outset, one must try to identify the constitu-
tiOnal right which is being enforced. This is not easy. 
as the precedents have been far from explicit. In 
Brown !, after emphasizing the importance of educat,ion. 
the C'ourt said that 
"l:)uch an opportumty, where the state has under-
taken to provide it. is a right which must be made 
available to all on equal terms.'' 347 {T. S .. at 493. 
ln Bro'WII II, the Court identified the "fundamental prin-
ciple" enunciated in BTOWI! l as being the unconstitu-
twnali ty of "racial discrimination in public education, .. 
349 r. S .. at 298. and spok0 of "the personal interest 
of the plaintifls in admission to public schools as soon 
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as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis. ' ' 349 U. S., 
at 300. Although this and similar language is ambiguous 
as to the specific constitutional right, it means-as a mini -
mum-that one has the right not to be compelled by 
state action to attend a segregated school system.'[ In 
the evolutionary process since 1954. decisions of this 
Court have added a significant gloss to this original ri~ht;, 
Although nowhere expressly articulated in these terms, 
I would now define it as the right. derived from the Equal 
Protection Clause. to expect that once the State has as-
sumed responsibility for education, local school boards 
will operate integrated school systems vYithin their re-
spective districts. This means that school authorities . 
consistent with the generally accepted educational goal of 
attaining quality education for all pupils, must make and 
implement their customary decisions with a view toward 
enhancing integrated school opportunities. 
The term "integrated school system" presupposes, of 
course, a total absence of any laws. regulations or policies 
supportive of the type of "legalized" segregation con-
demned in Brown. A system would be integrated in 
accord with constitutional standards if the responsible 
authorities had taken appropriate steps to ( i) integrate 
faculties and administration; ( ii) scrupulously assure 
equality of facilities, quality of instruction and curricula 
opportunities throughout the district; (iii) utilize their 
authority to draw attendance zones to promote wtegra-
tion; and ( iv) locate new schools, close old ones. and 
11 Sl:'r Birkl:'l , supra. n. 7. at 11~: 
'·It [thl:' problem of ~chool cll:'~l:'grl:'gatwn I has not bl:'en that ~im­
pll:' bl:'causl:' thl:' laconic opinion in Brou•n v. Board of Educa-
twn wa~ 1t:;elf not that ::;implr. Onl:' st rain in 1t beraml:' l:'vidrnt in 
~ub~l:' qlll:'llt decisiOns outlawing all forms of state-::;pon~orl:'d segrl:'ga-
tion 111 e\·l:' rything from the spectator sl:'ction of a courtroom to golf 
cour~l:'S. Tlw tmmmal propo~ition that !:'merged-and about time 
tt wa~ that It should l:'mergr-wa~ that the stat!:' ma.\· not , h)· ll:'gisla-
tion or administrativl:'l)·, rlass1fy tlw population along rartal lines.'' 
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determine the size and grade categories v.•ith this same 
objective in mind. Where schbol authorities decide to 
t111dertake the transportation of students. this also must 
be with integrative opportunities in mind. 
The foregoing prescription is not intended to be either 
definitive or aU-inclusive. but rather an indication of 
the contour characteristics of an integrated schooL syg~ 
tent in which all citizens and pupils may justifiably be 
confident that racial discrimination is neither practiced 
nor tolerated. An integrated school system does not 
mean-and indeed could not mean ih view of the resi·-
dential patterns of most of our ma.]or metropolitan 
areas-that every schooL must in fac~ be an . integrated 
unit. A schooi which happens to be all or predominantly 
white or al1 or i)reciominantly black is not a "segregated" 
school in an unconstitutional sense if the system itself is 
a genuinely integrated one. 
Having school boards operate an integrated school sys-
tem provides the best assurance of meeting the constitu-
tional requirement that racial discrimination . subtle or 
otherwise. ,..-ill find no place in the decisions of public 
school officials. Courts judging past school board actions 
with a view to their general integrative effect will be best 
ablP to assure an absence of such discrimination while 
avoiding the murky, subjective judgments inherent in 
the Court's search for "segregatory intent. " Any test 
resting on so nebulous and elusive an element as a 
school board's segregatory "intent" provides inadequatp 
assurance that minority children will not be short-
changed in the decisions of those entrusted with the non-
discriminatory operation of our public schools. 
Public schools are creatures of the State. and whether 
the segregation is state-created or state-assisted or 
merely state-perpetuated should be irrelevant to consti,. 
tutional principle. The school board exercises pervasive 
and continuing responsibility over the long range plan., 
7H:>O'i-CO~CUR & DISSEXT 
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ning as well as the Jaily operations of the public school 
system. It sets policies on attendance zones, faculty 
employment and assignments. school construction, clos-
ings and consolidations. and myriad other matters. 
School board decisions obviously are not the sole cause __ _ 
of segregated school conditions. But if. after..(detailed 
and complete public supervision, substantial ~chool segre-
gation still persists, the presumption is strong that the 
school board, by its acts or omissions. is in some part 
responsible. Where state action and supervision are so 
pervasive ami where. after years of such action, seg-
regated schools continue to exist within the district 
to a substantial degree. this Court is justified in find-
ing a prima facie case of a constitutional violation. 
The burden then must fall on the school board to demon-
strate it is operating an "integrated school system.'' 
It makes little sense to find prima facie violations and 
the consequent. affirmative duty to desegregate solely in 
those States with state-imposed segregation at the timE> 
of the Brown. decision. The history of state-imposed 
segregation is more widespread in our country than the 
de jure/ de facto distinction has traditionally cared to 
rceogmze. As one commentator has noted: 
"the three court of appeals dec1sions denying a con-
stitutional duty to abolish de facto segregation all 
arose in cities-Cincinnati, Gary and Kansas City, 
Kansas-where racial segregation 111 schools was 
formerly mandated by state or local ]a,.,·. [Deal v. 
Cincinnati Bd. of Educ ., 369 F. 2d 55 (C'A6 1966), 
cert. denied. 377 e. S. 924 ( 1964); Downs Y. Board 
of Educ. , 336 F. 2cl 988 (CAlO 1964). cert. de-
nied. 380 l'. S. 914. Bell \'. School City, 324 F . 2d 
209 (C'A7 1963). cert. denied , 377 C S. 924.] Ohio 
discarded its statute in 1887. Indiana in 1949. and 
Kansas City not until the advent of Brown. If 
Negro and white parents in Mississippi are required 
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to bus their children to distant schools on the theory 
that the consequences of past de jure segregation 
cannot otherwise be dissipated. should not the same 
reasoning apply in Gary. Indiana, where no more 
than five y0ars before Brown the same practice 
existed with presumably the same effects." Good-
man. De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional 
and Empirical Analysis. 60 Cal. L. Rev . 275·, 297 
(197:2) .1 " 
Kot only does the de jure/ de facto distinction operate 
jnequitably on communities in different sections of the 
eountry: more importantly, it disadvantages minority 
children as \vell . As the Fifth Circuit stated : 
"The Negro children in Cleveland. Chicago. Los 
Angeles. Boston. )I ew York, or any other area of the 
nation which thE' opinion classifies under de facto 
segregation, would receive little comfort from the 
assertion that the racial make-up of their school sys-
tem does not violate their constitutional rights be-
cause they were born into a de facto society. while 
the exact same racial make-up of the school system 
Ill the 17 southem and border states violates the 
' ~ Tlw author rontmue~ · 
·'True , tht (•arlier the polic~· of :;egregation wa~ abandoned the less 
danger there i~ that it continue~ to operHte cowrtly, i~ ,.; ignificantly 
r<'~pon~iblP for pre:;ent da.\· pattPrn~ of re,.;idential segregation, or has 
rontrihuted matPriall .\· to pre,.;C'nt communit~· attitude~ toward Xcgro 
~ehool ~. Hut there ~~ no rC'a~on to .-mppo,.;e that 1954 i~ a lllltYer~ally 
nppropmtt<' di,·iding linP bet\\'Pt>n dP jurp ~egregntion that ma~· 
~afel~· be ••~~umed to haw ~pent it~elf and that which ma~· not. 
For man~· remedial purpo~es, adoption of an arbitrar~· but ea;,;i]~· 
admim~tmbl e cu toff point might not be objectionable. But in a 
,< Jt\latton "urh a" ~rhool desegrrgation. wlwrr both tlw nght~ a,.;,.;ert ed 
and tlw rrmrdial bmdrn~ imposrd an• of ~ueh magnitudr, a nd where 
tlw rp~ulting sertwnal dis r rinunation i~ pa:;:;ionatel~· rrsrnt <'d. it 1~ 
:.,urPI~· 4U<'~tionable wlH'tiH'r sueh a rl>lt rarines~ 1~ ritlter politicall y 
or m orally atcPptable " 
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constitutional rights of their counterparts. or even 
their blood brothers, bec\).US~ they were born into 
a de jure society. All- childre'n everywhere in tlw 
nation are protected by the Constitution. and treat 
ment which violates their constitutional rights i1i 
one area. also violates such constitutional rights in 
another area.'' Cisneros v. Corp'lj-s Christi Independ-
ent School District, 467 F. 2d 142. 148 (CA5 en bane. 
1972) quoting United States v. J_efferson County 
Board of Eauc., 380 F. 2d 385. 397 (CA5 en bane) 
Ge'"'·in. J .. dissenting) ."' 
The Court today does move for the first time toward 
breaking down past sectional disparities. but it clings 
tenuously to its distinctioll. lt searches for de jure 
action in what the Denver School Board has clone or 
failed to do. and even here the Court does not rely upon 
the results or effects of the Board's conduct hut feels com-
pelled to find segregatory intent: 1• 
"We emphasize that the differentiating factor be-
tween de jure segregation and so-called de facio 
' " SPl' BwkPl, wpra. n 7, at 119 : 
'·If a Negro child perretve~ hi,; cieparation a~ rli~crmlltwtor~· and 
invtdiou,;, he 1~ not , 111 a ;;ociety a hundred ~·ear~ remo,·Pd from 
~lavrr~· . gomg to mak<' finr di~tinrtion~ about tlw ,;olll'<'l' of a par-
tiCular ,;eparation ,. 
11 Tlw Court toda~· doe" not rrquirc , howl·vrr, a ~rgn~gatur~· tntPnt 
with rr~pC'rt to thr entirr ;;rhool ~~·~tem. and indrC'cl hold~ that if ~u('h 
an mtrnt 1~ found wtth rc;;pect to ;;ome "rhool~ m a ~~·~tC'm. the' bur-
den-normal!~· on the plamtiff"-:;hift;; to the df'fl~ndant ~rhool au-
thorittC',; to praY!' a negative': name!~· . that thc·tr purpo~l·~ \Y<•rc· 
lwmgn , ante. pp 17- 18. 
Thr Court ha:; camP n long wn~· ~III('<' 8roll'JI l. F>tarttng from 
tlw una~,;ailablr de ;ure ground of tlw di,;rnminatorY run~tttnt wnal 
and ~tatutor~· provi:;ion,; of ~om<· Stat<'~, thr liP\\' furmulation-~tilt 
profe~smg fidPIIt~· to t hr de jure dart rinP-i~ that dP~c·grPga t ion "·ill 
be orderrd de;;pJtf' the ab,;r11rr of an~ · ~<'gn·gatorY law~ if: (i) ,;('grc•-
g'atcd ~chool~ in fact Pxi::<t : (it) a rou.rt find" that th<'y r<'~ult front 
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segregation to which we referred in Swann is pur-
pose or intent to segregate." (Court Opinion. p. 18) 
(italics are the Court's J. 
The ( 'ourt's insistence that the "differentiating factor' 
between de jure and de facto segregation be "purpose 
or intent'' is difficult to reconcile with the language in so 
recent a case as Wright v. Council of the City of E-mporia, 
407 "C. S. 451 ( 7972). In holding there that "motiva-
tion" is irrelevant, the Court said: 
" In addition , an inquiry into the 'dominant' motiva-
tion of school authorities is as irrelevant as it is fruit-
less . The mandate of Brow11 II ,x,·as to desegregate 
schools. and we have said that ' [ t] he measure of 
any desegregation plan is its effectiveness.· Davis 
v. School Commissioners of Mobile County, 402 P . S. 
:33. 37. 
"Thus. ,,.e have focused upon the effect-not thP 
purpose or motivation- of a school board's action 
in determining whether it is a. permissible method 
of dismantling- a dual system. 
"Though the purpose of the new school district was 
found to be discriminatory in many of these cases. the 
courts' holdings rested not on motivation or pur-
poses but on the effect of the action upon the dis-
mantling of the dual school system involved. That 
"·as the focus of the District Court in this case, ancl 
we hold that its approach was proper. 407 P . S .. 
a..t 462. 
f can discem no basis in law or logic for holdmg that 
the motivation of school hoard action is irrelPvant in 
,:o mP ;\('liOn takPtl IYJth ·"'f'!l; I'Pgator~· mtPnt b~· the "rhool hoard : 
(ni) "urh artJoll rrlatP" to an1· "meamngful :;egment" of tlw ,:rhool 
"~'"tc•m: and (n·) tlw "('hool bo;!rd ea mwt pro1·p that It" mtPnt\on,: 
,,·it h rP"pc·rt tc> the n•maindPr of t hP ,:y,;tc·m WN<' uon~c·grpg:a t <H~ · . 
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·virginia and con trolling in Colorado. It may be argued. 
of cour~e. that in Emporia a prior constitutional viola-
tion had already been proven and that this justifies the 
distinction. The net result of the Court's language. ho\v-
ever. is the application of an effect test to the actions of 
southern school districts and an intent test to those in 
other sections. at least until an initial de jure finding for 
those districts can be made. Rather than straining to 
perpetuate any such dual standard. we should hold forth-
rightly that significant segregated ~chool conditions in 
,.,,hatever section of the country are a prima facie viola-
tion of constitutional rights. As the Court ha!" noted 
elsewhere: 
"Circumstances or chance may well dictate that no 
persons in a certain class will serve on a particular 
jury or during some particular period. But it taxC's 
our credulity to ~ay that mere c/w:nce resulted i11 
there being no members of this class among the over 
six thousand jurors called in the past 25 years. Thl:' 
result bespeaks discrimnation, whether or not it was 
a, conscious decision on the part of any individual JUry 
('01/1/lltSSWiler. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 r. S. 475. 
482 (1954). (Emphasis added . ) 
B 
There is thus 110 reason as a matter of constitutiOnal 
principle to adhere to the de jure/ de facto distinction in 
school desegregation cases. In addition. there are rea-
sons of policy and prudent judicial administration vvhich 
point strongly toward the adoption of a uniform national 
rule. The litigation heretofore centered in the South 
already is surfacing in other regions. The decision of 
the Court today. emphasizing as it does the elusive 
element of segregatory intent, will invite numerous deseg-
regation suits in which there can he little' hopP of mu-
fQnnit,v of rf'~ult. 
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The issue in these cases will not be whether segregated 
education exists. This \vill be conceded in most of them. 
The litigation '"ill focus as a consequence of the Court 's 
decision on whether segregation has resulted in any 
"meaningful or significant" portion of a school system 
from a school board's "segregatory intent." The intrac-
table problems involved in litigating this issue are obvious 
to any lawyer. The results of litigation-often arrived 
at subjectively by a court endeavoring to ascertain the 
subjective intent of school authorities with respect to 
action taken or not taken over many years-will be 
fortuitous. unpredictable and even capricious. 
The Denver situation is illustrative of the problem. 
The courts below found evidence of de JUre violations 
with respect to the Park Hill schools and an absence of 
such violations with respect to the core city schools. 
despite the fact that actions taken by the school board 
with regard to those two sections were not dissimilar. 
It is, for example. quite possible to contend that both 
the construction of Manual High School in the core city 
area and Barrett Elementary School in the Park Hill area 
operated to serve their surrounding Negro communitie~ 
aml. in effect. to merge school attendance zones with 
segregated residential patterns. See Petitioner's Brief, 
pp. 80-83. Yet findings even on such similar acts will , 
under the de JUre/ de facto distinction. continue to differ. 
especially since the Court has never made clear v,:hat 
suffices to establish the requisite "segregatory intent" for 
an initial constitutional violation Even if It \\'ere pos-
Sible to clarify this question . \Yide and unpredictable 
differences of opinion among judges v;ould be inevitablP 
when dealing with an issue as slippery as "intent' ' or 
"purpose." especially when related to hundreds of 
decisions made by school authorities undH varying eon-
clitions over many years. 
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This Court has recognized repeatedly that it is "ex-
tremely difficult for a court to ascertain the motivation, 
or collection of different motivations. tha.t lie behind a 
legislative enactment.'' Pal111er v. Thompson, 403 t'. S. 
214. 224 (1971); McGinnis v. Royster,- r . S. -.-
(1973); United States V. O'Brien, 391 r. S. 367. 381 
(1968). Whatever difficu lties exist with regard to a sin-
gle statute will be compounded in a judicial review of 
years of administration of a large and complex school 
system."' Every act of a school board and school ad-
ministration. and indeed every failure to act where affirm-
ative action is indicated, must now be subject to scrutiny. 
The most routine decisions with respect to the operation 
of schools, made almost daily. can affect in varying de-
grees the extent to which schools are initially segregated. 
remain in that condition. are desegregated. or- for thf' 
long term future-arc likely to be one or the other. These 
uecisions include action or nonaction with respect to 
school building construction and location; the timing of 
building ne"· schools and their size; the closing and con-
solidation of schools; the drawing or gerrymandering of 
'"' A~ ot1r eonmwntator hn~ rxpr<'~~t·d it . 
.. If t hr rourt~ a rr mdeed prrpn rPd to inqu1rr nlto motiw. thorn~· 
question:< will ari~e even If onr ft:<~tmw,; that mrial mottvatwn i~ 
rapablr of bemg proven at trw!. What of the ea,.:c· m wh1rh one or 
morr mrmber~ of a ~rhool board, but Irs~ than a majorit~· . are found 
to hnYr acted on racwl ground~·~ What tf it appear;; that thr :;choof 
hoard 's actwn wa~ prompted bY a m1xtun• of moti\"C'~. Including con-
,;tJtutwnai!Y innocrnt one" that alonr would haw promptrd thr board 
to net? '\rhat If tlw member~ of thr :;chool board IYC'fC' not thrm-
~C'!n'~ rarwll~· m,;ptred but II"I:<hed to piPa~P thrir eon~tituent :;, many 
of whom t hr~· knrw to bP ~o ., If :<urh ca~r~ a rr cla~~ifird as un-
con:<titutional dr JtirC' :-<rgrPgntton . thPrP i:; lntlr pomt 111 prr~pn·mg 
tlw dr jmP-dr facto distinctiOn at all. And It ma~· 11"<'11 br that thl' 
diffcrpnrr brtwern an~· of 1 hP:<e :<ituations and onr m wh1rh rarwl 
motn·atwn ~~ nltogethN larking " too m~ignifirant. from tlw ,;tand-
pomt of both thP moral culpabiiit~· of tlw :-<tatr officml" and the· 
impn r t upon thr children lllYoh·Pd, to ,;upport a diffPrPIH'C' m roll -· 
StltlliiOnal trrn tment " n oorim:l ll , supra. II 11. at :2X4--2S5_ 
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student attendance zones; the extent to which a neigh-
borhood policy is enforced; the recruitment. promotion 
and assignment of faculty and supervisory personnel: 
policies with respect to transfers from one school to 
another; whether, and to what extent. special schools will 
be provided. \Vhere they will be located, and who will 
qualify to attend them; tlw determination of curriculunl, 
including whether there will be "tracks" that lead pri-
marily to college or to vocational training. and the rout• 
]ng of students into these tracks; and even decisions as 
to social. recreational and athletic policies. 
Ln Swann the Court did not have to probe into segre-
gatory intent and proximate cause \vith respect to each 
of these "endless" factors. The basis for its de jure find-
ing there was rooted primarily in the prior history of the 
desegregation suit. 402 LT. :-i .. at 5-f\. But in a case of 
the present type. where no such history exists. a judicial 
examination of these factors will be required under to-
day's decision. This will lead inevitably to uneven and 
unpredictable results, to protracted and inconclusive liti ~ 
gation . to added burdens on the federal courts. and to 
serious disruption of individual school systems. In the 
absence of national and objective standards. school boards 
and administrators will remain in a state of uncertainty 
and disarray, speculating as to what is required and when 
litigation '"ill strike . 
c 
Rather than continue to prop up a distmction no longer 
grounded in principle. and contributing to the conse-
quences indicated above . we should acknowledge that 
whenever public school segre!!ation exi!:its to a sub-
:-tantial degree there is priwa facie evidence of a con-
stitutional violatio11 by the responsible school board. lt 
is true. of course. that segregated schools- wherever 
located- art' not solely the product of thr action or 
inaction of public school auth oritH'f'. li1deC'd , as indi-
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cated earlier. there catt be little doubt that principal 
causes of the pervasive school segregation found in the 
major urban areas of this country. whether in the Xorth. 
West. or South. are the socio-economic influences "·hich 
have concentrated our minority citizens in the inner cities 
while the more mobile white majority disperse to the sub-
urbs. But it is also true that public school boards havf' 
continuing. detailed responsibility for the public school 
system within their district Jn and. as Judge John Minor 
v\' isdom has noted, '\vhere the figures l shO\\·ing 
segregation in the schools] speak so eloquently. a 
prima face case of discrimination is established." 
United States v. 1'exas Education Agency, 467 F. 2d 84 . 
873 (CA5 en bane 1972). Moreover. as foreshadmved itl 
Swann and as implicitly held today. school boards have a 
duty to minimize and ameliorate segregated conditions 
by pursuing an affirmative policy of desegregation. It is 
this policy which must be applied consistently on a na-
tional basis vvithout regard to a doctrinal distinction 
which has outlived its time. 
Ill 
The preceding section addresses the constitutional ob-
ligation of public authorities in the school districts 
throughout our country to operate integrated school sys-
tems. When the schools of a particular district are 
tn lndPPd, if onp goP~ bark far enough, It 1~ probable that all racwl 
~egregation, wherevE'r ocrurnng and wlwthE'r or not confined to the 
,.;chook ha~ at ,;omE' ttmE' bPPn ~upported or maintained b~· go\·Prn-
mcnt action. In Becket Y :School Board. :)0~ F . Supp. 127-l, l:H 1-
]:{15 (ED \'a. 1969), .TuclgC' Waltrr Hoffman compilPcl a ~ummar~· 
of pa,.;t public ,.;pgrPg:Hor~· action \\'hirh mcludPcl C'Xample~ from a 
gn·at majority of State~. He concluc!Pd that "on!~· a:; to the ,..;tate" 
of l\latnP, :\ew Hamp~htn' . \'crmont. Wa~hington, :'\r\·ada. and 
Hawaii dol'~ it appear from thi" notwxhandiw rr~earch that no cli~­
crimmator~· law~ np]watwl on the boob at onP tim<> or anotlwr." 
!rl., at 1:315. 
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found to be substantially segregated, there is a prima 
facie case that this obligation has not been met. The 
burden then shifts to the school authorities to demoii-
strate that they have in fact operated an integrated 
system as this term is defined above, supra, p. -. If 
there is a failure successfully to rebut the prima facie 
case. the question then becomes vvhat reasonable affinna= 
tive steps district courts may require to place the school 
system in compliai1ce with the constitutional standard. 
In short. what specifically is the nature and scope of the 
remedy'? 
As the Court's opinion virtually compels the finding on 
remand that Denver is a "dual school system." that city 
will then be under an "affirniative duty" to desegregatt' 
its entire system "root and branch.'' Green v. County 
School Board, 391 U. S .. at 438. Again, the critical ques-
tion is what ought this constitutional duty to entail. 
A 
The controlling case is Swann, supra, and the questiOn 
which will confront and confound the District Court and 
Denver School Board is what indeed does Swann require. 
Swann purported to enunciate no new principles, relying 
heavily on Brown I and J J and on Green. Yet it affirmed 
a district court order which had relied heavily oi1 "racial 
ratios'' and sanctioned transportation of elementary as 
well as secondary pupils. Lower federal courts have often 
read Swann as requiring far-reaching transportation de-
crees '' " to achiew the greatest possible degree of actual 
17 S!'e, e. g .. Thompson v. School Board of 1\'P trport Neu·~. -
F. 2d -,- ( 1972) , where the CA4 en bauc. uphrld a dist n ct court 
a'~ig;nm<•llt plan where "travel time, \·arying from a mmimum of 
fort~· mmutP::; alld a maxtmum of one hour , each wa~·, would bP n•-
4lllf<'d for bu ::; mg black ~tudent' out of the old Cit~· and whit e stu-
f[mt:< into thC' old Cit~· 111 order to ach ieve a racwl balancmg; of the 
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desegregation.'' 402 C S .. at 26. In the context of a 
large urban area. with heavy residential concentrations 
of white and black citizens in different-and widely 
separated-sections of the school district. extensive dis-
persal and transportation of pupils is inevitable if Swann 
is read as expansively as many courts have been rPading 
it to date. 
To.the extent that Swann may be thought to require 
large-scale or long-distance transportation of students in 
our metropolitan school districts. I record my profound 
misg1vmgs. i\othing in our Constitution commands or 
encourages any such disruption of public education. 
Fortunately, Swa11n also laid down a broad rule of reasOIJ 
under v,:hich desegregation remedies must remain flexible 
and other values and interests be considered. Thus the 
Court recognized that school authorities. not the federal 
judiciary, must be charged in the first instance with the 
task of desegregating local school systems. 402 U. ~-; at 
16. School boards in rural areas t adjust more 
readily to this task than those in metropolitan distnct~ 
di:stnct ." Thi:s tran~portation wa~ drcreed for childrrn from the th1rd 
grndr up, involving children a::; ~·oung a~ eight yrar:; of age. 
In N orthcross v. Memphis Bd. of Educ ., 466 F. :2d 890 , ~95 
(197:2), the CA6 affirmed <1 di"trict court a:;:;ignment plan wll!Ch 
daily tran:;ported 14,000 children with "the maxnnum tnm· to 1)('· 
~prnt on the bu:;e~ b~· nn~· child I being I :34 minute~ . .. . " ]Jre-
~umabl~· rarh \Ya~·. But a" .Judge Wrick notC'd in d1::::::ent tlw CA6 
lll~trurted the di:::trict judge to implrment ~·et fmthrr de~C'grC'gation 
ordC'r~. Plan:; prr:;rntl~· under con~ideration b,· that court call for 
the bu:;ing of :39 ,0~5 and 61 ,5:30 children re:::pecti,·el~·. for undetrr-
nunrd lrngth::: of timr. !d .. at 895-981-l. 
Prtitionrr" before thi::: Court in Potts v. Fla.r, :\o. 7:2- :2i'\i'\ , crl't . 
dc·nied , - l'. S. - (197-), contended that thr implrmentatwu 
of tlw CA5',.: dirrctive in Flax v. Potts, 464 F. 2d i-165 (197:2) , would 
f('(Jilli'C' bu~ ride" of up to two hour" and 20 minutr~ rach da~· anrl 
a round trip of up to 70 milr~. Prtition, at 14. \Vhilr rr~pondcnt s 
contrnd tlw,.:r figurr,: repn·~ent an "a,.:tonnding infbtion ." He~pon~e . 
111 ( . 1 rnn~portat\on of a ~ignifieant magnirml<' ~<'<'Ill~ lllC'\' liHhil' , 
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"with dense and shifting population. numerous schools, 
congested and complex traffic patterns." !d., at 14. 
Transportation orders are suspect "when the time or 
distance of travel is so great as to either risk the health 
of the children or significantly impinge on the education 
process. !d., at 31. Finally, the age of the pupils to 
be transported was recognized by the Court in Swann 
as one important limitation on the time of student 
travel. Ibid. 
These factors were supposed to help guide district courts 
in framing equitable remedies in school desegregation 
cases." And the Court further emphasized that equitable 
decrees are inherently sensitive. not solely to the degree 
of desegregation to be achieved. but to a variety of other 
public aml private interests: 
. . . a school desegregation case does not differ 
fundamentally from other cases involving the fram-
ing of equitable remedies to repair the denial of a 
constitutional right. The task is to correct, by a 
balancing of the individual and collective interest. 
the condition that offends the Constitution. 8wa1111 . 
. ~upra, at 15-16. 
Those words echoed a similar expression in Brou•n I I , 
349 l . S.. at 229 : 
" In fashioning and effecting the decrees , the court::; 
will be guided by equitable principles. Tradition-
ally, equity has been characterized by a practical 
flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility 
'' Sef' L'nited States " · Texw; Education Agency. -!til F . ~d iH~ . • ~~~ 
(CAS 1972) (Bell .. 1. , eonrurring man opinion in wl)]('h ~f'YPil otll('r 
.JUdgP~ joined) : 
.. ln our new the remedy which thr di~trict court ~~ r!'quirc•cl iu 
formula!<' ~hould be formulatf'd within the ent~re conte:rt of tht' 
opmwn Ill Swauu ,. Charlotte-M er-k/enbvrg Boarrl of Erlucn-
tim, . . . . LEmpha~i~ nddf'd .J " 
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for adJusting and reconciling public and private 
nreds .. , 
'Thus in school Jesegregation cases, as elsewhere, equrty 
counsels reason . flexibility and balance. See. e. {.J., Lemon 
Y. Kurtzman ,- 1J. S.- (1973). I am aware. of 
course. that reasonableness in any area is a relative anJ 
subjective concept. But with school desegregation, rea-
sonableness would seem to embody a balanced evaluation 
of the obligation of public school boards to promote deseg-
regation with other, equally important educational inter-
ests which a community may legitimately assert. ~eglect 
of either the obligation or the interests destroys the even-
handed spirit with which equitable remedies must bP 
approached."' Overzealousness in pursuit of any singlP 
goal is untrue to the tradition of equity and to the "bal-
ance" and "flexibility" with which this Court has always 
r<"garded it. 
B 
Where school authorities have defaulted in their duty 
to operate an integrated school system. district courts 
must insure that affirmative desegregative steps ensue 
:V[any of these can be taken effectively without dam-
aging state and parental interests in having children at-
tend schools within a reasonable vicinity of home. 
Where clesegregative steps are possible vYithin the frame-
work of a system of "neighborhood education." school 
authorities must pursue thrm. .For Pxample. bound-
"' Th<• rPI<'\·ant inquiry i~ "\\'hrther rill' C'O~t~ of aC'h]('nng dr~Pgn•­
gation in an~· given ~ituation out\\'righ tlw legal, moral and <•clu<·a-
t ional C'On~idrra tion~ fa ,·oring It. . . It i~ ci<'<l r . t h:l t t hr 
C'o11,;titutwn ~hould not bl' held to rrquir<' an~· tran,;portation plan 
that kePp~ rhild rPn on a bu,; for:\ ~ub,;tantial part of tlw da~·. con-
~ump~ ~ignifiC'ant portion~ of fund~ othPnYi~e >'pendahlP din•rtl~· on 
rdurat 1on , or ill\·oh·r,; a gl·nuinr Plrmrnt of danger to thP ~afl't_,. of 
tlw rhild." Sf'hool Dr,;rgrPgation Aftrr s,,·ann: :\ ThPon· of Co,·-
r:rnmPnt Hr>~pun~ihilit:·, :)9 P . Chi L. Hr,· . .J:2l. -1:2:2. H:{ ( 197:2). 
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aries of neighborhood attendance zones should })(' dra\Yil 
to integrate. to the extent practicable. the school's stu-
dent body. Constructio11 of ne'" schools should be of 
such a size and at such a location as to encourage the 
likelihood of integration, Swann, at 21. Faculty integra-
tion should be attained throughout the school system. 
Swann, at 1!J; United States v. Montyomery County 
Board of Education, 395 U.S. 225 ( 1~)()9 ). An optional 
majority to minority transfer program, "·ith the State 
providing free transportation to desiring students. 1s also 
a helpful adjunct to a desegregated school system. 
8wann, at 26-27. It hardly need be repeated that alloca• 
tion of resources within the school district must be made· 
with scrupulous fairness among all schools . 
. The above examples are meant to be illustrativr. 11ot 
exhaustive. The point is that the over-all integratiw 
impact of such school board decisions must be assessed by 
district courts in deciding whether the duty to desegregate 
has been met. For example. ''neighborhood school plans 
are constitutionally suspect \\'hen attendance zones arr 
superficially imposed upon racially defined neighborhoods. 
and \Yhe11 school construction preserves rather than elinu-
nates the racial hegemony of given schools." "" Keyes 
v. School District .Yo. 1, Denver Colorado, - F. :2d -, 
l ' ll'ited States v. Boa.rd of Education of Tulsa County, 
42~) F. :2d - . 1258-1259. This does not imply that 
decisions on faculty assignment. attendance zones. school 
constructio11. closing and consolidation. must be mack 
to the cletrinwnt of all neutral. nonracial considerations 
But these considerations ca11. \\·ith proper school board 
initiative. generally be met in a mallller that ,,·ill enhance 
the degree of school df'segrpgatio11 . 
""A 11~dlll "1 ttcl:-· of tlw lu~toncal 11"''" and aln1""" of thr m•tghhol'· 
hoOf[ ,-chool eonccpt lc' .\1 V\'r!lllH'rg. Ha ("(' (\: l'btr·r ( 19(17! . 
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DPfault1ng school authontiPs \\·ould have. at a mmJ· 
mum. the obligatio11 to take affirmative steps of the sort 
outlined in the abow section. ~chool boards ''.:ould . of 
course. be free to develop and initiate further plans to 
promote school desegregation . In a pluralistic society 
such as ours. it is essrnt1al that no racial minority fPt>l 
rlemeant>cl or discrimiiJated against and that students of 
all races learn to play. work. aile! eooperate with oiH' 
anotlwr in their common pursuits and endeavors. "\"oth-
ing in this opinion is meant to discourage school boards 
from exceeding minimal constitutional standards 1n pro-
moting the rrcognized values of integrated school 
conditions. 
A tonstitutional requtrement of rxtensive student 
transportation solely to achievr integration. howevrr. 
presents a vastly more eomplex problem. It promises 
on the 011e hand a greater degree of actual desegregation. 
while it infringes on what may fairly be regarded as 
important community asp1rations and personal nghts. 
Thr Equal Protection ClausP does 1ncleecl require that 
raeial discrimination not bt> tolerated in the deciswns 
of public school authoritirs. It does not command that 
school authorities undertake widespread student trans-
portation solely for the sakr of maximizing integration ."' 
"' In !act, dur 10 raciall~· ~rparatl• n:>~!(lPnlml pattern~ that l'ilar-
al'teriZI' our major mhan an·n~ It 1 ~ qtlltC' llllrrali~tle to thmk of 
al·h1r1·ing in man~- rit1C'~ ~uh~tantial IIIt Pgra tion throughout tlw 
.-chool ch~t net without a drgn·<· of ~t udPnt tran~portation wl11ch 
II'Ollld han• tlw gntve~t pconomi c and Pducational I'Oll~rqut•ncp,.. 
.-\ s l'rufr~~or HiekPI not <'~ 
·]n mo,;t of th e largPr mban ;tr<'a'. dPmographH· conditiOn~ :ll'f' ~urh 
thar no polit-.1· that a court 1':\n ordrr, and a ,;chou! boa rd , a rn~· Ol' 
P1·c•n a ~tate• hM tlw capability to put into ptfert . will Ill fact rr"ult 
JJt tlw forr~PC'ablP future lll ral'wll ~· ba lnn l'ed pub]I<' ~l' hoob. On!~ · 
i! rt•o nlPring of thP rnl·rronmPnt Im·o]nng ('(·onomH· and ~oculi poltrv 
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This obviously does not mean that bus transportatwn ' / 
has no place in public school systems or as a permissibk 0 .~~. 
desegregative ~The transporting of school children 
is as old as public education. and in rural and some 
suburban settings it IS as indispensable as the providing 
of books. It is presently estimated that approximately 
half of all American children ride buses to school for 
reasons UIIrelated to tntcgration ."" .-\t the secondary 
level in particular . where the schools are larger and servP 
a \vider. more dispersed constituency than the elementary • _ . _ L,.; ~ 
chool. some form of public or privately financed trailS:_- ~r-~­
portatioi1 is often necessary . 1~here is a..(difference . how-
Pver. in transportation plans voluntarily initiated by local 
school boards for educational purposes and those im~ 
posed by a fed eral court. Tlw former usually represe nt a 
Itecessary or convenient means of access to the school 
11earest home ; th e latter often require lengthy trips for Illl 
purpose other than to further Integration "" Yet thr' 
on tlw hroadt>:'t concrn·:tbk front rmg;hr ha1·(· an a ppn•cia blt• impaC't ' 
BH"ke! , supra. n. I . a t t:~:2 
"" E::<trmatr;:; 1·a rY .'i!l'a11n, ;-;upra. at :2\:J, notru that "erghtt•t•n mil -
lion of thr :\at1011'" publrc ::;chooJ chr!drr n , approximatPI~- :~9%, 11·rn• 
tran,;purtNl to thPir ;:;chool" In· bu;:; Ill l\!119- 1970 m all part' of thr 
('OIIlltr~·. ·• SPnator H Ib1coff (D.-Conn.) a thoughtful ~ t\IC!Pnt of t hi~ 
proiJirm. ,;tatrd that "two-third,; of all A111cncan chilclrrn toua~· ndP 
bu;:;c,; to "chool for rea ~on" tllll't'iat<'d to Intt'gmtion ... llR Cong . R(•f• 
8:25-t{. Frh :24, 197:2 
"" 1:-Tr"tonr•:dh·, d1~tant tran,portation wa~ wrong!~· ll"<'d to pro-
motP ~Pg;rt'g:ttion . ":\rgro clllldrPJ• ll'(•n• genrrall~· ('011~J(irrrd cap-
:tbiP oft l':l\'Ciimg; long;Pr di~t:t nrt'::< to ,;chool and Without th<' n1d of an~ 
,-rhicl<•. What wa~ too far for a whitt' child b<•c:1111<' rPa~onabl~· near 
tor :1 :\pg;ro child .'' WPinlwrg, supra. 11 . :20. at ~~ 
Tht:' dPplorab!r ht;-;tor~· ha~ it'd ;-;oml' to argur that mt t'g ratlvP bu,., 
nd p;-; arr Jll"titi rd n" a tonrm(•nt for past ,;pg regator~ · tnp,; and th:tt 
nr tghborhood ('duration '" now hut :1 codr-word for racwl ::<<'1/:f<'g:t -
tion . But rni,u,;(' of tran,portntion Ill th <' pa,;t dors not nnpl~ · rwigh -
horhood :<chooling ha" 11 0 l'alrd non,.;pg;rPg)lton· u~r~ for th r prt',;<' Jlt 
\or would wrongful tran,;portatJOI1 111 tlH• pa~t Jll"tlh drtnmrntal 
Jrnn:<portat\011 for tlw l'luldr<'l1 of trH[:I ), 
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Court in Swann was ut1questionably right in describing 
!;us transportation as "one tool of school desegregation." 
40:2 r . s .. at 30."' The crucial issue is '"hen. under \\'hat 
circumstances. and to what extent such transportation 
may appropriately be ordered. Tlw answer to thi 
turns- as it does so often in the law- upon a sound exerr 
eise of discretion under the circumstances. 
Swann itse1f recognized limits to clesegregative ob liga-
tions. lt noted that a constitutional requirement of "any 
particular degree of racial balance or mixing .. . would 
be disproved . . ... and sanctiOned district court usf> 
of mathematical ratios as "no more than a startmg point 
in the process of shaping a remedy. . 402 l!. S .. at 
24. 25. Thus particular schoo ls may be all \Yhlte or 
all black and st1ll not mfringe constitutional nghts ] LAV ~ 
if the syste111 is genumely integrated and school authori- / - -.. 
ties are pursuing integrative steps short of extensive a tj/ 
disruptive transportation. The refusal of the CourtJ to 
require racial balance 1n schoo ls throughout the district 
or the &~+tomati{ elwunatwn of all aone-race sCl1001S: c 
40:2 F. S .. at 26. 1s grounded 111 a recognition that the ~ 
;-\tate. parents. and ehildrPtl a ll have at stake m 
" ' :-;orne• c·ommtmitiP~ had tran~purt ;HIOil plan~ in Pfft·rt at tlw tllliP 
ol court riP~c·grrg:ttiOll ordrr~ . Srr ::)tcwul. supra. at 29, n. 11. DaVls 
' ' · &hoot Colllm'rs uf Mobtlt> ('ount!f. ~02 ll. S. :3:3, :3+-:35 (1971) 
<'ourt~ hn1·c· u~Pd tiH' prP~t·nc·c• or ah~<·nt·P of rx1~t1ng trH II ~JHll't:ttlon 
in a di~tn<·t :to' <HIP f:tl'tor Ill framing and tmplPnwntmg dP~t·grrgatwn 
d<'crf'r~. l '111ted ::ltatt's \' . ll'at.~otl Chapel Srhool Di:;tnct. Hti F. 2d 
\-H:l, \):3/ (l'.-\1' 1911): Sorthrross ,._Board of Educ .. ~-t-l F 2d 1179, 
11~:2- JL-.::l (('Ali 19/1) : Dauts ,._ Board of 8duc .. :QK F . Supp. 1197 , 
120:1 (ED Ark. 1911) \Yh <' n ' a ~chool hoard ~~ , · oluntnnl~· rngag;C'd 
111 t ran:'port ing :' tudrnt~ . a dl:'tl'tct l'OIII't j, , of l'0\11'~<' , ohlw:atcd to 
Jll:'lll'r th:tt ~uch tran~portatton I:' not tmdc•rtnkPn With ;:;rg;rrgator~· 
rffrct. \\'hPr<'. :tl:'o , ,·oluntar\· tran~portntion program~ nrr alrC'ady 
It! progn·~"- th<'n' mn~· hP grratt•r Jl!."tlficatloll for c·ottrt-urd<'t'Pcl trail:'· 
port ntton of "' ud<·nt" for n !'OIIIf!nl'nhle t1111e a/Ill distance t u arh t<'l'!' 
)l;l'<·ater Jllt<'g;ranop_ 
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school desegregatiOn decrees legitimate and recogmzable 
interests. 
The personal w tercst might be characterized as the 
desire that children attend community schools ncar 
home. Dr. James Coleman testified for petitioners at 
trial that "most school systems organize their schools in 
relation to the residents by having fixed school districts 
and some of these are very ethnically homogeneous." 
App. 154\:la. h1 Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 
396 F. 2d 55. 60 ( 1966). the ~ixth Circuit summarized 
thP advantages of such a neighborhood system of 
schools: "'' 
"Appellants. however. pose the question of \vhether 
the neighborhood system of pupil placement. fairly 
administerf'cl without racial bias. comports with the 
requirenwnts of equal opportunity if it nevertheless 
rPsults in the creation of schools with predominantly 
or eve11 exclusively \'egro pupils. The neighbor~ 
l1oocl systPJn IS 111 wide use throughout the nation 
and has been for many years the basis of schoo] 
administration. This is so because it is acknowl-
f'dged to have several valuable aspects which are an 
aid to education. such as minimization of safety haz-
ards to children in reaching school. economy of cost 
i 11 reducing transportation needs. ease of pupil 
placenwnt and administratiOn through the use of 
"'' Tlw t!'rnt "n!'ighl,orhood ~rhool '' ~hould not br ~nppo~rd to 
dl'note ~olrl~ · a walk-m :;chool or onr wlurh ~rrYr~ ('htldrC'n on!~· 111 
thp ~urroundmg bloch. Tltr Court Ita~ noted. Ill a dttfrrrnt con-
trxt. that "the word ·neighborhood' 1~ quitr a~ ,.;u~crptlblr of varta -
tlon a~ till' ll'ord ·]ocaltt~· · Both tPI'IIW arP ela~ttc and , deprndrnt 
upon ctrc·um~tancr~. ma~· lw r<ptall~· ,.;att:sfi<•d b~· arE'a~ mE'a,urE'Cl b~ 
rod,; or b~· mtlr~ . " ronnally \' Unll!ral Con~t. Co .. :2()9 tT . S. :385. 
;)95 ( 19:2()) !11 tlw ~rhool cutltPxt. "nrighborhood'' rdrr~ to rrlattn> 
proxnntt \'. to a prPfrrPII<'I ' for a ~('hool tt<•n n·r. rat hn than morl' 
f[t~tant from hom1 ·. 
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neutral, easily determ111ed standards, and betttlr 
home-school communication ,. 
The neighborhood school does provide greater ease of 
parental and student access and convenience. as well as 
greater economy of public administration. These are 
obvious and distinct advantages. but the legitimacy of 
the neighborhood concept rests on more basic groumls."'' 
~eighborhod school systems. neutrally administered. re-
flect the deeply felt desire of citizeus for a sense of com-
munity in the1r public education. Public schools havf' 
been a traditional source of strength to our :'\ation. and 
that strength may derive i11 part from the identification of 
many schools \\'ith the personal features of the surround-
ing neighborhood. Community support. interest and 
dedication to public schools may well run higher with a 
neighborhood attendance pattern: distance may encour-
age disinterest. Many citizens sense today a decline in 
tlw intimacy of our institutions-home. church. and 
school-which has caused a concomitant decline in tlw 
unity and communal spirit of our people. I pass no 
judgment on this viewpoint. but I do believe that this 
Court should be wary of compelling in the name of cou-
stitutional la\Y v.:hat may seem to many a dissolution in 
the traditional more personal fabric of their public 
schools. 
Closely related to the concept of a community and 
neighborhood education. are those rights and duties par-
ents have with respect to the education of their children. 
The law has long recognized the parental duty to nurture. 
support. and provide for the welfare of children. includ-
"" 1 do not unph· that thr ll<'tghborhood concPpt m11~t hr rmbodi('(l 
Jll <'H' r~· ~rhool ~,·~tem . But wlwrp a ~chool board ha~ cho~('ll it. 
f<'riNnl .imlgP~ ~hould accord 11 rP~Jl<'<' t 111 framing rPmrdtal deer<'<'~. 
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mg their education . Tn Pierce v. Society of Sisters , 268 
r. S. 510. 534. 535. a unanimous C'ourt held that : 
"Under the doctrine of Meyer v. lYebraska, 262 
r. S. 390. we think it entirely plain that the Act 
of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of 
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and 
education of children under their control. . . The 
child is not the mere creature of the state; those who 
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, 
coupled v.:ith the high duty. to recognize and pre-
pare him for additional obligations." 
And in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 482 
( 1965), the Court noted that in Pierce, "the right to eel u-
cate one 's children as one chooses is made applicable to 
the States by the force of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments... I do not believe recognition of this 
right can be confined solely to a parent's choice to send 
a child to public or private school. Most parents can-
not afford the luxury of a private education for therr 
children. and the dual obligation of private tuitions and 
public taxes. Those who may for numerous reasons 
eek public education for their children should not be 
forced to forfeit all interest or voice in the school their 
child attends. It \Vould , of course, be Impractical to 
allow thr wishes of particular parents to be controlling. 
Yet the interest of the parent in the enhanced parent-
school and parent-child communication allowed by the 
neighborhood unit ought not to be suppressPd by forre -----:--:-o, 
of Ia\\' ,-------------...,•&sl~~ 
In tlw Li IHiCPstawla!J.¥P na twna] concern for alleviating 
public school segregation . courts may have overlooked 
tlw fact that the rights and interests of children affected 
by a dese~regation program also are entitled to consid-
eration . Any child . white or black . who is compelled tq 
]Pavp his n<>ighborhood and spend si~nificant tinw Pach 
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clay being transported to a distant school suffers~ L-----
pairment of his liberty and his privacy. Xot long ago . 
.James B. Conant wrote that "laJt the elementary school 
level the issue seems clear. To send young children day 
after day to distant schools seems out of the question.""' 
A community may well conclude that the portion of a. 
child's day spent on a bus might be used more creatively 
in a classroom. playground. or some other extracurricular 
school activity. Decisions such as these. affecting the 
quality of a child's daily life. should not lightly be held 
constitutionally errant. 
To this point I have focused mainly on the personal 
interests of parents ami children which a community may 
believe to be best protected by a neighborhood system 
of schools. But broader considerations lead me to ques-
tion just as seriously any remedial requirement of exten-
sive student transportation solely to further integration . 
• -\ny such requirement is certain to fall disproportionately 
on the school districts of our country. depending on 
their degree of urbanization. financial resources, and their 
racial composition. ~om!:' districts with little or no bl-
racial population will experience little or no educational 
disruption. \vhile others. notably in large. biracial metro-
politan areas. must at considerable expense undertake 
extensive transportatiou to achieve the type of integra-
tion frequen tly being ordered by district courts."" At a 
time ,,·hen public education generally is suffering seriou& 
financial malnutntion. the econonuc burdens of such 
transportation can be severe. requiring both initial capital 
outlays and annual operating costs in the millions of 
dollars ."" :\11d while eonstitutional requirements havP-
"' ~lt11w and Suburb,-, 2\:l ( HWl 1 
" ·' 8PP 11. :21, ,;up1·a. 
"" ln :\f<•mphi~ , for Px:unplr, 1\'hil'h ha~ no hi,tor~· of hu~mg "tu-
rlPnt>'. th<' mmimum tran~portatJon plan ordf'frd h~· tlw court~ will. 
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often occaswned uneven burdens. never have they touched 
so sensitive a matter as >vide differences in the compulsory 
transportation requirements for literally hundreds of 
thousands of school children . 
The argument for student transportation also overlooks 
the fact that the remedy exceeds that which may be 
necessary to redress the constitutional evil. Let us use 
Denver as an example. The Denver School Board. by 
its actio11 and nonaction. may be legally responsible for 
some of the segregation that exists. But if one assumes 
a maximum discharge of constitutional duty by thE' 
DC'nvcr Board over tlw past decades. the fundamental 
problem of residential segregation would persist."" It 
is indeed a novel application of equitable power- not to 
mentio11 a dubious extension of constitutional doctrine-
to require so much greater a degree of forced school in-
tf'gration than would havf' rf'sulted from purely natural 
and neutral nonstate causes. 
Tlw compulsory transportation of students carries a 
further infirmity as a coiistitutional remedy. With most 
C'Onstitutional violations. the major burden of remedial 
action falls on offending state officials. Public officials 
who act to infringe personal rights of speech. voting. or 
religious exercise. for example, are obliged to cease the 
offPnding act or practice alH.l . where necessary. institute 
eorrf'ctivP mPasures. lt is they who hPar the brunt of 
n•qutrr. Ill 11tP School Board '~ l'~tnnatc•, an mtttal capital rxpendttun· 
of $1,fiG-l,19:2 for hu~P:s plu~ an annual operating co~t of $(i:29.19:2 
Tlw Board r~nmatr~ that a morr extrn~iv<• tran:;portatwn program 
to hr ron~tderrd b~ · tlw di~t t'll't court \Yill rrqurre mit in! c;tpital rn-
\'P~tllll' nt,.: of S:3.9:2-l,OOO and annual oprrnting co,;t,.: of $1 ,78:~,4!:)0 
Thr mo~t dra ~tic tran~portatron plan beforr thr di"tnct court rrquirr:; 
P~trrnatrcl annual oprratmg C'O~t,.: of from $:2 ,:35-±,2:20, $:2 ,-±:31,710, or 
$8,4(i:3,100 drpencling on thr Board ',.: trnn:;portation arrangl'ment~ 
.\' orthtro"" Y . Boa.rrl of Erl uratio11 of .11 etll phis C'ity S.rh .. -'IIJ!ra . 
n. 17, at K9iO: (W<'I('k, .J , dr~~<'lltlllf!) 
"'S<•<' 11 ~l. supra 
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remedial action. though other citizens will to varying d(•-
grees feel its effects. School authorities responsible for 
egregation must. at the very minimum, act to cease seg-
regatory acts. But when the obligation further extends 
to the transportation of students. the full burden of the 
affirmative remedial action is borne by children and par-
ents who did not participate in any constitutional 
violation . 
Finally. courts in requiring so far-reaching a remedy 
as student transportation solely to maximize integration .. 
risk setting in motion unpredictable and unmanageable 
social consequences. X o one can estimate the extent 
to which dismantling neighborhood education will hasten (_~ 
an exodus to private schools. leaving public school sys- ~- j 
tems the preserve of the disadvantaged of both races~ ~ 
~r guess how much impetus such dismantlement gives 
tlw movement from innercity to subur . and the further 
geographical separation of the races. ~or do we know 
to 'vhat degree this remedy may cause deterioration of 
community and parental support of public schools. or 
divert attention from the paramount goal of quality tn 
<'clucatwn to a perennially devisive debate over who IS 
to be transported where. 
The problem addressed in this opinion has perplexed 
courts. school officials. other public authorities, and stu-
dents of public eclucation for nearly two decades. Thr 
problem, especially since it has focused on the "busing 
issue." has profoundly disquieted the public wherever 
<'Xtensive transportation has been ordered . f make 110 
pretense of knowing the best aiiS\Yers. Yet. the issue in 
this and like cases comes to this Court as one of con-
stitutional law. As to this issue. I have no doubt what-
ever. There is nothing in the Constitution. its history 
or-until recently- in the jurisprudence of this Court 
that mandates the employment of forced transportation 
Qf yQung and teenage children to achievp a singlP interest. 
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as 1mportant as this interest may be. We have strayNl, 
quite far as I view it, from the rationale of Brown I 
and I l, as reiterated in Swann, that courts in fashioning 
remedies must be "guided by equitable principles" which 
include the "adjusting and reconciling [of! public and 
private needs." Brown JJ, 349 U. S .. at 220. 
T urge a return to this rationale. This would result, 
as emphasized above, in no prohibition on court-ordered 
:student transportation in furtherance of desegregation. 
But it would also require that the legitimate community 
interests in neighborhood school systems be accorded far 
greater respect. In the balancing of interests so appro-
priate to a fair and just equitable Jecree. transporta-
tion orders should be applied \Vith special caution to 
a11y proposal as disruptive of family life and interests-
and ultimately of education itself-as extensive transpor~ 
tation of elementary age children solely for desegregation 
purposes. As a minimum. this Court should not re-
quire school boards to engage in the unnecessary trans-
portation away from their neighborhoods of elementary 
age children. It is at this age level that neighborhood 
education performs its most vital educational role. 1t 
)s with respect to children of tender years that the 
greatest concern exists for their physical and psycholog-
ical health. It is also here, at the elementary school. 
that the rights of parents and children are most sharply 
hnplicatPd."' 
" ThPrf' maY well l:w advantage~ in commencing thP integrati\"l' 
l ' Xpenence~ at an early age , a,.; young children ma~· be le~~ likely 
than oldPr children and adult ~ to dPvelop an 111hibitmg nl<'tid con -
~rlou:<nP~:< . The:<P advantagp:; ::;hould bP con~tderPd a~ "chool board~ 
ma kP t hl' va no us decisions With t l1P VIPW to ach1Pvmg and prP:;Prv -
lng; an mtegrated school ,;y ::;tem. Supra , p. - But m tlw bal -
un cmg of all rp]evant mtPre::;t ::;, thP advantage~ of an Pari~ · mtPgra -
t\vp rxp<•nrnc<· must, and 111 all fiurne::;s "hould. lw weighed aga1n"t 
other rdPYant advantages and disadvantagl'" and in hght of t lw 
dPmograph1r rharacten~ tir;. of thP partlrular r·ommllllll\ ', 
~ Gifl.-Vl-~fu_~  
' ' 
&>j ~ 1 ~r:/-uFvL~ 
~~~k 
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\Vhile greater transportation of secondary school stu-
cleuts might be permitted. even at this level the desire of 
a community for racially neutral neighborhood schools 
~hould command judicial respect. It would ultimately 
he wisest. where there is no absence of good faith. to 
permit affected communities to decide this delicate issue 
of student transportation on their own. Legitimate. 
nonracial aspirations embodied in a neighborhood school 
foncept are entitled to judicial res~ 
JV l~-- -l~~ 
The ex1stmg state as failed to shed light and 
)rovide guidance on two ssue~essed in this opin- ~ 
-........, _ ~: (i) w ~ aml-to ·~ e~tet¥i-=tl unifeHfr V 
c:::r--j to our national prob-
lem{ of school desegregation and ( ii) · u whether the 
ambiguities of Swann, construed to date almost uni-
fonnly in favor of extensive transportation. should be 
redefined to restore a more viable balance among the 
various interests which are involved. With all deference. 
it seems to me that the Court today has addressed neither 
of these issues in a vvay that will afford adequate guid-
,.-----_....:a~':.:.lC::,:e::....::,to~t.he courts below in this case or lead to a rational. J3A 
~-----------..., coherent national policy• with rE"speet to;{ii1tegratiem in ~ 'r.J 
tlw 8 %.lz51 Pr. 
The Court has chosen. rather. to adhere to the de facto / 
de )'UTe distinction under circumstances. and upon a 
rationale. which can only lead to increased and incon-
clusive litigation. and-especially regrettable-to defer-
ment of a nationally consistent JUdicial position on this 
"::::..----4>-1'~.-l subject. There is. of course. state action in every 
school district in the land. The public schools ave 
always een funded and operated by States and their 
local subdivisions. It is true that segregated schools. 
E·ven in the cities of the South. are in large part the 
product of social and economic factors-and the resulting 
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residential patterns. But there is also not a school dis-
trict in the United States. with any significant minority 
school population. in which the school authorities-ill 
bite way or the other-have not contributed in some 
measure to the degree of segregation which still prevails. 
Lnsteacl of recognizing the reality of similar. multiple 
segregatory causes in school districts throughout the 
country. the Court persists in a distinction whose duality 
operates unfairly on local communities in one section of 
the country and on minority children in the others. 
The second issue relates to the ambiguities of Swann 
and the judicial disregard of legitimate community and 
individual interests in framing equitable decrees. In tlw 
absence of a more flexible and reasonable standard than 
that imposed by district courts after Swann, the 
desegregation which will now be decreed in Denver and 
other major cities may well involve even more extensive 
transportation than has been witnessed up to this time. 
It is well to remember that the course we are running 
is a long one and the goal sought in the end-so often 
overlooked-is the best possible educational opportunity 
for all children. Communities deserve the freedom and 
the incentive to turn their attention and energies to this 
goal of quality education. free from protracted and 
debilitating battles over court-ordered student transpor~ 
tation. The single most disruptive element in educa~ 
tion today is the widespread ust> of compulsory trans-
portation . especially at elementary grade levels. This 
has risked distracting and diverting attention from basic 
educational ends. dividing and embittering communities. 
and exacerbating rather than ameliorating inter-racial 
friction and misunderstanding. It is time to return to 
a more balanced evaluation of the recognized interests 
uf our society in achieving desegregation with other edu-
cational and societal interests a community may legiti-
mately assert. This will help assure that integrated 
il-50i-CO:\CTH ,\: DI~SE~T 
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school ~ystems will br establi~hed and mailltained by 
ratioiial action. will be better understood alld supported 
hy parellts and children of both rare:::. and will promote 
the rnduring qualities of all illtegratrd society so ess<'n-
tial to its genuine sueres::;. 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
I concur in the remand of th1s case for further pro-
ceedings in the District Court but on grounds that differ 
from those relied upon by the Court. 
This is the first school desegregation case to reach tlu 
Court which involves a major city outside the South . It 
comes from Denver, Colorado. a city and a State which 
have not operated public schools under constitutional or 
statutory provisions which mandated or permitted racial 
segregation.1 Nor has it been argued that any other 
legislative actions (such as zoning and housing laws) 
contributed to the segregation which is at issue." Thf> 
1 Article IX, § 8, of the Colorado Constitution has expn'ssly pro-
hibited "any classificatwn of pupils . . . on account of race or 
color" 
2 See, e. g .. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educatwn, 
402 U. S. 1, 23 (1971) 
" We do not reach . . the questiOn whether a showing that school 
segregation is a consequence of other types of state action, without 
any discrimmator~- action by school authorities, IS a constitutwnal 
violation requiring remedial action by a school desegregatiOn decree: ·· 
The term "state actwn ," as used herein, thus refer~ to actiOn~ of the 
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Court has inquired only to what extent the Denver 
public school authorities may havP contributed to the 
school segregatio11 which is ackno>dedgecl to exist in 
Denver. 
The predominantly minority schools are located in two 
areas of the city referred to as Park Hill and the core 
city area. The District Court considered that a school 
with a concentration of 70 to 75% "Negro or Hispano 
students" was identifiable as a segregated school. 313 
F . Supp., at 77. \Vherever one may draw this line, Jt is 
undisputed that most of the schools 111 these two area~ 
are in fact heavily segregated in the sense that their tu-
dent bodies are overwhelmingly composed of non-Anglo 
children. The rity-wicle school mix 111 DPnwr is fio % 
Anglo. 14% r\egro. and :2Wir Hispano. 111 areas of the 
city where the Anglo population largely resides, the 
schools are predominantly Anglo, if not entirely so. 
The situation in Denver is gf'nerally comparable to 
that in other large cities across the country in v.:h1ch there 
is a substantial mmority population and wherr desegre-
gation has not bee11 ordered by the federal courts. There 
is segregation in the schools of many of these cities fully 
as pervasive as that 111 southern cities prior to the deseg-
regation decrees of the past clec·ade and a half. The focus 
of the school desegregatiOn problem has now shifted from 
the South to the country as a whole. Unwilling and 
footdragging as the process was in most places. substan-
tial progress toward achieving i · ~ 1as een made 
in southern States." Xo romparable progress has been 
made in many nonsouthern cities v,:ith large minority 
3 According to the 1971 HEW e~t1mate, 43.9% of :;~ro pupils 
attended majonty white ~rhool~ in the South a~ opposed to only 
27. % who at•ended ~urh ~rhoob 111 the ;\lorth and West. Fifty-
::;even percent of all Xegro pupib 111 the i\orth and We::;t attend 
Rchool~ With over HO% mmority population a~ oppo~ed to 32.2% 
,who clo so in the South LIS Cong. Rec. Sl45 
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populations 1 primarily because of the de facto / de jure 
distinction nurtured by the courts and accepted com-
placently by many of the same voices which denounced 
the evils of segregated schools in the South." But if our 
national concern is for those who attend such schools, 
rather than for perpetuating a legalism rooted in history 
rather than present reality. vve must recognize that the 
evil of operating separate schools is no lPss in Denver 
than in Atlanta 
4 The 1971 HE\\r Enrollment Stn·,·r~· dramattzrd thr ;;egreg:1trd 
charactrr of publtc ~('hool ~~·::;tems In man~· nonsouthrrn cities. Thr 
prrcrntage of J\egro pupib winch allPndrd ::;chools morP than RO o/r 
black wa~ 91.:{ 111 Cl!'I'Pland. Ohw; 97.K 111 Compton , California , 
78.1 in Da~·ton. OhiO . 7~.() m Drtroit, :-riclngan . 9.5 7 m Gary . 
Indiana; Sfl.4 in Kan~a~ Ci1v, :'lli~:;oun; 8fl .ti in Los Angrle:;, Call-
forma: 78.8 in :\filwauker , Wi~con,;m; 91.:3 111 \"r11·nrk, Xew .Jrr,.:py 
89.8 in St. Loui~ , :-li::;~olll'l. Thr full data from thr Enrollment Sur-
vr~· rna~· br found 111 lli-1 Cong Rrc. Sl-t+-1-!8, .Tan. 20 , 1972. 
"A::; Srnator Ribicoff (D -Conn.) rrcognrzed · 
"For year,; we• han· fought the battle• of mtrgratiOII pnmnril~ 111 
the South whrn• thr prohkm wa" ;-;e•n•rr. It wa~ a long, arduou~ 
fight that elP:;PrvPd to be· fought and lll't-drd to be· II'OII. 
"lT nfortuna t rh·, a' tlw prohlPm of ra <'I:\ I i,.:oln t wn ha~ mol' Pel no1tl1 
of the :\Ia"on-Dtxon I ill(• , man.1· nort berner,.: ha 1·e Lid ;\!1 <·1·asrvt> 
fare\\'t'll to thP 100-~·par ~trngglP for rnewl el.Juaht~ · Om motto 
seem::; to haw bren ·Do to ;-;outhrmrr~ what you do not \\'ant to do 
to ~·our~rl f. ' 
''Good rrason~ h:Wt' nlwa.1·::; hl'<'ll offPrPcl. of rom~e . for not moving 
vigoron::;l~· nhrad m tllC' \"orth a~ 11·c•ll a" thr South. 
"Fir;-;(. It wa~ that t hr problrm wa~ wor~r 111 tlw South Then 
the fact" beg:1n to ~how that that wn, no longrr true. 
'' W(' thrn began to hPar thl' dP faeto-dP .JIIJ'l> rrfram . 
"Somrhow re~identwl ~rgn·ganon 111 tlw :\orth wa~ nrcidentnl or 
de facto and that mndr it brttrr than tllC' IPgall~· supported de jure 
,;egrrgation of th(• :::lout h. It wn~ a hard distinction for black children 
m totall~· ~Pgr('gatrd ~rhool::: m tlw \"orth to underAnnd. but 11 
allowed u,; 10 a1·oid thP problrm." liS Cong Her 82.5~2. Feh. 2-1 
1972. 
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In my view we should abandon a distinction which long 
since has outlived its time, and formulate constitutional 
principles of national rather than merely regional appli-
cation. Whe11 Brown v Board of Education, 347 U. 
483 (1954). was deciclt>d. thf' Jistinction betwf'Pn de jure 
and de facto segregation was consistent with the limited 
constitutional rationale of that casP. The situation con-
fronting the Court. largPly confined to tlw southern 
States, was officially imposed racial sPgregation in the 
schools extending back for many years and usually em-
bodied in constitutional and statutory provisions. 
The great contribution of Brown I was 1ts holding in 
unmistakable terms that the Fourteenth Amendment 
forbids state-compelled or authorized segregation of pub-
lic schools. 347 C . S., at 488. 493- 49i) . Although some 
of the language was more expansive. thf' holding 111 
Broum J was essentially negative It was impermissible 
under the Constitution for the States. or thPir mstru~ 
mentalities, to force children to attend segregated schools. 
The forbiclden action was de JUre, and the opinion in 
Brown I was construed-for some years anrl by many 
courts-as requiring only state neutrality. allowing "free-
dom of choice'' as to schools to be attended so long as the 
State itself assured that the choice was genuinely free of 
official restraints " 
6 Src, e. g .. Bradle y v. Sdwol Board. :3~5 F . 2d :1 10. 316 (CA~ 
en bane. 1965) . 
"It has brrn hrld again nnrl again .. that t hr Fourteenth 
AmendmPnt prohibition i~ not agnin~t ~<· .grrgation a~ ,,uch .. 
A stat e or ~chool di~trict offpnd~ no ron~titutionnl rrqtmcment 
when it grant~ to nil ~tudrnt~ uniform!~· a n unrr~trictrd frrrdom of 
choi ce a~ to thr ~chool attrndPd . ~o th;tt Pnch pupil , Ill rffPct. a~~ ign ~ 
hnn~Pif to thr "chool hr wi~hP~ to attrnd" tThr ca"r \\'a~ lat rr 
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But the doctrine of Brown I, as amplified by Brown I!, 
349 U. S. 294 ( 1955). did not retain its original meaning. 
In a series of decisions extending from 1954 to 1971 the 
concept of state twutrality was transformed into the 
present constitutional doctrine rf'quiring affirmative 
state action to desf'gre!!ate school system~. " The key-
stone case was Green v. ( 'uuuly 8chool Roard, :~91 r. S. 
430, 438 (1968). when· school boards ,,·err tkelared to 
have "the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might 
be necessary to convPrt to a unitary system in which 
racial discrimination would be eliminated root ami 
branch."' The school systPm before the Court in Green 
was operating i11 a rural and sparst•ly settled county 
"·herE' thE're werE' no concentrations of white and black 
population~. no neighborhood school system (there were 
only two schools in thE' county). and 110ne of the 
problems of an urbanizPd school district.' The Court 
properly iden tifiPd thP freedom of choicE' program 
therE' as a subterfuge. and the language in Green impos-
ing an affirmativt' duty to cottvert to a unitary system 
was appropriate on the facts before the Court. There 
was. however. reason to question tu what E'xtcnt this duty 
would apply in tlw vastly different factual setting of a 
vacated and rrmandrd b~· tin~ Court, whtrb expre::;~rd no virw on thr 
merits of the de~egrrgatton plan~ ~ulnm1 trd . ) :)s2 ll . S. 10:3, 10."> 
(1965) . Ser abo Bell ,. _ ,'ichoo/ City of Gary. huf .. :Q-+ F. 2cl 209 
(CA7 196:3) . Doa•ns ,._Board of Rduc .. :):m F. 2d 9i{~ (CAJO 19Ml : 
Deal v. Board of Educ .. ;~()9 F 2d 55 (CMi 19661 
7 For a rom·t~r histor~· and rommf'ntar~· on thf' f'\·olutiOII, :,;('l' gen-
rrall~· A. Biekrl. Thr Supremr Court. and tllf' Idea of Prog;rr~s. pp 
126-1:30 ( 1970) 
8 See abo the rompanion ra~e~ 111 Rm1 ey \". Board of Hducation. 
:391 tr. S. -+-+:3 (196H} , and !llonroe ,. Board of Cormn 'rs. 391 P . S 
450 (1968). nrttber of whteh mvoh·ed largr urban or mf'tropolitan 
.areas. 
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large city with extensive areas of resideutial segregation, 
presenting problems and calling for solutions quite dif-
ferent from those in the rural setting of Xew Kent 
County. Virginia. 
But the doubt as to whethPr the affirmative duty con-
cept would flower into a new coustitutional principle of 
general application was laid to rest by Swann v. Board 
of Education, 402 LT. ~- 1 ( 1971). in 'vhich the duty 
articulated in Green was applied to the urban school 
system of metropolitan Char lotte. X orth Carolina. l 11 
describing the residential pattPrll~ ttl Charlotte . thL' Co!lrt 
noted the "familiar phetlOlll('I10Jl .. in thl· metropolitan 
areas of minority groups lwing ·'concentrated in one part 
of the city." 40:L r. :-3 .. at :25. and acknowledged that ; 
"Rural areas accustomed for half a century to the 
consolidated · school system implemented by bus 
transportlltion could ' make· adjustments more readily 
than metropolitan areas with dense and shifting pop-
ulation, numerous schools. congested and colllplrx 
traffic patterns. " 402 l ~ ~ .. at l4 
Despite this recogmtwn of a fundamentally different 
problem from that involved 111 Green, the Court never-
theless held that the affirmative duty rule of Green was 
applicable, and prescribed for a metropolitan school sys-
tem with 107 schools and some 84,000 pupils essentially 
the same remedy-elimination of segregation "root and 
branch "-which had been formulated for the two schools 
and 1,300 pupils of New Kent County 
In Swann, the Court further noted it "·as concerned only 
with Sta.tes having "a long history" of officially imposed 
segregation and the duty of school authorities in those 
States to implement Brown I. 402 lJ. S .. at 5-6. In so 
doing, the Court refrained even from considering whether 
the evolution of constitutional doctrine from Brown I to 
Green/ Swann undercut whatever logic once supported 
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the de facto/ de jure distinction. In imposing on metro-
politan southern school districts an affirmative duty. en 6 
tailing large-scale transportation of pupils, to eliminate 
segregation in the schools, the Court required these dis-
tricts to alleviate conditions which in large part did not 
result from historic. state-imposed de jure segregation. 
Rather, the familiar root cause of segregated schools in all 
the biracial metropolitan areas of our country is essen-
tially the same: one of segregated residential and migra-
tory patterns the impact of which on the racial composi-
tion of the schools was often perpetuated and rarely 
ameliorated by action of public school authorities. This 
is a national , not a southem phenomenon . And it is 
largely unrelated to whether a particular State had (Jr did 
not have segregatory school law8 '• 
Whereas Brourn I rightly decreed the elimmation 
of state-imposed segregation in that particular section of 
the country where it did exist. Swann imposed obligations 
on southern school distrirts to elumnate conditions which 
are not regionally umque but are similar both in origin 
and effect to conditions in the n~st of the country . As 
9 A;,; Dr K arl Taruber statrs in hi ~ a rticle, Hr~idential SPgrE>gation. 
Scientific Amencan , August 1965, a t 14 : 
"No elaborate analysis is necessary to conclude from the~e figures 
that a high degreE' of rc, Identlal :;egregat ion based on racr IS a uni-
versal characteristic of Amrncan c iti P~ . Thi ,: ~egregation is found 
in the cities of the North and West a" \\'CII a:< of the South; 111 la rge 
cities as well as small ; 111 nonmdu~trial cit IE'~ as wrll a~ mdu~trial; in 
ci tirs w1th hundreds of thousands of Negro residents as well as those 
with only a few thousand ; and 111 cit ies that a re progressive 111 their 
employment practice and c1vil nght" policie:< as well a~ tlwse that 
are not " 
In his book , "\"egroes in Clt iP~ (1965) , Dr Taruber statPd that r e:o:i-
dential srgrrgatwn rxists " regardiPss of thr charactrr of local laws 
and policie~ and regardl rs~ of ot lwr form~ of di~crimmatwn ." !d., 
at :36. 
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the remedial obligations of Swann extend far beyond 
the elimination of the outgrowths of the state-imposed 
segregation outlawed in Brown, the rationale of Swarm 
points inevitably tovvards a uniform, constitutional ap~ 
proach to our national problem of school segregation. 
TI 
The Court's decision today. whrle adhering to the 
de jure/de facto distinction, will require the application 
of the Green/ Swann doctrine of "affirmative duty" to the 
Denver School Board despite the absence of any history 
of state-mandated school segregation. The only evidence 
of a constitutional violation was found in various de-
cisions of the school board. I coneur 111 tlw Court's posi-
tion that the public school authorities ar<' the responsible 
agency of the State. and that if the affirmative duty doC'-
trine rs sound constitutional la\\' for Charlotte. it is 
equally so for Denver. I would not, however, perpetuate 
the de jure/ de facto distinction nor would I leave to peti-
tioners the initial tortuous effort of identifying "segre-
gative acts" and deducing "segregatory Intent." I would 
hold, quite simply. that where segregated public schools 
exist within a school district to a substantial degree. there 
is a prima facie case that the duly constituted public 
authorities (I wm usually refer to them collectively as 
the "school board") are sufficrently responsible'" to im-
pose upon them a nationally applicable burden to demon-
10 A prima facie case of cun;:;tJtut IOnal \'lola1!on PXJ;:;t~ whPn segre-
gatiOn is found to a substantial degrpe 111 thP school~ of a par-
ticular district. lt Is rPcognized , of cour~e. that tlu~ term i~ rela-
ttve and provide~ no precise standard;:;. But circumstances, demo-
graphic and otherwise , vary from d1stnrt to district and hard and 
fast rules should not be formulated. The Pxistence of a substantial 
pPrcC'ntage of ~choob populated b~· ~tudent~ from onp racP only o~· 
predominately so populatrd. shou_ld triggrr the inquir ·, 
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strate they nevertheless are operating a genuinely inte-
grated school system. 
The principal reason for abandonment of the de jure/ 
de facto distinction is that. in view of the evolution of 
the holding in Brown I into the affirmative duty doctrine, 
the distinction no longer can be justified on a principled 
basis. In decreeing remedial requirements for the 
Charlotte/ Mecklenburg school district. Swann dealt 
with a metropolitan. urbanized area in which the basic 
causes of segregation were generally similar to those in 
all sections of the country. and also largely irrelevant 
to the existence of historic. stat(•-imposed segregation at 
the time of the Brown decision. Further. the extension 
of the affirmative duty concept to include compulsory 
student transportation went well beyond the mere rem-
edying of that portion of school 8egregatiou for which 
former state segregation Ia ws were ever responsible. 
Moreover, as the Court's opinion today abundantly dem-
onstrates. the facts deemed necessary to establish de JUre 
discrimination present problems of subjective intent 
\vhich the courts cannot fairly rPsolve . 
At the outset, one must try to 1dent1fy the constitu-
tional right which is being enforceu. This is not easy, 
as the precedents have been far from explicit. In 
Brown I , after emphasizing the importance of education, 
the Court said that : 
"Such an opportumty. where the state has under-
taken to provide it. is a right \Yhich must be made 
available to all on equal terms." 347 "C. S., at 493. 
ln Brown I I , the Court identified the "fundamental prm-
ciple" enunciated in Brown I as being the unconstitu-
tionality of "racial discrimination in public education,., 
349 U. S., at 298, and spoke of "the personal interest 
Qf the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon 
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as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis.'' 349 U. S., 
at 300. Although this and similar language is ambiguous 
as to the specific constitutional right, it means-as a mini-
mum-that one has the right not to be compelled by 
state action to attend a segregated school system.11 In 
the evolutionary process since 1954. decisions of this 
Court have added a significant gloss to this original right. 
Although nowhere expressly articulated in these terms, 
I would now define it as the right. derived from the Equal 
Protection Clause, to expect that once the State has as-
sumed responsibility for education, local school boards 
will operate integrated school systems within their re-
spective districts. This means that school authorities, 
consistent with the generally accepted educational goal of 
attaining quality education for all pupils, must make and 
implement their customary decisions with a view toward 
enhancing integrated school opportunities. 
The term "integrated school system" presupposes, of 
course. a total absence of any laws, regulations or policies 
supportive of the type of "legalized· segregation con-
demned in Brown. A system would be integrated in 
accord with constitutional standards if the responsible 
authorities had taken appropriate steps to (i) integrate 
faculties and administration ; ( ii) scrupulously assure 
equality of facilities, instruction and curricula oppor-
tunities throughout the district; (iii) utilize their au-
thority to draw attendance zones to promote integra-
tion; and (iv) locate new schools, close old ones. and 
11 See Bickel , supra, n. 7. at 118 : 
"It [the problem of ~chool deseg regatiOn I has not been that sim-
ple . . . because the laconic opinion in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion was itself not that :;imple. One strain in it became eYident in 
subsequent decisions outlawing all form:; of :<tatP-sponsored segrega-
tion in ever~·thing from the :spectator :;eetion of a courtroom to golf 
courses. The minimal proposition thilt emerged-and about time 
it was that it should emergE'--was that the :s tate ma~· not , by legisla-
tion or administratively, cla~>::;ih· the population along racial lines.' ' 
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-determine the size and grade categories with this same 
objective in mind. Where school authorities decide to 
undertake the transportation of students. this also must 
be with integrative opportunities in mind. 
The foregoing prescription is not intended to be either 
definitive or all-inclusive. but rather an indication of 
the contour characteristics of an integrated school sys-
tem in which all citizens and pupils may justifiably be 
confident that racial discrimination is neither practiced 
nor tolerated. An integrated school system does not 
mean-and indeed could not mean in view of the resi-
dential patterns of most of our major metropolitan 
areas-that every school must in fact be an integrated 
unit. A school which happens to be all or predominantly 
white or all or predominantly black is not a "segregated" 
school in an unconstitutional sense if the system itself is 
a genuinely integrated one. 
Having school boards operate an integrated school sys-
tem provides the best assurance of meeting the constitu-
tional requirement that racial discrimination, subtle or 
otherwise. will find no place in the decisions of public 
school officials. Courts judging past school board actions 
with a view to their general integrative effect will be best 
able to assure an abseuce of such discrimination while 
avoiding the murky, subjective judgments inherent in 
the Court's search for "segregatory intent." Any test 
resting on so nebulous and elusive an element as a 
school board's segregatory "intent" provides inadequate 
assurance that minority children will not be short-
changed in the decisions of those en trusted with the non-
discriminatory operation of our public schools. 
Public schools are creatures of the State, and whether 
the segregation is state-created or state-assisted or 
merely state-perpetuated should be irrelevant to consti~ 
tutional principle. The school board exercises pervasive 
and continuing responsibility over the long range plan~ 
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ning as well as the daily operations of the public school 
system. It sets policies on attendance zones, faculty 
employment and assignments, school construction, clos-
ings and consolidations, and myriad other matters. 
School board decisions obviously are not the sole cause 
of segregated school conditions. But if. after such de-
tailed and complete public supervision. substantial school 
segregation still persists. the presumption is strong that 
the school board, by its acts or omissions. is in some part 
responsible. Where state action and supervision are so 
pervasive and where, after years of such action, seg-
regated schools continue to exist within the district 
to a substantial degree. this Court is .i ustified in find-
ing a prima facie case of a constitutional violation. 
The burden then must fall on the school board to demon-
strate it is operating an "integrated school system." 
It makes little sense to find prima facie vwlations and 
the consequent affirmative duty to desegregate solely in 
those States with state-imposed segregation at the time 
of the Brown decision . The history of state-imposed 
segregation is more widespread 111 our country than the 
de jure/ de facto distinction has traditionally cared to 
recognize.'" As one commentator has noted 
"the three court of appeals decisions denying a con-
stitutional duty to abolish de facto segregation all 
· ~ Indeed , if one goe~ back far enough, it is probable that all rac:ial 
segregation, wherever occurring and whether or not confined to the 
schools, has at some time been supported or maintainrd by govern-
ment action . In Becket v. School Board, 308 F. Supp. 1274, 1311-
1315 (ED Va. 1969) , Judgr Waltrr Hoffman compilrd a summary 
of pa::;t public segregator~· action which included examples from a 
great majority of States. He concluded that "on!~· as to the states 
of l\1aine, New Hampshire , Vermont, Wa~hington , Nevada, and 
Hawaii does it appear from this nonexhaustive resea rch that no dis-
criminatory laws appeared on the books at one time or another.:' 
/d., at 1315._ 
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arose in cities-Cincinnati, Gary and Kansas City, 
Kansas-where racial segregation in schools was 
formerly mandated by state or local law. [Deal v. 
Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F. 2d 55 (CA6 1966), 
cert. denied, 377 U. S. 924 (1964); Downs v. Board 
of Educ., 336 F. 2d 988 (CAlO 1964) , cert. de-
nied, 380 U. S. 914, Bell v. School City, 324 F . 2d 
209 (CA7 1963) , cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924.] Ohio 
discarded its statute in 1887, Indiana in 1949, and 
Kansas City not until the advent of Brown. If 
Negro and white parents in Mississippi are required 
to bus their children to distant schools on the theory 
that the consequences of past de jure segregation 
cannot otherwise be dissipated, should not the same 
reasoning apply in Gary. Indiana, where no more 
than five years before Brown the same practice 
existed with presumably the same effects." Good-
man, De Facto School Segregation : A Constitutional 
and Empirical Analysis. 60 Cal. L. Rev. 275, 297 
(1972).13 
Not only does the de jure/ de facto distinction operate 
inequitably on communities in different sections of the 
1 3 The author continues : 
"True, the earlier the policy of segregation was abandoned the Jess 
dangrr there IS that 1! continues to operate covertly, is significantly 
responsible for present day patterns of reRidential segregation, or has 
contributed material!~· to present communit~· attitudes toward Negro 
schools. But there is no reason to suppose that 1954 is a univer:;ally 
appropriate dividing line between de jure segregation that may 
safely be assumed to have spent itself and that which may not . 
For many remedial purposes, adoption of an arbitrary but easily 
administrable cutoff point might not be objectiOnable. But in a 
situation such as school desegregation, where both the rights asserted 
and the remedial burdens imposed are of such magnitude, and where 
the resulting ;;ectional discrimination is passionately resented, it is 
surely questionable whether such arbitrariness is either politically 
or morally acceptable." 
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country: more importantly, it disadvantages minority 
children as well. As the Fifth Circuit stated: 
"The Negro children in Cleveland, Chicago, Los 
Angeles, Boston, New York, or any other area of the 
nation which the opinion classifies under de facto 
segregation, would receive little comfort from the 
assertion that the racial make-up of their school sys-
tem does not violate their constitutional rights be-
cause they were born into a de facto society, while 
the exact same racial make-up of the school system 
in the 17 southern and border states violates the 
constitutional rights of their counterparts, or even 
their blood brothers. because they were born into 
a de jure society. All children everywhere in the 
na,tion are protected by the Constitution, and treat-
ment which violates their constitutional rights in 
one area, also violates such constitutional rights in 
another area." Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independ-
ent School District, 467 F. 2d 142, 148 (CAS en bane, 
1972) quoting United States v. Jefferson County 
Board of Educ ., 380 F. 2d 385. 397 (CAS en bane) 
Gewin. J .. dissenting) ." 
The Court today does move for the first time toward 
breaking down past sectional disparities, but it clings 
tenuously to its distinction. It searches for de jure 
action in what the Denver School Board has done or 
failed to do, and even here the Court does not rely upon 
the results or effects of the Board 's conduct but feels com-
pelled to find segregatory intent : '" 
"We emphasize that the differentiating factor be-
~< Sre B1ckel, supra, 11. 7, at 119 : 
" If a Negro child perceives his srparation as discriminatory and 
invidious, he is not , in a soc iety a hundred ~·ea rs removed from 
slavery, going to make fine dist inctions about the source of a par-
ticular separation." 
"Thr Court toda y docs not require , however, a ::;egregatory intent 
with respect to the entire school system, and inder<i holds that if such 
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tween de jure segregation and so-called de facto 
segregation to which we referred in Swann is pur-
pose or intent to segregate." (Court Opinion, p. 18) 
(italics are the Court's). 
The Court's insistence that the "differentiating factor" 
between .de jure and de facto segregation be "purpose 
or intent" is difficult to reconcile with the language in so 
recent a case as Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 
407 U. S. 451 (7972). In holding there that "motiva, 
tion" is irrelevant, the Court said: 
"In addition, an inquiry into the 'dominant' motiva-
tion of school authorities is as irrelevant as it is fruit-
less. The mandate of Brown II \Vas to desegregate 
schools, a.nd we have said that ' [ t] he measure of 
any desegregation plan is its effectiveness.' Davis 
v. School Commissioners of Mobile County, 402 U. S. 
33, 37. 
"Thus, we have focused upon the effect--not the 
purpose or motivation-of a school board's action 
in determining whether it is a permissible method 
of dismantling a dual system. 
"Though the purpose of the new school district was 
found to be discriminatory in many of these cases, the 
an intent iH found with respect to some schools in a system, the bur-
den-normally on the plaintiffs-shifts to the defendant school au-
thorities to prove a negative : namely, that their purposes were 
benign, ante. pp. 17-18 
The Court has come a long wa~· since Brown I . Starting from 
the unassailable de jure ground of the discriminatory constitutional 
and statutory provisions of some States, the new formulation-still 
professing fidelity to the de jure doctrine-is that desegregation will 
be ordered despite the absence of any segregatory laws if: (i) segre-
gated schools in fact exist ; (ii) a court finds that they result from 
some action taken with segregatory intent by the school board , 
(iii) such action relates to any "meaningful segment" of the school 
system; and (iv) the school board cannot prove that its intentions 
with respect to the remainder of the system were nonsegregatory. 
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courts' holdings rested not on motivation or pur~ 
poses but on the effect of the action upon the dis-
mantling of the dual school system involved. That 
was the focus of the District Court in this case, and 
we hold that its approach was proper." 407 U. S., 
at 462. 
I can discern no basis in law or logic for holding that 
the motivation of school board action is irrelevant in 
Virginia and controlling in Colorado. It may be argued, 
of course, that in Emporia a prior constitutional viola-
tion had already been proven and that this justifies the 
distinction. The net result of the Court's language, how-
·ever, is the application of an effect test to the actions of 
southern school districts and an mtent test to those in 
other sections, at least until an initial de jure finding for 
those districts can be made. Rather than straining to 
perpetuate any such dual standard, we should hold forth-
rightly that significant segregated school conditions in 
whatever section of the country are a prima facie viola-
tion of constitutional rights. As the Court has noted 
elsewhere ; 
"Circumstances or chance may ,.,·ell dictate that no 
persons in a certain class will serve on a particular 
jury or during some particular period. But it taxes 
our credulity to say that mere chance resulted in 
there being no members of this class among the over 
six thousand jurors called in the past 25 years. The 
result bespeaks discrimnation, wlwther or ·not it was 
a conscious decision on tlw part of any individual jury 
commissioner." Henwndez v. Texas, 347 U. S. 475, 
482 (1954) . (Emphasis added.) 
B 
There is thus no reason as a matter of constitutional 
principle to adhere to the de jure/ de facto distinction in 
schoQl desegregation cases, In addition, ther~ ar~ r~a, •. 
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sons of policy and prudent judicial administration which 
point strongly toward the adoption of a uniform national 
rule. The litigation heretofore centered in the South 
already is surfacing in other regions. The decision of 
the Court today, emphasizing as it does the elusive 
element of segregatory intent, will invite numerous deseg-
regation suits in which there can be little hope of uni-
formity of result. 
The issue in these cases will not be whether segregated 
education exists. This will be conceded in most of them. 
The litigation will focus as a consequence of the Court's 
decision on whether segregation has resulted in any 
"meaningful or significant" portion of a school system 
from a school board 's "segregatory intent." The intrac-
table problems involved in litigating this issue are obvious 
to any lawyer. The results of litigation- often arri ved 
at subjectively by a court endeavoring to ascertain the 
subjective intent of school authorities with respect to 
action taken or not taken over many years- will be 
fortuitous, unpredictable and even capricious. 
The Denver situation is illustrative of the problem. 
The courts below found evidence of de jure violations 
with respect to the Park Hill schools and an absence of 
such violations with respect to the core city schools, 
.despite the fact that actions taken by the school board 
with regard to those two sections were not dissimilar. 
It is, for example, quite possible to contend that both 
the construction of Manual High School in the core city 
area and Barrett Elementary School in the Park Hill area 
, operated to serve their surrounding Negro communities 
and, in effect, to merge school attendance zones with 
segregated residential patterns. See Petitioner's Brief, 
pp. 80-83. Yet findings even on such similar acts will, 
under the de jure/ de facto distinction, continue to differ, 
especially since the Court has never made clear what 
suffices to establish the requisite "segregatory intent" for 
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an initial constitutional violation. Even if it were pos-
sible to clarify this question , wide and unpredictable 
differences of opinion among judges would be inevitable 
when dealing with an issue as slippery as "intent" or 
"purpose," especially when related to hundreds of 
decisions made by school authorities under varying con-
ditions over many years. 
This Court has recognized repeatedly that it is "ex-
tremely difficult for a court to ascertain the motivation, 
or collection of different. motivations, that lie behind a 
legislative enactment," Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S. 
214, 224 (1971); McGinnis v. Royster,- U.S.-,~ 
(1973); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 381 
(1968) . Whatever difficulties exist with regard to a sin~ 
gle statute will be compounded in a judicial review of 
years of administration of a large and complex school 
system. 11' Every act of a school board and school ad-
ministration, and indeed every failure to act where affirm-
ative action is indicated, must now be subject to scrutiny. 
'"'A~ one commentator hao: t•xprr~~ed it : 
"If the courts are indeed prepared to inquire into motive, thorny 
questions will arise even if one assume~ that rarwl motivation is 
capable of being proven at trial. What of the casf' in which one or 
more members of a school board, but less than a majority, are found 
to have acted on racial grounds? What if it appea rs that the school 
board's action was prompted by a mixture of motives, including con-
stitutionally innocent ones that alone would have prompted the board 
to act? What if the members of the school board were not them-
selves racially inspired but wished to please their constituents, many 
of whom they knew to be so? If such cases are classified as un-
constitutional de jure segregation, there is little point in preserving 
the de jure-de facto distinction at all. And it may well be that the 
difference between any of these situations and one in which racial 
motivation is altogether lacking is too insignificant, from the stand-
point of both the moral culpability of the state officials and the 
impact upon the children involved, to support a difference in con~ 
stitutional treatment," Goodman, supra, n. 11, {lt 284-285, 
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The most routine decisions with respect to the operation 
of schools, made almost daily, can affect in varying de-
grees the extent to which schools are initially segregated, 
remain in that condition, are desegregated, or-for the 
long term future-are likely to be one or the other. These 
.decisions include action or nonaction with respect to 
school building construction and location; the timing of 
building new schools and their size; the closing and con-
solidation of schools; the drawing or gerrymandering of 
student attendance zones; the extent to which a neigh-
borhood policy is enforced; the recruitment, promotion 
and assignment of faculty and supervisory personnel; 
policies with respect to transfers from one school to 
another; whether, and to what extent, special schools will 
be provided, where they will be !orated, and who will 
qualify to attend them; the determination of curriculum, 
including whether there will be "tracks" that lead pri-
marily to college or to vocational training, and the rout:: 
ing of students into these tracks; and even decisions as 
to social. recreational and athletic policies. 
In Swann the Court did not have to probe into segre-
gatory intent and proximate cause with respect to each 
of these "endless" factors. The basis for its de jure find-
ing there was rooted primarily in the prior history of the 
desegregation suit. 402 U. S., at 5-6. But in a case of 
the present type, where no such history exists, a judicial 
examination of these factors will be required under to-
day's decision. This will lead inevitably to uneven and 
unpredictable results, to protracted and inconclusive liti-
gation, to added burdens on the federal courts, and to 
serious disruption of individual school systems. In the 
absence of national and objective standards, school boards 
. and administrators will remain in a state of uncertainty 
and disarray, speculating as to what is required and when 
litigation will strike. 
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Rather than continue to prop up a distinction no longer 
grounded in principle, and contributing to the conse-
quences indicated above, we should acknowledge that 
whenever public school segregation exists to a sub-
stantial degree there is prima facie evidence of a con-
stitutional violation by the responsible school board. It 
is true, of course, that segregated schools-wherever 
located-are not solely the product of the action or 
inaction of public school authorities. Indeed, as indi-
cated earlier, there can be little doubt that principal 
causes of the pervasive school segregation found in the 
major urban areas of this country, whether in the North , 
West, or South, are the socio-economic influences which 
have concentrated our minority citizens in the inner cities 
while the more mobile white majority disperse to the sub-
urbs. But it is also true that public school boards have 
continuing, detailed responsibility for the public school 
system within their district and, as Judge John Minor 
Wisdom has noted, "where the figures [showing 
segregation in the schools] speak so eloquently, a 
prima face case of discrimination is establish ed." 
United States v. Texas Education Agency, 467 F. 2cl 848, 
873 (CA5 en bane 1972). Moreover, as foreshadowed in 
,Swann and as implicitly held today. school boards have a 
duty to minimize and ameliorate segregated conditions 
by pursuing an affirmative policy of desegregation. It is 
this policy which must be applied consistently on a na-
tional basis without regard to a doctrinal distinction 
which has outlived its time. 
III 
The preceding section addresses the constitutional ob-
ligation of public authorities in the school districts 
throul?ihout our COI,lntry to operat~ inter;rated school sys· 
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terns. When the schools of a particular district are 
found to be substantially segregated, there is a prima 
facie case that this obligation has not been met. The 
burden then shifts to the school authorities to demon-
strate that they have in fact operated an integrated 
system as this term is defined above. supra, p. 10. If 
there is a failure successfully to rebut the prima facie 
case, the question then becomes what reasonable affirma-
tive desegregative steps district courts may require to 
place the school system in compliance with the consti-
tutional standard. In short. what specifically is the 
nature and scope of the remedy'? ~ 
As the Court's opinion virtually compels the finding~ 
remand that Denver il"a "dual school system,'' that city 
will then be under i:w "affirmative duty" to desegregate 
its entire system "root and branch." Green v. County 
School Board, 391 U. S., at 438. Again, the critical ques-
tion is what ought this constitutional duty to entail. 
A 
The controlling case is Swann , supra, and the question 
which will confront and confound the District Court and 
Denver School Board is what indeed does Swann require. 
Swann purported to enunciate no new principles, relying 
heavily on Brown I and II and on Green. Yet it affirmed 
a district court order which had relied heavily on "racial 
ratios" and sanctioned transportation of elementary as 
well as secondary pupils. Lower federal courts have often 
read Swann as requiring far-reaching transportation de-
crees " "to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual 
uSee, e. g., Thompson v. School Board of Newport News, -
F . 2d -,- (1972), where the CA4 en bane, upheld a district court 
assignment plan where '' traYel time, varymg from a minimum of 
forty minutes and a maximum of onP hour, each wa~· . would be re-
quired for busing black students out of the old City and white stu-
dents into the old City in order to achieve a racial balancing of the 
~fF ~Lif'~ 
~,~Q_~~ 
.J-c ~. Jj-T~kv 
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desegregation." 402 U. S .. at 26. In the context of a ~. tlj--z_ 
large urban area, with heavy residential concentrations ~ 
of white and black citizens in different-and widely ~,La 
separated-sections of the school district, extensive dis-
persal and transportation of pupils is inevitable if Swann 
is read as expansively as many courts have been reading 
it to date. 
To the extent that Swann may be thought to require 
large-scale or long-distance transportation of students in 
our metropolitan school districts. I record my profound 
misg1vmgs. ~othing in our Constitution commands or 
encourages any such court compelled disruption of public 
education. F~rtuna,.te~Swann a]sQ lai r own a roa 
rule of reason under which desegregation remedies must 
M'-/1 A -~~1 flexib~e and other values and interests be consid-
'47 .....- ~e-d~ ~he Court recognized that school authorities. 
/\ ~the federal judiciary. must be charged in the first in-
~ ~~~1ce with the task of desegregating local school systems. 
402 e. S., at 16. choo boar sin rural areas can a just 
more readily to this task than those in metropolitan dis-
district. " Thi,; transportation \\'as ch·crrcd for C"hildrrn from the th1rd 
grade up , involving children as young as eight ~·cars of age. 
In Northcross v. Memphis Bd. of Educ .. -1-66 F . 2d 890, 895 
(1972), tiJP CAfi affirmed a di::;trict court a::;;:; Ignmrnt plan which 
daily transportrd 14,000 children with '· the maximum time to be 
spent on the buses by any child fbringl 34 minutes. . ," pre-
sumably each way. But as .Judge Wrick noted in di~:srnt the CA6 
instructed t hr district judgr to implement ~·c t further de:segregation 
orders. Plans presently undrr con:sidcration b~· that court call for 
the busing of 39,085 and 61,530 children re:spect i,·ely , for undeter-
mined length;; of timr. !d. , at 895-9R6. 
Petitioner::; before this Court in Putts " · Flax. No. 72-288, cert. 
denied, - U. S. - (197-), contcndrd that the implementation 
of the CA5'::; directive in Flax \' . Potts , 46-1- F. 2d 865 (1972). would 
requirr bu;; ridr:s of up to two hours and 20 minutes rach day and 
a round trip of up to 70 miles. Petition , at 14 Whil r respondents 
contend these figure,; reprr:srnt an "a~tounding inflation," Response, 
at 7, tran:sportation of a significant magnitude seems inrvitable. 
,/a . I re-...ed 
de.v.c.t1 
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tricts "with dense and shifting population , numerous 
schools, congested and complex traffic patterns." !d., at 
14. , Transportation orders are suspect "when the time or 
..-------di;tance of travel is so great as to either risk the health 
of the children or significantly impinge on the education 
process." Id ., at 31. Finally, the age of the pupils to 
be transported was recognized by the Court in Swann 
as one important limitation on the time of student 
travel. Ibid. 
These factors were supposed to help guide district courts 
in framing equitable remedies in school desegregation 
cases.18 And the Court further emphasized that equitable 
decrees are inherently sensitive, not solely to the degree 
of desegregation to be achieved, but to a variety of other 
public and private interests 
. . . a school desegregation case does not differ 
fundamentally from other cases involving the fram-
ing of equitable remedies to repair the denial of a 
constitutional right The task is to correct, by a. 
balancing of the individual and collPctive interest, 
the condition that offends the Constitution. Swann, 
supra, at 15-16. 
Those words echoed a similar expression in Brown II, 
349 U. S., at 229: 
"In fashioning and effecting the decrees, the courts 
will be guided by equitable principles. Tradition-
ally, equity has been characterized by a practical 
flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility 
'ls See United States v . Texas Ed'Ucatwn Agency, 467 F. 2d 848, 883 
(CAS 1972) (Bell, J ., concurrmg in an opinion in which seven other 
judges joined) · 
"In our view the remedy which the district court is required to 
formulate should be formulated within the entire context of the 
opm10n in Swann v Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educa-
tion. . . . [Emphasis added.] " 
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for adjusting and reconciling public and private 
needs." 
Thus in school desegregation cases. as elsewhere, eqmty 
counsels reason, flexibility and balance. See. e. g., Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, - t". S. - (1973 ). I am aware, of 
course, that reasonableness in any area is a relative and 
subjective concept. But with school desegregation, rea-
sonableness would seem to embody a balanced evaluation 
of the obligation of public school boards to promote deseg-
regation with other. equally important educational inter-
ests which a community may legitimately assert . Neglect 
of either the obligation or the interests destroys the even-
handed spirit with which equitable remedies must be 
approached.' u Overzealousness in pursuit of any single 
goal is untrue to the tradition of equity and to the "bal-
ance '' and "flexibility' ' which this Court ha::; alway~ 
respected . 
B 
Where school authonties have defaulted in their duty 
to operate an integrated school system , district courts 
must insure that affirmative clcsegregative steps ensue. 
-~ of these can be taken effectively without dam. 
aging state and parental interests in having children at-
tend schools within a reasonable vicinity of home. 
Where desegregative steps are possible within the frame-
work of a system of "neighborhood education," school 
authorities mm;t£ pursue them. For example, bound-
19 The relevant mqtury Is ··whether the costs of achH'ving de egre-
gation in any given ~it uatwn outweigh the legal, moral and educa-
tional considerations favonng It. It IS clear ... that the 
Constitution ~hould not be held to reqmre an~· transportation plan 
that keeps children on a bus for n substantial part of the da~· . con-
sumes ::; ignificant portwns of funds otherwise spendable directly on 
educatiOn, or involve~ a genuine rlement of danger to the sa fety of 
the child." School De~egregation After Swann: A Theor.\· of Gov-
eJ:nment. R esponsibility, 39 lJ Chi , L Rev 421 , 422, 443 (1972), 
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aries of neighborhood attendance zones should be drawn 
to integrate, to the extent practicable, the school's stu-
dent body. Construction of new schools should be of 
such a size and at such a location as to encourage the 
likelihood of integration, Swann, at 21. Faculty integra-
tion should be attained throughout the school system, 
Swann, at 19; United States v. Montgomery County 
Board of Education, 395 U.S. 225 (1969). An optional 
majority to minority transfer program, with the State 
providing free transportation to desiring students . is also 
a helpful adjunct to a desegregated school system. 
Swann, at 26-27. It hardly need be repeated that alloca~ 
tion of resources within the school district must be made 
with scrupulous faimess among all schools. 
The above examples are meant to be Jllust~ x 
exhaustive. The point is that the over-all ~tlve,;- -
impact of such school board decisions must be assessed by 
district courts in decidmg whether the duty to desegregate 
has been met. For example. "neighborhood school plans 
are constitutionally suspect when attendance zones are 
superficially imposed upon racially defined neighborhoods, 
and when school construction preserves rather than elimi-
nates the racial hegemony of given schools.' ' 2° Keyes 
v. School District 1\'o. 1, Denver Colorado,- F. 2d -. 
United States v Boa.rd of Education of Tulsa County, 
429 F. 2d -. 1258-1259. This does not imply that 
decisions on faculty assignment, attendance zones. school 
constructiOn. closing and consolidation, must be made 
to the detriment of all neutral, nonracial considerations. 
But these considerations can . with proper school board 
initiative, generally be met in a manner that will enhance 
the degree of school desegregation . 
20 A useful ~tud~· of the l11~tonral u:;es and abuse:; of th<' neighbor-
hood school concept. is M . Weinberg, Race & Place (1967) . 
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c 
Defaulting school authorities \vould have. at a mini~ 
mum, the obligation to take affirmative steps of the sort 
outlined in the abow section . School boards wo uld, of 
course, be free to develop and initiate further plans to 
promote school desegregation. fn a pluralistic society 
such as ours, it is essential that no racial minority feel 
.demeaned or discriminated agamst ancl that students of 
all races learn to play. work. and cooperate with on 
another in their common pursuits and endeavors ~oth­
ing in this opinion is meant to discourage sehoul boards 
from exceeding minimal constitutional standards ll1 pro-
moting the r~gni~Nl values of in tegraterl school 
oonditions 
A constitutional requirement of extensive student 
transportation solely to achieve integratiou presents a 
vastly more complex problem. It pronuses on the one 
hand a greater degree of actual desegregatiOn. while It 
infringes on what may fa1r ly be regarded as,(important 
commumty aspiratiOns and personal nghts. :-iuch a re-
quirement is further likely to ~
sources from the forrmost 1-!:0al of any school system · 
the best quality education fur all pupils. The Equal 
Protection Clause does mdeed command that raCial dis-
crimination not be tolerated in the decisions of public 
school authonties. But 1t docs not 
authorities undertake widespread student transportatiOn 
solely for the sakP of maxinm:ing integration "· 
21 In fact, du!:' to racwJI~ · ~Pparatf' r!:'~ldrnttal p<lttern~ that rhar-
actenzf' our maJor urban areas 1t 1s qmte unrealistlc to thmk of 
arh1eving 111 man~· c1t1e~ ~ub~tantwl mtegratwn throughout the 
school di~tnrt \nthout a degr!:'r of ;,;tucirnt tran~portation whiCh 
would have tlw gravest eronom1r and educatwnal con~equenr·es 
As Proff'R~or Birkel note~ 
•·In mo~t of the larger urban an·a~. drmograph1c ronditwns arP ;;urh 
that no pohrv that a comt can order. ang a school boarq. a dt~· Qf 
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This obviously does not mean that bus transportation 
has no place in public school systems or is 110t a per-
missible means 111 the desegregative process. The trans-
porting of school children is as old as public education . 
and in rural and some suburban settings It is as indis-
pensable as the provJdiitg of books. It is prPscntly esti-
mated that approximately half of all Amencan childn•Jt 
ride buses to school for reasoiJS umelated to integra-
tion ."" At the secondary levPI in particular. wherP 
the schools are larger and I:'PrvP a wider . nwre dit::-
persecl constituency than the elem(•ntary :::chool. some 
form of pubhc or privately financed transportation IE-
often necessary There 1:,; a :::Iglllfil·ant differettce. hO\\ 
ever. m transportation plans voluntarily IIIItiatetl by loeal 
school boards for PdueatJOnal purposes and those un -
posed by a federal court. ThP former usually represent a 
necessary or convenient Illcan of access to the school 
nearest home; the latter oftelt rcquirP IPngthy tnps for uu 
purpose other than to further integration .!.• Yet the 
eve11 a ~tat(· ha~ TIH rapalltl!l ,\ 111 put .nto effe!'t , \\'Ill no fal·t l'l' ~ul! 
m rhe fort>~rrablr fnttm• 111 ractnll~ balam·pd public >'C'hool:- Unl~ 
a rrordrr111g of tlw em·IronmPnr m\·ol\'lnf! t'l·onomic and ,ocwl polle) 
on thr hroadr:;t eonrrintbiP front mtght have an apprrciable tmpart ' 
B1ckel , supra. n ;- , at 1:3:2 
22 E~ttmatr~ ,·ary. Su•ann, supra, nt 29, notre! that "rightPrn mil-
lion of thr ?\Tat10n'~ pnblir ~chool clnldrrn , approximatr!~· 39% , wcrP 
t.ran~portrd to thr1r ~rhool~ b~· bus 111 1969-1970 m all part~ of the 
ro1mtr~· " Srnator R1b1roff (D.-Conn .) a thouf!htful student of tht~ 
problPm. ;o;tatf'cl that " ti\'O-thmt~ of all AmPncan rhildr!:'n toda.\· ridE' 
hu~!:':< to school for rPa~nn~ llnrPiatl'd to mtrgratJon · IH~ Cong Rr!' 
8254:3, F!:'b 2-i, 1972 
~=• Hi~tonrall~· . cl!~t <lnt tntll>'JlortatJon wa~ 1vrongJ~· 1 1~r<l to rro-
motr ~rgr<'g<lt 1011 ' · \' rgro eh1ldrrn ,,·rrc• grnrrall~· con~IdrrPcl eap-
ablP of trawlling longrr cl!,.;tanrr~ to ~rhool and without thr mel of nny 
\'rh1rlr What wa~ too far for a \\'hJte child brrnnw rpa~onably nrar 
for a \'pgro chJid .' W(•Jl1l}('rg. 8upra. 11 '20 . a! K7 
Th1~ deplorable lnstor)' hn." Ire! somr to argur that intf'gratwr hus 
riclr:< arr .iustJfi(•d a~ atonPmE'nt for pa~t ~rgrl'gator~ tnp:,; and that 
nr1ghborhood l'durat1on !>' now bn1 a r·odr -1\'ord for racwl ;;;rgrrga-
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Court in u•w1 11 was unquestionably right in descn bing 
b us t ransportation as "one tool of school desegregation.'' 
402 C ::-l .. at 30."' Tlw rrucial1ssue IS when. under what 
circumstances. and to what extent such transportation 
may appropriately b<· ordered ThP answer to this 
turns-as it does so often 111 the law-upon a sound exer-
cise of discretion under the circumstances. 
Swann itself recogmzt:•d lim1ts to desegrega~Ive obliga-
tions. It noted that a co nstitutional requirement of "any 
particular degree of racial balance or mix1ng would 
be disproved . ." am! sanctiOned district court USl 
of mathematiCal ratiOs al' "no more than a startmg point. 
in the process of shap1ng a n:·medy ... . · 402 e. S .. at 
24. :25. Thus particular ::;clwols t11ay be all white u1 
all black and still not mfringc· const1tutwnal nght~; 
if the system IS genuinely Integrated and school authori -
ties are pursuing intcgratiVl' steps short of extensive and 
disruptive transportat1o1t. ThP rdusal of till' ( 'ourt 111 
Swann to require 1·al'Jal balallf'<" Jil ~eh(Joli" throug;hou1 tiH· 
i ion But rm~u~r ol t ran~ponat toll til t IH· pa~t Joe~ not mtpl,\ t1t'tglt 
borhood ~rhoolmg; hn~ no Yaltd non~<'IP'Pg;ator~· u~P~ for (]](' pn·~t'lll 
:\or would wrongful t ran:; port a non Ill t Itt pa~t .JU~t tf~ elf' I runrnt ;t l 
lrn n:;porta t ton for t lw c!uldn•n of toda.\ 
2
' Some communttte~ had tran~purtatton plan~ 111 ('/tP('t ;It the tlllll 
of court de~eg;regntton order~. :See Swann. supra. at 29, n . II ; Davis 
v. School Cornm'rs of Mob1/e Cou'nty, ~02 1'. S. 8:3, :34-:35 (197I) 
C'onrt~ han• u~rd tht· pre~en<·<· or ab~t'IH't • of t'Xt,<flng t mn~portat tOil 
in a dt~tnct a~ unP factor 111 frammg; and nnplrmr-ntmg; clr~rg-rcgntton 
decrt'e,.:. Cmted State~ v. Watson Chapel <\chuol D1:stnct. ~~ti F. :Zd 
9.'38, 9:{7 (CAS 1971). Northcroos \" Board uf Educ., 444 F 2d II79, 
111\:2-111~:{ ( CA!i 1971), Dat•ts \'. Board of Educ .. :3:21- F. Supp 1197, 
1203 (ED Ark. 1971) WhPn· a ~chool board 1~ \·oluntanl~· engaged 
in trau~port mg :;tudent::<, a dt,.:t nc·t conrt 1~, of eour:;r, ob!tgntrcl to 
insure that ~uch tran~portatton ~~ not undrrtakrn wtth :;egregator~· 
effrct. ·wherr, abo, voluntary tran~portatiOn prog;ram:; arP alrcnd~· 
Ill progr<'~"• thert' ma.\· be greatn Jtl~ttfiratton for rourt-orclncd tran"-
portatton of "'tudrnt~ fur a r·omJmrahle tune and rlzstauce to arhtp\T· 
grea t{'r \lltt'graqo11, 
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district or the arbitrary elunwation of all ''one-race 
schools." 402 U. ~-.at 26. is grounded in a recognition that 
the State. parents. and children all have at stake in 
school desegregation decrees legitimate and recognizable 
interests. 
The personal interest nught lw c·haracterized as the 
desire that children attend community schools near 
home. Dr. James Coleman testified for petitioners at 
trial that "most school systems organize their schools in 
relation to the residents by having fixed school districts 
and some of these are very eth lll('ally homogeneous.'' 
App. 1549a. In Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 
396 F. 2d 55. 60 ( 1966). the Sixth C'n·cUlt summarized 
the advantages of <~uch a ne1p:hhorhood <~ystem ot 
schools . !:· 
'' Appellants. however. pose th<' questw11 ut whether 
the neighborhood system of pupil placernent. fa1rly 
administered without racial bias. comports with the 
requirements of Pqual opportumty If Jt nevertheless 
results in the creation of schools \\·ith predominantly 
or even exclusively ~cgro pupils. Tlw neighbor-
hood system JS in wicle use throughout the natiOn 
and has been for many years the basis of school 
admimstratwn. Tlus IS so because it JS acknowl-
edged to have several valuable aspects which are an 
aid to education, such as minimization of safety haz-
~ " Tlw term ' ' neighborhood ~chou! ~hould not ue ~uppo~rd w 
denotr ~olrl~· a walk-111 ,;chou! or onP wh1rh ,;en·r::; rhildren only in 
the surroundmg bloch. Tlw Court ha;:; noted , in a different con-
trxt , that "thr word ' neighborhood ' ~~ qu1tl' a~ su~crptJble of varia-
tion n~ th0 won! ·Joraht~·.· Both t0rms nre eln>'tir and, deprndeni 
upon rirrum~tanre~. ma.'· be equall .\· ,.:atistiC'd b~· an·no: Inl'rt~ured b_'. 
rod,; or by mile~." Connally '" General ( 'on ~; t Co .. 2()9 ( T S. 385 , 
395 (192ti) . In the ~ehool colltrxt , " nPighhorhoocl " refrr~ to re!ntJVr 
proximity . to a prdPre11cr lor n ,.:r·hool nParer . rather than mort 
distant from home. 
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ards to children in reaching school, economy of cost 
in reducing transportation needs, ease of pupil 
placement and administration through the use of 
neutral, easily determined standards. and better 
home-school commu11ication 
The neighborhood school does provide greater ease of 
parental and student access and convenience, as well as 
greater economy of pub!Jc administration . These are 
obvious and distinct advantages. but the legitimacy of 
the neighborhood concept rests on more basic grounds. 21' 
Neighborhod school systems. Jwutrally admimstered, re-
flect the deeply felt desire of citizen~ for a sense of com-
munity in their pubhr educatiOn . Publ1c schools ha ve 
been a traditional source of strength to our ~atiOJl , and 
that strength may derivP 111 part from the identification of 
many schools with the personal features of the surround-
ing neighborhood. Community support. mterest and 
dedication to pubhc schools may well run higher with a 
neighborhood attendance pattern . d1sta11ce may encour-
age disinterest. Many Citizens sense today a decline l1l 
the intimacy of our institutions- home. ch urch , and 
school-which has caused a concon11tan t d<'clinP In tht 
unity and communal spirit ot our people. { pass 1J1 1 
judgment on this viewpoint, but I do believe that this 
Court should be wary of compelling in tlw name of con-
stitutional law what may seem to many a dissolution in 
the traditional, more personal fabric of their public 
schools. 
Closely related to the concept of a community and 
neighborhood educatiOn, are those rights and duties par-
ents have with respect to the education of their children 
2
H 1 do not Imply that the ne ighborhood rouceJH mu~t be embodied 
in every ~chool ~~·~tem . But wlwrr :1 ~rhool board ha~ cho~en I1 , 
frc\cral judge~ ~hould accord n respPct !ll frnmmg rcmec!wJ deere<;>~. 
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The law has long recogmzed the parental duty to nurture, 
support. and provide for the welfare of children. includ-
ing their education. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
U. S. 510, 534, 535. a unanimous Court held that · 
"Under the doctrine of At eyer v. l \' ebraska, 262 
U. S. 390. we think it entirely plain that the Act 
of 1922 unreasonably intPrferes >vith the liberty of 
parents and guardians to direct the upbnnging and 
education of children under their control. . . . The 
child is not the mere creature of the state; those who 
nurture him and dirPct h1s dcstmy have the nght. 
coupled with the high cl u ty. to recognize and pre-
pare him for additional ohligations " 
And Ill Gris'wold v. Connecticut, 381 l ' S. 479. 4~2 
(1965 ). the Court noted that Ill Pierce, "the rtght to edu-
cate one's children at> one chooses IS made apphcable to 
the States by the force of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments." I do not believe recognitwn of this 
right can be confined solely to a parent's choice to seud 
a child to public or pnvatP school. Most parents can-
not afford the luxury of a pnvate educatiuu for their 
children, and the dual obhgatiou of privatP tuitwns and 
public taxes. Those who may for numerous reasons 
seek public education for their children should not be 
forced to forfeit all interest or voicP in the school their 
child attends. It would. of course. be Impractical to 
allov.: the wishes of particular parpnts to be controlling. 
Yet the interest of the parent in the enhanced parent-
school and parent-child commumcation allowed by the 
neighborhood unit ought not t1> be supprPsserl by force 
of law 
In the commendablP 11atJOnal eon cern for alleviating 
public school segregation . courts may haw overlooked 
thP fact that thP rights and in tPrests of children affected 
h a desegregation program al$.o are entitlPrl to c.onsi<l-
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eration. Any child, white or black, who is compelled to 
leave his neighborhood and spend significant time each 
day being transported to a distant school suffers an im-
pairment of his liberty and his privacy. Kot long ago . 
James B. Conant wrote that "[a]t the elementary school 
level the issue seems clear To send young children day 
after day to distant schools seems out of the question. '' 27 
A community may well conclude that the portion of a 
child's day spent on a bus might be used more creatively 
in a classroom, playground . or some other extracurricular 
school activity. Deciswns such as these. affectmg the 
quality of a child's daily life. should not lightly be held 
constitutionally errant 
To this pomt r have focused mainly 011 the }Jersollaf 
interests of parents a.nd children whiCh a community may 
believe to be best protectecl by a neighborhood system 
of schools. But broader consideratiOns lead me to ques-
tion just as senously any remedial requirement of exten-
sive student transportation solely to further mtegration. 
Any such requirement is certam to fall disproportionately 
on the school distncts of uur country. depending on 
their degree of urbanization, financial resources, and their 
racial composition. Some districts \\ ith little or no bi-
racial population will experience httle or no educatwnal 
disruption, while others, notably in large, biracial metro-
politan areas, must at considerable expense undertake 
extensive transportation to achieve the type of integra-
tion frequently bemg ordered by district courts."" At a 
time when public education generally is suffering serious 
financial malnutritiOn . the economic burdens of such 
transportation can be severe, requiring both initial capital 
outlays and annual operating costs in the millions of 
2 ' Slum~ and Suburb, , 29 (l\Jfll1, 
~to S0P 11 21, SUP/0 . 
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dollars. 2 " And while constitutwnal requirements have 
often occasioned uneven burdens, never have they touched 
so sensitive a matter as wide differences in the compulsory 
transportation requirements for literally hundreds of 
thousands of school children. 
The argument for student transportation also overlooks 
the fact that the remedy exceecls that which may be 
necessary to redress the constitutional evil. Let us use 
Denver as an example. The Denver School Board, by 
its action and nonaction, may be legally responsible for 
some of the segregation that exists. But if one assumes 
a maximum discharge of constitutional duty by the 
Denver Board over the past decades. tlw fundamental 
problem of res1clen tial segrega t10n would persist."" It 
is indeed a novel application of equJtable power-not to 
mention a dubious extension of constitutional doctrine-
to require so much greater a degree of forced school in-
tegration than would have resulted from purely natural 
and neutral nonstate causes. 
The compulsory transportation of stude11ts earries a 
further infirmity as a ronstitutwnal remedy With mosf 
constitutional vwlatwnb, thP ma.Jot hurdt>tt of remetbal 
action falls on offending state officials. Public official~' 
who act to infringe personal rights of spet>ch, voting. or 
2
" In Memphu;, for example, which ha~ no htstory of bu~ing stu-
dentl', the minanum transportation plan ordered by the courts will 
require, in the School Board 's estimate, an mitml capital expenditure 
of S1 ,664,192 for buses plus an annuar operatmg co~t of S629,192. 
The Board· estimates that a more exten~Ive transportatiOn program 
to be considered b~· the distnct court will require mitial capital in-
vestments of S3,924,000 and annual operatmg co~ts of $1,78:3,490. 
The most drast1c transportatiOn plan before the distnct court require:, 
estimated annual operatmg co:;ts of from $2,354,220, $2,431,710, or 
$3,463,100 depending on the Board 's tran,;portation arrangements. 
N orthcross v Board of Eduratwn of ,11 emphzs C'1ty 8ch .. . apm, 
n. 17~ at K9K t WC'Ick , .r r!J~~C'ntm~ ) •. 
50 S~e n !:J S~tprU!.< 
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religious exercise, for example, are obliged to cease the 
offending act or practice and. where necessary , institute 
corrective measures. It is they who bear the brunt of 
remedial action. though other citizens will to varying de-
grees feel its effects. School authorities responsible for 
segregation must . at the very minimum. act to 4:le~seg­
regatory acts. But when the obligation further extend 
to the transportation of student::; , thl' full burden of the 
affirmative remedial action is bonw by children and par-
ents who did not participate III any constitutional 
violation . 
Finally, courts in requmng so far-reaching a remedy 
as student transportation solely to maximize integration, 
risk setting In motiOn unpredictable and Uitmanageable 
social consequences. ~ o one can estimate th e extent 
to which dismantling neighborhood educatiOn will hasten 
an exodus to private schools. leaving public school sys-
tems the preserve of the disadvantaged of both races. 
Or guess how much impetus such dismantlement giVf-'S 
the movement from innercity to suburb . and th e furth er 
geographical separation of the race::; . . ot Jo we ktJO \\ 
to what degree this remedy may cause detenoration of 
community and parPntal support of public schools. or-
divert attention from the paramount goal uf quality m 
education to a perennially devisive debate over who 1s 
to be transported where 
The problem addressed in this opmion has perplexed 
courts. school officials, other public authonties. ant! stu-
dents of public eclucation for nearly two drcacles. Tlw 
problem . especially smce 1t has focused on the "busing 
issue." has profoundly riJsquieted the public wherever 
Pxtensive transportatiOn has been ordPrecl . l make no 
pretense of knowmg the hPst ans\\'ers. Yet. the issue m 
this and like cases comes to this ( 'ourt as one of con-
stitutional law. As to this issue, 1 have no doubt what-. 
('y~r , There is nothing 111 the Constitution. its history 
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or-until recently-in the jurisprudence of this Court 
that mandates the employment of forced transportation 
of young and teenage children to achieve a smgle interest , 
as important as this interest may be . We have strayed. 
quite far as 1 view It, from the rationale of Brown f 
and 11, as reiterated in Swann, that courts in fashioning 
"'\ 
remedies must be "guided by equitable principles'' which 
include the "adjusting and reconciling lof] public and 
private needs." Rrown II, 349 r. S .. at 229. 
I urge a return to this rationale. This would result, 
as emphasized above. in no prohibition on court-ordered 
student transportation In furtherance of desegregation. 
But it would also require that the legitimate community 
interests m neighborhood school systems be accorded far 
greater respect. In the balancmg of interests so appro-
priate to a fair and JUSt eqmtable rlecree, transporta-
tion orders should be appliecl with special cautwn to 
any proposal as disruptive of family life and interests- · 
and ultimately of education itself-as extensive transpor-
tation of elementary age children solely for df'segregatiou 
purposes. As a minnnum, th1s Court should not re-
quire school boards to f'ngage 111 the unnecessary trans-
portation away from their neighborhoods of elementary 
agf' children ." ' lt IS at tlnr,; age level that J1e1ghborhood 
education performs its most vital educational role. It 
is with respf'ct to children of tender years that the 
greatest concern exists for their physical and psycholog·-
31 Thcrr may wrll h<· advantagr~ in <·omtn<'IlCing rlw intrgmtivr 
rxperiences at an rarl.\· age, ;t~ ~·otmg rhtldren rna~ · be le<'~ ltkel) 
than older rluldren and adult~ to den·lop an mhtbitmg ractal con-
<'ciou~ne:;::< The::<e advantage~ :;hould br con::>tdrrrd a~ ~chool board:,. 
makr thr vanou,: drctsJOn~ wtth thr \'IPW to achtrvtng and prr~rrv­
ing an mtrgra trd "rhool ~y~t pm Supra. p 10 But in t lw hal -
ancm)r of all rpJp,·ant mtrrr.,t~. tlw ach·antagr~ of an rarl~· mtrgra-
tivr exprnrncr mtt8t, and 111 all fatrnr::>~ ~hould , br wrighPd agam,;t 
other rrlevant aclvantageH and rltHadvantage~ and m light of tht> 
demographie charartenstH·~ of thP partJcular rommumtr. 
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ical health. It is also hPre, at the elementary school, 
that the rights of parents and children are most sharply 
implicated. '2 
IV 
The existing state of law has failed to shed light and 
provide guidance on the two issues addressed m this opin-
ion: ( i) whether a constitutional rule of uniform. na-
tional application should be adopted with respect to our 
national problem of school desegregatiOn and ( ii) if so. 
whether the ambiguities of Swann , construed to date 
almost uniformly in favor of extensive transportation. 
should be redefined to restore a more viable balance 
among the various interests wh1ch are involved. W1th 
all deference. 1t seems to me that the ( 'ourt today ha~ 
addressed neither of these i~sut's Ill a way that, will afford 
adequate guidance to the courts below Ill this case or lead 
to a rational, coherent natwual pohcy. 
The Court has chosen. rather, to adhere to the de facto! 
,de jure distinction under circumstances, and upon a 
rationale, which can only lead to mcreased and lllcon-
clusive litigation. and-espeCially regrettable-to defer-
ment of a nationally consistent J uclicia] pos1t10n on this 
subject. There IS, uf course . state actiOn 111 every 
school district 111 the land. The pubhc schools always 
have been funded and operated by ~tates and their 
local subdivisions. It 1s true that segregated schools, 
even m the cities of the South, are in large part the 
product of social and economic factors-and the resulting 
residential patterns. But there is also not a school <.hs-
""·while greater tran::<portntion of ~l'rondarY ~chool ~tudPnt~ might 
be permtttPd, en' n at tin~ levpJ thr dr~II'P of a commumt~· for racwll~· 
nPutral nrighborhood ~choob ~hould command judicial rr~pt>ct. It 
would ultimatt>l~· l>P WI~f'Sl, wherr there I:; no ab~PllCP of good faith . 
10 permit affected communitiP~ to dPcidP thi~ delicate I~~ue of ~<tudPitt 
t rnn~portHtion ou their own . 
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trict in the United States. with any significant minority 
school population. in which the school authorities-in 
one way or the other-have not contributed in some 
measure to the degree of segregation which still prevails. 
Instead of recognizing the reality of similar, multiple 
segregatory causes in school districts throughout the 
country, the Court persists in a distinction whose duality 
operates unfairly on local communities in one section of 
the country and on minority children m the others. 
The second issue relates to the ambiguities of Swann 
and the judicial disregard of legitimate community and 
individual interests in framing equitable decrees. In the 
absence of a more flexible and reasonable standard than 
that unposed by distnct courts after Swanu, the 
desegregation which \vill now be decreed 111 Denver and 
other major cities may \Vell involve even more extensive 
transportation than has been \\·itnessed up to this time. 
It is well to remember that the course we are running 
is a long one and the goal sought in the end-so often 
overlooked-is the best possible educational opportumty 
for all children. Communities deserve the freedom and 
the incentive to turn their attentwn and energies to thiE-
goal of quality education. frpe from protracted and 
debilitatmg battles over court-ordered student transpor-
tation. The single most disruptive element in educa-
tion today is the widespread use of compulsory trans-
portation. especially at elementary grade levels. This 
has risked distractmg and diverting attention from basic 
educational ends. dividing and embittering communities, 
and exacerbating rather than ameliorating inter-racial 
friction and misunderstanding. It 1s time to return to 
a more balanced evaluation of the recognized interests 
of our society in achieving desegregation with other edu-
cational and sometal interests a community may legiti-
mately assert. ThiR will help assure that integrated 
... 
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school systems will be established and maintained by 
rational action, will be better understood and supported 
by parents and children of both races. and will promote 
the enduring qualities of an integrated society so essen-
tial to its genuine success. 
(Chambers Copy) 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
~0. 71-50i 
vYi1fred Keyes et al., 
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School District No. 1. Denver. 
Colorado, et a1. 
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On Writ of Certiorari to 
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the Tenth Circuit. 
1973] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
I concur in the remand of this case for further pro-
ceedings in the District Court, but on grounds that differ 
from those relied upon by the Court. 
This is the first school desegregation case to reach this 
Court which involves a major city outside the South. It 
comes from Denver, Colorado, a city and a State which 
have not operated public schools under constitutional or 
statutory provisions which mandated or permitted racial 
segregation.1 Nor has it been argued that any other 
legislative action (such as, for example, zoning and hous-
ing laws) contributed to the segregation which is at 
issue.2 The Court has inquired only to what extent the 
Denver School Board may have contributed to the segre-
gated schools which are acknowledged to exist in Denver. 
1 Article IX, § 8, of the Colorado Con~titution hm; cxpre~ .-ly pro-
hibited "any classification of pupils . . . on account of race or 
color." 
"See, e. g., Swann Y. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 U. S. 1, 23 (1971): 
"We do not reach ... the que~tion whether a showing that ~chool 
,;egregation is a consequence of other types of state action, without 
any discriminatory action by school authorities, is a constitutional 
\·iolation requiring remedial action by a school desegregation decree." 
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The predominantly minority schools a.re located in two 
areas of the city referred to as Park Hill and the core 
city area. The District Court considered that a school 
with a concentration of 70 to 75 7o "Negro or Hispano 
students" was identifiable as a segregated school. 313 
F. Supp., at 77. Wherever one may draw this line, it is 
undisputed that most of the schools in these two areas 
are in fact heavily segregated in the sense that their stu-
dent bodies are overwhelmingly composed of non-Anglo 
children. The city-wide school mix in Denver is 66 % 
Anglo, 141o Negro, a.ncl 20% Hispano. In areas of the 
city where the Anglo population largely resides, the 
schools are predominantly Anglo , if not entirely so. 
The situation in Denver is generally comparable to 
that in other large cities across the country in which there 
is a substantial minority population and where desegre-
gation has not been ordered by the federal courts. There 
is massive segregation in the schools of these cities fully 
as pervasive as that in southern cities prior to the deseg-
regation decrees of the past decade and a half. The focus 
of the school desegregation problem has now shifted from 
the South to the country as a whole. Unwilling and 
footdragging as the process ''"as in most places, substan-
tial progress toward achieving integration has been made 
in southern States." No comparable progress has been 
made in ma.ny nonsouthern cities with large minority 
populations" primarily because of the de facio / de jure 
"Arrorcling to the 1971 HEW e~tim:1tc, 4~.9% of .'\egro pupils 
attended mn.iority white school~ in the South n~ oppo~ecl to only 
27.8% who nttenclecl surh schools in the ~orth and We"t. Fifty-
~e ,·en pereent of nil ~Pgro pupils in the i\orth and \Ye~t attend 
~chools with oYer 80% minority population as oppo~ed to 32.2% 
who do so in the South. 118 Cong. Rer. Sl-J.5. 
4 The 1971 HEW Enrollment SUI"\"e~· dramatizf'd the ~f'g: rPg:: Jt ed 
character of public schools in man~· nonsouthern citie~. The per-
cpntagc of Negro pupil s which attended schools mon· tlmn 80% 
black was 91.3 in CJc,·ela nd , Ohio; 97.8 in Compton, C::lli fo rnia; 
.. 
' 
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distinction nurtured by the courts and accepted com-
placently by many of the same voices which denounced 
the evils of segregated schools in the South." But if our 
national concern is for those who attend such schools, 
rather than for perpetuating a legalism rooted in history 
rather than logic, we must recognize that the evil of 
operating separate schools IS no less in Denver than in 
Atlanta. 
I 
In my view we should abandon a distinction which long 
since has outlived its time, and formulate constitutional 
principles of national rather than merely regional appli-
cation. When Brown v. Boar.d of Education, 347 U. S. 
483 (1954), was decided, the distinction between de jure 
7S.l in Da~·ton, Ohio; 7S.6 in Detroit, Michigan; 95.7 in Gary, 
Indiana: 86.4 in Kansas Cit~·, Mi~~ouri: 86.6 in Los Angclr~, Cali-
fornia; 78.8 in Milwaukre, Wi~con~in: 91.3 in :'\ewark, ~e\Y .Jer!"r~·; 
i'9.S in St. Louis, Mi~souri. The full data from the Enrollment Sur-
Ye~· maY be found in ll8 Cong. nee. S1·H-H8, Jan. 20, 1972. 
" As Senator Ribiroff (D.-Conn.) recognized: 
.. For ~·ear;; \Ye haYe fought the battle of integration primarily in 
the South where the problem was sm·err. It was a long, ardnou~ 
fight that de~ern·d to be fought and nrecled to br won. 
"Unfortunate)~·, as the problem of racial isolation has moved north 
of the Mason-Dixon line, many northernerR haYe bid an entRiYe 
f:trr\Yell to the 100-~·e:1r ~truggle for r:trial equnlit~·. Our motto 
~erms to haYe been 'Do to southcrnrrs what ~·ou do not wnnt to do 
to your~elf.' 
" Good reasons h:n·e al\\'it~·~ been offrred, of eour~e. for not mo\·ing 
\ · igorouRl~· ahead in the :\"orth as well as the South. 
"Fir;:t , it was that the problem was wor;:e in the ~outh. Then 
the factR began to show that tlwt wns no longer true. 
""·e then began to hear the de facto-de jure refrain. 
"Someho\Y rcsidentinl segregation in the North was arridrntnl or 
dr facto and that made it better than the lrgall~· Rupportcd dr jure 
~cgrcgation of the South. It was a hard distinction for blnck children 
in totnll~· segregated schools in the North to underRt:md, but it 
:dlowccl us to aYoid the problem." ll8 Cong. Rec. S2542, Frb. 24, 
1972. 
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and de facto segregation was consistent with the limited 
constitutional rationale of that case. The situation con-
fronting the Court, largely confined to the southern 
States, was officially imposed racial segregation in the 
schools extending back for many years and usually em-
bodied in constitutional and statutory provisions. 
The great contribution of Brown I was its holding in 
unmistakable terms that the Fourteenth Amendment 
forbids state-compelled or authorized segregation of pub-
lic schools. 347 U. S., at 488, 493-495. Although some 
of the language was more expansive, the holding in 
Brown I was essentially negative: It was impermissible 
under the Constitution for the States, or their instru-
mentalities, to force children to attend segregated schools. 
The forbidden action was de jure, and the opinion in 
Brown I was construed-for some years and by many 
courts-as requiring state neutrality, allowing "freedom 
of choice" as to schools to be attended so long as the 
State itself assured that the choice was genuinely free of 
official restraints. 6 
But the doctrine of Brown I, as amplified by Brown II, 
349 U. S. 294 (1955), did not retain its pristine meaning. 
In a series of decisions extending from 1954 to 1971 the 
'' Sre, e. g., Bradley "· School Board, 345 F. 2d 310, 316 (CA4 
en bane. 1965): 
'·It has been held again and again ... that the Fourlcenth 
Amrndment prohibition i:; not against segregat ion as such .... 
A state or school district offends no constitutional requ irement 
when it grant::; to all student::; uniform]~· an unre><trictrd freedom of 
choice as to school attended, so that each pupil, in effect , as~ign~ him-
self to the school he wishes to attend. " (The case wa~ later Yacated 
and rrmanded by this Court which expres,;ed no view on the merits 
of the desegregation plans submitted.) 382 U. S. 103, 105 (Hl65). 
Src also Bell v. School Citu of Gary, Ind., 324 F. 2d 209 (CA7 1963); 
Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F. 2d 988 (CA10 1964) ; Deal v. 
Board of Educ., 369 F. 2d 55 (CA6 1966) . 
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concept of state neutrality evolved 7 and was expanded to 
the present constitutional doctrine requiring affirmative 
state action to desegregate school systems. The key-
stone case was Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 
430, 438 ( 1968), where school boards were declared to· 
have "the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might 
be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which 
racial discrimination would be eliminated root and 
branch." The school system before the Court in Gre.en 
was operating in a rural and sparsely settled county 
where there were no concentrations of white and black 
populations, no neighborhood school system (there were 
only two schools in the county), and where none of the 
problems of an urbanized school district existed. The 
Court properly identified the freedom of choice program 
there as a subterfuge, and the language in Green impos-
ing an affirmative duty to convert to a unitary system 
was appropriate on the facts before the Court. There 
was, however, reason to question to what extent this duty 
applied in the vastly different factual setting of a large 
city with extensive areas of residential segregation , pre-
senting problems and calling for solutions quite different 
from those in the rural setting of New Kent County, 
Virginia. 
But the doubt as to whether the affirmative duty con-
cept would flower into a new constitutional principle of 
general application was laid to rest by Swann v. Board 
of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1971), in which the affirma-
tive duty articulated in Green was applied to the urban 
school system of metropolitan Charlotte, North Carolina. 
In describing the situation as to residential patterns in 
Charlotte, the Court noted the "familiar phenomenon" 
7 For a conci,;e history and commentary of the evolution, sec gen-
erally A. Birkel, The Supreme Court and 1 he Idea of Progrc~s , pp .. 
126--130 (1970). 
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in the metropolitan areas of minority groups being "con-
centrated in one part of the city," 402 U. S. , a.t 25, a.nd 
acknowledged that: 
"Rural areas accustomed for half a. century to the 
consolidated school system implemented by bus 
transportation could make adjustments more readily 
than metropolitan areas with dense and shifting pop-
ulation, numerous schools, congested and complex 
traffic patterns." 402 U. S., at 14. 
Despite this recognition of a. fundamentally different 
problem from that involved in Green, the Court never-
theless held that the affirmative duty rule of Green was 
applicable, and prescribed for a. metropolitan school sys-
tem \Yith 107 schools and some 84,000 pupils essentially 
the same remedy-elimination of segregation "root and 
branch"-which had been formulated for the two schools 
a.nd 1,300 pupils of New Kent County. 
In Swann, the Court further noted it \va.s dealing only 
with States having "a long history" of officially imposed 
segregation and the duty of school authorities in those 
States to implement Brown I. 402 U. S. , at 5-6. In 
so doing. the Court refrained even from noting that the 
evolution of constitutional doctrine from Brown I to 
Green/ Swann undercut whatever logic once supported 
the de facto/.de jure distinction. In imposing on metro-
politan southern school districts as affirmative duty, in-
cluding large-scale transportation of pupils, to eliminate 
separate schools, the Court required these districts to 
alleviate conditions which in large part did not result 
from historic, state-imposed de jure segregation. Rather, 
the familiar root cause of segregated schools in all the 
biracial metropolitan areas of our country is essentially 
the same: one of segregated residential and migratory 
patterns the impact of \Yhich on the racial composition 
of the schools \Yas perpetuated and rarely ameliorated by 
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action of public school authorities. This is a national , 
not a. southern phenomenon. And it is largely unrelated 
to ,,·hether a particular State had or did not have segre-
gatory school laws.8 
Whereas Brmvn I rightly addressed the elimination 
of state-imposed segregation in that particular section of 
the country ""·here it did exist, Swann imposed obligations 
on southern school districts to eliminate conditions which 
are not regionally unique but are similar both in origin 
and effect to conditions in the rest of the country. As 
the remedial obligations of Swann extend far beyond 
the elimination of the outgrowths of the state-imposed 
segregation outlawed in Brown, the inevitable rationale 
of Swann points towards a uniform, constitutional ap-
proach to our national problems of school segregation. 
II 
The Court's decision today, while adhering to the 
de jure/ de facto distinction, will require the application 
of the Green/ Swann doctrine of "affirmative duty" to the 
Denver School Board despite the absence of any history 
of state-mandated school segregation. The only evidence 
of a constitutional violation was found in various de-
'As Dr. Karl Taeuber states in his article, R<'~idcntial 8<'g:r<'gnt ion , 
Seicntific Amrrican , Augu~t 1965, nt 14: 
"'No elaborate anal~·~is is necr~:::ary to conclude from these figures 
that a high degree of r<'~idential ~rgrrgation based on race i~ n uni-
, ·c r~a l charartcri~tic of ~\mcriean eitie~. This scgreg:1tion i ~ found 
in the cities of the :\orth and \Ye~t as \H'll n:-: of the South; in lnrgc 
cities a:;: well a::: small: in nonindust rial eitir,.: ns m•ll a~ indu:-,trial; in 
cities with hundreds of thou,.:ands of Nrgro rr:::idrnt,; :1~ wdl ns those 
with on]~· a few thousand: and in citi<'s that are progre;:~i,·e in their 
employment practice nnd ci,·il rights policic~ as well ns tho~c that 
a rc not." 
In hid book, .\'rgroe~ in Citirs, Dr. Taeubcr stated that rc~idcntial 
~egregation exi~ts "regardless of the character of local laws and 
polieic::: nnd regardlc~s of other forms of discriminntion." !d ., at-. 
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cisions of the school board. I concur in the Court's posi-
tion that the public school authorities are the responsible 
agency of the State, and that the affirmative duty doctrine 
is equally applicable in Charlotte and in Denver. I 
disagree, however, with any perpetuation of the de j-ure/ 
de facto distinction and with leaving to petitioners the 
initial tortuous effort of identifying "segregative acts" 
and deducing "segregatory intent." I would hold, quite 
simply, that where segregated public schools exist. there 
is a strong prima facie case that the duly constituted 
public authorities (I will usually refer to them collec-
tively as the "school board") are sufficiently responsible 
to impose upon them a nationally applicable duty to take 
appropriate desegregatory measures. 
A 
The principal reason for abandonment of the de jure/ 
de facto distinction is that, in view of the evolution of 
the holding in Brown I into the affirmative duty doctrine, 
it no longer can be justified on a principled basis. In 
addition, as this case abundantly demonstrates, proof of 
the facts deemed necessary to apply the distinction pre-
sents problems vvhich the courts cannot fairly resolve. 
At the outset, one must try to identify the constitu-
tional right which is being enforced. This is not easy, 
as the precedents have been far from explicit. In 
Brown I, after emphasizing the importance of education, 
the Court said that: 
"Such an opportunity, where the state has under-
taken to provide it. is a right which must be made 
available to all on equal terms." 347 U. S., at 493. 
In Brown II, the Court identified the "fundamental prin-
ciple" enunciated in Brown I as being the unconstitu-
tionality of "racial discrimination in public education," 
349 U. S., at 298, and spoke of "the personal interest 
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of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon 
as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis." 349 U. S., 
at 300. Although this and similar language is ambiguous 
as to the specific constitutional right, it meant-as a mini-
mum-that one has the right not to be compelled by 
state action to attend a segregated school system.9 In 
the evolutionary process since 1954, decisions of this 
Court have added a significant gloss to this original right. 
Although nowhere expressly articulated in these terms, 
I would now define it as the right to expect that the 
State-once it assumes responsibility for public educa-
tion-will provide a reasonable opportunity for educa-
tion in an integrated school system. The correlative of 
this right should be the duty imposed upon the State-
not merely to outlaw dual school systems-but affirma-
tively to take reasonable action consistent with educa-
tional goals to provide integrated school opportunities.10 
9 Sec Bickel, supra, n. 7, at 118: 
"It. [the problem of ::;chool desegregation] has not been that sim-
ple ... because the laconic opinion in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion was itself not that simple. One st rain in it became eYidcnt in 
subsequent decisions outlawing all forms of state-spon~ored segrega-
tion in everything from the spectator section of a courtroom to golf 
courses. The minimal proposition that emerged-and about time 
it was that it should emerge-was that the state ma~· not, by legisla-
tion or administrative!~·, classify the population along racial lines." 
10 The term " integrated school s~·stem" i:; used generally to denote 
a system possessing mo::;t, if not all, of the following characteri:stics: 
there would be, of course, no law~, regulations or policy supportive 
of the t~·pe of "legalized" segregation condemned in Broten (a condi-
tion manifest !~· innilid and no longer exi:;ting owrtly an~·wherc). 
The school board would have pmsued, within the limits of a rule of 
reason consistent with educational goals, the affirmative duty prin-
ciple enunciated in Green. This dut~· would require that a school 
board take sueh appropriate affinnatiYe mensure:; to (i) integrate 
fully faculties nnd administration; (ii) scrupulously a~,;urc equality 
of farilitie::;, qualit~· of instruction and curricula opportunities 
throughout the district ; (iii) utilize its authority to draw attendance 
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It is difficult to perceive a basis for vindicating or 
denying this right, as the case may be, depending upon 
whether or not some court determines that the segre-
gated schools are the product of de facto rather than 
de jure action. If, as in Swann, "segregation was the 
evil" held to be unconstitutional, 402 U. S., at 15, there 
is little reason for perpetuating the evil in some sec-
tions of the country on the basis of a formalistic 
distinction. 
Public schools are creatures of the State, and whether 
the segregation was state-created or state-assisted or 
merely state-perpetuated should be irrelevant to consti-
tutional principle. The school board exercises pervasive 
and continuing responsibility over the long range plan-
ning as well as the daily operations of the public school 
system. It sets policies on attendance zones, faculty 
employment and assignments, school construction, clos-
ings and consolidations, and myriad other matters. 
School board decisions obviously are not the sole cause 
of segregated school conditions. But if, after detailed 
and complete public supervision, segregated schools still 
zones to promote integration ; (iv) locate new ~ehool~, do~e old ones, 
and determine the size and grade categories of ~choob with this 
~arne objocti\·e in mind; and (v) rc~ort to HUch rea~onable trans-
portal ion of pupild, c~pecially at the serundary len'!, n~ i.~ com-
patible with sound educational gonls. These specification,; arc not 
intended to bf' either definiti\·c or indusiw: rather, they are indica-
tin' of the chnracteri~tic:< of an integmted ~ehool system, in whid1 
all eitizens and pupils ma.\· justifiably be confident that im·idions dis-
crimination is neither practiced nor tolerated. This docs not men n-
and indeed could not mean in \·irw of the re~iclcnti:d pattern~ of 
mo~t of our major metropolitan arcHs-that c\·cry school mu~t have 
~omr racial mixing. A school whieh happrn.~ to be all white or all 
blnck i,; not a "segregated" school in thr legal ~rnsc if tho i')·stcm 
itsrlf is a genuinelY intcgrntrd one as de~cribcd herein. 
The charaetcri,;:tics and affirmative obligntion~ of nn integrated 
::;chool system nrc "Pclled out more fully in §III, infra. 
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persist, the presumption is strong that the school board. 
by its acts or omissions, is in some part responsible. 
\Vhat state action and supervision is so pervasive and 
where, after years of such action , schools remain thor-
oughly segregated. this Court is justified in finding a 
prima facie case of a constitutional violation. The bur-
den the must fall on the school board to demonstrate it 
is operating an "integrated school system" (n. 10, supra). 
It makes little sense to find prima facie violations and 
the consequent affirmative duty to desegregate solely in 
those States with state-imposed segregation at the time 
of the Brown decision. The history of state-imposed 
segregation is more widespread in our country than the 
de jure/ de facto distinction has traditionally cared to 
rceognize. As one commeu tat or has noted: 
"the three court of appeals decisions denying a con-
stitutional duty to abolish de facto segregation all 
arose in cities-Cincinnati. Gary and Kansas City, 
Kansas-\vhere racial segregation in schools was 
formerly mandated by state or local law. [Deal v. 
Cincimwti Bd. of Educ. , 369 .F. 2d 55 (CA6 1966) , 
cert. denied. 3i7 U. S. 924 (1964); Downs\'. Board 
of Educ. , 336 F. 2d 988 (CAlO 1964) , cert. de-
nied, 380 U. S. 914, Bell v. School City, 324 F. 2d 
209 (CA7 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924.] Ohio 
discarded its statute in 1887, Indiana in 1949, and 
Kansas City not until the advent of Brown. If 
Negro and white parents in Mississippi are required 
to bus their children to distant schools on the theory 
that the consequences of past de jure segregation 
cannot otherwise be dissipated, should not the same 
reasoning apply in Gary, Indiana, where no more 
than five years before Brown the same practice 
existed with presumably the same effects." Good-
man, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional 
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and Empirical Analysis, 60 Cal. L. Rev. 275, 297 
( 1972).11 
Not only does the de furelde facto distinction operate 
inequitably on communities in different sections of the 
country: it disadvantages minority children as well. As 
the Fifth Circuit stated: 
"The Negro children in Cleveland, Chicago, Los 
Angeles, Boston , New York, or any other area of the 
nation which the opinion classifies under de facto 
segregation, would receive little comfort from the 
assertion that the racial make-up of their school sys-
tem does not violate their constitutional rights be-
cause they were born into a de facto society, while 
the exact same racial make-up of the school system 
in the 17 southern and border states violates the 
constitutional rights of their counterparts, or even 
their blood brothers, because they were born into 
a de jure society. All children everywhere in the 
nation are protected by the Constitution , and treat-
ment which violates their constitutional rights in 
one area, also violates such constitutional rights in 
another area." Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independ-
11 The author continues: 
"True, the ea rlier the policy of segregation was abandoned the less 
danger there is that it cont inues to operate coYertl)·, is signifi ca ntly 
responsible for present day patterns of residential segrega tion, or has 
contributed materially to present community att itudes toward :Negro 
schools. But t here is no reason to suppose that 1954 i ~ a universally 
appropriate dividing line between de jure segrega tion t hat may 
safely be assumed to h;w e ~pen t itself and that which rna)· not. 
For many remedial purposes, adoption of an arbitrar)· but rasily 
administrable cutoff point might not be obj ectionable. But in a 
situat ion such as school desegrega tion, where both the rights a~~erted 
and the remedial burdens imposed are of such magnitude, and 11·here 
t he resulting sectional discrimination is passionately resented, it is 
surely questionable whether such arbitrarineos is either politi cally 
or morall y acceptable." 
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ent School District, 467 F. 2d 142, 148 (CA5 en bane, 
1972) quoting United States v. Jefferson County 
Board of Bduc., 380 F. 2d 385, 397 (CA5 en bane) 
Gewin, J .. dissenting) . 1 ~ 
The Court today does move for the first time to·ward 
breaking down past sectional disparities, but it clings 
tenuously to its unprincipled distinction. It searches 
for de jure action in what the Denver School Board has 
done or failed to do, and even here the Court does not 
rely upon the results or effects of the Board's conduct 
but feels compelled to find segregatory intent: 13 
"We emphasize that the differentiating factor be-
tween de jure segregation and so-called de facto 
segregation to which we referred in Swann is pur-
pose or intent to segregate." (Court Opinion, p. 17) 
(italics are the Court's). 
12 Ser Bickel, supra. n. 7, at 119: 
"If a Negro child perceives hi~ separation as discriminatory and 
invidious, he is not, in a society a hundred years removed from 
slavery, going to make fine distinctions about the source of a par-
ticular separation." 
1
" The Court does not rrquire, however, a segregator:v intent with 
respect to the entire school system, and indeed holds that if such an 
intent is found with respect to some schools in a sy~tem, the burden-
normally on the plaintiffs-shifts to the defendant school authorities 
to prove a negative: namely, that their purposes were benign, ante, 
pp. 17-18. 
The Court has come a long way since Brown I. Starting from 
the unassailable de jure ground of the discriminatory constitutional 
:md statutory provi,.:ions of ~orne States, the new formubtion-still 
professing fidelit~· to the de jure doctrine--is that desegregation will 
be ordered despite the absrnre of any segregato ry laws if: (i) srgre-
gated "chool~ in fact exist; (ii) a court finds that they rrsult from 
some action taken with segregatory intent b:v the school board; 
(iii) such action need not relate to more than a "meaningful segment" 
of the school ~~·stem; and (iv) the school board cannot prove that 
it s intention" \Yith respect to the remainder of the system were 
non~egrrgatory. 
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The Court's insistence that the "differentiating factor'' 
between .de jure and .de facto segregation be "purpose 
or intent" is difficult to reconcile in light of the opposite 
view explicitly announced as recently as in Wright v. 
Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U. S. 451 (1972). 
In holding there that "motivation" is irrelevant, the Court 
said: 
"In addition, an inquiry into the 'dominant' motiva-
tion of school authorities is as irrelevant as it is fruit-
less. The mandate of Brown II was to desegregate 
schools, and we have said that '[t]he measure of 
any desegregation plan is its effectiveness.' Davis 
v. School Commissioners of Mobile County, 402 U. S. 
33, 37. 
"Thus, we have focused upon the effect-not the 
purpose or motivation-of a school board's action 
in determining whether it is a permissible method 
of dismantling a dual system. 
"Though the purpose of the new school district was 
found to be discriminatory in many of these cases, the 
courts' holdings rested not on motivation or pur-
poses but on the effect of the atcion upon the dis-
mantling of the dual school system involved. That 
was the focus of the District Court in this case, and 
''"e hold that its approach was proper." 407 U. S., 
at 462. 
I can discern no basis in law or logic for holding that 
the motivation of school board action is irrelevant in 
Virginia and controlling in Colorado. I have noted above 
the pitfalls in distinguishing Emporia because there was 
a history of state imposed segregation in Virginia, and 
not in Colorado. In fact, it was arguable in Emporia 
that the most recent history-the reasons for the in-
corporation of Emporia into a separate school district-
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" ·ere not segregatory. 14 Rather than attempt to adjudi-
cate the largely subjective issue of intent or motivation, 
the Court in Emporia concerned itself with the results 
and found that these were likely to be of more rather 
than less segregation. The rationale of the Emporia 
case is inconsistent with the de jure/ de facto distinction , 
and commends itself in this respect both on grounds of 
principle and practicality. 
B 
There is thus no reason as a matter of constitutional 
principle to adhere to the de jure/ de facto distinction in 
school desegregation cases. In addition, there are rea-
sons of policy and prudent judicial administration which 
point strongly toward the adoption of a uniform national 
rule. The litigation heretofore centered in the South 
already is surfacing in other regions. The decision of 
the Court today, emphasizing as it does the elusive 
element of segregatory intent. will invite numerous deseg-
regation suits in which there can be little hope of uni-
formity of results. 
The issue in these cases ''"ill not be whether segregated 
education exists. This will be conceded in most of them. 
The litigation will focus as a consequence of the Court's 
decision on whether segregation has resulted in any 
"meaningful or significant" portion of a school system 
from a school board's "segregatory intent." The intrac-
table problems involved in litigating this issue are obvious 
to any lawyer. The results of litigation-often arrived 
at subjectively by a court endeavoring to ascertain the 
subjective intent of school authorities with respect to 
action taken or not taken over many years-will be 
fortuitous. unpredictable and even capricious. 
1
'
1 Src Wright v. Council of the City of E111poria. 442 F. 2d 570, 
574 (CA4 1971), whrre the Court of Appral~ noted "that was no-
finding [by the di~trict court] of discriminatory purpo~e .... " 
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The Denver situation is illustrative of the problem. 
The courts below found evidence of de jure violations 
with respect to the Park Hill schools and an absence of 
such violations with respect to the core city schools, 
despite the fact that actions taken by the school board 
with regard to those two sections were not dissimilar. 
It is. for example, quite possible to contend that both 
the construction of Manual High School in the core city 
area and Barrett Elementary School in the Park Hill area 
operated to serve their surrounding Negro communities 
and , in effect, to merge school attendance zones with 
segregated residential patterns. See Petitioner's Brief, 
pp. 80-83. Yet findings even on such similar acts will, 
under the de jure/,de facto distinction, continue to differ, 
especially since the Court has never made clear what 
suffices to establish the requisite "segregatory intent" for 
an initial constitutional violation. Even if it were pos-
sible to clarify this question, wide and unpredictable 
differences of opinion among judges would be inevitable 
when dealing with an issue as slippery as "intent" or 
"purpose," and especially when related to hundreds of 
decisions made by school authorities under varying con-
ditions over many years. 
This Court has recognized repeatedly that it is "ex-
tremely difficult for a court to ascertain the motivation, 
or collection of different motivations, that lie behind a 
legislative enactment," Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S. 
214, 224 (1971); McGinnis v. Royster,- U.S.-,-
(1973); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367. 381 
(1968). Whatever difficulties exist with regard to a sin-
gle statute will be compounded in a. judicial review of 
years of administration of a large and complex school 
system.'" Every act of a school board and school ad-
10 As one commentator has exprrs,;ed it: 
"If the court;; :ne indeed j)I'Cparcd to inquire into moti1·e, thorny 
quc~tion~ will ari~e en'n if one as;;umes that racial moti1·atiun is 
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ministration , and indeed every failure to act where affirm-
ative action is indicated, must now be subject to scrutiny. 
The most routine decisions with respect to the operation 
of schools, made almost daily, can affect in varying de-
grees the extent to which schools are initially segregated, 
remain in that condition, are desegregated, or-for the 
long term future-are likely to be one or the other. These 
decisions include action or nonaction with respect to 
school building construction and location; the timing of 
building new schools and their size; the closing and con-
solidation of schools; the drawing or gerrymandering of 
student attendance zones; the extent to which a neigh-
borhood policy is enforced, especially with respect to ele-
mentary schools; the recruitment, promotion and assign-
ment of faculty and supervisory personnel; policies with 
respect to transfers from one school to another; whether, 
and to what extent, special schools will be provided, where 
they will be located, and who will qualify to attend them; 
the determination of curriculum, including whether there 
will be "tracks" that lead primarily to college or to voca-
tional training, and the routing of students into these 
tracks; and even decisions as to social, recreational and 
athletic policies. 
capable of being proven at trial. What of the case in which one or 
more members of a school board, but less than a majority, nrc found 
to have ncted on racial grounds? What if it appears that the ~chool 
board's action \\·as prompted b~· a mixture of motives, inrluding con-
stitut ionall~· innocent ones that alone would haw 11rompted the board 
to art"? What if the members of the school board were not them-
sci ve::; racia!l~· inc-:pired but wished to please their constituents, many 
of whom they knew to be so? If such cases are clas~:;ifird as un-
constitutional de jure srgrcgat ion , there is little point in preserving 
the de jure-de facto di~tinction at all. And it ma~· \Yell be that the 
cliffrrence between any of the::;c situations and one in which racial 
motivation is altogether lacking is too insignificant, from the stand-
point of both the moral culpability of the :>tate officials and the 
impact upon the children involYccl, to support a differrncc in con-
st it ut ional treatment." Goodm:m, supra, n. 11, at 284-285. 
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In Swann the Court did not have to probe into segre-
gatory intent and proximate cause with respect to each 
of these "endless" factors. The basis for its .de jure find-
ing there \Yas rooted primarily in the prior history of the 
desegregation suit. 402 U. S., at 5-6. But in the 
Denver-type case, where no such history exists, a judicial 
examination of these factors will be required under to-
day 's decision. This will lead inevitably to uneven and 
unpredictable results, protracted and inconclusive litiga-
tion, to added burdens on the federal courts, and to serious 
disruption of individual school systems. In the absence 
of national and objective standards, school boards and 
administrators will remain in a state of uncertainty and 
dismay, speculating as to what is required and when 
litigation will strike. 
c 
Rather than continue to prop up a distinction no longer 
grounded in principle, and which will contribute to the 
consequences indicated above, we should acknowledge 
that whenever significant public school segregation exists 
there is strong prima facie evidence of a constitutional 
violation. It is true, of course. that segregated schools-
wherever located-are not solely the product of state 
action or inaction. Indeed, as indicated earlier, there can 
be little doubt that a principal cause of the pervasive 
school segregation found in the major urban areas of this 
country, whether in the North, West. or South, are the 
socio-economic influences which have concentrated our 
minority citizens in the inner cities while the more mobile 
white majority disperse to the suburbs. But it is also 
true that public school authorities have continuing. de-
tailed responsibility for the public school systems 'r. and, 
";Indeed, if 011e goe,: back f:tr enough, it i . ; prob:1ble th:tt all racial 
~ogregation, where,·er ocrurring and whether or not confinf'd to tho 
~('hoots , has at some time b0en ~upported or nwintained b~· go,·f'rn-
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as one distinguished judge has noted. "where the figures 
[showing segregation in the schools] speak so eloquently, 
a prima facie case of discrimination is established." 
United States v. Texas Education Agency, 467 F. 2d 848, 
873 (CA5 en bane 1972). Moreover, as foreshadmYed in 
Swann and as implicitly held today, school boards have a 
duty to minimize and ameliorate segregated conditions 
by pursuing an affirmative policy of desegregation. It is 
this policy '<Yhich must be applied consistently on a na-
tional basis without regard to a doctrinal distinction 
,,·hich has outlived its time. 
III 
The preceding section addresses the constitutional right 
of each child to expect that public school authorities take 
all reasonable steps in providing him an education in an 
integrated school system. Segregated schools, regard-
less of history or sectional location, stand as prima facie 
evidence that this right has been violated. The question 
thus becomes what reasonable steps to maximize integra-
tive opportunities must school authorities demonstrate, 
either to overcome allegations of constitutional violations 
or to remedy those violations which are sho\m to exist. 
In short. what specifically is the nature and scope of the 
remedy? 
As the Court's opinion virtually compels the finding on 
remand that Denver is a "dual school system," that city 
will soon confront the "affirmative duty" to desegregate 
ment aetion. In Becket , .. School Board, 30H F. Supp. 127-1-, 1311-
1:315 (ED \'a. 1969) . .Judge Walter Hoffm:m compiled a ~111nmary 
of pa,;t public ~'<egregator~· action whieh included examples from a 
gTPat ma.iorit~· of State:;. He concluded that "on!~, ns to the ;-;tates 
of :Maine, .:\ew Hamp:shire. Vermont, \Vaohington, Ne1·ada, and 
Hawaii does it apJlear from thi:s nonexhansti1·e research that do dis-
criminntory law:; nppcnrcd on the boob at one time or another." 
!d., at 1;j15. 
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its entire system "root and branch." Green v. County 
School Board, 391 U. S., at 438. Again, the critical ques-
tion is what ought this constitutional duty to entail. 
A 
The controlling case is Swann, supra, and the question 
which will confront and confound the District Court and 
Denver School Board is what indeed does Swann require. 
Swann purported to enunciate no new principles, relying 
heavily on Brown I and II and on Green. Yet it affirmed 
a district court order which had relied heavily on "racial 
ratios" and sanctioned extensive transportation of ele-
mentary as well as secondary pupils. Perhaps because 
of the far-reaching contours of the Charlotte/ Mecklenburg 
desegregation decree approved by this Court, lower fed-
eral courts have since read Swann as requiring similar 
decrees.17 In the context of a large urban area, with 
17 See, e. g., Thompson v. School Board of Ne1cpori News, -
F. 2d - , - (1972), wlwre the CA4 en bane, upheld a dist rict court 
a~signment plan where '· travel time, yarying from a minimum of 
fort~· minutes and a maximum of one hour, each way, would be re-
quired for busing black students out of the old City and white stu-
dents into the old City in order to achie,·e a racial balancing of the 
di~trict ." This tran8portation was decreed for children from the third 
grade up, involving children as young as eight years of age. 
In N orthcross v. Memphis Bd. of Educ., 466 F. 2d 890, 895 
(1972), the CA6 affirmed a district court a~signment plnn which 
dail~· transported 14,000 children with "the maximum time to be 
spent on the buses b~· an~· child [being] 34 minute~ . .. ," pre-
sumably each way. But a~ .Judge Weick noted in di~~ent the CA6 
in:-<tructed the district judge to implement yet furtlwr de~rgregation 
order~. Plans presently under com:ideration by that court call for 
the busing of 39,085 and 61,530 children respecti,·el~· , for undeter-
mined lengths of time. /d., at 895-986. 
Prtitioners before this Court in Potts '"· Flax, 1\o. 72-2.'-:8. eert. 
drnied, - U. S. - (197-), contended that the implementation 
of the CAS's directi,·e in Flax v. Potts, 464 F. 2d 865 (1972), \Yould 
rrquire bus rides of up to two hour;; and 20 minutes eac-h clay and 
a round trip of up to 70 miles. Petition , at 1-1. While respondents 
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heavy residential concentrations of white and black citi-
zens in different-and widely separated-sections of the 
school district. extensive dispersal and transportation of 
pupils is inevitable if Swann is read as expansively as 
many courts have been reading it to date. 
To the extent that Swann may be thought to require 
large-scale or long-distance transportation of students in 
our metropolitan school districts, I record my profound 
misg1vmgs. Nothing in our Constitution commands or 
encourages any such disruption of public education. 
Fortunately, Swann also laid down a broad rule of reason 
under which desegregation remedies must remain flexible 
and other values and interests be considered. Thus the 
Court recognized that school authorities, not the federal 
judiciary, must be charged in the first instance with the 
task of desegregating local school systems. 402 U. S. , at 
16. School boards in rural areas might adjust more 
readily to this task than those in metropolitan districts 
"with dense and shifting population, numerous schools, 
congested and complex traffic patterns." !d., at 14. 
Transportation orders were suspect "when the time or 
distance of travel is so great as to either risk the health 
of the children or significantly impinge on the education 
process." I d., at 31. Finally, the age of the pupils to 
be transported was recognized by the Court in Swann 
as one important limitation on the time of student 
travel. Ibid. 
The factors were supposed to help guide district courts 
in framing equitable remedies in school desegregation 
cases.18 And the Court further emphasized that equitable 
contend t hese figures represent [1 11 "a8tounding inflation," Response, 
at 7, t ransportat ion of an irrational magnit ude seems inc,·it able. 
I H Sec United States , .. Texas Education Agency, 467 F . 2d 848, 883 
(CA5 1972) (Bell, .T. , concurring in an opinion in which eight judges 
joined) : 
··I n our ,·iew the remedy whi rh the di~t ri ct court i8 required t o 
fo rmulate should be formulated within the entire context of t he 
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decrees are inherently sensitive, not solely to the degree 
of desegregation to be achieved, but to a variety of other 
public and private interests: 
. . . a school desegregation case does not differ 
fundamentally from other cases involving the fram-
ing of equitable remedies to repair the denial of a 
constitutional right. The task is to correct, by a 
balancing of the individual and collective interest, 
the condition that offends the Constitution. Swann, 
supra, at 15-16. 
Those words echoed a similar expression in Bro'wn I I, 
349 U. S .. at 229: 
"In fashioning and effecting the decrees, the courts 
will be guided by equitable principles. Tradition-
ally, equity has been characterized by a practical 
flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility 
for adjusting and reconciling public and private 
needs." 
Thus in school desegregation cases, as elsewhere, equity 
counsels reason, flexibility and balance. I am aware, of 
course, that reasonableness in any area is a relative and 
subjective concept. But with school desegregation, rea-
sonableness "·ould seem to embody a balanced evaluation 
of the obligation of public school boards to promote 
desegregation with other, equally important interests 
which a community may legitimately assert. Neglect of 
either the obligation or the interests destroys the even-
handed spirit with which equitable remedies must be 
approached.19 Overzealousness in pursuit of any single 
opinion in Swann v. Charfotte-!l!ecl.-lenburo Board of Educa-
tion. . . . [Empha~i5 adc!C'd.j" 
'"The relevant inquirY j,; .. ,,·hrthrr thr co~t~ of achiC'1·ing; dc~rgre­
gation in any given ~itnation out1reig;h tlw !C'gal, moral and ccluca-
tional considerations fa,·oring it. . . . It i~ denr ... that the 
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goal is untrue to the tradition of equity and to the "bal-
ance'' and "flexibility'' \Yith which this Court has ahYays 
regarded it. 
B 
School boards have at their disposal a variety of means 
to implement their duty to promote school desegregation. 
Many of these can be employed effecti \'ely without darn-
aging state and parental interests in having children at-
tend schools within a reasonable vicinity of home. 
Where desegregative steps are possible within the frame-
work of a system of "neighborhood education." school 
authorities should pursue them. For example, bound-
aries of neighborhood attendance zones should be drawn 
to integrate, to the extent practicable, the school's stu-
dent body. Construction of new schools should be of 
such a size and at such a location as to encourage the 
likelihood of integration, Swann, at 21. Faculty integra-
tion should be attained throughout the school system, 
Swann, at 19; United States v. Montgomery County 
Board of Education, 395 U.S. 225 (1969). An optional 
majority to minority transfer program. with the State 
providing free transportation to desiring students. is also 
a helpful adjunct to a desegregated school system. 
Swann, at 26-27. It hardly need be said that allocation 
of resources within the school district must be made with 
scrupulous fairness among all schools. 
The above examples are meant to be illustrative, not 
exhaustive. The point is that the over-all integrative 
impact of such school board decisions is a crucial factor 
Constitution should not bP held to rcquirc an~· transportation plan 
that keeps rhildrcn on a bu::; for a substanti:1l part of tllf' da~·. con-
sumes i'ignificant portion~ of funds othcrwi:-e spcndablf' dirPctly on 
cducation, or involn's a gPnuine l'lcmcnt of dangcr to the safrt~· of 
the child." School Desegregation After Rwann: A Theor~· of Gov-
cmmcnt Bcspon::;ibilit~·, 39 U. Chi. L . Be1'. 421, 422, 443 (1972). 
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in assessing their constitutional validity."° For example, 
"neighborhood school plans are constitutionally suspect 
when attendance zones are superficially imposed upon 
racially defined neighborhoods, and when school construc-
tion preserves rather than eliminates the racial hegemony 
of given schools." 21 Keyes v. School District No. 1, 
Denver, Colorado,- F. 2d -. United States v. Boatrd 
of Education of Tulsa County, 429 F. 2d -, 1258- 1259. 
If these decisions are made consistently with such segre-
gatory effect, they violate the right to each child to an 
education in an integrated school system. 
c 
The affirmative duty of school officials is to operate an 
integrated school system. This should encompass, at 
a minimum, the obligation to take integrative steps of 
the sort outlined in the above section. Such steps would 
not compromise any significant, countervailing state in-
terest. Extensive transportation of students solely to 
maximize integration, however, presents a vastly more 
complex problem. It promises on the one hand a greater 
degree of actual desegregation, 22 while it infringes what 
may fairly be regarded as important personal rights. 
20 This should not imply that derisions on fa cult~· as~ignment, 
attcnuan ce zones, school construction, closing and consolidation, must 
be made to the detriment of all neutral, nonracial ron~idcrations. 
But the8c considerations ran, with proper school board ini t iat ive, 
general!~· be met in a manner that will enhance integrative 
opportunities. 
21 A u~cful study of the historical uses and abuses of thr neighbor-
hood school concept is l\I. Weinberg, R ace & Place (1967). 
"" In fact. due to rarially separate residential patterns that rhar-
actrrizc our major urban are;l,; it i~ quite unrcali~t i c to think of 
achieving in many cities subMantial "racial balance" without a 
degree of student trans11ortation which would ha,·e the gmvest 
economic and educational consequence~. 
A~ Profrs~or Bickrl notr,; : 
'· In most of the larger urban :ucn~. demographic conditions arc such 
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The transporting of school children is as old as public 
education, and in rural and some suburban settings it is 
as indispensable as the providing of books. It is pres-
ently estimated that approximately half of all American 
children ride buses to school for reasons unrelated to 
integration.23 There is a difference, however, in trans-
portation plans voluntarily initiated by local school 
boards for educational purposes and those imposed by a 
federal court. The former may represent a convenient 
means of access to the school nearest home; the latter 
often require distant trips for no purpose other than to 
further integration."'' Yet the Court in Swann was un-
questionably right in describing bus transportation as 
that no policy that a court can order, and a school board, a city or 
e\·cn a state has the capability to put into effect, will in fact result 
in the foreseeable future in racially balanced public school~ . Only 
a reordering of the em·ironmcnt invoh·ing economic and social policy 
on the broadest conceivable front might have an appreciable impact." 
Bickel , supra. n. 7, at 132. 
2:. Estimates Yary. Swann, supra. at 29, noted that ' ·eighteen mil-
lion of the Nation',; public school children, approximately 39%, were 
transported to their schoob by bus in 1969-1970 in all parts of the 
countr)·." Senator Ribicoff (D.-Conn.) a thoughtful student of this 
problem, stated that "two-third~ of all American children toda~· ride 
buses to school for reasons unrelated to integration." 118 Cong. Rcc. 
8254:3 , Feb. 24, 1972. 
"·' Historically, distant transportation was wrong!)· used to pro-
mote segregation. " Negro children were generally considered cap-
able of travelling longer di~tanccs to school and without the aid of any 
Ychicle. What was too far for a white child became reasonably near 
for a Kegro child ," Weinberg, supra, n. 21, at 87. 
This deplorable history has led some to argue that intcgrati\·c bus 
ride,; are justified as atonement for past scgregatory trip::; and that 
neighborhood education i:; now but a code-word for racial ~e~~:rega­
tion. But mi~use of neighborhood schooling in the pn~t doc,; not. 
imply it hns no \·a!id nonsegregatory uses for the present. Nor would 
wrongful tran~portation in the pa:;t justify detrimental transporta-
tion for the children of today. 
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"one tool of school desegregation." 402 U. S., at 30.25 
The crucial issue is when, under what circumstances, and 
to what extent such transportation may appropriately 
be ordered. The answer to this turns-as it does so often 
in the law-upon a sound exercise of discretion under the 
circumstances. 
Swann itself recognized limits to integrative obliga-
tions. It noted that a constitutional requirement of "any 
particular degree of racial balance or mixing ... would 
be disproved ... ," and sanctioned district court use 
of mathematical ratios as "no more than a starting point 
in the process of shaping a remedy .... " 402 U. S., at 
24, 25. Winston-Salem/ Forsyth Board of Education v. 
Scott, 404 U. S. 1221, 1228 (1971) (Chambers opinion of 
BuRGER, C. J.). Thus particular schools may be all white 
or all black and still not infringe constitutional rights 
if the system is genuinely integrated and school authori-
ties are pursuing integrative steps short of extensive and 
disruptive transportation. The refusal of the Court to 
require racial balance in schools throughout the district 
or the automatic elimination of all "one-race schools," 
"·'Some communitirs had tran~port:ttion plnn~ in effect at thP tim!' 
of ronrt despg;rrgation order~. Src Su•mm. supra. at 29, n. 11: Da~ •is 
v. School Comm'rs of Mobile County. 402 U. S. ~3, 34-~.5 (1971). 
Conrts have used the pre,;enre or absenre of exi~ting tran~porta­
tion in a di~trirt a;; onr f:trlor in framing and implenwnting deseg-
rrgation decrrP~. Sre. e. (} .. Winston-Sale111 / Forsyth Bd. of Edllc. 
, .. Scott. 404 U. S. 1221 , 1225 (1971) (Chamber~ opinion of BuHGER, 
C. J.): ['nited States "· TT'atson Chapel School District. 4-W F. 2d 
9:~:~. 9~7 (CA8 1971) : N orthcross \'. Board of Educ .. 444 F. 2d 1179, 
11R2-11R~ (CA6 1971): Davis \' .Board of Educ. , 328 F. Supp. 1197, 
1203 (ED Ark. 1971). \\"herr a S!'hool board is ,·olunt:t ril~· engaged 
in t ran~porting studrnt~. a di~t rirt court i", of eour,:r , obli.gatrd to 
in,:11re that surh tran~portntion j, not undertaken \\'ith ,:egrcg:~tory 
rffect. Where, :1l,:o, Yoluntary trnnRportation progr:1m~ are :~lrracly 
in progress, there rna~' be grratcr ju,;tific:~1ion for rourt-ordrrrd 1nms-
portation of studrnts for a comparable time and distancp 1o :tehieve 
gren ter integration. 
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402 U. S .. at 26. is grounded in a recognition that the 
State. parents. and children all have at stake in 
school desegregation decrees legitimate and recognizable 
interests. 
The personal interest might be characterized as the 
desire that children attend community schools nearest 
home. Dr. James Coleman testified for petitioners at 
trial that "most school systems organize their schools in 
relation to the residents by having fixed school districts 
and some of these are very ethnically homogeneous." 
App. 1549a. In Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 
396 F. 2d 55, 60 (1966). the Sixth Circuit summarized 
the advantages of such a neighborhood system of 
schools: 2 r. 
"Appellants. ho\\'evcr, pose the question of whether 
the neighborhood system of pupil placement, fairly 
administered without racial bias. comports with the 
requirements of equal opportunity if it nevertheless 
results in the creation of schools \\'ith predominantly 
or even exclusively Kegro pupils. The neighbor-
hood system is in \\'ide use throughout the nation 
and has been for many years the basis of school 
administration. This is so because it is acknmd-
edgecl to have several valuable aspects \Yhich are an 
aiel to education, such as minimization of safety haz-
ards to children in reaching school, economy of cost 
m reducing transportation needs. ease of pupil 
"" ThC' tC'rm " neighborhood ~rhool" ~hould not bC' ~uppo~cd to 
denote ~olC'l~· a walk-in school or one whir·h :<C'I'\·c~ children on]~· in 
the surrounding block,.:. Thr Court ha;; notPd. in a different con-
tpxt, that '·the word ·neighborhood ' i~ quite a,.: :::u:;crptibiP of , ·aria-
tion a:< the word 'locality.' Both terms arC' Plastic and, ckpPndrnt 
upon circum~tnncel'. ma~· be Pqnall~· ;;ati.-<fied b~· arras mea~mPd by 
rods or b~· mile"." Connally , .. General Canst. Co., 2fi9 U. S. :385, 
:195 (1926). In the school context, "neighborhood" refer,.: to relative 
proximit~' , to a prefercnre for a school nearer, rather than more 
di:;tant from home. 
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placement and administration through the use of 
neutral. easily determined standards. and better 
home-school communication." 
The neighborhood school does provide greater ease of 
parental and student access and convenience, as \VCll as 
greater economy of public administration. These arc 
obvious and distinct advantages, but the legitimacy of 
the neighborhood concept rests on more basic grounds.~' 
Keighborhood schools. neutrally administered. reflect 
the deeply felt desire of citizens for a sense of community 
in their public education. Public schools have been a 
traditional source of strength to our 1\ation, and that 
strength may derive in part from the identification of 
many schools with the personal features of the surround-
ing neighborhood. Community support, interest and 
dedication to public schools may well run higher with a 
neighborhood attendance pattern: distance may encour-
age disinterest. Many citizens sense today a decline in 
the intimacy of our institutions-home, church. and 
school-"·hich has caused a concomitant decline in the 
unity and communal spirit of our people. I pass no 
judgment on this viewpoint, but I do believe that this 
Court should be -vmry of compelling in the name of con-
stitutional law what may seem to many a dissolution in 
the traditional, more personal fabric of their public 
schools. 
Closely related to the concept of a community and 
neighborhood education , are those rights and duties par-
ents have with respect to the education of their children. 
The la'" has long recognized the parental duty to nurture, 
support, and provide for the welfare of children , includ-
"'I do not imply that the 1~cig;hborhood concept offer~ the only, 
or rvcn the mo~t preferabl e way to organize a school s~·~tem. I do 
cont r nd that, where n school board ha~ chosen it . federal juclg:cs 
~hou lcl acconl it rc~pect in framing remed ial decrees. 
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ing their education. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510. 534. 535, a unanimous Court held that: 
"Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U. S. 390, 've think it entirely plain that the Act 
of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of 
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and 
education of children under their control. . . . The 
child is not the mere creature of the state; those who 
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, 
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and pre-
pare him for additional obligations." 
And in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 482 
( 1965), the Court noted that in Pierce, "the right to edu-
cate one's children as one chooses is made applicable to 
the States by the force of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments." I do not believe recognition of this 
right can be confined solely to a parent's choice to send 
a child to public or private school. Most parents can-
not afford the luxury of a private education for their 
children, and the dual obligation of private tuitions and 
public taxes. Those who may for numerous reasons, 
seek public education for their children should not be 
forced to forfeit all interest or voice in the school their 
child attends. It would, of course, be impractical to 
allow the wishes of particular parents to be controlling. 
Yet the interest of the parent in the enhanced parent-
school and parent-child communication allowed by the 
neighborhood unit ought not to be suppressed by force 
of law. 
In the understandable national concern for alleviating 
public school segregation, courts may have overlooked 
the fact that the rights and interests of children affected 
by a desegregation program also are entitled to consid-
eration. Any child, white or black, who is compelled to 
leave his neighborhood and spend significant time each 
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day being transported to a distant school suffers an im-
pairment of his liberty and his privacy. Not long ago, 
James B. Conant, wrote that "[a]t the elementary school 
level the issue seems clear. To send young children day 
after day to distant schools seems out of the question." 28 
A community may well conclude that the portion of a 
child 's day spent on a bus might be used more creatively 
in a classroom, playground, or some other extracurricular 
school activity. Decisions such as these, affecting the 
quality of a child's daily life, should not lightly be held 
constitutionally errant. 
To this point I have focused mainly on the personal 
interests of parents and children which a community may 
believe to be best protected by a neighborhood system 
of schools. But broader considerations lead me to ques-
tion just as seriously any remedial requirement of exten-
sive student transportation solely to further integration. 
Any such requirement is obliged to fall disproportionately 
on different school districts of our country, depending on 
their degree of urbanization, financial resources, and their 
racial complexion. Some districts \vith little or no bi-
racial population will experience little or no educational 
disruption, while others. notably in large, biracial metro-
politan areas, must at considerable expense undertake 
extensive transportation to achieve the type of integra-
tion frequently being ordered by district courts."9 At a 
time when public education generally is suffering serious 
financial malnutrition. the economic burdens of such 
transportation can be severe, requiring both initial capital 
outlays and annual operating costs in the millions of 
dollars.30 And while constitutional requirements have 
" 8 Slums and Submb,:, 29 ( 1961). 
"
0 See n. 22, supm. 
'"'In Memphi~ . for PX;ttnplc, which h:ts no hi,:tor~· of bu,: ing stu-
dcnts, the minimum transportation pl:tn ordNcd b~· t hP rourt~ will 
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often occasioned uneven burdens, never have they touched 
so sensitive a matter as wide differences in the compulsory 
transportation requirements for literally hundreds of 
thousands of school children. 
The argument for student transportation also overlooks 
the fact that the remedy exceeds that which may be 
necessary to redress the constitutional evil. Let us use 
Denver as an example. The Denver School Board, by 
its action and nonaction, may be legally responsible for 
some of the segregation that exists. But if one assumes 
a maximum discharge of constitutional duty by the 
DenYer Board over the past decades. a fundamental 
problem of residential segregation would persist."' It 
would indeed be a novel application of equitable power-
not to mention a dubious extension of constitutional 
doctrine-to apply some retributive theory which would 
require a greater degree of forced school integration than 
would have resulted from purely natural and neutral non-
state causes. 
The transportation of students carries a further in-
firmity as a constitutional remedy. With most consti-
tutional violations. the major burden of remedial action 
falls on offending state officials. Public officials \Yho act 
to infringe personal rights of speech, voting. or religious 
exercise, for example, are obliged to cease the offending 
act or practice and, 'vhere necessary, institute corrective 
rrquirr, in thr School Board '~ r:<tim:1tr , an initial capit:tl rxprnditurc 
of S1.66.f,192 for bu~r~ plu~ an annual opPrating co~t of S629,192. 
The Board r~timatr" that a morr rxtrn:<i,·c tran,portation program 
to br con~idered bY the di~trirt court will require initi:d capital in-
w~tmrnts of S3 ,92-t,OOO and annual oprrating ro~t,; of S1,7S:3 ,490 .. 
The most dr:1:0tic tran,port:llion pl:m bcforr the cJi,trict eourt rrquircs 
r:<tirmtrd :lllnttal operating cost~ of from 82.:354.220, 82 ,4:31.710, or 
s:~,46:1,100 drpending on the Board's tmn~port:1tion :1rrangrments. 
N orthcross v. Board of Education of Memphis City Sch .. supra, at 
S!)S (\Veick, .T. cli,.;,cnting). 
:n Sec n. 8, supra. 
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measures. It is they who bear the brunt of remedial 
action. though other citizens \Yill to varying degrees feel 
its effects. School authorities responsible for segrega-
tion must, at the very minimum, act to cease segregatory 
acts. But when the obligation further extends to the 
transportation of students, the full burden of the affirma-
tive remedial action is borne by children and parents who 
are quite innocent of any constitutional violation. 
Finally, courts in requiring so far-reaching a remedy 
as student transportation solely to maximize integration, 
risk setting in motion unpredictable and unmanageable 
social consequences. No one can estimate the extent 
to which dismantling neighborhood education will hasten 
an exodus to private schools, leaving public school sys-
tems the preserve of the disadvantaged of both races. 
Or guess how much impetus such dismantlement gives 
the movement from innercity to suburb, and the further 
geographical separation of the races. Nor do we know 
to what degree this remedy may cause deterioration of 
community and parental support of public schools, or 
divert discussion from the paramount goal of quality in 
education to a perennially hassling debate over who is 
transported where. We do not even know to what extent 
forced racial balancing in public schools will be necessary 
or effective in reducing racial inequality.32 I can make 
32 As columnist William Raspberry has noted, it may be offen-
::<i,·e 1 o many black citizens to imp!:: that their children cannot be 
JHOpE'rl~· educat0d unless thry are busE'd long di~tances to assure 
schooling \Yith white childrm: 
'·It has long sE'emed in~anr to mr for black people to pur~ue ,,·bites 
from this neighborhood to that and clear on out of the country 
becausr of some unspoken belirf that black children could not get a 
proprr education in the absence of white children." Ibid. 
Such statement~ do not diminish the desirability and constitutional 
necessity of maintaining an integrated school system. But if the 
S!!Stem i" genuinely desegregated, racial balance in the srnse of 
i'llb~tantial mixing of races in all of a district's schools is not mnn-
clatrd by anything in the Constitution. 
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no steadfast predications. Yet in pursuit of maximum 
integration through extensive student transportation, 
courts have ventured onto unchartered terrain in a man-
ner which in the end may prove self-defeating to the 
desired objectives. 
I would impose no flat prohibition on student trans-
portation to further desegregation. But a neighborhood 
system of schools ought, to a much greater extent than 
heretofore, be one legitimate community interest con-
sidered by district courts in framing equitable relief. 
Transportation orders should be applied with a special 
caution to any proposal as disruptive of family life 
and interests--and ultimately of education itself-as ex-
tensive intra-city transportation of elementary age chil-
dren solely for desegregation purposes. At a minimum, 
this Court should not require school boards to engage in 
the unnecessary transporting of children in the elementary 
grades. It is at this age level that neighborhood educa-
tion performs its most vital educational role. It is with 
respect to children of tender years that the greatest con-
cern exists for their physical and psychological health. 
It is also here, at the elementary school, that the rights 
and duties of parents are most sharply implicated. 
While greater transportation of secondary school stu-
dents might be permitted, even at this level the desire of 
a community for racially neutral neighborhood schools 
should command judicial respect. It would be wisest, 
where there is no absence of good faith , to permit af-
fected communities to decide this delicate issue of student 
transportation on their own. Legitimate. nonracial aspi-
rations embodied in a neighborhood school concept are 
entitled to judicial respect. 
IV 
The existing state of law has failed to shed light and 
provide guidance on two issues, namely: (i) \\·hether and 
to what extent a uniform judicial approach will be taken 
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to our national problems of school desegregation and 
(ii) if so. whether the ambiguities of Swann, construed 
to date almost uniformly in favor of extensive trans-
portation, will be redefined to restore a more viable bal-
ance bet\Yeen the various interests which are involved. 
With all deference, it seems to me that the Court today 
has addressed neither of these issues in a way that will 
lead to a rational, coherent national policy vvith respect 
to integration in the schools. 
The Court has adhered to the de facto/ de jure distinc-
tion under circumstances, and upon a rationale, \Yhich can 
only lead to increased and inconclusive litigation, and-
especially regrettable-to deferment of a nationally con-
sistent judicial position on this critical subject. There 
is, of course, state action in every school district in the 
land. The public schools have always been funded and 
operated by States and their local subdivisions. It is true 
that segregated schools, even in the cities of the South, 
are in large part the product of social and economic 
factors-and the resulting residential patterns. But 
there is also not a school district in the United States, 
\Yith any significant minority school population, in \Yhich 
the school authorities-in one way or the other-have 
not contributed in some measure to the degree of segrega-
tion \rhich still prevails. Instead of recognizing the 
reality of similar, multiple segregatory causes in school 
districts throughout the country. the Court persists in a 
distinction whose duality operates unfairly on local com-
munities in one section of the country and on minority 
children in the others. 
The second issue relates to the ambiguities of Swann 
and the judicial do"·ngrading of legitimate community 
interests in framing equitable decrees. In the absence 
of a more flexible and reasonable standard than that im-
posed by district courts, purporting to follow Swann, the 
desegregation which will now be decreed in Denver and 
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other major cities may well involve even more extensive 
transportation than has been witnessed up to this time. 
It is \Yell to remember that the course we are running 
is a long one and the goal sought in the end-so often 
overlooked-is the best possible educational opportunity 
for all children. Communities deserve the opportunity 
to turn their attention and energies to this goal of quality 
education, free from protracted and debilitating battles 
over extensive student transportation. The single most 
disruptive element in education today is the widespread 
use of compulsory transportation , especially at elemen-
tary grade levels. This has risked distracting and di-
verting attention from basic educational ends, dividing 
and embittering communities, and exacerbating rather 
than ameliorating inter-racial friction and misunder-
standing. It is time to return to a more balanced evalua.-
tion of the interest of our society in achieving desegrega-
tion with those legitimate interests a community may 
assert in nonracial neighborhood and community educa-
tion. This will help assure that desegregation is accom-
plished by rational action , better understood and sup-
ported by parents and children of both races. For the 
long term, this will promote an enduring quality of inte-
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MR. JuSTICE PowELL concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
I concur in the remand of this case for further pro-
ceedings in the District Court. but on grounds that differ 
from those relied upon by the Court. 
This is the first school desegregation case to reach this 
Court which involves a major city outside the South. It 
comes from Denver. Colorado. a city and a State which 
have not operated public schools under constitutional or 
statutory provisions ·which mandated or permitted racial 
segregation .1 Nor has it been argued that any other 
legislative actions (such as zoning and housing laws) 
contributed to the segregation which is at issue." The 
1 Article IX, § 8, of the Colorado Con;;titution has cxpresRl~· pro-
hibited "any classification of pupils . .. on account of race or 
color ." 
"Sec, e. g .. Su·ann Y . Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education .. 
-!02 U. S 1, :23 (1971) : 
" \Yr do not reach . . . the qur~twn whether a showing that ;;choof 
~egregation i;; a con~equrner of other t~· pe~ of o;tate action, without 
an~· di;;criminator~· action b~ · ;;chool authoritie;;, 1~ a con::;titutionai 
violation requiring remedial action b~- a ;;chool de~egregation drcrrr .'" 
Thr trrm "~taw action.'' a~ u~rd lwrrin . thu~ rrfer~ to action~ of tlw 
appropriatr publle ~chool n11thoritiP~ . 
.: .,. 
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Court has inquired only to what extent the Denver 
public school authorities may have contributed to the 
school segregation which is ackno>Yledged to exist in 
Denver. 
The predominantly minority schools are located in two 
areas of the city referred to as Park Hill and the core 
city area. The District Court considered that a school 
with a concentration of 70 to 75o/r "Negro or Hispano 
students" was identifiable as a segregated school. 313 
F . Supp., at 77. Wherever one may draw this line. it is 
undisputed that most of the schools in these two areas 
are in fact heavily segregated in the sense that their stu-
dent bodies are overwhelmingly composed of non-Anglo 
children. The city-\vide school mix in Denver is 66% 
Anglo. 14% Negro. and 20% Hispano. In areas of the 
city where the Anglo population largely resides. the 
schools are predominantly Anglo. if not entirely so. 
The situation in Denver is generally comparable to 
that in other large cities across the country in which there 
is a substantial minority population and where desegre-
gation has not been ordered by the federal courts. There 
is segregation in the schools of many of these cities fully 
as pervasive as that in southern cities prior to the deseg-
regation decrees of the past decade and a half. The focus 
of the school desegregation problem has now shifted from 
tlw South to the country as a whole. Unwilling and 
footdragging as the process was in most places. substan-
tial progress toward achieving integration has been made 
m southern States." Xo comparable progress has been 
made in many nonsouthern cities \\·ith large minority 
-, Ac·eording to thr 1971 HEW r~tunatr , 43.9% of :\Tf'gro puptl:; 
attc·11drd majonty \Yhitr school~ in thf' South a:; oppo~ed to only 
:!7 .8% who attE-nded ~urh ~rhoob in the North and Weo:t. Fifty-
,;evcn percent of all Nep;ro pupil,; m thf' North and We:;t attf'nd 
~C'hool~ with over ~0% mi11ority population a~ opposE-d to .'32.2% 
who do ~o in the South . 111' C'ong. Rrr . Sl.J-5. 
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, populations ' primarily because of the de facto / de jure 
. distinction nurtured by the courts and accepted com-
placently by many of the same voices "':hich denounced 
the evils of segregated schools in the South. '· But if our 
national concern is for those who attend such schools. 
rather than for perpetuating a legalism rooted in history 
rather than present reality, we must recognize that the 
evil of operating separate schools is no less in Denver 
than in Atlanta. 
'The 1971 HEW Enrollmrnt Surn'y dramatized the ;.;egre.~ated 
eharnrtPr of public ~rhool ~~Aem~ in man~· non::;outhern riti~ . ThP 
perrpntagr of ;'\egro pupils which attrnded ::;rhoob morr than 80% 
black WH~ 91.1 in Clewland. Ohio; 9i.8 in Compton , California: 
78.1 in Da~·ton, Ohio; 7fUl m Drtroit, ).[irhigan; 95.7 in Gar~· . 
Indiana; 86.-+ in Kan,;a~ Cit~· , ).Ii~::;ouri: SfUl in Lo~ Angelrs, Cali-
fornia ; 78.8 in ~[ihYaukrr, Wiscon~in; 91.:3 in :\ewark, New .Jrr~ey : 
,1\9.8 in St. Lolli::;. :\[i::;,;ouri. Thr full dnta from the Enrollment Sur-
,·p~ · rna~· br found in 118 Cong. Ree. Sl-++-1-+8, .Tan. 20, 197:2. 
' A~ Senator Ribicoff (D.-Conn.) rrrognizPd : 
"For ~·ear~ wr have fou~ht thr hattlr of mtrgration primaril~ - Ill 
thr South wherr thr problrm wa~ ::;evrrr. It was a long, arduou~ 
fi~ht that de~en·ecl to b(' fought and nreded to br won . 
"l nfort-unatcl~- . a~ the problrm of racml t~olatwn ha" movl'd north 
of the :\Ia::;on-Dixon linr. man~· northrrnrr,- ha\'P bid an ent::;ivr 
farr\\·dl to the 100-~·rar ~truggl(' for mcial rquality. Our motto 
~rrm::; to havr brrn 'Do to :<outlwrn('r:< what ~-ou do not W<lnt to do 
1 o ~·om:<rlf .' 
' ·Good rpa"on" havr alwa~- ,_ b(•Pn off('red , of cour::;e , for not movmg 
, - igorou"J~- ahrad in t !JP ?\' ort h n" wrll a~ t hr South. 
"Fir"t. it wa" that thr problrm wa:< wor"r m thr South . Then 
thP fart:< lw~an to "how that that wn" no longer true. 
•·wp thrn brgan to !war tlw dP facto-dP jure rrfram . 
··Somrhow rr~idrntial "<'grrgation in tlw '\orth wa~ accidrntal or 
dr f;trto and that madr it brttrr than thr lrga]J~- ~upportrd dr jure 
~rgrrp:ation of the South. It \\'a" a hard di~tinrtion for black childrrn 
m totallY ~egrrgntrd "choob in tlH' :\orth to under"tand. but it 
allowed u:< to avoid thr prohlrm •· I JS Cong Rrr S:25-+2 . ~~rb. 2-+ , 
1972. 
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In my view we should abandon a distinction which long 
since has outlived its time, and formulate constitutional 
principles of national rather than merely regional appli-
cation. When Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 
483 ( 1954), was decided, the distinction between de jure 
and de facto segregation was consistent with the limited 
constitutional rationale of that case. The situation con-
fronting the Court, largely confined to the southern 
States. was officially imposed racial segregation in the 
schools extending back for many years and usually em-
bodied in constitutional and statutory provisions. 
The great contribution of Brown I was its holding in 
unmistakable terms that the Fourteenth Amendment 
forbids state-compelled or authorized segregation of pub-
lic schools. 347 U. S., at 488. 493-495. Although some 
of the language ''vas more expansive. the holding in 
Brown I was essentially negative: It was impermissible 
under the Constitution for the States, or their instru-
mentalities. to force children to attend segregated schools. 
The forbidden action was de jure, and the opinion in 
Brown l was construed:....._for some years and by many 
courts-as requiring only state neutrality, allowing "free-
dom of choice" as to schools to be attended so long as the 
State itself assured that the choice was genuinely free of 
official restraints." 
"Sec·, e. g .. Bradley v. School Board. :~45 F. 2d :310, 316 (CA4 
en bauc. 1965) : 
" It ha:< been lwld again and agam . . . rhar rhe Fourteenth 
Amendmcnt prohibition i" not again::;t ~egregation a~ .-<uch . 
A ~tnte or ~rhool di~trict offend" no con~titutwnal requirement 
when it grant~ to all "tudent~ uniform]~· an unre:<tncted freedom of 
choice a" to ~chool attended, ~o that each pupil , m effect, a~~w;n~ him-
"elf to the ~chool he wi~h<'" to attmd." (The ca~e wa~ later vacntecl 
i l-50i-CO~CUH. & DlSSEXt 
KBYES v. SCHOOL DISTHICT XO. 1, DEXVER, COLO 5 
But the doctrine of Brown I, as amplified by Brown II, 
349 F. S. 294 ( 1955). did not retain its original meaning. 
In a series of decisions extending from 1954 to 1971 the 
concept of state neutrality was transformed into the 
present constitutional doctrine requiring affirmative 
state action to desegregate school systems.' The key-
stone case was Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 
430. 438 ( 1968), >vhere school boards were declared to 
have "the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might 
be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which 
racial discrimination \\"ould be eliminated root and 
branch." The school system before the Court in Green 
was operating in a rural and sparsely settled county 
where there were no concentrations of white and black 
populations. no neighborhood school system (there were 
only two schools in the county). and none of the 
problems of an urbanized school district.' The Court 
properly identified the freedom of choice program 
there as a subterfuge. and the language in Green impos-
ing an affirmative duty to convert to a unitary system 
\Vas appropriate on the facts before the Court. There 
was. however. reason to question to what extent this duty 
would apply in the vastly different factual setti11g of a 
and rl'manded b~· thi~ Court, which expre~,.;ed no \'irw on the mNit~ 
of thr dr,.;e~~:rpgation plan~ ~ubmittrd.) :382 U. S. lo:3, 105 (1D55). 
8er abo Bell v. School City of Gary. Ind .. :32-t F. 2d 209 (CA7 1963) ; 
Downs v. Board of Educ., :3:35 F. 2d 98~ (CAIO 191l.f): Deal v. 
Board of Educ., 359 F. 2d 55 (CAll 196()) 
' For a concisr histor~· and commrntar~· on tlw evolution, ,.;rr ~~:rn­
nal!~- :\. Biehl, Thr Suprrmr Court and thr Idea of Progrr~;; , pp 
12()-1:30 ( 1970) . 
'Srr al~o thr compamon ea~c·:; 111 Rauey \' . Board of Rducatwu. 
:ml LT. 8 . .t.t:3 ( 196~), and .u Oil roe \', Board of rom m'n;. :{91 l '. S. 
-+50 ( l9fil'). llE'itlwr of which uwolnd largr urban or mrtropolitan 
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large city with extensive areas of residential segregation. 
presenting problems and calling for solutions quite dif-
ferent from those in the rural setting of ~ew Kent 
County. Virginia. 
But the doubt as to whether the affirmative duty con-
cept would flower into a new constitutional principle of 
general application was laid to rest by Swann v. Board 
of Education, 402 U. S. 1 ( 1971), in which the affirma-
tive duty articulated in Green was applied to the urban 
school system of metropolitan Charlotte. ~orth Carolina. 
In describing the residential patterns in Charlotte, thP 
Court noted the "familiar phenomenon" in the metro-
j)Olitan areas of minority groups being "concentrated in 
one part of the city, ' ' 402 U. S .. at 25. and acknowledged 
that : 
"Rural areas accustomed for half a century to the 
consolidated school system implemented by bus 
transportation could make adjustments more readily 
than metropolitan areas with dense and shifting pop-
ulation, numerous ~hools, congested and complex 
traffic patterns.'' 402 U. S. , at 14. 
Despite this recognition of a fundamentally different 
problem from that involved in Green, the Court never-
theless held that the affirmative duty rule of Green was 
applicable, and prescribed for a metropolitan school sys-
tem with 107 schools and some 84,000 pupils essentially 
the same remedy-elimination of segregation "root and 
branch "-v,:hich had been formulated for the two schools 
and 1,300 pupils of New Kent County. 
In Swann, the Court further noted it was dealing only 
with States having "a long history" of officially imposed 
segregation and the duty of school authorities in those 
States to implement Brown I. 402 L. S .. at 5- 6. In so 
doing, the Court refrained even from considering whether 
the evolution of constitutional doctrine from Brown I to 
il-507-CONCUR & DISSEr-.:T 
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Green / Swann undercut whatever logic once supported 
the de facto/ de jure distinction. In imposing on metro-
politan southeru school districts an affirmative duty, en-
tailing large-scale transportation of pupils. to eliminate 
segregation in the schools. the Court required these dis-
tricts to alleviate conditions which in large part did not 
result from historic, state-imposed de jure segregation. 
Rather, the familiar root cause of segregated schools in all 
the biracial metropolitan areas of our country is essen-
tially the same: one of segregated residential and migra-
tory patterns the impact of which on the racial composi-
tion of the schools was often perpetuated and rarely 
ameliorated by action of public school authorities. Thi 
1s a national, not a southern phenomenon. And it is 
largely unrelated to whether a particular State had or did 
not have segregatory school laws." 
Whereas Brown I rightly decreed the elimination 
of state-imposed segregation in that particular section of 
the country where it did exist. Swann imposed obligations 
on southern school districts to eliminate conditions which 
are not regionally unique but are similar both in origin 
and effect to conditions in the rest of the country. As 
''A:; Dr. Karl Taeuber ~tate~ in hi~ article, Re,;Identwl Segregation. 
Scientific American, Augu~t 19fj5, at 14: 
" No elaborate analysis is neces:;ary to conclude from thr~e figures 
that a high degree of re:;idential segregation based on rare 1~ a uni-
vNsaJ characteristic of American cities. Thi~ ::;egrega1ion 1~ found 
in the cities of the North and Wrst as well a:; of the South: in large 
cltie;,; a;; well as small ; in nonindustrial citie:- a~ well a" indu:'trial; 111 
citie~ with hundreds of thousands of ~egro resident::: as well as tho:;e 
with on!~· a few thousand; and 111 citie" that are progres~i,·e in the1r 
emplo~·ment practice and Civil rights polirie" a:; well a" tho:;e that 
:tre not " 
Tn Ius book. Xegroe,; in Citir,; (1965), Dr. Taeubrr "tatrd that rr~i­
dentwl ::;egregation PXIsts "regardless of thr character of lora! Jaws 
and poliriP" and regardiPss of othrr forms of disrnminatiOII ." !d. , 
at :~G . 
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th r remedial obligations of Swann extend far beyoiid 
the elimination of the outgrowths of the state-imposed 
segregation outlawed in Brown, the rationale of Swann 
points inevitably tov.:ards a uniform. constitutional ap-
proach to our national problem of school segregation , 
TI 
The Court's decision today, >vhile adhering to the 
de jure/ de facto distinction, will require the application 
of th e Green/ Swanu doctrine of "affirmative duty '' to the 
Denver School Board despite the absence of any history 
of state-mandated school segregation. The only evidence 
of a constitutional violation was found in various de~ 
risions of the school board. I concur in the Court 's posi-
t ion that the public school authorities are the responsible 
agency of the State, and that if the affirmative duty doc-
trine is sound constitutional law for Charlotte. it IS 
equally so for Denver. 1 would not. however . perpetuate 
the de jure/ de facto distinction nor would I leave to peti-
tioners the initial tortuous effort of identifying "segre-
gative acts" and deducing "segregatory intent. " I 11·ould 
hold . quite simply, that where segregated public schools 
r xist with in a school district to a substantial degree. there 
is a prima facie case that the duly constituted public 
a uthorities (I will usually refer to them collectively as 
the "school board " ) are sufficiently responsible '" to im-
pose upon them a nationally applicable burden to demon-
"' A prima far1r ca~r of l'On~ titlll ional \·iolatwn rx 1 ;o; t ~ \\'h r n ~rgrl'­
ga tiOtl 1 ~ found to a ~u b~ t a ntial drgrrr in tlw ~rhoob of a par-
ti cul a r cl1~ t n c r. It 1 ~ rProgni zt•cl , of rom~r, that thi~ tprm i ~ rr la-
t in · :llld pro \ · idP~ no prrr i~r ~tandarcl~ . But rirrum~ t a n rP~ , clr mo-
gra phi r and othPn\·i~P. \'i ll'~- from di~ trirt to di~tri f' t a nd ha rd a nd 
fa~ t rul E'~ ~hould not bE' fo rmulat r d_ ThE' rxi~ t Pn rr of a ~uh,.; tantia l 
{lE' rerntagr of ~f'hoob popula t r d b~- "tudr nt ~ from onr ra r r onl \' or 
pn •dominatrh- ~o populat r d . ,.; honld triggrr t hr wquiry , 
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strate they nevertheless are operating a genuinely inte-
grated school system. 
A 
The principal reason for abandonment of the de jure/ 
de facto distinction is that. in view of the evolution of 
the holding in Brown I into the affirmative duty doctrine. 
the distinction no longer can be justified ou a principled 
basis. In decreeing remedial requirements for the 
Charlotte/ Mecklenburg school district. Swann dealt 
with a metropolitan. urbanized area in which the basic 
causes of segregation were generally similar to those in 
all sections of the country. and also largely irrelevant 
to the existence of historic. state-imposed segregation at 
the time of the Brown decision. Further. the extension 
of the affirmative duty concept to require compulsory 
student transportation went well beyond the mere rem-
edying of that portion of school segregation for which 
former state segregation laws were ever responsible. 
Moreover. as the Court's opinion today abundantly dem-
onstrates. the facts deemed necessary to establish de juTe 
discrimination present problems of subjective intent 
,,·hich the courts cannot fairly resolve. 
At the outset. one must try to identify the constitu· 
tiona] right which is being enforced. This is not easy. 
as the precedents have been far from explicit. In 
Brown I, after emphasizing the importance of education. 
the C'ourt said that : 
"Such an opportunity. where the state has under-
taken to provide it. is a right which must be made 
available to all on equal terms." 347 C. S .. at 493. 
In BTow·n ll, the Court ide11tified the "funclamental prin-
ciple" enunciated in BTOwn I as being the unconstitu-
tionality of "racial discrimination in public education.'' 
349 r. S .. at 298. and spoke of "the personal interest 
of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon 
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as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis. " 349 U. S., 
at 300. Although this and similar language is ambiguous 
as to the specific constitutional right, it means-as a mini-
mum-that one has the right not to be compelled by 
state action to attend a segregated school system. 11 In 
the evolutionary process since 1954. decisions of this 
Court have added a significant gloss to this original right, 
Although nowhere expressly articulated in these terms. 
I would now define it as the right, derived from the Equal 
Protection Clause. to expect that once the State has as-
sumed responsibility for education. local school boards 
will operate integrated school systems \\'ithin their re-
spective districts. This means that school authorities. 
consistent with the generally accepted educational goal of 
attaining quality education for all pupils, must make and 
implement their customary decisions with a view toward 
enhancing integrated school opportunities. 
The term "integrated school system'' presupposes. of 
course, a total absence of any laws. regulations or policies 
supportive of the type of "legalized" segregation con-
demned in Brown. A system would be integrated in 
accord with constitutional standards if the responsible 
authorities had taken appropriate steps to ( i) integrate 
faculties and administration; ( ii) scrupulously assure 
equality of facilities, quality of instruction and curricula 
opportunities throughout the district; (iii) utilize their 
authority to draw attendance zones to promote integra-
tion; and ( iv) locate new schools, close old ones. and 
11 SN· Birkel, supra. n. 7. at 118 : 
' ' I t rthe problem of ~chool dr~egregation I has not bf:'f:'n that ~im­
plr . becau~e thf:' laconic opinion in Brown v . Board of Educa-
twu wa~ it~elf not that ~implr. Onr stram in 1t became evidrnt 111 
~ub~equent decisions outlawing all forms of state-~pon~orrd segrega-
tion 111 e \·er~·t hing from tlw spectator section of a courtroom to golf 
tour~e8. The rnmimal propo~ition that emer~~:ed-and about time 
tt wn~ that 1t should emergr-wa~ that the state ma~· not, b~· legisla-
tion or admini~trativel~·. da~sify the population along rarial Jines .. , 
7Hi07-COXCU:t{ & DISSENT 
:KBYES v, 8CHOOL DISTIUCT KO. 1, DENYER, COLO. i1 
determine the size and grade categories with this same 
objective in mind . Where school authorities decide to 
undertake the transportation of students. this also must 
be with integrative opportuuities in mind. 
The foregoing prescription is not intended to be either 
definitive or all-inclusive. but rather an indication of 
the con tour characteristics of an integrated school syg· 
tem in which all citizens and pupils may justifiably be 
confident that racial discrimination is neither practiced 
nor tolerated. An integrated school system does not 
mean-and indeed could not meai1 ih view of the resi:. 
dential patterns of most of our ma.]or metropolitan 
areas-that every school must in fac~ be an . integrated 
unit. A school which happens to be all or predominantly 
white or all or iJreciominantly black is not a "segregated" 
school in an unconstitutional sense if the system itself is 
a genuinely integrated one. 
Having school boards operate an integrated school sys-
tem provides the best assurance of meeting the constitu-
tional requirement that racial discrimination . subtle or 
othenYise. will find no place in the decisions of public 
school officials. Courts judging past school board actions 
with a view to their general integrative effect will be best 
able to assure an absence of such discrimination vvhile 
avoiding the murky, subjective judgments inherent in 
the Court's search for "segregatory intent." Any test 
resting on so nebulous and elusive an element as a 
school board's segregatory "intent" provides inadequate 
assurance that minority children will not be short-
changed in the decisions of those entrusted ".,.ith the non-
discriminatory operation of our public schools. 
Public schools are creatures of the State. and whether 
the segregation is state-created or state-assisted or 
merely state-perpetuated should be irrelevant to consti, 
tutional principle. The school board exercises pervasive 
and continuing responsibility over the long range plan= 
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ning as well as the daily operations of the public school 
system. It sets policies on attendance zones, faculty 
employment and assignments. school construction, clos-
ings and consolidations, and myriad other matters. 
School board decisions obviously are not the sole cause 
of segregated school conditions. But if. after detailed 
and complete public supervision, substantial school segre-
gation still persists. the presumption is strong that the 
school board, by its acts or omissions. is in some part 
responsible. Where state action and supervision are so 
pervasive and where. after years of such action. seg-
regated schools continue to exist within the district 
to a substantial degree. this Court is justified in find-
ing a prima facie case of a constitutional violation. 
The burden then must fall on the school board to demon-
strate it is operating an "integrated school system. ' ' 
It makes little sense to find prima facie violations and 
the consequent. affirmative duty to desegregate solely in 
those States with state-imposed segregation at the time 
of the Brown decision. The history of state-imposed 
segregation is more widespread in our country than the 
de jure/ de facto distinction has traditionally cared to 
rceognize. As one comnwntator has noted: 
" the three court of appeals decisions denying a con-
stitutional duty to abolish de facto segregation all 
arose in cities-Cincinnati. Gary and Kansas City, 
Kansas- where racial segregation m schools was 
formerly mandated by state or local law. [Deal v. 
Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F. 2d 55 ( CA6 1966), 
cert. denied. 377 C S. 924 (1964); Downs Y. Board 
of Educ., 336 F. 2cl 988 ( C AlO 1964). cert. de-
nied. 380 C. S. 914. Bell , .. School City, 324 F. 2d 
209 (C'A7 1963). cert. denied. 377 1:. S. 924.J Ohio 
discarded its statute in 1887. Indiana in 1949. and 
Kansas City not until the advent of Bro·wn. If 
Segro and >vhite parents in Mississippi are required 
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to bus their children to distant schools on the theory 
that the consequences of past de jure segregation 
cannot otherwise be dissipated. should not the same 
reasoning apply in Gary. Indiana, where no more 
than five years before Brown the same practice 
existed with presumably the same effects." Good-
man. De Facto School Segregation~ A Constitutional 
and Empirical Analysis. 60 Cal. L. Rev. 275, 297 
(1972).1 " 
Kot only does the de jure/ de facto distinction operate 
inequitably on communities in different sections of the 
country~ more importantly. it disadvantages minority 
children as well. As the Fifth Circuit stated: 
"The ::\"" egro children in Cleveland. Chicago. Los 
Angeles. Boston. Xew York, or any other area of the 
nation which the opinion classifies under de facto 
segregation. would receive little comfort from the 
assertion that the racial make-up of their school sys-
tem does not violate their constitutional rights be~ 
cause they were born into a de facto society, while 
the exact same racial make-up of the school system 
m the 17 southern and border states violates the 
1
" Thr author rontmur~: 
·'Trur. the earlier the polic.\· of srgregation was abandoned the lrss 
dangrr thPrr i~ that it continur~ to oprratr covrrtl~-. i:< ,;ignificantly 
rl'spon:;ibiC' for prP:;ent cia~· pattrrn:; of re~idPntial ~rgrPgation, or has 
eontributrd matPriall~· to prr~ent communit~· attitude~ toward Negro 
:;chool ,.:. Hut therr ~~no rra:;on to .~uppo:;e that 1954 i:; a uniYer,.:ally 
appropriate diYiding linr brtwren dr jurr ,;rgregation that may 
~afrl~- hr a,.:~unwd to ha\'(' ><]Wilt it:;e]f and thnt which mn~· not. 
For man~· rPmedtal ]Htrpo><r,;. adoption of an arbitrar~· but ra,;i]~­
admini,.:t rablr <·utoff point might not br objectionable. But in a 
:;ttuatton ,.:uch a" :;chool d~rgrrgation. wht're both tht' nght:; a,;:;rrted 
and tlw rrmrdial burdrn" impo,;pc] nrP of :;uch magnitudr. and where 
t hr rr,;u]ting "rctwnal di"crimmat ion j,.: pa:;::<ionate]~- re,;rntPcl. it t" 
.~un·]~, qur:;tionahle whPthrr >'ItCh arbitrarinr~~ i~ rither politically 
or morally aeerptnble ." 
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constitutional rights of their counterparts, or even 
their blood brothers, bec1;1Us~ they were born into 
a de jure society. AU children everywhere in the 
nation are protected by the Constitution. and treat-
ment which violates their constitutional rights i1i 
one area. also violates such constitutional rights in 
another area.'' Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Indepe nd-
ent School District, 467 F. 2cl 142. 148 ( CA5 en bane, 
1972) quoting United States v. J_efferson County 
Board of 8duc., 380 F. 2cl 385. 397 IC'Ai'i en bane) 
Gewin. J .. dissenting) .1" 
The Court today does move for the first time toward 
breaking clown past sectional disparities. but it clings 
tenuously to its distinction. It searches for de jure 
action in what the Denver School Board has do11e or 
failed to do, and even here the Court does not rely upon 
the resu lts or effects of the Board 's conduct hut feels com-
pelled to find segregatory intent: 11 
"We emphasize that the differentiating factor be-
tween de jure segregation and so-called de facto 
1
'
1 Sf'<' Birkrl , supra. n. 7, ar 119 : 
'·If a Negro rhild peref'lVE'~ hi~ srparation a~ di~crmunator~· and 
invidiou~. hr i::-: not, in a o;ocirt~· a hundrrd ,·l'ar~ rrmon•d from 
~lavrr~· . gomg to makP finr distinrtion~ about tiH· ,;om<·<• of ;t par-
ticular ::;rparation .. 
11 Thr Court toda~· doe~ not rrquire, howl'vl'r. a ,;pgrPgator~ · llltl'llt 
with rr~prct to thr entirE' ~chool "~·~trm, ami indPl'd hold~ th>~t if ~uclt 
an mtrnt 1,; found w1th rr,;pect to :somE' ,;cltool~ 111 a ,;~·,;trm. tlw blll'-
den-normall\' on the plamtiff:,;-l:'hifts to the d1•fpndant ,;('!tool au-
thoritJf',; to pron' a negativr: n;tmel~ · . that riH•Jr purpo,;(',; \H'n· 
h<•mgn , ante. pp 17- 18. 
Thr Court hal:' comf' a long wa~· ~Jilt'<' 8roll'll !. F;tartJng; from 
thr una,;,;ailablr de JUre ground of thr di,;cnmJnalor~ · eon,;tit JJtlonal 
and ~tatutor~· provision~ of ~omc• Stat<•,; , tlw liP\\' formulation-,;tilt 
profe~::;mg fidelitY to thr de jure doctrinr-i,; that dr~rg;n•g;ation ll'ill 
br ordPrrd c!Pspttr the ab~rJlCr of an~· ,;pgn·gaton· Ia\\'~ if: (i) ~l'grr­
!);atcd ~chao]~ in fact rxi::'t : ( ii) a COIJ.l't find~ that tlH•y rr·,;u[t from 
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segregation to which we referred in Swann is pur-
pose or i11tent to segregate." (Court Opinion. p. 18) 
(italics are the Court's). 
The ( 'ourt's insistence that the "differentiating factor '' 
bet\\·een de jure and de facto segregation be "purpose 
or intent" is difficult to reconcile with the language in so 
recent a case as Wright v. Council of the City of E-mporia, 
407 LT. S. 451 ( 7972). In holding there that "motiva-
tion" is irrelevant, the Court said: 
"In addition, an inquiry into the 'dominant· motiva-
tion of school authorities is as irrelevant as it is fruit-
less. The mandate of Brown II was to desegregate 
schools. and we have said that ' [ t lhe measure of 
any desegregation plan is its effectiveness.' Davis 
v. School Commissioners of .Mobile County, 402 U.S. 
33. 37. 
"Thus. we have focused upon the effect-not the 
purpose or motivation-of a school board's action 
i11 determining whether it is a permissible method 
of dismantling a dual system. 
•'Though the purpose of the Jlev\· school district was 
found to be discriminatory in many of these cases. the 
courts' holdings rested not on motivation or pur-
poses but on the effect of the action upon the dis-
mantling of the dual school system involved. That 
,,·as the focus of the District Court in this case. and 
we hold that its approach ,,·as proper. 407 F . S .. 
a.t 462. 
T can discern no basis in law or logic for holding that 
the motivation of school board action is irrelevant in 
~omr :let loll takrn 1\'Ith ~c>p;regator~· mtrnt h~· thr ~rhool hoard : 
(Iii) ~llf'h H('!JOil rrlatP~ to an~· "mraningful scgmrnt" of tlw ~chool 
~.~ ·~t<·m : anfl (i\') til(' .-whuol hoard c·annot JHon• that It~ intrntion~ 
,,·it h n·~pc·r t to the !'Pilla inder of t lw ~yst<·m wPn· nonsrgrpga tor~ · . 
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Virginia and controlling in Colorado. It may be argued. 
of course. that in Emporia a prior CO IIstitutional viola-
tion hac! already been proven and that this justifies the 
distinction. The net result of the Court's language. ho,,·_ 
ever. is the application of an effect test to the actions of 
southem school districts and an intent test to those in 
other sections. at least unti l an initial de jure finding for 
those districts can be made. Rather than straining to 
peqX'tuate any such dual standard. we should hold forth-
rightly that significant segregated school conditions in 
whatever section of the country are a prima facie viola-
tion of constitutional rights. As the Court has noted 
else\Yhere: 
"Circumstances or chance may well dictate that no 
persons in a certain class will serve Oil a particular 
jury or during some particular period. But it taxes 
our credulity to say that mere chance resulted in 
there being no members of this class among the over 
six thousand jurors called in the past 25 years. The 
result bespeaks discrimnation, whether or not it was 
a. conscious decision on the part of any individual JUry 
r·ommissio-ner." Hernandez v. Te:ms, 347 l T. ~- 475. 
482 ( 1954). (Emphasis added .) 
B 
There is thus 110 reason as a matter of constitutwnal 
principle to adhere to the de jure/ de facto distinction in 
school desegregation cases. In addition. there are rea-
sons of policy and prudent judicial administration which 
point strongly toward the adoption of a uniform national 
rule. The litigation heretofore centered in the South 
already is surfacing in other regions. The decision of 
the Court today. emphasizing as it does the elusive 
element of segrega.tory intent, will invite numerous deseg-
regation suits in whicb there can be little hope of uni-· 
fQrmit,v of re~ult .. 
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The issue in these cases will not be whether segregated 
education exists. This will be conceded in most of them. 
Tht> litigation '"ill focus as a consequence of the Court 's 
decision on vvhetlwr segregation has resulted in any 
"meaningful or significant" portion of a school system 
from a school board's "segregatory intent." The intrac-
table problems involved in litigating this issue are obvious 
to any lawyer. The results of litigation-often arrived 
at subjectively by a court endeavoring to ascertain the 
subjective intent of school authorities with respect to 
action taken or not taken over many years-will b(' 
fortuitous. unpredictable and even capricious. 
The Denver situation is illustrative of the problem. 
The courts belov.- found evidence of de JUre violations 
with respect to the Park Hill schools and an absence of 
such violations with respect to the core city schools. 
despite the fact that actions taken by the school board 
with regard to those two sections were not dissimilar. 
It is. for example. quite possible to contend that both 
the construction of Manual High School in the core city 
area and Barrett Elementary School in the Park Hill area 
operated to serve their surrounding Negro communities 
and. in effect. to merge school attendance zones with 
segregated residential patterns. See Petitioner's Brief, 
pp. 80- 83. Yet findings even ou such similar acts will, 
under the de jure/ de facto distinction. continue to differ. 
especially since the Court has never made clear what 
suffices to establish the requisite "segregatory intent" for 
an initial constitutional violation . Even if 1t \\'ere pos-
sible to clarify this question. '"ide and unpredictable 
differences of opinion among judges would be inevitable 
when dealing with an issue as slippery as "intent' ' or 
" purpose." especially when related to hundreds of 
decisions made by school authorities unc!Pr varying eon-
eli tions over many years. 
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This Court has recognized repeatedly that it is "ex-
tremely difficult for a court to ascertain the motivation , 
or collection of different motivations. tha.t lie behind a 
legislative enactment." Pal111er v. Thompson , 403 C. S. 
214, 224 ( 1971); NfcGi11nis v. Royster, - r . S. -.-
(1973); United States V. O'Brien, 391 r. R. 367. 381 
(1968). Whatever difficulties exist with regard to a sin-
gle statute will be compouilcied in a judicial review of 
years of administration of a large and complex school 
system.'' Every act of a school board and school ad-
ministration. and indeed every failure to act v.·here affirm-
ative action is indicated, must now be subject to scrutiny. 
The most routine decisions with respect to the operation 
of schools, made almost daily. can affect in varying de-
grees the extent to which schools are initially segregated. 
remain in that condition. are desegregated. or-for the 
long term future- arc likely to be one or the other. These 
decisions include action or nonaction with respect to 
school building coustruction and location; the timing of 
building ne>Y schools and their size; the closing and con-
solidation of schools; th e drawing or gerrymanderi11g of 
·,c, A~ Oil<' eommC'ntator h;~~ C'x prl'~~('(l it : 
'"If thC' court~ are mdrrd prC'pnn·d to inqum• uno motll"<', thorn~· 
qurstion~ will a ri~e e\"C'n tf onC' a~~umC'~ that ra cial motll"atiOll i~ 
ca pablr of brmg prown at trial. What of thr cas<' m ll"hi('h one or 
morr membf'r~ of a ~rhool board. but lr~~ than a majorit~·. arr found 
to haYC' nctrd on ractal ground::;'' ~1h11t if it apprars 1h:1t tllC' ::;rhool 
board'~ :1ct10n \\"a::; promptC'd bY a mixtnn• of motiYC'~. lll cl nding con-
~titntionall~· innocrnt one~ that alone would han promptPd thC' board 
to :let'? What tf the mrmber;;: of thr ::;c hool board \\"C'f<' not them-
~C'h·e::; rnciall~· m~pired but " ·i::;hrd to pl ra~P their eon,.;ti turnt ::;, mnny 
of \\"hom thC'~· knP\Y to br "o·? If ,;urh ca,.;e~ are rla::;"ifird a::; un-
eon,.;tituttonal de Jlll'C' ,;egrPgatton. thNe i~ little pomt m prr~Nving 
thC' de jmC'-dC' facto di~tinctJOn at all. And tt ma~· \H'll bC' that the 
differencC' brtll"rcn an~· of tllC',.;c ,.;i tuation" and one in ll"htrh ra rml 
motiYatJOn ts altogC'thrr la cking '" too m,;ignifirant. from thP ,;tand-
pomt of both thC' moral rulpabtlit~· of thr "tatr official,; and thr· 
tmpart upon thP children inYOI\'NI. to ,;upport a diffprrnce in ron-
s1ttutional trPatmrnt ," C:ooqma11. supm. n 11. at 1i<4-2S.'i_ 
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student attendance zones; the extent to \\·hich a neigh-
borhood policy is enforced; the recruitmeiit. promotion 
and assignment of faculty ami supervisory personnel: 
policies \Yith respect to transfers from 011e school to 
another; whether. and to what extent. special schools ·will 
be provided. where they \YiJI be located. and who \\"ill 
qualify to attend them; the determination of curricululiL 
including whether there \\·ill be "tracks" that lead pri-
marily to college or to vocational training. and tlw rout"' 
ing of students into these tracks; and even decisions as 
to social. recreational and athletic policies. 
In Swann the Court did not have to probe into segre-
gatory intent and proximate cause with respect to each 
of these "endless'' factors . The basis for its de jure find-
ing there was rooted primarily in the prior history of the 
desegregation suit. 402 l r. ~-. at ;)- 6. But in a case of 
the present type. where no such history exists. a judicial 
examination of these factors will be required under to-
clay's decision. This will lead inevitably to uneven and 
unpredictable results. to protracted and inconclusive li ti-
gation . to added burdens on the federal courts. and to 
serious disruption of individual school systems. ln the 
absence of IIational and objective standards. school boards 
and administrators will remain in a state of uncertainty 
and disarray. speculating as to \Vhat if' required and vdwn 
litigation wiJI strike. 
c 
Rather than contmue to prop up a distinction no longer 
grounded in principle. and contributing to the conse-
quences indicated above. we should ackno\Yledge that 
whenever public school segregation exists to a sub-
~tantial degree there is prima facie evidence of a con-
stitutional violation by the responsible school board . lt 
i~ true. of course. that segregated schools- wherever 
located- are not solely thr product of the action or 
i naction of public ~ch oo l authorities. In<kf'd. as indi-
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catecl earlier. there can be little doubt that principal 
causes of the pervasive school segregation found in the 
major urban areas of this country. whether in the Xorth, 
\Vest. or South. are the socio-economic influences \\·hich 
have concentrated our minority citizens in the inner cities 
while the more mobile white majority disperse to the sub-
urbs. But it is also true that public school boards have 
continuittg. detailed responsibility for the public school 
system vYithin their district"' and. as Judge John Minor 
vVisdom has noted. "where the figures lshowing 
segregation in the schools] speak so eloquently. a 
prima face case of discrimination is established." 
U11ited States v. Texas Education Agency, 467 F. 2d 84 . 
873 ( CA5 en bane 1972). Moreover. as foreshadowed itl 
Swann and as implicitly held today. school boards have a 
duty to minimize and ameliorate segregated conditions 
by pursuing an affirmative policy of desegregation. It is 
this policy which must be applied consistently on a na-
tional basis without regard to a doctrinal distinction 
\Yhich has outlived its time. 
nr 
The preceding section addresses the constitutional ob-
ligation of public authorities in the school districts 
throughout our country to operate integrated school sys-
tems. When the schools of a particular district are 
'" IndPPd, if onP g;oP,.; back far Pnoug;h, it i" probabiP that :til ractal 
"Pg;regnt ton, whprever occurnng; and II'IJPther or not confined to thr 
:<chools. ha,.; at somp ttmP bt>Pn ~upportPd or maintained bv g;o\·rrn-
mPnt aetion. In Becket \· . School Board. :~0~ F. Supp. 1:27-t, 1:311-
]:{15 (ED \'a. 1969), .Tudg;r WaltN Hoffman compi!Pd a :<ummary 
of Jl:l"t public segregator~· action \\'hich lllcluded Pxample" from :1 
g;n•at majorit~· of Statr". He contluded that "on!~ · a~ to the .-<tntes 
of :\lamP, \"P\\' Hamp~hire. Vermont. V\1ashington, :\t>vada. and 
H:twaii clop,.; it appPar from thi,.; nonPxhau,.;ti\'P rp,.;parch that no cli~­
criminator~· law~ appearrd on thr hooks at one tim<' or anorlwr_"' 
lcl,., at 1:315, 
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found to be substau tially segregated. there is a prima 
facie casr that this obligation has not been met. The 
burden then shifts to the school authorities to demon-
strate that they have i ii fact operated an integrated 
system as this term is defined above, supra, p. - . If 
therr is a failure successfully to rebut the prima facie 
case. the question then becomes what reasonable affirma= 
tive steps district courts may require to place the school 
system in compliaiJCe 1vith the constitutional standard. 
In short. what specifically is the nature and scope of thl:! 
remedy'? 
As the Court's opinion virtually compels the finding on 
remand that Denver is a "d ual school system,'' that city 
will then be under an "affirniative duty" to desegregatf' 
its entire system "root and branch.'' Green v. County 
School Board, 391 U. S .. at 438. Again, the critical ques-
tion is what ought this constitutional duty to entail. 
A 
The controlling case is Swan'll, supra, and the question 
which will confront and confound the District Court and 
Denver School Board is what indeed does Swann require . 
Swann purported to e iJunciate no new principles, relying 
heavily on Brown I and If and on Green. Yet it affirmed 
a district court order which had relied heavily oi1 "racial 
ratios" and sanctioned transportation of elementary as 
\Yell as secondary pupils. Lo\Yer federal courts have often 
read 81l'ann as requiri11g far-reaching transportation de-
crees " "to achieve tlw greatest possible degree of actual 
"SPe. e. g .. Thompson 1' . School Board of Xell'port New&. -
F . 2d -,- (1972) , whPre thr CA.J. en bauc. upheld a distnct court 
a~~igmnPnt plan wherr ·'travrl timr, varying from a mmimum of 
fort~· minutP~ and a maxnnum of one hour, rach wa~· . would br rr-
qtmPd for bu~mg black ~tudrnt~ out of thr old Cit~· and white stu-
~!Pnt~ into til<' old Cit,1· 111 order to ach1rve a rarwl balnncmg of tho 
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desegregation." 402 L". S., at 26. In the context of a 
large urban area. with heavy residential concentrations 
of white and black citizens in different-and widely 
Eeparated-Eections of the school district, extensive dis-
persal and transportation of pupils is inevitable if Swann 
is read as expansively as many courts have been reading 
it to date. 
To. the extent that Swann may be thought to require 
large-scale or long-distance transportation of students in 
our metropolitan school districts. I record my profound 
misgiVmgs. Xothing in our Constitution commands or 
encourages any such disruption of public education. 
Fortunately, Swann also laid down a broad rule of reason 
under which desegregation remedies must remain flexible 
and other values and interests be considered. Thus the 
Court recognized that school authorities. not the federal 
judiciary, must be charged in the first instance with the 
task of desegregating local school systems. 402 U. 8., at 
16. School boards in rural areas might adjuEt more 
readily to this task than those in metropolitan districts 
district." This transportation wa:; dPcreed for children from the thtrd 
grad<> up, im·olving childrPn a,; young a:; eight year,; of agr. 
In Northcross v . .l1emphis Bd. of Educ .. 466 F. :2d 890, 895 
(1972), the CA(i affirmed n di:strict court a,;:signment plan which 
daily transported 14,000 childrrn with "the maxtmum timr to hP· 
,.;prnt on thr buses b~· an~· child rbeing 1 :34 minute~ . .. . " prP-
,.,umabl~· rnch wa~·. But ;t::< .Judgr Weick notre! in dt~:o:E'nt thr CA6 
tn;trurtPd thr di~trict judgr to implrment ~·pt furthrr dr,.;pgrrgation 
orcl<'r~. Plan,; prPsentl~· undrr <·on,.;idPration b~· that court rail for 
the busing of :39 ,0~5 and 61 ,5:30 childrPn rr:sprctiYrl~·. for unc!Ptrr-
nunrd length:; of timP. !d .. :tt 895-981i. 
PPtitionrr:< hdorP this Court in Pott:s ,._ Flax , Xo 72- 2RS, CPrt . 
rlPnied , - r. S. - ( 197-), contendrd that t hr implrmPntallon 
of tlw CA5'~ dirPctiYP in Plax \',Putts. 464 F. 2d 865 (197:2), would 
rpquirP bu" ridP" of up to two hours and 20 minutP~ rach c!n~· and 
a round trip of up to 70 milP" . Prtition , at 14. Whilr rr"ponc!Pnts 
contPnd thP::;P figure:; rP]H<•,.;pnt an "a::<tounding inflation ." Hrspon,.;p , 
<If ( , t rnn,.;portnti.on of a ,.;ignificant magnitud<• "'<'<'Ill~ iuPvitn bll' , 
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"with dense and shifting population. numerous schools, 
congested and complex traffic patterns." !d. , at 14. 
Transportation orders are suspect "when the time or 
distance of travel is so great as to either risk the health 
of the children or significantly impinge on the education 
process. ld., at 31. Finally. the age of the pupils to 
be transported was recognized by the Court in Swann 
as one important limitation on the time of student 
travel. Ibid. 
These factors were supposed to help guide district courts 
in framing equitable remedies in school desegregation 
cases.'" And the Court further emphasized that equitable 
decrees are inherently sensitive. not solely to the degree 
of desegregation to be achieved. but to a variety of other 
public and private interests : 
. . . a school desegregation case does not difl'er 
fundamentally from other cases involving the fram-
ing of equitable remedies to repair the denial of a 
constitutional right. The task is to correct. by a. 
balancing of the individual and collective interest. 
the condition that ofl'ends the Constitution . Swann. 
supra, at 15-16. 
Those '"·ords echoed a similar expression in Bro11•n II , 
349 U. S., at 229: 
" r n fashionillg and efl'ecting the decrees . the courts 
will be guided by equitable principles. Tradition-
ally, equity has beell characterized by a practical 
flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility 
"Sr<• L'nited States"· Te.ta~; Education Agency. -W7 F . :.!d S-1-8. ,.;;s:{ 
(CA5 197:2) (Brll . .J. , concmring 111 an opinion in \Yiuch ~r\·rn othl'r 
Jttd~~:r~ jo inrd) : 
.. In on r \·ipw the renwdy which t hr district comt is n•quirrd i o 
formnlatr ~houlcl b(' formulated within thr entire coute:rt of thr 
opmwn in Swawt \· . Charlotte-Mer-klenbvrg Board of Educa-
tion. . . . [Empha~i::; :LdciC'd.j" 
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for adjusting and reconciling public and private 
needs .. , 
Thus in school desegregation cases, as elsewhere, equity 
counsels reason. flexibility attd balance. See. e. g. , Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, - F. S. - ( 1973). I am aware. of 
course, that reasonableness in any area is a relative and 
subjective concept. But vvith school desegregation. rea-
sonableness would seem to embody a balanced evaluation 
of the obligation of public school boards to promote dPse~­
regation ,,·ith other, equally important educational inter-
f•sts which a community may legitimately assert. Xeglect 
of either the obligation or the interests destroys the even-
handed spirit with which equitable remedies must be 
approached."' Overzealousness in pursuit of any singlf> 
goal is untrue to the tradition of equity and to thf' "bal-
ance" and "flexibility" with which this Court has always 
rf'garded it. 
B 
Where school authorities have defaulted in their duty 
to operate an integrated school systf'm. district courts 
must insure that affirmative desegregative steps ensuf' . 
;\/[any of thesf' can be taken effectively ,,·ithout dam-
aging state and parental interests in having children at -
tf'ncl schools within a reasonable vicinity of home. 
Where desegregative steps are possible within the frame-
\York of a system of "neighborhood education ." school 
authorities must pursue tlwm. .For example. hound-
"' The• rPl(•yant inquiry i~ ""whrt hrr thP ('O~t~ of arhiPnng dr~('gn•­
gation in an~· gi\·pn ~ituation otllwrigh thr lrgal. moral and e•durn-
tional eon~idrration~ fit\·oring 11. • • . [t i~ clPar . th:tt thr 
Con:<titution ,;hould not br hrld to rrquirP am· tran:<portation plan 
t hnt krrp~ childrrn on a bu,; for a ~ub:<tantial part of thr da~·. ('On-
~lllllP~ :<ignifi('ant portion" of fund~ othrrwi~P ,;ppndahlr din• ctl~ · on 
Pducation. or inYoh·r,; a genuine· C'!rmrnt of dangrr to thr ~aft• t\ · of 
the ('hild ." ~chool ])p,;rgrrgntion After Swann: :\ Theor~ · of (;0\·-
C'flllllrnt Hr·~pon:<ibil ity. :39 l". Chi . L. Hr\·. -t21. -l:2:2 , -l-l:l ( 197:!). 
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aries of neighborhood attendance zones should be drawn 
to integrate. to the extent practicable. the school's stu-
dent body. Construction of ne,,· schools should be of 
such a size and at such a location as to encourage the 
likelihood of integration. Swann, at 21. Faculty integra-
tion should be attained throughout the school system. 
Swann, at 19; United States v. Montgomery County 
Board of Education, 395 U.S. 225 ( 1969). An optional 
majority to minority transfer program, \\"ith the StatE' 
providing free transportation to desiring students. 1s also 
a helpful adjunct to a desegregated school system. 
Swann, at 26- 27. It hardly need be repeated that alloca-
tion of resources within the school district must be made 
\vith scrupulous fairness among all schools . 
. The above examples are meant to be illustrativ0. ttot 
exhaustive. Th0 point is that the over-all intt>grative 
impact of such school board decisions must be assessed by 
district courts in deciding whether the duty to desegregate 
has been met. For example. "neighborhood school plans 
are constitutionally suspect \\"hen attendance zones arr 
superficially imposed upon racially defined neighborhoods. 
and whe11 school construction preserves rather than elimi-
nates the racial hegemony of given schools ... "" Keyes 
v. School District .Yo. 1, Denver Colorado,- F. :2d -, 
l ' wiled States v. Board of Education of Tulsa County, 
429 F. :2d -. 1258- 1259. This does not imply that 
decisions on faculty assignment. attendance zones. school 
construction. closing and consolidation. must be made 
to the detriment of all neutral. nonracial considerations. 
But these considerations can. \\"ith proper school board 
initiative. generally be met in a manner that "·ill enha11re 
the degree of school clPsegregation . 
"" A II~dul ~1ucl~ · of tlw lu~torieal II~<·~ and ahll~<'~ of 1lw n<·Ighhol·· 
hood ~chool concept 1~ ::\1 WPmlwrg, Ha<·<· ,\: Pia<"<' 119(-\7). 
71-.SOi-CO.:;cTn & D1SSE:\T 
2 KEYES 1•. SCHOOL DISTHIC'T ;\0. 1. DE.:--YEH. COLO. 
c 
Drfaulting school authontics ,,·oulcl have. at a mini· 
mum. the obligation to take affirmative steps of the sort 
outlined in the above section. :-lchool boards would. of 
course. be free to develop and initiate further plans to 
promote school desegregation. Ln a pluralistic society 
such as ours. it is Pssentwl that 110 racial minority feel 
demeaned or discriminate><! against and that students of 
all races learn to play. work. am! cooperate \\'ith Oil(' 
another in their common pursuits and endeavors. X oth-
jng in this opinion is nwant to discourage school boards 
from exceeding minimal consti tu tiona! standards in pro-
moting the recognized values of integrated school 
eonditions. 
A co11stitutional requirement of extensive student 
transportatio11 solely to achieve integration, hovvever. 
presents a vastly more eomplex problem. It promises 
011 the one hand a greater degree of actual desegregation. 
,,·hile it infringes on what may fairly be regarded as 
important community aspirations and personal nghts. 
The Equal Protection Clause does lllcleecl require that 
racial discrimination not be tolerated in the deciswn 
of public school authorities. It does not command that 
school authorities unclertakr widespread student trans-
portation solely for the sake of maximizing integration ."' 
"' In fact , dur to racial!~· .-<rparat<· n·~J(i<·ntiai p:tttrrn~ that clwr-
art<:"rlz<· om major urban <H<'a~ lt 1~ quitP unrrali~t1c to thmk of 
a ('h1r1·ing in man _,. rit1r~ ~~~h~tantial 1ntrgration throughout tlw 
~chool di~tnrt 11·ithom a drgn·<· of ~tudPnt tran~portation IYhich 
1\'0llld hal'<' tilf' gran'~t eronumic and c•du<'ational <'Oil~<'CJll<'ll<'<'~ . 
. -\ s l'rofr~~or Hirkd not<· ... . 
· In mo~t of the largPr urban nn·a~. drmograplnr ronditwn~ nrr ~nell 
that no policY that a court r·;1n ordPr. and a ~rhool board. a cJt~· or 
r1·rn a ~tat<' lw~ th<· rnpabiht~· to put into <'ffrct . II'II! m fart rr~ult 
in tbr for!'~PPablr futnr<' m ra<·J;dl~ · babJJH'Pd puhll<' ~<'hoob. On!~· 
i1 rrordrring of thr ('tll'irnnnwnt llll·oii'Jilg <'!·onomJc <tllcl :-;oculi pol1ry 
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This obviously does not mean that bus transportatwn 
has no place in public school systems or as a permissible 
desegregative tool. The transporting of school children 
is as old as public education. and in rural and some 
suburban settings it is as indispensable as the providing 
of hooks. It is presently estimated that approximately 
half of all American chilclrpn ride buses to school for 
reasons unrelated to integration."" At the secondary 
level in particular. where the schools are larger and servP 
a wider. more dispersed constituency than the elementary 
school. some form of public or privately financed trans~ 
portatioi1 is often necessary. 'rhere is a difference. ho,,·_ 
Pver. in transportation pla11S voluntarily initiated by local 
school boards for educational purposes and thosP im-
posed by a federal court. The former usually represent a 
11ecessary or convenient means of access to the school 
nearest home; the latter often require lengthy trips for no 
purpose other tha11 to further rntegratiolL"" Yet thr 
on thr broadr~t ronrrn·:tblr front might have an apprrciahl<' impact .'' 
Bl('krl, supra. n. 7, at 1:3:2 
"" E~tlm:Hr:; var~· . SU'ann. supra, at :29. notrd that "rightl'Pil mil-
lion of thr X anon·~ public "rhool clnldrrn, approx1matrl~· :m%, wrn· 
tran.-po;-trd to thr1r ~rhoob b~· bu~ in l9fi9-l970 Ill all part~ of thr 
conntn·.' ' Srnator Rib1cotf (D.-Conn.) a thoughtful "tndrnt of thi~ 
prohlrm. ~tatl'd that ··two-third,- of all Amrncan rhildrrn toda~· ndr 
bn~r" to "chou! for rra~on" unrrlatrd to Intrgration." ]]g Cong. RPr· 
82.5-t::l. FPb. :24, 197:2. 
"" Hi"torirall~·. ch,tant tran,porta1ion wm. IITong;l~· tN•d io pro-
motr ,-pgrt>ga t ion . .. :\ rgro child rrn ll'!' r<' grnrrall~· ron"Idrrrcl rap-
:lhlr of 1r:11·rllmg longrr di,tanrr" to ,.:chool and without thr aid of an~ 
YPhirlr. What ll'a~ too far for :1 whitr child brramr rra:::onahl~· nrar 
Jor 11 :\q?;ro child." WPinlwrg, su pra. 11. :20. at S/ 
Tin~ drplorablc• hi~<tor~ · ha~ lrd ,;onH· to argur that mtrgrativr bu~ 
nd!'~ arr .iu~<tifiPd "" atonrmrnt for pa~t "rgrrgator~· tnp~ Hnd thai 
IWighborhood PdurHtlOII ~~ 110\\' hut a eodr-11·orrl for racwl "rgrrga-
tiOll . Hut mi"ii~<P of tran,;por1HtiOII Ill tlw pa,; t dor~< not imp[~· nrigh-
horhoud ~choolmg ha~ 110 1·;tlid noll,;<'grrg;lton· u,-p~ for tlw JlfC'~<<'nt 
X or would IITongful 1 ra n,;port a 1 Ion 111 t he• JIH"t Jll~t II\· drtnmrn t a[ 
t r;l n><por t<l 1 ion for r he· c-lnld rPII of 1 orl:1 1 , 
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Go1:1rt in Swann \\"aS UllQUcstionaoly right in describing 
bus transportation as "one tool of school desegregation.·· 
402 C S .. at 30."' The crucial issue is "·hen. under \Yhat 
circumsta11Ces. ami to what extent such transportation 
may appropriately be ordcrNI. Tlw answer to this 
turns-as it does so often in the law- upon a sound exer• 
eise of discretion under the circumstances. 
Swann itself recognized limits to desegregative obliga-
tions. It noted that a constitutional requir<>ment of "any 
particular degree of racial balance or mixing . .. ,.,·ould 
lw disproved . . .'' and sanctioned district court usP 
of mathematical ratios as "no more than a startmg point 
in the process of shaping a remedy .. . ·· 402 'G. S .. at 
24. 25. Thus particular schools n1ay be all \\·lute or· 
all black and still not infringe constitutional nghts 
if the system is genuinely integrated and school authori-
ties are pursuing integratiVl' steps short of extensive and 
disruptive transportation. The refusal of the Court to 
require racial balance in schools throughout the district 
vr the automatic elimination of all "one-race schools. " 
402 l. S .. at 26. IS grounded in a recognition that the 
State. parents. and children all have at stake in 
2 ' Some• eommunittr~ had tran~purtation plan~ in rff<•rt at tht• timr 
o court dr~t·grrgatiOII ordrr~. 8rr ::)u·awt. oU]Jra, at :29, n. 11 : Dav1s 
, .. School Comm'rs of Mobile Count!/. -1-0:2 lT. S. :3:3, 34-:35 (1971) . 
( 'on rt~ IHt \'(' ll~f'd t hl' prl'~l'ncr or a b~<·ner of PXI~tmg t nut~porta t ton 
in a di~tnet a~ OIH' fartor in framing and implenwnting df'~<'grrgation 
derrf'r~. [ 'niter! State:;\'. ll'atso11 Chap!:'! School Di:;tnct. -1--1-ti F . :Zd 
9:n. 9:37 (CA.!' 1971): i\'orthr-ross Y. Board of Edur .. -1--1--l F 2d 1179, 
111':2-llx:l (C'A.ti 1971): Dal'ts ,._Board of 8duc .. :3:21' F . Supp. 1197 , 
120;3 (ED A.rk. 1\-l/1 ). \Yhpn· a ~ehool board 1~ ,·oluntaril~ · f'ngagrcl 
Ill tran~porting :'tttdPtlt:'. a di,tnrt court i~ . of eour:'f', obl!!!:ated to 
m~urr th<lt ~ueh t rrm~portat ion 1 ~ not llltdPrtakPn \\'ith ::<Pgrpgator~­
Pff<'ct. "'hrn·. al~o. Yo!umar~· tran~port<ltion progrnm~ arr nlrf'ad~ 
111 prol-(n'~" . t hPn• nl:l~· br gr<'a t <·r .i u~t lfieallon for court -ordNf'd tra n~­
portntion of ~tudt•ttt~ fo r a tomparahle time awl distaw·e to nchlP\'t' 
1\l't·at (' r lllt<·g:rat tOll. 
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school clesegregatwn decrees legitimate and recoglllzable 
interests. 
The personal Interest might be characterized as the 
desire that children attend community schools ncar 
home. Dr. James Coleman testified for petitioners at 
trial that "most school systems organize their schools in 
relation to the residents by having fixed school districts 
and some of these are very ethnically homogeneous." 
App. 1549a. In Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 
396 F. 2d 55. 60 ( H)66). the Sixth Circuit summarized 
the advantages of such a neighborhood system of 
1<chools: ",-. 
"Appellants. however. pose the question of whether 
tlw neighborhood system of pupil placement. fairly 
administered without racial bias. comports with the 
requirements of equal opportunity if it nevertheless 
l'esults in the creation of schools with predominantly 
or eve11 exclusively :\egro pupils. The neighbor-
hood system 1s 111 wide use throughout the nation 
and has been for many years the basis of school 
administration. This is so because it is acknowl-
edged to have several valuable aspects \Yhich are an 
aid to education. such as minimization of safety haz-
ards to children in reaching school. economy of cost 
in reducing transportation needs. ease of pupil 
placement and administration through the use of 
"' TIH' trrm ·' nPighhorhood ~rhool' ' ~hould not bP ~uppo~Pcl to 
dPnotP ~o}ph- a IYalk-tn :school or onr 1\'lnc-h srrYP~ c·hildren on}~- Jll 
tlw ~mroundmg blork.-<_ Thr Comt ha" notPd. m a dtffnrnt con-
trxt. that "thr 1\'ord ·nptghborhoocl' t~ quite' a,: ~ll::'rrpttbiP of l'a na-
tion a" thl· 1\'orcl ·Joraltt~· · Both tPrm:-< arP ela~tH' and. drpendrnt 
upon C'Jf(•um~tanrP;-<, ma~· be· Pquall~· ~nt it<fiPd b~- arpa,.: mpn~urPd b.1 
rod:-; or b~ - nulr,.:" Connally 1· nenl!l'al Con~;l. Co .. :2()9 (1. S. :31-:5. 
895 ( l 9:2()) In t IH' ,.:rhool rontPxt, .. ll<'ighborhood '' rdrr,.: to rl' la tn·p 
proxtmlt~·. to a prc•fPrPnrr for a ~<'hool tJC•an·r. ratlwr thaJJ more 
dJ,.:tant from hom1 •. 
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neutral, easily determined standards, and bette!' 
home-school comm u nica tiou " 
The neighborhood school does provide greater ease of' 
parental and student access and convenience, as well as 
greater economy of public administration. These are 
obvious and distinct advantages. but the legitimacy oi 
the neighborhood concPpt rests on more basic grounds."'; 
:\eighborhod school syst<"ms. neutrally administered. re~ 
fleet the deeply felt desire of citizens for a sense of com-
munity in their public education. Public schools have 
been a traditional source of strength to our :\'ation. and 
that strength may derive in part from the identification of 
many schools with the personal features of the surround-
ing neighborhood. Community support. interest and 
dedication to public schools may well run higher with a 
nPighborhood attendance' pattern: distance may encour-
a~e disintf'rest. Many citizens sense today a decline in 
tlw intimacy of our institutions-home. church. and 
school-which has caused a concomitant decline in the 
unity and communal spirit of our people. I pass no 
judgment on this viewpoint. but I do believe that this 
Court should he wary of compelling in the name of con-
stitutional law >vhat may seem to many a dissolution in 
the traditional. more personal fabric of their public 
schools. 
Closely related to tlw concept of a community and 
neighborhood education. are those rights and duties par-
ents have v.:ith respect to the education of their children. 
The law has long recognized the parental duty to nurture. 
support. and providf' for the welfarf' of children. includ-
"'' 1 do uot 1mpl.1· that thr 1wip;hhorhood conrrpt rnu~t hr rrnbodird 
m rvrr.1· ~chool ".1·:-;tem . Hut wlwrr a "ehool board ha~ cho~rn it. 
f<'d<'ral .iuclg<'" ~hould arrord 1t n'"JlPl't 111 frmning rrnwrlial deere·<·~ . 
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ing their education. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
C S. 510. 534. 535. a unanimous Court held that: 
"Under the doctrine of Af eyer v. K ebraska, 262 
r. S. 390. we think it entirely plain that the Act 
of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of 
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and 
education of children under their controL . . . The 
child is not the mere creature of the state; those who 
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, 
coupled with the high duty. to recognize and pre-
pare him for additional obligations." 
And in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 482 
(1965). the Court noted that in Pierce, "the right to edu-
cate one's children as one chooses is made applicable to 
the States by the force of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments." r do not believe recognition of this 
right can be confined solely to a parent's choice to send 
a child to public or private schooL Most parents can-
not afford the luxury of a private education for their 
children. and the dual obligation of private tuitions and 
public taxes. Those \Yho may for numerous reasons 
seek public education for tlwir children should not be 
forced to forfeit all interest or voice iu the school their 
child attends. lt would. of course. be impractical to 
allow thf' v,:ishes of particular parf'nts to be controlling. 
Yet the interest of the parent in the enhanced parent-
school and parent-child communication allowed by the 
nf'ighborhood unit ought not to lw suppressed by force 
of Ia"· 
In the understandable natwnal concern for alleviating 
public school segregation . courts may have overlooked 
the fact that the rights and interests of children affected 
hy a desegregation program also arf' entitled to consid-
eration. Any child, whit<' or black. who is compelled tQ 
IPav(' his 1wighborhood and spend sig11ificant timf' each 
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day being transported to a distant school suffers an im· 
pairment of his liberty and his privacy. X ot long ago, 
James B. Conant wrote that "la]t the elementary school 
level the issue seems clear. To send young children day 
after clay to distant schools seems out of the question.""' 
A community may well conclude that the portion of a 
child's day spent on a bus might be used more creatively 
in a classroom. playground. or some other extracurricular 
school activity. Decisions such as these. affecting the 
quality of a child's daily life. should not lightly be held 
constitutionally errant. 
To this point I have focused mainly on the personal 
interests of parents and children which a community may 
believe to be best protected by a neighborhood system 
of schools. But broader considerations lead me to ques-
tion just as seriously any remedial requirement of exten-
sive student transportation solely to further integration. 
AIIY such requirement is certain to fall disproportionately 
on the school districts of our country. depending 011 
their degree of urbanization. financial resources. and their 
racial composition. ~ome districts vvith little or no bJ-
racial population \Vill experience little or no educational 
disruption. while others. notably in large. biracial metro-
politan areas. must at considerable expense undertake 
extensive transportation to achieve the type of integra-
tioii frequcntly being ordered by district eourts."" At a 
time \Yhen public education generally is suffering seriom< 
financial malnutrition. the economic burdens of such 
transportation can be severe. requiring both initial capital 
outlays and annual operating costs in the millions of 
dollars."" And v.:hile constitutional requirements have. 
"' ::-;Jum~ and Submb~. 29 ( 19H1) 
.,, S<·r n. :21. sup1·a. 
"" In :\f rmphi~ , for c•x;unplr, whic·h ha~ no hi,rorY of hu~mg ~ru­
<trnt". tlw mmimum trnn~portation plan ordrrrd h~· tlw romt~ wil)_ 
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often occasioned uneven burdens, never have they touched 
so sensitive a matter as wide differences in the compulsory 
transportation requirements for literally hundreds of 
thousands of school children. 
The argument for student transportation also overlooks 
the fact that the remedy exceeds that which may be 
necessary to redress the constitutional evil. Let us use 
Denver as an exa.mpk. The Denver School Board. by 
its action and nonaction. may be legally responsible for 
some of the segregation that exists. But if one assumes 
a. maximum discharge of constitutional duty by the 
DC'n ver Board over the past decades. the fu nclamen tal 
problem of residential segregation would persist."" It 
is indeed a novel application of equitable power- not to 
mention a dubious extension of constitutional doctrine-
to requirc so much greater a degree of forced school in~ 
tcgration than would ha.vc resulted from purely natural 
and neutral nonsta.te causcs. 
The compulsory transportation of students carries a 
further infirmity as a constitutional remedy. With most 
constitutional violations. the major burden of remedial 
action falls on oft'ending state officials. Public officials 
\\'ho act to infringe personal rights of speech. voting. or 
religious exercise. for example. are obliged to cease the 
(Jffemling act or practice and. where necessary. institute 
eorrective measures. lt is they who hear the brunt of 
n•qmrr . Ill the Sehool Board·~ l':;timatr , an IllltJal capital exprnditun· 
of Sl ,Ho-+ ,192 for bu~e~ plu~ an annual operating ro~t of $()29.192 
Tlw Board r,;timate~ that a morr extrno:ivP tran::'portntion program 
to he ron::'tclrred b~· thr di~trict court \\·ill require mitial capital m-
\·e:;tm<'nt,; of S:3 .92-+,000 and annual opC'rating co:;t,; of $1 ,78:3,.!90 
Thr mo~t clra:;t ir tran~portatton plan before' the di::'trirt eourt r<'quirr" 
p:;ttmatrd annual operating ro:;t:; of from $2,:35-!,220. 82,.!:31,710. or 
$:3,4():3 ,100 depending on thr Board',; tran:;portntion arrangrmC'Ilt:; . 
.\'orthc1·o~~ \'. Bua.rrl of Erlucatio11 of .l!emphi~ ('ity Sch .. supra . 
II . 17 . at X9X (V\'ri<·k . .f .. dt~~(·nttng) . 
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remedial action. though oth0r citizens will to varying de-
grees feel its effects. School authorities responsible for 
segregation must. at tht' very minimum, act to cease seg-
regatory acts. But when the obligation further extends 
to the transportation of students. the full burden of the 
affirmative remedial action is borne by children and par-
ents who did not participate in any constitutional 
violation. 
Finally, courts in requiring so far-reaching a remedy 
as student transportation solely to maximize integration .. 
risk setting in motion unpredictable and unmanageable 
sociaJ consequences. Xo one can estimate the extent 
to which dismantling neighborhood education will hasten 
an exodus to private schools. leaving public school sys-
tems the preserve of the disadvantaged of both races. 
Or guess how much impetus such dismantlement gives 
the movement from innercity to suburb, and the further 
geographical separation of the races. ~or do we know 
to what degree this remedy may cause deterioration of 
community and parental support of public schools. or 
divert attention from the paramount goal of quality in 
education to a perennially devisive debate over \~·ho is 
to be transported where. 
The problem addressed in this opinion has perplexed 
courts, school officials, other public authorities. and stu-
dents of public education for nearly two decades. Thr 
problem, especially since it has focused on the "busing 
issue." has profoundly disquieted the public wherever 
rxtensi ve transportation has been ordered. 1 make no 
pretense of knowing the best anS\\·ers. Yet. the issue in 
this and like cases comes to this Court as one of con-
stitutionalla\\·. As to this issue. I have no doubt what-
ever. There is nothing in the Constitution, its history 
or-until recently- in the jurisprudence of this Court 
that mandates the employment of forced transportation 
Qf young and tPenage children to achieve a single interest, 
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as important as this interest may be. We have strayPtl. 
quite far as I view it, from the rationale of Brown l 
and I I, as reiterated in Swann, that courts in fashioning 
remedies must be "guided by equitable principles" which 
include the "adjusting and reconciling [ ofl public and 
private needs." Brown ll, 349 U. S .. at 229. 
T urge a return to this rationale. This would result, 
as emphasized above, in no prohibition on court-ordered 
student transportation in furtherance of desegregation. 
But it would also require that the legitimate community 
interests in neighborhood school systems be accorded far 
greater respect. In the balancing of interests so appro-
priate to a fair and just equitable decree. transporta-
tion orders should be applied \Yith special caution to 
any proposal as disruptive of family life and interests-
and ultimately of education itself-as extensivP transpor-
tation of elementary age children solely for desegregation 
purposes. As a minimum. this Court should not re-
quire school boards to engage in the unnecessary t.rans-
portation away from their neighborhoods of elementary 
age children. It is at this age level that neighborhood 
education performs its most vital educational role . lt 
is with respect to children of tender years that the 
greatest concern exists for their physical and psycholog-
ical health. It is also here, at the elementary school. 
that the rights of parents and ehildren are most sharpl.v 
implicatPcl."' 
"ThrrP mn ~ · well bP advantage:; in rommrncing thr intrgr<ltin• 
('Xprnencr~ at an rarly age , a ::; young children ma.1· bP le~~ likel y 
I han oldrr clulclren and adult · to develop an mhibiting rar1:1l con-
~riou~nr~~- The~r advantage~:; ::;hould be con:>Iderrd a~ ~chool board~ 
make til(' V<Hiou~ deci::;ion ~:; With the new to nchieving and prr~rn·­
Jilg an mtrgratecl school ::;y~:; tem . Supra, p. - . But i11 thr bal-
ancing of all rrlr1·ant mterc::; t::;, the advantagl'~ of an Pari~· mtegra-
t ivr (•xprnrnce must , and in all fairne,;,; ~hould, br wei~dwd agam~t 
otlwr rrlr1·nnt advantage:,; and cli~aclvantagPs and in light of tlH' 
rlrmographir rharnrtenstic~ of thr particular f'Oll1Il11111Jtl·, 
71-507-CO.l\-Cl!R & DISSE~l' 
36 KEYES v. SCHOOL DISTHICT ~0. 1, DEX\'ER , COLO. 
vVhile greater transportation of secondary school stu-
dents might be permitted. even at this level the desire of 
a community for racially neutral neighborhood schools 
should command judicial respect. It would ultimately 
lw wisest. where there is no absence of good faith. to 
permit affected communities to decide this delicate issue 
of student transportation on their own. Legitimate. 
nonracial aspirations embodied in a neighborhood school 
eoncept are entitled to judicial respect. 
IV 
The existing state of law has failed to shed light and 
provide guidance on two issues. addressed in this opin-
ion. namely: ( i) whether and to what extent a uniform 
judicial approach should be taken to our national prob-
lems of school desegregation and ( ii) if so. whether the 
ambiguities of Swann, construed to date almost uni-
formly in favor of extensive transportation. should be 
redefined to restore a more viable balance among the 
various interests \Yhich are involved. With all deference. 
it seems to me that the Court today has addressed neither 
of these issues in a way that will afford adequate guid-
ance to the courts below in this case or lead to a rationaL 
coherent national policy with respect to integration in 
the schools. 
The Court has chosen. rather. to adhere to the de facto/ 
de jure distinction under circumstances. and upon a 
rationale. \vhich can only lead to increased and incon-
clusive litigation. and-especially regrettable-to defer-
ment of a nationally consistent judicial position on this 
critical subject. There is. of course. state action in every 
school district in the land. The public schools have 
always been funded and operated by States and their 
local subdivisions. It is true that segregated schools. 
Pve 11 in the cities of the South . are in large part the 
product of social and economic factors-and the resulting 
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residential patterns. But there is also not a school dis-
trict in the United States. with any significant minority 
school population. in 'vhich the school authorities-ill 
olle way or the other-have not contributed in some 
measure to the degree of segregation which still prevails. 
Instead of recognizing the reality of similar. multiple 
segregatory causes in school districts throughout the 
country. the Court persists in a distinction \vhose duality 
operates unfairly on local communities in one section of 
the country and on minority children in the others. 
The second issue relates to the ambiguities of Swann 
and the judicial disregard of legitimate community and 
individual interests in framing equitable decrees. In the 
absence of a more flexible and reasonable standard than 
that imposed by district courts after Swann, tlw 
clesegregation which will now be decreed in Denver and 
other major cities may v.·ell involve even more extensive 
transportation than has been witnessed up to this time. 
It is well to remember that the course we are running 
is a long one and the goal sought in the end-so often 
overlooked-is the best possible educational opportunity 
for all children. Communities deserve the freedom and 
the incentive to turn their attention and energies to this 
goal of quality education. free from protracted and 
debilitating battles over court-ordered student transpor~ 
tation. The single most disruptive element in educa~ 
tion today is the widespread use of compulsory trans~ 
portation. especially at elementary grade levels. This 
has risked distracting and diverting attention from basic 
educational ends. dividing and embittering communities. 
and exacerbating rather than ameliorating inter-racial 
friction and misunderstanding. It is time to return to 
a more balanced evaluation of the recognized interests 
uf our society in achieving desegregation with other edu-
cational and societal interests a community may legiti-
mately assert. This will help assure that integrated 
;):-. 1\FYE:-' 1'. ~<'HOOL lllSTHl<'T \"(). I. l>E\"\'EH. ('()],() 
school ~ystems will lw Pstabli~:dwd UJJd mai11tained by 
rational action. \Yill he better understood and i"Upport('d 
by parc11ts and childrcll of both race:,;. all(! "·ill proinote 
the enduring qualities of an i11tegratcd society so es~NJ­
tial to its genui11l' success. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~ 
No. 71-507 
Wilfred Keyes et al., 
Petitioners, 
v. 
School District No. 1, Denver, 
Colorado, et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari to 
the United States 
Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit. 
[June 21, 1973] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
I concur in the remand of this case for further pro-
ceedings in the District Court, but on grounds that differ 
from those relied upon by the Court. 
This is the first school desegregation case to reach this 
Court which involves a major city outside the South. It 
comes from Denver, Colorado, a city and a State which 
have not operated public schools under constitutional or 
statutory provisions which mandated or permitted racial 
segregation.1 Nor has it been argued that any other 
legislative actions (such as zoning and housing laws) 
contributed to the segregation which is at issue.2 The 
1 Article IX, § 8, of the Colorado Constitution has expressly pro-
hibited "any classification of pupils . . . on account of race or 
color." 
2 See, e. g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 U. S. 1, 23 (1971): 
"We do not reach ... the question whether a showing that school 
segregation is a consequence of other types of state action, without 
any discriminatory action by school authorities, is a constitutional 
violation requiring remedial action by a school desegregation decree." 
The term "state action," as used herein, thus refers to actions of the 
appropriate public school authorities. 
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as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis." 349 U. S., 
at 300. Although this and similar language is ambiguous 
as to the specific constitutional right , it means-as a mini-
mum-that one has the right not to be compelled by 
state action to attend a segregated school system. In 
the evolutionary process since 1954, decisions of this 
Court have added a significant gloss to this original right. 
Although nowhere expressly articulated in these terms, 
I would now define it as the right, derived from the Equal 
Protection Clause, to expect that once the State has as-
sumed responsibility for education, local school boards 
will operate integrated school systems within their re-
spective districts." This means that school authorities, 
consistent with the generally accepted educational goal of 
attaining quality education for all pupils, must make and 
implement their customary decisions with a view toward 
enhancing integrated school opportunities. 
The term "integrated school system" presupposes, of 
course, a total absence of any laws, regulations or policies 
supportive of the type of "legalized" segregation con-
demned in Brown. A system would be integrated in 
accord with constitutional standards if the responsible 
authorities had taken appropriate steps to (i) integrate 
faculties and administration; (ii) scrupulously assure 
equality of facilities, instruction and curricula oppor-
tunities throughout the district; (iii ) utilize their au-
thority to draw attendance zones to promote integra-
tion; and ( iv) locate new schools, close old ones, and 
11 Sec di~rut:s i on in Par t III , in fra, of the remedia l act ion whi ch 
is appropriat e to arromp li~h desegregation "·here a rom t fi nds that 
a srhoo l bon rd ha~ fa il ed to opr ratc nn integrated school system 
within its di~ tri ct. Plain t iffs mu~t, howenr , C::'tnb li ~ h the fa ilure 
of a Rrhool boa rei to operate an in tegrated school ~~·stem before a 
court ma~· order clc-<rgrcgat iYc ,- t cp~ b,· '"a~· of rcm cd~·. These arc 
t \\'0 dist inct steps wh ich recogn ize the ncce~" i t~· of p roYing t he con-
stitut ional ,·iolat ion before de,-rg rcga t i,·e remedial action can be 
ordered. 
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determine the size and grade categories with this same 
objective in mind. Where school authorities decide to 
undertake the transportation of students, this also must 
be with integrative opportunities in mind. 
The foregoing prescription is not intended to be either 
definitive or all-inclusive, but rather an indication of 
the contour characteristics of an integrated school sys-
tem in which all citizens and pupils may justifiably be 
confident that racial discrimination is neither practiced 
nor tolerated. An integrated school system does not 
mean-and indeed could not mean in view of the resi-
dential patterns of most of our major metropolitan 
areas-that every school must in fact be an integrated 
unit. ~ A school which' happens to be all or predominantly 
white. or all · or predominantly black is not a "segregated" 
school in an unconstitutional sense if the system itself is 
a genuinely integrated one. 
Having school boards operate an integrated school sys-
tem provides the best assurance of meeting the constitu-
tional requirement that racial discrimination, subtle or 
otherwise, will find no place in the decisions of public 
school officials. Courts judging past school board actions 
with a view to their general integrative effect will be best 
able to assure an absence of such discrimination while 
avoiding the murky, subjective judgments inherent in 
the Court's search for "segregatory intent." Any test 
resting on so nebulous and elusive an element as a 
school board's segregatory "intent" provides inadequate 
assurance that minority children will not be short-
changed in the decisions of those entrusted with the non-
discriminatory operation of our public schools. 
Public schools are creatures of the State, and whether 
the segregation is state-created or state-assisted or 
merely state-perpetuated should be irrelevant to consti-
tutional principle. The school board exercises pervasive 
and continuing responsibility over the long range plan-
71-507-CONCUR & DISSENT 
20 KEYES v. SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, DENVER, COLO. 
c 
Rather than continue to prop up a distinction no longer 
grounded in principle, and contributing to the conse-
quences indicated above, we should acknowledge that 
whenever public school segregation exists to a sub-
stantial degree there is prima facie evidence of a con-
stitutional violation by the responsible school b0ard. It 
is true, of course, that segregated schools-wherever 
located-are not solely the product of the action or 
inaction of public school authorities. Indeed, as indi-
.cated earlier, there can be little doubt that principal 
,causes of the pervasive school segregation found in the 
major urban areas of this country, whether in the North, 
West, or South, are the socio-economic influences which 
have concentrated our minority citizens in the inner cities 
while the more mobile white majority disperse to the sub-
urbs. But it is also true that public school boards have 
continuing, detailed responsibility for the public school 
system within their district and, as Judge John Minor 
Wisdom has noted, "where the figures [showing 
segregation in the schools] speak so eloquently, a 
prima face case of discrimination is established." 
United States v. Texas Education Agency, 467 F. 2d 848, 
873 (CAS en bane 1972). Moreover, as foreshadowed in 
Swann and as implicitly held today, school boards have a 
duty to minimize and ameliorate segregated conditions 
by pursuing an affirmative policy of desegregation. It is 
this policy which must be applied consistently on a na-
tional basis without regard to a doctrinal distinction 
which has outlived its time. 
III 
The preceding section addresses the constitutional ob-
ligation of public authorities in the school districts 
throughout our country to operate integrated school sys-
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tems. When the schools of a particular district are 
found to be substantially segregated, there is a prima 
facie case that this obligation has not been met. The 
burden then shifts to the school authorities to demon-
strate that they have in fact operated an integrated 
system as this term is defined above, supm, p. 10. If 
there is a failure successfully to rebut the prima facie 
case, the question then becomes what reasonable affirma-
tive desegregative steps district courts may require to 
place the school system in compliance with the consti-
:·tutional standard. In short, what specifically is the 
nature and scope of the remedy? 
As the Court's,opinion virtually compels the finding on 
remand that Denver has a "dual school system," that city 
will then be · under an "affirmative duty" to desegregate 
its entire system "root and branch." Green v. County 
School Board, 391 U. S., at 438. Again, the critical ques-
·tion is what ought this constitutional duty to entail. 
A 
The controlling case is Swann, supra, and the question 
which will confront and confound the District Court and 
Denver School Board is what indeed does Swann require. 
Swann purported to enunciate no new principles, relying 
heavily on Brown I and II and on Green. Yet it affirmed 
a district court order which had relied heavily on "racial 
ratios" and sanctioned transportation of elementary as 
well as secondary pupils. Lower federal courts have often 
read Swann as requiring far-reaching transportation de-
crees 
1 7 
"to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual 
17 See, e. g., Thompson v. School Board of N ewport N ews, -
F. 2d - , - ( 1972), where the CA4 en bane, upheld a district court 
assignment plan where "travel time, varying from a minimum of 
forty minutes and a maximum of one hour, each way, would be re-
quired for busing black students out of the old City and white stu-
dents into the old City in order to achieve a racial balancing of the 
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desegregation." 402 U. S., at 26. In the context of a 
large urban area, with heavy residential concentrations 
of white and black citizens in different-and widely 
separated-sections of the school district, extensive dis-
persal and transportation of pupils is inevitable if Swann 
is read as expansively as many courts have been reading 
it to date. 
To the extent that Swann may be thought to require 
large-scale or long-distance transportation of students in 
our metropolitan school districts, I record my profound 
misg1vmgs. Nothing in our Constitution commands or 
encourages any such court compelled disruption of public 
education. It may be more accurate to view Swann as 
having laid dom1 a broad rule of reason under d1ich 
desegregation remedies must remain flexible and other 
values and interests be considered. Thus the Court 
recognized that school authorities, not the federal judi-
ciary, must be charged in the first instance with the task 
of desegregating local school systems. 402 U. S., at 16. 
It noted that school boards in rural areas can adjust 
more readily to this task than those in metropolitan dis~ 
district." This transportation was decreed for children from the third 
grade up, involving children as young as eight years of age. 
In Northcross v. Memphis Bd. of Educ., 466 F. 2d 890, 895 
(1972), the CA6 affirmed a district court assignment plan which 
daily transported 14,000 children with "the maximum time to be 
spent on the buses by any child [being] 34 minutes. . . ," pre-
sumably each way. But as Judge Weick noted in dissent the CA6 
instructed the district judge to implement yet further desegregation 
orders. Plans presently under consideration by that court call for 
the busing of 39,085 and 61,530 children respectively, for undeter-
mined lengths of time. /d., at 895-986. 
Petitioners before this Court in Potts v. Flax, No. 72-288, cert. 
denied, - U. S. - (197-), contended that the implementation 
of the CA5's directive in Flax v. Potts, 464 F. 2d 865 (1972), would 
require bus rides of up to two hours and 20 minutes each day and 
a round trip of up to 70 miles. Petition, at 14. While respondents 
contend these figures represent an "astounding inflation," Response, 
at 7, transportation of a significant magnitude seems inevitable. 
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tricts "with dense and shifting population, numerous 
schools, congested and complex traffic patterns." !d., at 
14. Although the usc of pupil transportation was ap-
proved as a remedial device. transportation orders are 
suspect '\yhen the time or distance of travel is so great 
as to either risk the health of the children or significantly 
impinge on the education process." !d. , at 31. Finally, 
the age of the pupils to be transported \Yas recognized' 
by the Court in Swann as one important limitation on 
the time of student travel. Ibid. 
These factors were supposed to he'lp guide district courts 
in framing equitable remedies in school desegregation 
cases.18 And the Court further emphasized that equitable· 
decrees are inherently sensitive, not solely to the degree 
of desegregation to be achieved, but to a variety of other 
public and private interests: 
. . . a school desegregation case does not differ 
fundamentally from other cases involving the fram-
ing of equitable remedies to repair the denial of a 
constitutional right. The task is to correct, by a 
balancing of the individual and collective interest, 
the condition that offends the Constitution. Swann, 
supra, at 15-16. 
. Those words echoed a similar expression in Brown 11, 
349 U. S., at 229: 
"In fashioning and effecting the decrees, the courts 
will be guided by equitable principles. Tradition-
ally, equity has been characterized by a practical 
flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility 
18 See United States v. Texas Education Agency, 467 F. 2d 848, 883 
(CA5 1972) (Bell, J., concurring in an opinion in which seven other 
judges joined): 
"In our view the remedy which the district court is required to 
formulate should be formulated within the entire context of the 
opmwn in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educa-
tion. . . . [Emphasis added.]" 
71-507-CONCUR & DISSENT 
KEYES v. SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, DENVER, COLO. 27 
This obviously does not mean that bus transportation 
has no place in public school systems or is not a per-
missible means in the desegregative process. The trans-
porting of school children is as old as public education, 
and in rural and some suburban settings it is as indis-
pensable as the providing of books. It is presently esti~ 
mated that approximately half of all American children 
.ride buses to. school for reasons unrelated to integra-
tion.2" At the secondary level in particular, whe~ 
the schools are larger and serve a wider, more dis-
persed constituency than the elementary school, some 
form of puqlic o.r privately financed transportation is 
often necessary. There is a significant difference, how-
ever, in transportation plans volu,ntarily initiated by local 
school boards for educational purposes and those im-
posed by a federal court. The former usually represent a 
necessary or convenient means of access to the school 
nearest home; the latter often require lengthy trips for n9 
purpose other than to further integration.23 Yet the 
even a state has the capability to put into effect, will in fact result 
in the foreseeable future in racially balanced public schools. Only 
~ reordering of the environment involving economic and social policy 
on the broadest conceivable front might have an appreciable impact." 
Bickel, supra, n. 7, at 132. 
22 Estimates vary. Swann, supra; at 29, noted that "eighteen mil-
lion of the Nation's public school children, approximately 39%, were 
transported to their schools by bus in 1969-1970 in all parts of the 
country." Senator Ribicoff (D.-Conn.) a thoughtful student of this 
problem, stated that "two-thirds of all American children today ride 
buses to school for reasons unrelated to integration." 118 Cong. Rec. 
82543, Feb. 24, 1972. 
23 Historically, distant transportation was wrongly used to pro-
mote segregation. "Negro children were generally considered cap-
able of travelling longer distances to school and without the aid of any 
vehicle. What was too far for a white child became reasonably near 
for a Negro child," Weinberg, supra, n. 20, at 87. 
This deplorable history has led some to argue that integrative bus 
rides are justified as atonement for past segregatory trips and that 
neighborhood education is now but a code-word for racial segrega-
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religious exercise, for example, are obliged to cease the 
offending act or practice and , where necessary, institute 
corrective measures. It is they who bear the brunt of 
remedial action, though other citizens will to varying de-
grees feel its effects. School authorities responsible for 
segregation must, at the very minimum, discontinue seg-
regatory acts. But when the obligation further extends 
to the transportation of students, the full burden of the 
affirmative remedial action is borne by children and par-
ents who did not participate in any constitutional 
vi.olation. 
Finally, courts in requiring so far-reaching a remedy 
as student transportation solely to maximize integration, 
risk setting in motion unpredictable a.nd unmanageable 
social consequences. No one can estimate the extent 
to which dismantling neighborhood education will hasten 
an exodus to private schools, leaving public school sys-
tems the preserve of the disadvantaged of both races. 
Or guess how much impetus such dismantlement gives 
the movement from innercity to suburb, a.nd the further 
geographical separation of the races. Nor do we know 
to what degree this remedy may cause deterioration of 
community and parental support of public schools, or 
divert attention from the paramount goal of quality in 
education to a perenni-ally devisive debate over who is 
to be transported where. 
The problem addressed in this opinion has perplexed 
courts, school officials, other public authorities, and stu-
dents of public education for nearly two decades. The 
problem, especially since it has focused on the "busing 
issue," has profoundly disquieted the public wherever 
extensive transportation has been ordered. I make no 
pretense of knowing the best answers. Yet, the issue in 
this and like cases comes to this Court as one of con-
stitutional law. As to this issue, I have no doubt what-
ever. There is nothing in the Constitution, its history 
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or-until recently-in the jurisprudence of this Court 
that mandates the employment of forced transportation 
of young and teenage children to achieve a single interest, 
as important as this interest may be. We have strayed, 
quite far as I view it, from the rationale of Brown I 
and I I, as reiterated in Swann, that courts in fashioning 
remedies must be "guided by equitable principles" which 
include the "adjusting and reconciling [of] public and 
private needs," Brown II, 349 U. S., at 229. 
I urge a return to this rationale. This would result, 
as emphasized above, in no prohibition on court-ordered 
student transportation in furtherance of desegregation. 
But it would also require that the legitimate community 
interests in neighborhood school systems be accorded far 
greater respect. In the balancing of interests so appro-
priate to a fair a.nd just equitablt;:! decree, transporta-
tion orders should be applied with special caution to 
any proposal as disruptive of family life and interests-
and ultimately of education itself-as extensive transpor-
tation of elementary age children solely for desegregation 
purposes. As a minimum, this Court should not re-
quire school boards to engage in the unnecessary trans-
portation away ~rom their neighborhoods of elementary 
age children.31 It is at this age level that neighborhood 
education performs its most vital educational role. It . 
is with respect to children of tender years that the 
greatest concern exists for their physical and psycholog-
31 There may well be advantages in commencing the integrative 
experiences at an early age, as young children may be less likely 
than older children and adults to develop an inhibiting racial con-
sciousness. These advantages should be considered as school boards 
make the various decisions with the view to achieving and preserv-
ing an integrated school system . Supra, p. 10. But in the bal-
ancing of all relevant interests, the advantages of an early integra-
tive experience must, and in all fairness should, be weighed against 
other relevant advantages and disadvantages and in light of the 
demographic characteristics of the particular community. 
